Taitz v. Obama ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
ORLY TAITZ, )
Plaintiff )
)
) Civil Action No. 10-151
v. )
)
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, )
Defendant. )
)
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Pending before the Court is plaintiff Orly Taitz’s second motion [34] for reconsideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition,
the reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court will deny the motion
for the reasons set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed suit seeking, among other relief, a writ of quo warranto against the
President to determine his eligibility for office. On April 14, 2010, the Court granted [22, 23]
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint. On June 18, 2010, the Court
denied [33] plaintiff’s first amended motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) [25]. Plaintiff
has now filed a second motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a party from an
otherwise final judgment or order for one of the following six reasons:
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(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A party must make a Rule 60(b) motion “within a reasonable time,” and
for subsections (1)–(3), “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
As this Court has noted, motions to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) are disfavored
and should be granted only in extraordinary circumstances. Liberty Prop. Trust v. Republic
Props. Corp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 95, 97 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Niedermeir v. Office of Baucus, 153
F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001)). But the standards that govern Rule 60(b) are even more
restrictive. United States v. Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d 153, 156–58 (D.D.C. 2003). Indeed, “in
most cases, the bar stands even higher for a party to prevail on a Rule 60(b) motion for relief
from judgment” than on a Rule 59(e) motion. Uberoi v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 271
F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002).
To the extent that a party cannot demonstrate one of the specific situations enumerated in
subsections (1)–(5) of Rule 60(b), the catch-all clause in Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from a final
judgment or order for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Rule
60(b)(6), however, applies only to extraordinary situations and should be sparingly used. Twelve
John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see
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also Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 157. Reconsideration is proper under Rule 60(b)(6) only “when
a party timely presents a previously undisclosed fact so central to the litigation that it shows the
initial judgment to have been manifestly unjust.” Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636
F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 157.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Quo Warranto Claims
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of her quo warranto claims under
Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6). In support of her motion, she alleges a mistake of fact and law in
the Court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Specifically, plaintiff
contests the Court’s statement that “amendment of the complaint to add [Alan Keyes and Gail
Lightfoot] would be futile because they lack standing to pursue a quo warranto action against a
public official.”
At the outset, the Court notes that plaintiff improperly alleges a mistake in the denial of
her motion under Rule 59(e) as grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). Plaintiff is asking the Court
to reconsider its dismissal of her amended complaint. She therefore must identify a mistake in
the Court’s dismissal, not in its denial of her first motion for reconsideration, to merit relief
under Rule 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
Nevertheless, the Court has already addressed plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiff sought leave
to amend her complaint in her first motion for reconsideration, asserting that Keyes and
Lightfoot would have standing to bring a quo warranto action. The Court denied the motion with
regard to the quo warranto claims because plaintiff had not alleged that Keyes and Lightfoot
were unavailable to join her suit at the time of filing, nor had she identified an intervening
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change in controlling law or need to correct a clear error or manifest injustice. The Court further
noted that amendment of plaintiff’s complaint would be futile because Keyes and Lightfoot lack
standing to pursue a quo warranto action against a public official. Contrary to plaintiff’s repeated
assertions, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held that only the Attorney General may
bring a quo warranto action against a public official. Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1498
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Carmody, 148 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1945)) (“[T]his
court has stated that actions against public officials (as opposed to actions brought against
officers of private corporations) can only be instituted by the Attorney General.”).
In her second motion for reconsideration, plaintiff adds nothing but further allegations of
the President’s ineligibility for office. She offers no new factual or legal argument meriting
reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1). Nor has she identified any “previously undisclosed fact so
central to the litigation” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc.,
636 F.2d at 577. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion with regard to her quo
warranto claims.
B. Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) Claims
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of her FOIA claims under Rule
60(b)(1). In support of her motion, she alleges a mistake of fact in the Court’s denial of her
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff suggests that the Court “misunderstood”
her FOIA request. She alleges that the President is using a stolen Social Security number, and
that he therefore has no standing to object to her request because “one does not have an
expectation of personal privacy in someone else’s stolen records.” In her reply to defendant’s
opposition, plaintiff further argues that the requested Social Security application does not fall
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within FOIA Exemption 6. Specifically, she contends that there would be no invasion of personal
privacy because she does not seek the name on the application.
Once again, plaintiff improperly alleges a mistake in the denial of her motion under Rule
59(e) as grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). Indeed, the Court did not misunderstand plaintiff’s
FOIA request; rather, plaintiff misunderstands the Court. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s FOIA
claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. In denying her first
motion for reconsideration, the Court further noted that Social Security numbers are not subject
to disclosure under FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (enumerating the exemption for “personnel
and medical files and similar files the discourse of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of privacy”); see also Sherman v. Dep’t of the Army, 244 F.3d 357, 364–65 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding that disclosure of Social Security numbers in personnel files would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under Exemption 6).
Plaintiff’s arguments do nothing to undermine the Court’s dismissal of her FOIA claims
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Moreover, plaintiff fails to identify any mistake in
the Court’s dismissal of her complaint that would merit reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1).
Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion with regard to her FOIA claims.
C. Standing
Plaintiff contests the dismissal of her complaint for lack of standing, asserting that new
evidence now gives her standing. First, plaintiff presents a letter from the Department of Justice
regarding her $20,000 sanction for frivolous filings in a separate suit challenging the President’s
eligibility for office. Plaintiff contends that this sanction is evidence of injury resulting from
“fraud committed by Obama, which caused Judge Land to believe that Taitz’s action of doubting
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Obama was frivolous.” Second, plaintiff claims to have evidence of an “additional last name”
allegedly used by the President, which “tends to show that Obama indeed committed fraud . . .
[and] that she has suffered due to fraud committed by him.”
Plaintiff’s sanction does not constitute new evidence under Rule 60(b)(2). Judge Land
imposed a Rule 11 sanction on plaintiff on October 13, 2009. See Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F.
Supp. 2d 1363 (M.D.Ga. 2009). Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint with this Court on
March 22, 2010. Plaintiff cannot now use her Rule 60(b) motion to allege facts known to her at
the time she filed her amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (permitting
reconsideration for “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)”).
Even if plaintiff were offering “newly discovered evidence,” the Court holds once again
that she does not have standing to assert generalized grievances. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992). There is no causal connection between plaintiff’s
sanction for frivolous filings and the President’s alleged conduct, nor can this Court redress the
alleged injury by vacating another court’s sanction. See id. at 560–61. Moreover, absent
causation and redressability, plaintiff’s alleged evidence of fraudulent conduct does nothing to
establish standing. Plaintiff thus offers no evidence meriting reconsideration under Rule 60(b).
Plaintiff also raises new legal theories in an effort to establish standing. First, she alleges
injury based on a Good Samaritan theory. The Court will not consider this argument, as plaintiff
cannot use her Rule 60(b) motion to raise legal arguments that were available to her at the time
of filing. Second, she argues that her $20,000 sanction now gives her “interested person” status
under the quo warranto statute. The Court again refers plaintiff to its dismissal of her complaint,
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which explains that only the Attorney General may bring a quo warranto action against a public
official. See Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1498. Plaintiff thus offers no legal basis for reconsideration
under Rule 60(b).
D. Honest Services Fraud Claim
Plaintiff raises a new claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, asserting that her $20,000 sanction
represents a scheme to deprive her of honest services. Here, she does not seek reconsideration of
the Court’s dismissal of her complaint. Rather, she is asking the Court to consider a new claim,
apparently on the basis of “newly discovered evidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). As noted above,
however, plaintiff’s sanction does not constitute new evidence. Therefore, the Court will not
consider a legal argument that plaintiff could have raised in her complaint.
E. Commerce Clause Claims
Plaintiff renews her arguments based on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
The Court dismissed her Commerce Clause claims for lack of standing. Plaintiff now asserts that
the healthcare legislation violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the
Establishment Clause.
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the Court did not state that plaintiff could proceed under
the Establishment Clause. The Court simply recognized that taxpayer standing may be sufficient
in an Establishment Clause challenge to government action. Regardless, plaintiff cannot use her
Rule 60(b) motion to raise legal arguments that were available to her at the time of filing.
Therefore, the Court will not address plaintiff’s new claims.
F. Chabad Decision
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Plaintiff points to this Court’s recent decision in Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United
States v. Russian Federation, No. 05-1548, 2010 WL 3033485 (D.D.C. July 20, 2010), as a “new
legal finding” that supports the Court’s jurisdiction in the instant action. Chabad involved a
default judgment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and simply has nothing to do with
plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff thus gives the Court no basis for reconsideration under Rule 60(b).
G. Factual Arguments in Plaintiff’s Reply
To the extent that plaintiff offers new factual arguments in her reply to defendant’s
opposition, the Court will disregard these arguments. Courts ordinarily decline to consider
arguments that are raised for the first time in a reply to an opposition. See Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Nat’l Institutes of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43–44 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The
Court highly disfavors parties creating new arguments at the reply stage that were not fully
briefed during the litigation.”); Wright v. United States, 139 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The
reason for this rule of waiver is that a reply brief containing new theories deprives the respondent
of an opportunity to brief those new issues.”). Accordingly, new factual arguments in plaintiff’s
reply provide no basis for reconsideration under Rule 60(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion [34] for reconsideration of this Court’s Order [22]
dismissing her claims is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on December 9, 2010.
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