United States v. Williams ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________________
    )
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,           )
    )
    v.                            )               Criminal No. 09-0026 (PLF)
    )
    RICO RODRIGUS WILLIAMS,             )
    )
    Defendant.                    )
    ____________________________________)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    This matter came before the Court on the government’s motion in limine
    regarding two unrelated requests: First, the government requested that the Court preclude the
    defendant from making improper “missing witness” arguments about either Latisha Ellis or Dr.
    Kathleen Ingwersen — both of whom the government announced would not testify at trial.
    Second, the government requested that the Court preclude the defendant from impeaching
    government witnesses by omissions in their prior statements. (See Mot. at 1, Oct. 18, 2010.)
    As to the government’s first request, the defendant represented that he “does not
    intend to argue that [Ms. Ellis’ or Dr. Ingwersen’s] testimony would have been favorable to him
    or adverse to the government.” (Resp. at 2, Oct. 21, 2010.) Thus, this being a nonissue, the
    Court will deny as moot the government’s motion to preclude the defendant from making
    improper “missing witness” arguments.
    As to the government’s second request, the law is clear that “[o]ne may impeach a
    witness by asking him about prior inconsistent statements.” United States v. Stock, 
    948 F.2d 1299
    , 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1991). A prior inconsistent statement can take the form of either an
    affirmative statement or an omission. See 
    id.
     Regarding omissions, “[p]rior statements that omit
    details covered at trial are inconsistent if it would have been ‘natural’ for the witness to include
    them in the earlier statement.” 
    Id.
     (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 
    447 U.S. 231
    , 239 (1980));
    Jenkins v. Anderson, 
    447 U.S. at 239
     (“Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be
    impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally
    would have been asserted.”); see also 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD ,
    FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6203, at 517 (1993) (“[A]n inconsistency may
    exist where the prior statement omits an important fact mentioned during testimony, especially
    where one would reasonably expect the witness to mention the fact if he believed it to be true.”).
    This “test is plainly elastic, as the ‘naturalness’ of a witness’s decision to omit a
    point may depend on nuances of the prior statement’s context, as well as on his own loquacity.”
    United States v. Stock, 
    948 F.2d at 1301
    . A district court’s role is thus to determine whether “a
    jury might reasonably [find a witness’] omission unnatural and the prior statements inconsistent
    with [the witness’] trial testimony.” See 
    id.
     If so, “[i]n the absence of some countervailing
    factor,” then the matter should go to the jury — that is, counsel “deserve[] a chance to convince
    the jury that [a witness’] omission . . . was inconsistent with [the witness’ trial] testimony.” See
    
    id.
     Furthermore, in the criminal context, the court of appeals has cautioned that, although district
    courts “must have some discretion over the matter, appellate courts have found preclusions
    [relating to cross-examination on a witness’ prior omission] to be error.” United States v. Stock,
    
    948 F.2d at 1301
    ; see also 
    id. at 1302
     (“[W]e find that the court’s forbidding defense counsel to
    cross-examine [a witness regarding his omission] violated [the defendant’s] right to confront
    witnesses.”).
    2
    The “naturalness” inquiry is a context-specific one, and a blanket rule of
    preclusion is inappropriate. See United States v. Stock, 
    948 F.2d at 1301
    . Thus, the
    government’s motion to preclude the defendant from impeaching government witnesses by
    omissions, implicitly denied during the course of the government’s presentation of its
    case-in-chief, now is formally denied.1
    Accordingly, it is hereby
    ORDERED that the government’s motion in limine to preclude the defendant
    from making improper “missing witness” arguments [91] is DENIED as moot; and it is
    FURTHER ORDERED that the government’s motion in limine to preclude the
    defendant from impeaching government witnesses by omissions [91] is DENIED.
    SO ORDERED.
    /s/________________________
    PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
    DATE: November 3, 2010                               United States District Judge
    1
    During the course of the defendant’s trial, the defendant has attempted to impeach
    several of the government’s witnesses by omissions. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 46:5-49:24, Oct. 26,
    2010 A.M.) The Court’s rulings on any of the government’s objections during the course of the
    trial reflect the principles discussed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. (See id.)
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Criminal No. 2009-0026

Judges: Judge Paul L. Friedman

Filed Date: 11/3/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014