Bender v. North American Telecomunications Inc. ( 2010 )


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  •                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,     :
    :
    ex rel.                  :
    :
    ROBERT KEITH BENDER,          :
    :
    Plaintiff,               :
    :
    v.                       :     Civil Action No. 06-1432 (GK)
    :
    NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNI-   :
    CATIONS, INC., et al.    :
    :
    Defendants.              :
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff-Relator Robert Bender brings this qui tam suit under
    the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 
    31 U.S.C. §§ 3729
     et seq., on behalf
    of the United States against seven Defendants. This matter is
    before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Amended
    Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [Dkt. Nos. 51-52].
    Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions, Replies, and
    the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth below, the
    Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint of Defendant PAE Government
    Services, Inc. is granted and the Motion to Dismiss the Amended
    Complaint of Defendants North American Telecommunications, Inc.
    (“NATI”), Capitol Technology Services, Inc. (“CTSI”), Chang D.
    Hwang, John G. Carothers, Heys S. Hwang, and James W. Ruest is
    granted.
    I.    BACKGROUND1
    Plaintiff is an electrician formerly employed by Defendant
    NATI. From October 1, 1997, to March 31, 2003, NATI had an
    Operations   and    Maintenance   contract   with    the   United    States
    Department of Agriculture (“USDA” or the “Government”) to maintain
    four USDA buildings in Washington, D.C. Under the contract, NATI
    was   responsible   for   day-to-day   maintenance   of    the   buildings.
    Defendant CTSI took over the contract on April 1, 2003. Defendant
    PAE Government Services, Inc. (“PAE”) is a subcontractor of CTSI
    and performed electrical work on the buildings. Plaintiff was never
    employed by either CTSI or PAE. The other four defendants are or
    were officers or employees of NATI and CTSI: Chang D. Hwang,
    President of NATI; John G. Carothers, former Operations Coordinator
    for NATI and CTSI; Heys S. Hwang, President of CTSI; and James W.
    Ruest, project Manager at CTSI.
    The Amended Complaint alleges five violations of the FCA.
    Count I alleges that NATI and CTSI falsified response times to
    service calls in order to claim the monthly bonuses provided for in
    their contract. Count II alleges that NATI and CTSI misrepresented
    non-reimbursable repairs as reimbursable repairs. Count III alleges
    1
    For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual
    allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and
    liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Aktieselskabet AF
    21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 
    525 F.3d 8
    , 15 (D.C. Cir.
    2008); Shear v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 
    606 F.2d 1251
    , 1253 (D.C.
    Cir. 1979). Therefore, the facts set forth herein are taken from
    the Amended Complaint.
    -2-
    that NATI, CTSI, and PAE charged the USDA for work performed by
    employees who did not possess the qualifications required by the
    governing contract. Count IV alleges that NATI and CTSI billed the
    USDA for overtime work that their contracts excluded from overtime
    status. Count V alleges that NATI and CTSI misrepresented the
    amount of work they performed.
    On August 14, 2006, Plaintiff filed his Complaint [Dkt. No.
    1]. On September 27, 2007, The United States filed a Notice of
    Election to Decline Intervention [Dkt. No. 22].2 On May 14, 2008,
    all of the Defendants except PAE filed a joint Motion to Dismiss
    pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)[Dkt. No. 31]. On the same date, PAE filed
    a separate Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 32]. Upon consideration of
    these Motions, along with Plaintiff’s Oppositions [Dkt. Nos. 34-35]
    and Defendants’ Replies [Dkt. Nos. 36-37], the Court dismissed the
    Complaint with leave to file an Amended Complaint on February 25,
    2010 (“February 25 Opinion”) [Dkt. Nos. 47-48]. United States ex
    rel. Bender v. N. American Telecomms., Inc. et al., 
    686 F. Supp. 2d 46
     (D.D.C. 2010).
    2
    The United States, pursuant to 
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (b)(1),
    requests that if either Plaintiff or Defendants move to dismiss,
    the Court solicit the Government’s written consent before granting
    approval. Notice of Election to Decline Intervention, at 1 [Dkt.
    No. 22]. However, that provision pertains to voluntary dismissals
    only, and does not prevent the Court from dismissing an action for
    failure to state a claim. United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Fahey,
    
    121 F.2d 28
    , 29 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
    -3-
    On April 26, 2010, Plaintiff proceeded to file his Amended
    Complaint [Dkt. No. 50]. On May 10, 2010, all Defendants except PAE
    filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (“NATI Motion”)
    [Dkt. No. 51]. On the same date, PAE filed its separate Motion to
    Dismiss the Amended Complaint (“PAE Motion”) [Dkt. No. 52]. On June
    7, 2010, Plaintiff filed his respective Oppositions [Dkt. Nos. 54-
    55]. On June 14, 2010, Defendants filed their separate Replies
    [Dkt. Nos. 58-59].
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    To   survive   a     motion   to   dismiss    under     Rule   12(b)(6),   a
    plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
    that is plausible on its face” and to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims
    across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been stated
    adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
    consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” 
    Id. at 563
    . A
    complaint   will    not    suffice,     however,   if   it    “tenders   ‘naked
    assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v.
    Iqbal, 
    129 S.Ct. 1937
    , 1948 (2009) (citing Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 557
    ).
    Under the Twombly standard, a “court deciding a motion to
    dismiss must not make any judgment about the probability of the
    plaintiffs’ success . . . must assume all the allegations in the
    -4-
    complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . [and] must give
    the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from
    the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame
    Jeans Inc., 
    525 F.3d 8
    , 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    To prove a violation of the FCA, a plaintiff must show either
    that the   defendant   (1)   “knowingly   presents,   or causes   to   be
    presented [to the Government] a false or fraudulent claim for
    payment or approval,” 
    31 U.S.C. § 3729
    (a)(1), or (2) “knowingly
    makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
    statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved.” 31
    U.S.C. 3729(a)(2).3 A “claim” includes “any request or demand . .
    3
    As part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009
    (“FERA”), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 
    123 Stat. 1617
     (2009), Congress made
    a number of changes to the FCA. FERA includes a retroactivity
    clause which states that a new subsection would apply to all FCA
    “claims” pending as of June 7, 2008. 123 Stat. at 1625 (codified as
    a note following 
    31 U.S.C. § 3729
    ). However, as courts that have
    considered this clause have noted, “claims” refers only to a
    defendant’s request for payment, and not to pending cases. See
    United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., -- F. Supp. 2d --
    No. CV-04-1543, 
    2009 WL 2929250
     at * 14 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2009)
    (“Congress did not intend ‘claims’ . . . to mean ‘cases.’”); United
    States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., -- F. Supp. 2d -- No.
    95-CV-970, 
    2009 WL 3626773
     at *4 (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 27, 2009) (“[A]
    plain reading of the retroactivity language reveals that the
    relevant change is applicable to ‘claims’ and not to ‘cases.’”).
    As the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2006, there
    are no allegations here of any pending claims by the Defendants on
    June 7, 2008. Therefore, the retroactivity clause does not apply,
    and the prior version of the FCA (last amended in 1994) will be
    (continued...)
    -5-
    . for money or property” made to a recipient if the Government
    provides or reimburses the recipient any portion of the money
    requested. 
    31 U.S.C. § 3729
    (c). The knowledge requirement is
    satisfied if a person “has actual knowledge of the information,
    acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
    information, or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity
    of the information.” 
    31 U.S.C. § 3729
    (b). Finally, the Complaint
    must allege materiality. See United States ex rel. Ervin and
    Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton Sec. Group, 
    370 F. Supp. 2d 18
    , 36
    (D.D.C. 2005) (“The great weight of case law holds that the
    materiality of a false record or statement is an element of False
    Claims Act liability.”).
    “[B]ecause the False Claims Act is self-evidently an anti-
    fraud statute, complaints brought under it must comply with Rule
    9(b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]” in order to state
    a claim. United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 
    286 F.3d 542
    , 551-52   (D.C.   Cir.   2002).   Rule   9(b)   requires   that   “[i]n
    alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
    the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    9(b). Thus, to satisfy Rule 9(b), a FCA relator must state the
    time, place, and contents of the false representations, the facts
    3
    (...continued)
    used throughout the remainder of this opinion.
    -6-
    misrepresented, and what was obtained or given up as a consequence
    of the fraud. United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 
    642 F.2d 1373
    , 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
    III. ANALYSIS4
    A.      Plaintiff’s Claims Against PAE Are Dismissed
    The Amended Complaint alleges that “each of the above-named
    Defendants have caused the submission of false claims” in Counts I,
    II, and V. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 188, 195, 257. In Counts III and IV, the
    Amended Complaint alleges, in substance, that PAE used false
    records in the preparation of fraudulent claims submitted by
    others, knew of the fraudulent claims, and acted in deliberate
    ignorance of that knowledge. Id. at ¶¶ 219-222, 236-239. PAE argues
    that       Plaintiff   fails   to   allege   any   facts   relating   to   PAE’s
    wrongdoing under Counts I, II, IV, and V. PAE Mot. 5-7. PAE further
    argues that, in Count III, Plaintiff fails to allege a knowing
    violation of the False Claims Act and fails to identify any
    4
    The applicable statute of limitations under the FCA is six
    years. 
    31 U.S.C. § 3731
    (b) (“A civil action under Section 3730 may
    not be brought more than six years after the date on which the
    violation of Section 3729 is committed.”). See United States ex
    rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 
    474 F. Supp. 2d 75
    ,
    89 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that the statute of limitations applies
    to relators when the Government does not intervene). The original
    Complaint was filed on August 14, 2006. The Plaintiff concedes that
    potential FCA violations that occurred prior to August 14, 2000,
    are time-barred. Pl.’s Opp’n. to NATI Mot. at 11. The Court
    therefore dismisses any allegations of claims accruing prior to
    August 14, 2000.
    -7-
    particular false claim. Id. at 8-13. For these reasons, PAE seeks
    dismissal of the Amended Complaint.
    As noted in the February 25 Opinion, a “complaint must make
    specific allegations against each individual defendant rather than
    collective     allegations     against       ‘each    of    the     above-named
    Defendants,’ since one of the main rationales behind Rule 9(b)’s
    particularity    requirement     is     to    ‘guarantee      all     defendants
    sufficient information to allow for preparation of a response.’”
    United States ex rel. Bender, 
    686 F. Supp. 2d at 50
     (quoting United
    States ex rel. Joseph, 
    642 F.2d at 1385
    ). Therefore, Plaintiff must
    specifically    allege   facts   giving      rise    to   liability    for   each
    defendant individually. See United States ex rel. Grynberg v.
    Alaska Pipeline Co., Civ. No. 95-725, 
    1997 WL 33763820
    , at *4
    (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 1997) (dismissing FCA claim where complaint
    alleged only that “each Defendant engaged in at least one of the
    [alleged] practices”).
    The allegations against PAE in Plaintiff’s original Complaint
    were dismissed because the allegations contained in Counts I, II,
    IV, and V were “silent regarding PAE’s liability.” United States ex
    rel. Bender, 
    686 F. Supp. 2d at 50
    . In an effort to correct this
    deficiency, Plaintiff has merely inserted in his Amended Complaint
    the single sentence that, under Counts I, II, IV, and V, CTSI and
    NATI’s fraudulent “practice[s] continued by PAE employees.” Am.
    -8-
    Compl. ¶¶ 73, 90, 102, 153, 171. Aside from this conclusory
    statement regarding PAE’s practices, Plaintiff fails to allege the
    date of any fraud perpetrated by PAE or any other information
    regarding specific fraudulent claims submitted or prepared by PAE.
    It is insufficient to allege a scheme against one defendant
    and merely ascribe similar behavior to another. See U.S. v. N.Y.
    City Health and Hosp. Corp., No. 95 Civ. 7649(LMM), 
    2000 WL 1610802
    , at *3 (Oct. 27, 2000 S.D.N.Y.) (dismissing the complaint
    as to defendants against whom plaintiff made no specific factual
    allegations but whom plaintiff claimed must have been engaged in
    the same conduct as other defendants because they operated under
    the same contract). Therefore, Counts I, II, IV, and V must be
    dismissed against PAE for failure to state a claim.
    Count III alleges that PAE employed unlicensed electricians,
    thereby causing CTSI to falsely certify to the USDA that it was in
    compliance with its contractual obligation to use only licensed
    electricians. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104-22, 211-22. Now, Plaintiff does
    make specific allegations against PAE. In particular, Plaintiff has
    responded to the finding in the February 25 Opinion that Plaintiff
    had failed to specify which PAE employees were allegedly unlicensed
    by naming several of the unlicensed employees. See Am. Compl. ¶¶
    109-112.
    -9-
    Nonetheless, the Amended Complaint, like the Complaint before
    it, fails to identify what particular false claims were allegedly
    submitted by PAE, the content of any such false claims, and “who
    precisely was involved in the fraudulent activity.” United States
    ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 
    389 F.3d 1251
    , 1257
    (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also United States ex rel. Brown v. Aramark
    Corp., 
    591 F. Supp. 2d 68
    , 74 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[A] relator must
    provide details that identify particular false claims for payment
    that were submitted to the government.”). Plaintiff merely alleges
    that the “work of unlicensed and/or unqualified electricians . . .
    was billed by PAE to CTSI, and then by CTSI to USDA.” Am. Compl. ¶
    113. Whether or not PAE’s conduct violated its contract, Plaintiff
    has not made any allegation that PAE submitted or caused to be
    submitted any claim containing false or fraudulent information.
    Further, the Amended Complaint, like the Complaint before it,
    does not allege that PAE acted to knowingly cause CTSI to submit
    false claims to the USDA, as required by 
    31 U.S.C. § 3729
    (b).5 For
    5
    “If a subcontractor . . . makes a false statement to a
    private entity and does not intend the Government to rely on that
    false statement as a condition of payment, the statement is not
    made with the purpose of inducing payment of a false claim ‘by the
    Government.’ In such a situation, the direct link between the false
    statement and the Government's decision to pay or approve a false
    claim is too attenuated to establish liability.” Allison Engine Co.
    v. United States ex rel. Sanders, -- U.S. –- 
    128 S. Ct. 2123
    , 2130
    (2008), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat 1617
    (2009).
    -10-
    example, there is no allegation that PAE was aware of CTSI’s
    contract requiring it to employ only licensed electricians, or that
    CTSI’s contract even applied to PAE as a subcontractor. See United
    States ex rel. Alexander v. Dyncorp., Inc., 
    924 F. Supp. 292
    , 303
    (D.D.C. 1996) (noting that FCA plaintiffs need to state facts from
    which the court can infer a knowing violation on the part of the
    defendants).
    Thus, because it fails to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity
    requirement, as well as the FCA’s knowledge requirement, Count III
    must be dismissed against PAE for failure to state a claim.
    B.   Plaintiff’s Claims Against NATI, CTSI, Chang D. Hwang,
    John G. Carothers, Heys S. Hwang, and James W. Ruest Are
    Dismissed
    The remaining Defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. Each
    count will be addressed in turn.
    1. Count I Is Dismissed
    Count I alleges that Defendants falsified response times to
    service calls in order to obtain contractual bonuses for prompt
    service. Am. Compl. ¶ 52. Defendants argue that Count I of the
    Amended Complaint “fails to supply any of the specifics this Court
    already ruled must be produced.” NATI Mot. 9. Defendants contend
    that the Amended Complaint does not allege the content of the false
    claims, identify the employees who made them, state how many times
    -11-
    or when the false claims were submitted, or describe any specific
    false bonus claims submitted. 
    Id.
    While Rule 9(b) is “not intended to be a formalistic bar to
    sub-standard pleadings,” an FCA Plaintiff must set out the details
    of the specific scheme, supply the time, place, and content of
    false representations, and link that scheme to claims for payment
    made to the United States. United States ex rel. Brown v. Aramark
    Corp., 
    591 F. Supp. 2d 68
    , 75 (D.D.C. 2008); United States ex rel.
    Barrett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 
    251 F. Supp. 2d 28
    , 35
    (D.D.C. 2003).
    Although the Amended Complaint does describe how the alleged
    scheme was carried out, it contains no allegations as to any
    specific false claims submitted by any Defendant. Nor does the
    Amended Complaint offer any specific information as to the time or
    place of false representations. Rather, the Amended Complaint
    merely alleges that NATI and CTSI employees submitted claims with
    false completion times for service calls “on numerous occasions.”
    Am. Compl. ¶ 55.
    The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s difficulty in gaining
    access to documents that may provide details about specific false
    claims submitted to the Government. See Opp’n to NATI Mot. 16-17.
    Plaintiff points out that, as an electrician, he had no access to
    the types of documents that would confirm the improprieties he
    -12-
    regularly observed. 
    Id.
     However, Rule 9(b) is clear in requiring
    plaintiffs to allege specific times, places, and contents of false
    representations. See United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline
    Beecham, Inc., 
    245 F.3d 1048
    , 1051 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that,
    although “Rule 9(b) may not require [plaintiff] to allege, in
    detail, all facts supporting each and every false” claim, plaintiff
    must be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular
    misconduct alleged); United States ex rel. Barrett, 
    251 F. Supp. 2d at 35
     (“While a complaint that covers a multi-year period may not
    be required by Rule 9(b) to contain a detailed allegation of all
    facts supporting each and every instance of submission of a false
    claim, some information on the false claims must be included.”).
    Critically,   plaintiffs   must    provide   “defendants   sufficient
    information to allow for preparation of a response.” United States
    ex rel. Joseph, 
    642 F.2d at 1385
    .
    In only one instance does Plaintiff attempt to overcome the
    lack of specificity by describing an incident in “the Summer of
    2002,” when he “personally witnessed NATI employee Daniel Thayer .
    . . locking the times of service calls in order to make them appear
    as if they had been completed with the times applicable for a
    bonus.” Am. Compl. ¶ 70. Plaintiff goes on to allege that he
    confronted Daniel and Kenneth Thayer about the incident, but
    neither gave any response. Id. at ¶ 71. While these allegations do
    -13-
    present some specific facts, the crucial fact Plaintiff fails to
    allege is whether any NATI employee filed a false claim with the
    Government based on the conduct described. Without an allegation of
    a   false   claim   submitted    to    the       Government,   Plaintiff     cannot
    overcome the requirements of Rule 9(b). See United States ex rel.
    Barrett, 
    251 F. Supp. 2d at 35
     (a viable complaint must allege
    “that claims for payment were made to the federal government”).
    Therefore, Count I must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
    2.    Count II Is Dismissed
    Count II alleges that NATI and CTSI, through named Defendants
    and other employees, fraudulently accumulated minor repairs until
    the   aggregated    repairs     reached      a    dollar   threshold    entitling
    Defendants to extra compensation. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 192-93. Defendants
    argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege specific false
    claims, dates of specific false claims, or employees who submitted
    such false claims under Count II. NATI Mot. 10-14.
    Many of Plaintiff’s allegations in Count II neglect to allege
    specific instances of employees submitting false claims. Rather
    than allege any particular times or examples of claims falsely
    submitted for additional compensation, Plaintiff relies on words
    like “routinely,” “occasionally,” and “frequently.” Am. Compl. ¶¶
    92-93, 98. These allegations alone do not set out the time of the
    false representations      with       sufficient      specificity.     See   United
    -14-
    States ex rel. Totten, 
    286 F.3d at 552
    ; United States ex rel.
    Joseph, 
    642 F.2d at 1385
     (plaintiffs must provide “all defendants
    sufficient information to allow for preparation of a response.”).
    When Plaintiff does describe specific instances of misconduct
    in Count II, he fails to allege that false claims were actually
    submitted to the Government. In particular, Plaintiff alleges five
    instances from 2000 through 2003 in which Defendants accumulated
    minor repairs   in   order to   achieve   the minimum   threshold for
    additional reimbursement. Am. Compl. ¶ 94. However, Plaintiff makes
    no allegation that any claim submitted to the Government based on
    the aggregate repairs actually contained any false or fraudulent
    information. Without this critical allegation, Plaintiff has failed
    to allege any statutory false claim with sufficient particularity.
    United States ex rel. Barrett, 
    251 F. Supp. 2d at 35
    .6 Count II
    must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
    3.   Count III Is Dismissed
    Count III alleges that Defendants billed the USDA for work
    performed by unlicensed employees in violation of a contractual
    clause. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 211-12. However, the Amended Complaint
    6
    Plaintiff also alleges that a memorandum, dated February 6,
    1998, states that “NATI is pushing to get more MRWO because they
    can ‘double dip’ the Government and make extra money.” Am. Compl.
    ¶ 89. For the reasons noted above, FCA violations that occurred
    prior to August 14, 2000, are time-barred. See supra note 4, at 7.
    Therefore, any allegations relating to claims accruing before
    February 6, 1998 are not relevant.
    -15-
    contains no allegation that Defendants actually submitted a claim
    to the USDA reflecting that the employees were licensed.7 See
    Martin v. Arc of Dist. of Columbia, 
    541 F. Supp. 2d 77
    , 82-83
    (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing an FCA claim based on an allegation that
    defendant did not comply with the government’s requirement for
    hiring experienced employees because plaintiff made no allegation
    that a fraudulent claim was submitted); United States ex rel. Ervin
    and Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton Sec. Group, 
    370 F. Supp. 2d 18
    , 36
    (D.D.C.   2005)   (“[A]   relator   must   produce   evidence   that   the
    7
    Although Plaintiff has not raised the theory of “implied
    certification” in his papers, it is clear that, in certain
    circumstances, this Circuit permits an FCA claim based on the
    theory that a bill submitted to the government impliedly certified
    that laws, regulations, or contractual provisions were complied
    with. See United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 
    288 F.3d 421
    , 426 (D.C.
    Cir. 2002) (finding liability for false claims based on “reports in
    support of payment that omitted information indicating that
    [defendant] was acting in a manner that was contrary to the core
    terms of the Program.”).
    However, courts may infer a false claim from a bill silent as
    to compliance with contractual provisions “only where certification
    [of compliance] was a prerequisite to the government action
    sought.” United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science and
    Engineering, Inc., 
    214 F.3d 1372
    , 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This
    crucial   element    has  been    described   as   requiring   that
    “[c]ertification of compliance with the statute or regulation
    alleged to be violated must be so important to the contract that
    the government would not have honored the claim presented to it if
    it were aware of the violation.” United States ex rel. Barrett, 
    251 F. Supp. 2d at 33
    . Plaintiff has made no such allegation here. See
    
    id. at 35
     (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim due to failure to allege
    that defendant’s violation rose “to the level of affecting the
    government’s decision to pay”). Plaintiff similarly fails to make
    this allegation in either Counts IV or V.
    -16-
    defendant actually submitted false demands for payment or submitted
    false records or statements in order to get a false claim paid.”).
    Whether Count III alleges breach of contract or common law fraud is
    irrelevant since a qui tam plaintiff has no standing to bring such
    causes of action under the statute. See, e.g., United States ex
    rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., 
    999 F. Supp. 78
    , 92 (D.D.C.
    1998) (common law cause of action distinct from claims under FCA)
    rev’d on other grounds, 
    173 F.3d 870
     (D.C. Cir. 1999). Hence, Count
    III must be dismissed.
    4.   Count IV Is Dismissed
    Count IV alleges that NATI and CTSI, through named Defendants
    and other employees, billed the USDA for overtime that did not
    qualify for overtime status, id. at ¶ 226, and then gave employees
    “Compensation Time” in lieu of monetary compensation. Id. at ¶ 228.
    Plaintiff alleges that NATI and CTSI’s contract specified that
    certain work conducted outside of normal business hours would not
    be reimbursable as overtime. Id. at ¶¶ 125-130. Plaintiff claims
    that Defendants billed the Government for overtime work that should
    have fallen into this non-reimbursable category. ¶ 123. Defendants
    argue, in substance, that Plaintiff does not allege any false
    claims submitted to the Government. See NATI Mot. 15-17.
    Plaintiff does allege several specific instances in which
    Defendants submitted bills to the Government for overtime work that
    -17-
    Plaintiff believes should not have been counted as overtime under
    the contract. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 124,8 135, 137. However, the claims
    that Defendants submitted to the Government for payment were not in
    and of themselves false or fraudulent. United States ex rel. Ervin
    and Assocs., 
    370 F. Supp. 2d at 36
    . Indeed, Plaintiff’s description
    of the bills submitted to the Government indicates that Defendants
    very precisely described the work for which they sought overtime
    reimbursement.   See,    e.g.,   Am.   Compl.   ¶   135.   At   most,   these
    allegations   describe    a   breach   of   contract   claim,    for    which
    Plaintiff has no standing under the False Claims Act. See United
    States ex rel. Owens v. First Kuwaiti Gen. Trading & Contracting
    Co., 
    612 F.3d 724
    , 728 (4th Cir. 2010) (the FCA “does not allow a
    qui tam relator to shoehorn what is, in essence, a breach of
    contract action into a claim that is cognizable under the False
    Claims Act”) (internal quotations omitted); United States ex rel.
    Hendow v. University of Phoenix, 
    461 F.3d 1166
    , 1171 (9th Cir.
    2006) (“for a breach of contract . . . to give rise to an action
    under the False Claims Act, it requires a false claim.”) (internal
    8
    Plaintiff refers to Exhibit A, which identifies eleven
    Monthly Status Reports, presumably submitted to the Government,
    which Plaintiff “personally knows involved overtime charges
    improperly billed to the Government.” Am. Compl. ¶ 124. Ten of
    these eleven Monthly Status Reports are irrelevant, as they are
    dated prior to the August 14, 2000. Any claims based upon those
    Monthly Status Reports are time-barred.
    -18-
    quotations omitted); United States ex rel. Long, 
    999 F. Supp. 78
    ,
    92.
    Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants improperly awarded
    employees Compensation Time in lieu of monetary payment similarly
    fail to encompass an actual false or fraudulent claim. Plaintiff
    alleges that NATI persisted in using Compensation Time, despite the
    fact that its use was both illegal and contrary to the Collective
    Bargaining Agreement between the local union and NATI. Am. Compl.
    ¶¶    140-41.          Regardless    of   the     propriety   of   NATI’s    use   of
    Compensation Time, Plaintiff makes no allegation that Defendants
    made any misrepresentation to the Government in claiming payment,
    as required by the False Claims Act.9 Therefore, Count IV must be
    dismissed.
    5.        Count V Is Dismissed
    Count        V     simply     alleges     that   NATI   failed    to   complete
    maintenance tasks required by contract. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 243-44.
    Plaintiff       alleges       that     the     Defendants’    failure   to   perform
    preventative and other required maintenance at an acceptable level
    rendered their bills to the Government false claims. Am. Compl. ¶¶
    156-71. Count V is insufficient for the same reasons as Count IV.
    Although Plaintiff details many pieces of equipment that did not
    9
    As noted supra note 7, at 15-16, Plaintiff has also failed
    to allege that the use of Compensation Time was “contrary to the
    core terms” of the contract. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 
    288 F.3d at 426
    .
    -19-
    receive the maintenance required by NATI’s contract, Plaintiff does
    not allege that claims were submitted to the Government containing
    false or fraudulent information about such maintenance. As with
    Count   IV,   the   alleged   conduct   at   most   amounts   to   breach   of
    contract. Therefore, Count V must be dismissed.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss the
    Amended Complaint of Defendant PAE is granted; the Motion to
    Dismiss the Amended Complaint of Defendants NATI, CTSI, Chang D.
    Hwang, John G. Carothers, Heys S. Hwang, and James W. Ruest is
    granted. As Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend, the Amended
    Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.
    An Order will issue with this opinion.
    /s/
    November 4, 2010                   Gladys Kessler
    United States District Judge
    Copies to: counsel of record via ECF
    -20-