A.B. v. District of Columbia ( 2010 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    EBONY HOLMES-RAMSEY, as mother
    and next friend of A.B., a minor child,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                                  Civil Action No. 10–1283 (CKK)
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (November 2, 2010)
    Plaintiff Ebony Holmes-Ramsey (“Plaintiff”) brings this action behalf of her minor
    daughter, A.B., pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 
    20 U.S.C. §§ 1400
     et seq.,1 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    ,
    the McKinney-Vento Homelessness Assistance Act (“McKinney Act”), 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 11431
     et
    seq., and 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (“Section 1983”). Compl. at 2, Docket No. [1]. Plaintiff names as
    Defendants to this action the District of Columbia, District of Columbia Mayor Adrian Fenty in
    his official capacity, and District of Columbia Chancellor of Public Schools Michelle Rhee2 in
    her official capacity (collectively “Defendants”). This case comes to the Court on appeal from a
    1
    The IDEA was reauthorized and recodified pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
    Education Improvement Act in 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 
    118 Stat. 2647
     (2004). The
    amendments provide that the short title of the reauthorized and amended provisions remains the
    Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. See Pub. L. No 108-446, § 101; 118 Stat. at 2647;
    
    20 U.S.C. § 1400
     (2006) (“This chapter may be cited as the ‘Individuals with Disabilities
    Education Act’”). Accordingly, the Court refers to the amended Act herein as the IDEA.
    2
    Michelle Rhee has been replaced by Interim Chancellor Kaya Henderson. Pursuant to
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Henderson shall be substituted as defendant.
    May 1, 2010 Hearing Officer Determination (“HOD”) regarding Plaintiff’s due process
    complaint against the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”). Compl. Facts ¶¶ 20, 49.3
    Currently before the Court is Defendants’ [6] Motion for Partial Dismissal of Complaint,
    in which Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to state a claim under Section 504 and
    Section 1983 and fails to state a claim against Mayor Fenty and Interim Chancellor Henderson.
    After reviewing the Complaint, the parties’ filings regarding the pending motion, as well as the
    relevant statutes, regulations, and case law, the Court shall GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-
    PART Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal of Complaint. Specifically, the Court shall
    GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 504 claim and Defendants’ motion to
    dismiss Mayor Fenty and Interim Chancellor Henderson as defendants. In regard to Plaintiff’s
    Section 1983 claim, the Court shall GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss insofar as the claim
    alleges that the hearing officer erred in concluding that he did not have jurisdiction over
    Plaintiff’s McKinney Act claim. The Court shall DENY, however, Defendants’ motion to
    dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim insofar as the Complaint states a McKinney Act violation
    independent of the hearing officer’s jurisdictional decision.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.      The IDEA Statutory and Regulatory Framework
    Although Plaintiff asserts claims under multiple statutes, the IDEA is of particular
    importance in this case. The purpose of the IDEA is “to ensure that all children with disabilities
    have available to them a free appropriate public education [“FAPE”] that emphasizes special
    3
    In setting forth the Complaint’s allegations, Plaintiff has numbered each paragraph that
    begins a new section of the Complaint––e.g., “Facts”––starting at 1, such that the Complaint
    contains several paragraphs that are numbered “1.” To avoid confusion, the Court shall refer to
    paragraphs in regard to both their number and Complaint section.
    2
    education and related services designed to meet their unique needs . . . . ” 
    20 U.S.C. § 1400
    (d)(1)(A). “Implicit” in the IDEA’s guarantee “is the requirement that the education to
    which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped
    child.” Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 
    458 U.S. 176
    , 200 (1982).
    As a condition of receiving funding under the IDEA, school districts are required to adopt
    procedures to ensure appropriate educational placement of disabled students. See 
    20 U.S.C. § 1413
    . A student’s eligibility for a FAPE is determined by the results of testing and evaluating
    the student, and the findings of a “multidisciplinary team” or “individualized education program”
    (“IEP”) team. 
    Id.
     § 1414. An IEP team consists of the parents and teachers of the disabled
    student, as well as other educational specialists, who meet and confer in a collaborative process
    to determine how best to accommodate the needs of the student and provide a FAPE. See id. §
    1414(d)(1)(B).
    An IEP is created to meet the special educational needs of each disabled student. See id.
    § 1414(d)(2)(A). The IEP must be formulated in accordance with the terms of the IDEA and
    “should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from
    grade to grade.” Rowley, 
    458 U.S. at 204
    . The IDEA requires IEPs to include statements of
    present functional performance, measurable annual goals, how the goals will be measured, and
    “the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services . . . to be
    provided to the child, or on behalf of the child, and a statement of the program modifications or
    supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child.” 
    20 U.S.C. § 1414
    (d)(1)(A)(I).
    “If no suitable public school is available, the school system must pay the costs of sending the
    child to an appropriate private school.” Reid v. District of Columbia, 
    401 F.3d 516
    , 519 (D.C.
    3
    Cir. 2005) (citation and alterations omitted).
    The IDEA guarantees parents of disabled children the opportunity to participate in the
    evaluation and placement process. See 
    20 U.S.C. §§ 1414
    (f), 1415(b)(1). Parents who object to
    their child’s “identification, evaluation, or educational placement” are entitled to an impartial due
    process hearing, see 
    id.
     §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1), at which they have a “right to be accompanied and
    advised by counsel” and a “right to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel
    the attendance of witnesses,” id. § 1415(h). In the District of Columbia, a qualified impartial
    hearing officer conducts the due process hearing in accordance with the Act. D.C. Mun. Regs.
    tit. 5-E, § 3030.
    B.        Factual and Procedural Background 4
    As of the filing of the Complaint, A.B., a four-year-old, had been diagnosed with, inter
    alia, Attention Deficit Disorder Hyperactivity Disorder, Borderline Intellectual Functioning, and
    Receptive/Expressive Language Disorder. Compl. Facts ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that DCPS
    violated its obligation under the IDEA to “locate, identify, evaluate and develop an IEP for all
    students eligible for special education by their third birthday” because DCPS failed to screen
    A.B. for special education services until nearly one year after A.B.’s third birthday. Id. ¶ 4; see
    also id. ¶¶ 3, 7. Consequently, A.B. attended Edward C. Mazique Parent and Child Center, a
    facility that did not provide special education services, during the 2008-2009 school year. Id. ¶ 5.
    A.B. was first evaluated by DCPS on September 21, 2009. Id. ¶ 8. As a result of this
    evaluation, DCPS found that A.B. was not eligible for speech and language services. See id.
    Subsequently, on October 7, 2009, DCPS convened an IEP meeting for A.B. and drafted an IEP
    4
    The facts set forth below are those most relevant to the pending motion to dismiss.
    4
    that specified A.B. was to receive ten hours of special education per week at Raymond
    Elementary School, A.B.’s neighborhood school at that time. See id. ¶¶ 10-11. At the IEP
    meeting, Plaintiff expressed concerns with A.B.’s placement in Raymond Elementary. Id. ¶ 11.
    Specifically, Plaintiff informed DCPS that she and A.B. were currently living in transitional
    housing, that they would have to vacate this housing near the middle of the school year, and that
    Plaintiff was concerned that after they moved, A.B. would have endure the disruption of being
    transferred to a different school in the middle of the school year. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. In response to
    these concerns, Plaintiff alleges that “DCPS did not offer to provide [Plaintiff] with
    transportation, or a different placement, nor did DCPS offer [Plaintiff] any of the services
    [Plaintiff] was entitled to under the McKinney-Vento Act. DCPS only told [Plaintiff] to contact
    DCPS if [Plaintiff] moved.” Id. ¶ 12.
    To avoid transferring A.B. from Raymond Elementary in the middle of the 2009-2010
    school year, Plaintiff decided to keep A.B. enrolled at Edward C. Mazique Parent and Child
    Center for another year. Id. ¶ 15. Thus, similar to the year before, A.B. did not receive special
    education services during the 2009-2010 school year. Id.
    On March 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed a due process complaint, alleging that DCPS (1) failed
    to timely identify, evaluate, and locate A.B.; (2) failed to identify all of A.B.’s disabilities; (3)
    failed to develop an appropriate IEP for A.B. for the 2009-2010 school year; and (4) failed to
    provide A.B. proper placement for the 2009-2010 school year, including failing to meet its
    obligations under the McKinney Act. Id. ¶ 20. With respect to relief, Plaintiff requested that the
    hearing officer find that DCPS denied A.B. a FAPE and order DCPS to provide compensatory
    education, as well as place and fund A.B.’s placement at a full-time non-public therapeutic
    5
    special education program. Id.
    Before the due process hearing began on April 21, 2010, the hearing officer requested
    briefing as to whether he had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s McKinney Act claim. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. At
    the due process hearing, DCPS stipulated that it violated the IDEA by failing to locate, identify,
    and evaluate A.B. by her third birthday, as well as by failing to develop an IEP for A.B. until
    fourteen months after her third birthday. See id. ¶ 50. On May 1, 2010, the hearing officer
    issued the HOD, in which he found that DCPS’ delay in developing an IEP for A.B. denied her a
    FAPE. See id. ¶¶ 49-50. For relief, the HOD ordered that DCPS fund pre-academic tutoring for
    A.B., as well as A.B.’s attendance at a therapeutic summer camp. See id. ¶¶ 49-50. The HOD
    denied, however, Plaintiff’s remaining allegations, finding that the hearing officer did not have
    jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s McKinney Act claim and that Plaintiff had not met her burden of
    proof on the remaining IDEA claims. See id. ¶¶ 50-51.
    On July 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case. Count I of the Complaint
    alleges that “Section 504 requires substantial procedural compliance with all procedural and
    substantive rights under the [IDEA],” id. ¶ 75, and that Defendants violated IDEA and Section
    504 by failing to provide A.B. with a FAPE, failing to “evaluate A.B. in all areas of her
    disability, and failing to provide an appropriate IEP and educational placement to A.B.,” id. ¶ 76;
    see also id. ¶ 77. Count II alleges that “[b]y failing to award appropriate relief, and by failing to
    rule on DCPS’ violation of the [McKinney Act], Plaintiffs have been denied federal statutory
    rights under color of law in violation of 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .” 
    Id. ¶ 79
    .
    Instead of filing an answer, Defendants filed a [6] Motion for Partial Dismissal of
    Complaint (“Defs.’ Mot.”) on August 19, 2010. Plaintiff then filed her [7] Opposition to
    6
    Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal of Complaint (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) on September 2, 2010.5
    The time for Defendants to file a reply has long since expired, see LCvR 7(d) (providing that the
    moving party may file a reply within seven days of service of the memorandum in opposition),
    and therefore the matter is now ripe for the Court’s review and resolution.
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain
    statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a), “in
    order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
    rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 
    355 U.S. 41
    , 47 (1957)). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a
    Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must furnish “more than
    labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 
    Id.
     “Nor
    does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
    enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    129 S.Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 557
    ). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that if accepted as true,
    “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 570
    . “A claim has
    facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 
    129 S.Ct. 1949
     (citing Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 556
    ).
    5
    Plaintiff attached an October 1, 2009 DCPS press release as an exhibit to her
    Opposition. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A. The Court may not consider materials outside the pleadings
    in a motion to dismiss without converting it to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ.
    12(d). The Court declines to do so here and therefore excludes the exhibit and does not consider
    it.
    7
    When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe
    the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all reasonable
    factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations. In re United Mine Workers of
    Am. Employee Benefit Plans Litig., 
    854 F. Supp. 914
    , 915 (D.D.C. 1994); see also Schuler v.
    United States, 
    617 F.2d 605
    , 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The complaint must be liberally construed in
    favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
    the facts alleged”) (internal quotation omitted). However, a plaintiff must provide more than just
    “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 
    129 S.Ct. at 1950
    . When a
    complaint’s well-pleaded facts do not enable a court, “draw[ing] on its judicial experience and
    common sense,” “to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint has not
    shown that the pleader is entitled to relief. 
    Id.
    III. DISCUSSION
    A.      Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Pursuant to Section 504
    Section 504 provides, in pertinent part, that “no otherwise qualified individual with a
    disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
    the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
    program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    (a). To state a
    claim under Section 504, a plaintiff must at least demonstrate “that he or she was discriminated
    against ‘solely by reason of his or her handicap.’” Walker v. District of Columbia, 
    157 F. Supp. 2d 11
    , 35 (D.D.C. 2001) (quoting 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    (a)). In IDEA cases, however, the D.C. Circuit
    has noted that “‘in order to show a violation of [Section 504], something more than a mere
    failure to provide the [FAPE] required by the [IDEA] must be shown.’” Lunceford v. Dist. of
    8
    Columbia Bd. of Educ., 
    745 F.2d 1577
    , 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Monahan v. Nebraska,
    
    687 F.2d 1164
    , 1170 (8th Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, plaintiffs must show that defendants acted in
    bad faith or with gross misjudgment to assert a Section 504 claim in an IDEA case. E.g.,
    Henneghan v. Dist. of Columbia Pub. Schs., 
    597 F. Supp. 2d 34
    , 37 (D.D.C. 2009); R.S. v.
    District of Columbia, 
    292 F. Supp. 2d 23
    , 28 (D.D.C. 2003).
    In this case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a Section 504 claim
    because the Complaint does not allege that A.B. was discriminated against solely because of her
    disability or that Defendants exhibited bad faith or gross misjudgment in doing so. Defs.’ Mot.
    at 6-7. In response, Plaintiff argues that (1) the Complaint alleges sufficient facts for the Court to
    infer that A.B. was treated differently because of her disability; (2) because this is not a case for
    damages, Plaintiff does not need to allege bad faith or gross misjudgment; (3) even if Plaintiff
    does have to allege bad faith or gross misjudgment, the Complaint contains sufficient allegations
    of such; and (4) Defendants have already been found to be acting in bad faith or with gross
    misjudgment in the pending class action suit before Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth, DL v.
    District of Columbia, No. 05-CV-1437. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15-17. In this case, the Court agrees
    with Defendants that the Complaint does not allege that they acted in bad faith or with gross
    misjudgment. Therefore, the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section
    504 claim.
    As a threshold matter, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that she does not need to
    allege facts to support that Defendants acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment because she
    is not seeking damages. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15-16. Plaintiff’s obligation to allege a factual
    predicate to support an allegation of bad faith or gross misconduct is not dependent on the type of
    9
    relief sought, but on the fact that her Section 504 claim is asserted in the context of an IDEA
    case. See, e.g., Lunceford, 
    745 F.2d at 1580
     (holding that “in order to show a violation of
    [Section 504], something more than a mere failure to provide the [FAPE] required by the [IDEA]
    must be shown’”) (quoting Monahan, 
    687 F.2d at 1170
    ) (emphasis added); see also Monahan,
    
    687 F.2d at 1171
     (“So long as the state officials involved have exercised professional judgment,
    in such a way as not to depart grossly from accepted standards among educational professionals,
    we cannot believe that Congress intended to create liability under [Section] 504.”). Thus, the
    Court concludes that Plaintiff must allege a factual predicate to support an allegation that
    Defendants acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment in order to assert a Section 504 claim.
    Anticipating this conclusion, Plaintiff relies on several of the Complaint’s allegations to
    argue that the Complaint in fact alleges gross misjudgment. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 17.6 For
    example, Plaintiff cites to allegations that A.B. was screened almost a year later than required
    under the IDEA, Compl. Facts ¶ 7, and that Defendants did not provide A.B. with the speech and
    language services she needed, id. ¶¶ 5, 8. These allegations, though serious, amount to garden
    variety IDEA violations, and the Complaint contains no indication that these alleged violations
    occurred due to gross misjudgment. See R.S., 
    292 F. Supp. 2d at 28
     (dismissing a Section 504
    claim when “nothing in the complaint suggests an allegation of bad faith or gross misjudgment”);
    cf. Henneghan, 
    597 F. Supp. 2d at 37
     (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss a Section 504
    claim because the complaint “expressly allege[d] ‘gross negligence’ . . . and the nature of the
    facts alleged yield a reasonable inference of bad faith and gross misjudgment . . . .”). Moreover,
    as Plaintiff does not claim that Defendants instituted a policy that systematically excluded A.B.
    6
    The Court notes that Plaintiff does not contend that she has alleged facts from which
    bad faith on the part of Defendants may be inferred. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 17.
    10
    from receiving a FAPE, the Complaint’s allegations do not warrant the inference that Plaintiff
    alleged gross misjudgment. See Douglass v. District of Columbia, 
    605 F. Supp. 2d 156
    , 168
    (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to infer a claim of gross
    misjudgment when the complaint alleged that DCPS “provided only regular education student
    [with] the opportunity to earn [credits toward graduation] and work towards a regular high school
    diploma, but did not provide the same opportunity to special education students”) (internal
    quotation marks omitted and first alteration in the original). Although the Complaint’s
    allegations may be sufficient to allege that Defendants failed to provide A.B. a FAPE, to assert a
    Section 504 claim “something more than a mere failure to provide [a FAPE] must be shown.”
    Lunceford, 
    745 F.2d at 1580
     (quoting Monahan, 
    687 F.2d at 1170
    ). Finally, the fact that some
    Defendants were found in a different case to have acted in bad faith or gross misjudgment, does
    not change the fact that the Complaint in this case fails to allege bad faith or gross misjudgment.
    Therefore, despite Rule 12(b)(6)’s low threshold, the Court concludes that the Complaint
    does not allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state a claim under Section 504 in the
    context of an IDEA case. Accordingly, the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss
    Plaintiff’s Section 504 claim.
    B.      Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim
    In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that “by failing to award appropriate relief, and by failing to
    rule on DCPS’ violation of the [McKinney Act], Plaintiffs have been denied federal statutory
    rights under color of law in violation of 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .” Compl. Facts ¶ 79. The McKinney
    Act provides, in pertinent part:
    Each State educational agency shall ensure that each child of a homeless individual
    and each homeless youth has equal access to the same free, approriate public
    11
    education [FAPE], including a public preschool education, as provided to other
    children and youths.
    
    42 U.S.C. § 11431
    (1). Those seeking to enforce their rights under the McKinney Act must do so
    by invoking Section 1983.7 Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 
    27 F.3d 605
    , 612 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
    Defendants have moved to dismiss Count II, arguing that hearing officer correctly
    concluded that he did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s McKinney Act claim because the
    McKinney Act is enforceable only in federal court. Defs.’ Mot. at 7 (citing Lampkin, 
    27 F.3d at 612
    ). In response, Plaintiff argues that she has stated a Section 1983 claim based on a violation
    of the McKinney Act, for two reasons. First, Plaintiff insists that the hearing officer had
    jurisdiction over her claim that DCPS violated the McKinney Act, such that his decision not to
    exercise jurisdiction over this claim deprived A.B. of her rights under the McKinney Act. See
    Pl.’s Opp’n at 18-19. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that, even if the hearing officer did not have
    jurisdiction to entertain her McKinney Act claim, this Court has jurisdiction over her Section
    1983 claim that Defendants violated A.B.’s McKinney Act rights. Id. at 18. The Court shall
    address each argument in turn.
    1.      Plaintiff Has Failed to State a McKinney Act Violation Based on the
    Hearing Officer’s Jurisdictional Decision
    Plaintiff contends that she has stated a claim under Section 1983 because the hearing
    officer erroneously declined to exercise jurisdiction over her McKinney Act claim. The parties’
    briefing focuses solely on this issue. See Defs.’ Mot. at 7-8; Pl.’s Opp’n at 17-21. Defendants do
    7
    Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that: “Every person who, under color of any
    statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
    Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
    within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
    by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
    or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .
    12
    not question whether a hearing officer’s legal ruling can form the basis of a Section 1983 claim
    or whether Plaintiff can assert such a claim when the hearing officer is not named as a party
    defendant, and therefore the Court does not address these issues. Rather, the Court shall restrict
    its analysis to the issue of whether the hearing officer erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction
    over Plaintiff’s McKinney Act claim.
    Neither party has cited any case law that explicitly addresses whether a hearing officer
    has jurisdiction over McKinney Act claims. Nevertheless, Plaintiff insists that the IDEA and the
    McKinney Act’s similar purposes demonstrate Congress’ intent that the two statutory schemes
    work together to provide FAPE to homeless children. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 18-19. From this
    conclusion, Plaintiff asserts that the hearing officer must have had jurisdiction over her
    McKinney Act claim, just as he did over her IDEA claims, to ensure the delivery of A.B.’s
    FAPE. See 
    id. at 19
    . Defendants, relying on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Lampkin v. District of
    Columbia, 
    27 F.3d 605
     (D.C. Cir. 1994), argue that the hearing officer did not have jurisdiction
    over Plaintiff’s McKinney Act claim because the McKinney Act is only enforceable through a
    Section 1983 claim asserted in a federal court. See Defs.’ Mot. at 7-8. The Court agrees with
    Defendants and shall grant their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based on the
    hearing officer’s jurisdictional decision.
    In Lampkin, the D.C. Circuit held that the McKinney Act “confers enforceable rights on
    its beneficiaries” that may be enforced under Section 1983. 
    27 F.3d at 612
    . In reaching this
    conclusion, the D.C. Circuit noted that “the McKinney Act contains no statutory mechanisms for
    the administrative enforcement of the beneficiaries’ rights . . . .” 
    Id. at 611
     (emphasis added). As
    the McKinney Act is not enforceable at the administrative level, the Court holds that, regardless
    13
    of whether the IDEA and McKinney Act have similar purposes, the hearing officer did not err in
    concluding that he lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s McKinney Act claim. Accordingly, the
    Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a Section 1983 claim with respect to the hearing
    officer’s jurisdictional decision.
    2.      The Court Cannot Conclude that Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Section
    1983 Claim for a McKinney Act Violation Independent of the Hearing
    Officer’s Jurisdictional Decision
    Plaintiff also claims that her Complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to state a
    McKinney Act violation independent of the hearing officer’s jurisdictional decision. Pl.’s Opp’n
    at 18, 21. Defendants do not rebut this argument, as they neglected to file a reply and their
    motion to dismiss focuses exclusively on how McKinney Act violations are only enforceable in
    federal court. See Defs.’ Mot. at 7-8. Without an argument to the contrary, the Court cannot
    conclude that the Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a McKinney
    Act violation independent of the hearing officer’s decision.
    It is true that the Complaint repeatedly alleges that the hearing officer erred in declining
    jurisdiction. See, e.g., Compl. Facts ¶ 67 (“The [hearing officer] erred by finding [he] did not
    have jurisdiction to rule as to whether or not DCPS violated the [McKinney Act]”); id. ¶ 79
    (Count II: “By failing to award appropriate relief, and by failing to rule on DCPS’ violation of the
    [McKinney Act], Plaintiffs have been denied federal statutory rights under color of law in
    violation of 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .”). However, the Complaint also alleges that: (1) Plaintiff and
    A.B. met the McKinney Act’s definition of homelessness and lived in transitional housing during
    “all times relevant to this action prior to February 2010,” 
    id.
     Parties ¶ 4; (2) Plaintiff informed
    DCPS that she and A.B. lived in transitional housing, 
    id.
     Facts ¶ 11; and (3) “DCPS did not offer
    14
    to provide [Plaintiff] with transportation, or a different placement, nor did DCPS offer [Plaintiff]
    any of the services [Plaintiff] was entitled to under the McKinney-Vento Act,” 
    id. ¶ 12
    .
    Construing these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff
    may have asserted a McKinney Act violation arising out of Defendants’ decision not to offer
    A.B. transportation or a different placement. Although it is somewhat unclear as to whether
    Plaintiff has met her burden of pleading to establish municipal liability against the District of
    Columbia under Section 1983, the Court declines to make a ruling on this issue because
    Defendants have not briefed it.
    Therefore, the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983
    claim insofar as the claim is based on the hearing officer’s refusal to exercise jurisdiction over
    Plaintiff’s McKinney Act claim. However, the Court shall deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss
    Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim to the extent the Complaint states a McKinney Act violation
    independent of the hearing officer’s jurisdictional decision.
    C.      The Court Shall Dismiss Mayor Fenty and Interim Chancellor Henderson as
    Defendants
    Finally, Defendants have moved to dismiss Mayor Fenty and Interim Chancellor
    Henderson (collectively “the Officials”) as defendants. Defendants contend that because the
    Officials were sued in their official capacities, Plaintiff’s suit is effectively against the District of
    Columbia and the Officials’ inclusion is “redundant and an inefficient use of judicial resources.”
    See Defs.’ Mot. at 5 (quoting Robinson v. District of Columbia, 
    403 F. Supp. 2d 39
    , 49 (D.D.C.
    2005)). Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s failure to mention the Officials in the
    Complaint, other than listing them in the Complaint’s caption, further supports dismissing the
    Officials as defendants. See 
    id.
     Plaintiff opposes dismissing the Officials and counters that: (1)
    15
    the cases relied upon by Defendants are distinguishable; (2) other courts have allowed
    individuals named in their official capacities to be named defendants; (3) the Officials created
    and supervised DCPS, the agency responsible for the alleged denial of A.B.’s FAPE; and (4) the
    Officials had notice of DCPS’ alleged failures due to the pending class action before Chief Judge
    Lamberth. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 10-13. For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall grant
    Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Officials as defendants.
    Plaintiff’s claims against the Officials in their official capacities are effectively claims
    against the District of Columbia. See Kentucky v. Graham, 
    473 U.S. 159
    , 165-66 (1985)
    (“Official capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
    an entity of which the an officer is an agent.’” (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690 n.55 (1978))). “[C]ourts have routinely dismissed claims against individuals named in
    their official capacity as ‘redundant and an inefficient use of judicial resources.’” Robinson, 
    403 F. Supp. 2d at 49
     (quoting Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia, 
    973 F. Supp. 184
    , 187 (D.D.C.
    1997)); see also Price v. District of Columbia, 
    545 F. Supp. 2d 89
    , 94-95 (D.D.C. 2008)
    (“[W]hile neither the Supreme Court nor the District of Columbia Circuit have held that a
    municipal defendant sued in his or her official capacity in conjunction with the District of
    Columbia must be dismissed, summary dismissal is the norm in this jurisdiction . . . .”)
    (collecting cases).
    The Court finds no reason to deviate from this general principle in this case.
    Significantly, the Complaint’s omission of any factual allegations regarding the Officials
    indicates that the Officials were named as defendants simply as another means of asserting
    claims against the District of Columbia. Plaintiff’s perfunctory inclusion of the Officials as
    defendants is therefore “redundant and an inefficient use of judicial resources.” Robinson, 
    403 F. 16
    Supp. 2d at 49 (quoting Cooke-Seals, 
    973 F. Supp. at 187
    ).
    Plaintiff’s arguments against dismissing the Officials are unpersuasive. First, although
    Plaintiff is correct that the cases cited in Defendants’ motion to dismiss are not IDEA cases,
    Plaintiff fails to explain how this is a meaningful distinction that requires this Court to find that
    the Officials’ inclusion is not redundant and unnecessary. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 10; cf. Robinson,
    
    403 F. Supp. 2d at 49
     (noting that courts in this Circuit have applied this general principle in
    cases involving various claims, including Section 1983 and tort claims). In fact, other courts
    have found official capacity defendants redundant and unnecessary in cases involving IDEA
    claims. See, e.g., Va. Office of Prot. & Advocacy v. Va. Dep’t of Educ., 
    262 F. Supp. 2d 648
    , 655
    (E.D. Va. 2003); McCachren v. Blacklick Valley Sch. Dist., 
    217 F. Supp. 2d 594
    , 599 (W.D. Pa.
    2002). Second, most of the cases cited by Plaintiff are inapposite to the issue currently under
    consideration because these cases do not discuss whether including the official as a defendant
    was appropriate. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11; see, e.g., Walker, 
    157 F. Supp. 2d at
    13 n.1 (noting that
    plaintiffs also named the DCPS’s superintendent in his official capacity, but not analyzing
    whether the superintendent was appropriately named as a defendant). Third, Plaintiff’s
    allegations relating to the Officials’ involvement with DCPS are made for the first time in her
    opposition brief. However, “[i]t is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs
    in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Arbitraje Casa de Cambio, S.A. de C.V. v. U.S. Postal
    Serv., 
    297 F. Supp. 2d 165
    , 170 (D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted). Moreover, these allegations
    pertain specifically to Mayor Fenty and former Chancellor Rhee and are therefore inappropriate
    in an official-capacity action.
    Finally, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that Chief Judge Lamberth’s opinion in DL v.
    District of Columbia, 
    450 F. Supp. 2d 21
     (D.D.C. 2006), requires the Court to deny Defendants’
    17
    motion to dismiss. Although Chief Judge Lamberth did state that “government officials . . . are
    not shielded from suit simply because the District of Columbia is also named,” he relied on Best
    v. District of Columbia, 743 F. Supp 44 (D.D.C. 1990), in reaching this conclusion. See DL, 
    450 F. Supp. 2d at 24
    . In Best, plaintiffs asserted claims against the District of Columbia and two of
    its employees pursuant to Section 1983 and the common law for violating plaintiffs’ privacy
    rights by videotaping them without their consent. See Best, 743 F. Supp. at 45, 49. The portion
    of Best that Chief Judge Lamberth cites to in DL discusses the Best court’s denial of the
    defendant-employees’ qualified immunity defense. See id. at 49. In essence, then, Best was an
    individual-capacity action, whereas here, Plaintiff has not alleged that the Officials themselves
    violated Plaintiff or A.B.’s rights, and the Complaint only mentions the Officials in its caption.
    See generally Compl. Therefore, the Court finds Best, and consequently DL, distinguishable
    from the case at bar.
    In conclusion, the Court finds Plaintiff’s perfunctory inclusion of the Officials “redundant
    and an inefficient use of judicial resources.” Robinson, 
    403 F. Supp. 2d at 49
     (quoting Cooke-
    Seals, 
    973 F. Supp. at 187
    ). The Court shall therefore grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
    Officials as defendants.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, the Court shall GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART
    Defendants’ [6] Motion for Partial Dismissal of Complaint. The Court shall GRANT
    Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 504 claim, as well as Defendants’ motion to
    dismiss Mayor Fenty and Interim Chancellor Henderson as defendants in this action. In regard to
    Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, the Court shall GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss insofar as
    the claim alleges that the hearing officer erred in concluding that he did not have jurisdiction
    18
    over McKinney Act violations. The Court shall DENY, however, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
    Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim to the extent the Complaint states a McKinney Act violation
    independent of the hearing officer’s jurisdictional decision. An appropriate Order accompanies
    this Memorandum Opinion.
    Date: November 2, 2010.
    /s/
    COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
    United States District Judge
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2010-1283

Judges: Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly

Filed Date: 11/2/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014

Authorities (20)

McCachren v. Blacklick Valley School District , 217 F. Supp. 2d 594 ( 2002 )

R.S. v. District of Columbia , 292 F. Supp. 2d 23 ( 2003 )

Frank A. Schuler, Jr. v. United States of America, ... , 617 F.2d 605 ( 1979 )

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. , 98 S. Ct. 2018 ( 1978 )

Robinson v. District of Columbia , 403 F. Supp. 2d 39 ( 2005 )

DL v. District of Columbia , 450 F. Supp. 2d 21 ( 2006 )

Reid Ex Rel. Reid v. District of Columbia , 401 F.3d 516 ( 2005 )

Conley v. Gibson , 78 S. Ct. 99 ( 1957 )

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 127 S. Ct. 1955 ( 2007 )

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937 ( 2009 )

Virginia Office of Protection & Advocacy v. Virginia, ... , 262 F. Supp. 2d 648 ( 2003 )

Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia , 973 F. Supp. 184 ( 1997 )

Douglass v. District of Columbia , 605 F. Supp. 2d 156 ( 2009 )

In Re United Mine Workers of America Employee Benefit Plans ... , 854 F. Supp. 914 ( 1994 )

Walker v. District of Columbia , 157 F. Supp. 2d 11 ( 2001 )

pierce-lunceford-v-district-of-columbia-board-of-education-the-hospital , 745 F.2d 1577 ( 1984 )

james-h-monahan-as-next-friend-of-daniel-j-monahan-george-rose-as-next , 687 F.2d 1164 ( 1982 )

Kentucky v. Graham , 105 S. Ct. 3099 ( 1985 )

Price v. District of Columbia , 545 F. Supp. 2d 89 ( 2008 )

Henneghan v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS , 597 F. Supp. 2d 34 ( 2009 )

View All Authorities »