Musgrove v. District of Columbia Public Schools ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
MILDRED MUSGROVE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 06-1861(EGS)
v. )
)
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE )
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff, Mildred Musgrove, filed a Complaint against
the District of Columbia Public Schools (“defendant” or “District
of Columbia”) alleging retaliatory discharge, hostile work
environment, denial of service, and age and gender
discrimination. Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss by the
defendant. After careful consideration of defendant’s motion,
plaintiff’s opposition, and applicable case law, this Court
DENIES defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Mildred Musgrove, was the principal at Anacostia
High School from 1997 until 2003. She had been a teacher and
principal with the District of Columbia Public Schools since
1970. In February 2003, she was placed on administrative leave
for disregarding the superintendent's directive regarding locked
doors in the school in violation of the D.C. Fire Code. She was
eventually terminated,1 which she grieved. The grievance
resulted in arbitration, and she settled the case, whereby she
was reinstated as a principal with back pay. The settlement
notwithstanding, plaintiff did not resume her role as a
principal.2
On May 19, 2004, plaintiff filed a claim with the District
of Columbia Office of Human Rights (“OHR”) alleging retaliatory
discharge, hostile work environment, violations of equal pay, and
denial of service. In her Complaint, plaintiff makes specific
allegations of harassment, retaliation, and discrimination,
including violations of the Equal Pay Act and the D.C. Human
Rights Act (“DCHRA”). The same claim was cross-filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), where the
parties went through mediation and an investigation. After a
clerical error was corrected, the EEOC issued a right to sue
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The reasons given for termination were “(1) Discourteous
treatment of the public supervisor, or other employees and (2)
Violation of the rules, regulations or lawful orders of the Board
of Education or any directive of the Superintendent of Schools.”
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On July 9, 2004, plaintiff received a letter from the
defendant informing her that she was being appointed principal at
Coolidge Senior High School. She was instructed to report for
duty on July 12, 2004. When she reported to the school, she was
unable to get in touch with her supervisor, or anyone who knew of
her appointment as principal at Coolidge. Her continued attempts
to contact her supposed supervisor were to no avail.
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letter on August 7, 2006.3 Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on
November 1, 2006.
On July 11, 2008, defendant filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that (1) plaintiff’s claims are untimely; (2) plaintiff
failed to comply with D.C. Code § 12-309; (3) plaintiff’s claims
are barred by the one-year statute of limitations and the
settlement agreement she entered into; and (4) punitive damages
are not recoverable against the District of Columbia.
On February 3, 2009, this Court directed the parties to
address the applicability, if any, of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act of 2009, to this matter. As a result, defendant withdrew
its timeliness argument.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must make
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Musgrove case was mistakenly administratively dismissed
by OHR because of mistaken identity. This problem was correct by
the OHR Director Kenneth Saunders. Saunders attempted to
administratively close the case a second time in 2005; he
rescinded the dismissal. On July 21, 2005, the EEOC sent
plaintiff a right to sue letter for Simone Greggs, who worked at
the Hard Rock Café in Washington, D.C. – another case of mistaken
identity. It took a year before plaintiff was able to correct
these identity issues and receive a proper right to sue letter
from the EEOC.
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sufficiently detailed factual allegations in her complaint. See
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id. (citation omitted). “In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint and grant the plaintiff
the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.” Eleson v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282
(D.D.C. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“However, ‘a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of
[her] entitlement to relief [in her complaint] requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court is “not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” when
considering a motion to dismiss. Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,
456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). In determining whether a complaint
fails to state a claim, the Court “may consider only the facts
alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or
incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court]
may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial
Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (footnote and citation
omitted).
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B. D.C. Code § 12-309D.C. Code § 12-309 has a notice provision requiring a
plaintiff who files suit “against the District of Columbia for
unliquidated damages” to give notice “within six months after the
injury or damage was sustained . . . in writing to the Mayor of
the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause,
and circumstances of the injury or damage.” D.C. Code § 12-309.
The notice requirement is a condition precedent to filing a suit
against the District of Columbia. Gwinn v. District of Columbia,
434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981). “Section 12-309 is not, and
does not function as, a statute of limitations. Rather, it
imposes a notice requirement on everyone with a tort claim
against the District of Columbia, and compliance with its terms
is ‘mandatory as a prerequisite to filing suit against the
District.’” District of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359
(D.C. 1995) (quoting Hardy v. District of Columbia, 616 A.2d 338,
340 (D.C. 1992)).
Defendant argues that plaintiff still has not notified the
mayor under the statute. Plaintiff argues that not only did she
notify the District of Columbia under § 12-309, but also that the
statute does not apply because there is no way she could have
known within six months after her termination that she would
inevitably file suit against defendant because she had a
statutory right to file her case with OHR or with the EEOC –
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which could have continued for longer than six months.
As an initial matter, this Court finds that plaintiff did
give defendant notice of her intention to file a claim. In a
letter dated September 24, 2004, plaintiff’s attorney informed
the District of Columbia that plaintiff was prepared to proceed
to trial. See Letter from E. Lindsey Maxwell II, Esq. to Valerie
Jones, Sept. 20, 2004. The letter clearly states that
plaintiff’s claims are based on age and gender discrimination,
among other things. On September 21, 2004, the District of
Columbia responded to plaintiff’s attorney by letter stating that
the plaintiff’s correspondence was being transferred to the
Attorney General for the District of Columbia. See Letter from
to Valerie Jones to E. Lindsey Maxwell, Sept. 21, 2004.
According to the D.C. Court of Appeals, the purpose of § 12-
309 is to “provide an early warning to District of Columbia
officials regarding litigation likely to occur in the future.”
Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1978).
Section 12-309 also serves to “permit the District to conduct an
early investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding
such claims.” Id. In Mazloum v. District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department, 522 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2007),
this Court held that “the content requirements of the notice
given to the District . . . ‘are to be interpreted liberally, and
in close cases [courts are to] resolve doubts in favor of finding
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compliance with the statute.’” (quoting Shaw v. District of
Columbia, 2006 WL 1274765 (D.D.C. May 8, 2006)).
Plaintiff’s letter clearly warned District of Columbia
officials that litigation was likely to occur in the future, and
the District of Columbia had sufficient time to conduct an early
investigation of the facts and the circumstances surrounding
plaintiff’s claims. Interpreting the statute liberally,
plaintiff gave notice under the statute. Her claims are not
barred by § 12-309. Having decided that plaintiff complied with
the statute, it is not necessary for this Court to decide whether
the statute applies to plaintiff’s claims.
C. Statute of Limitations and the Settlement Agreement
I. Statute of Limitations
D.C. Code § 2-1403.16 provides that a cause of action must
be filed "within one year of the unlawful discriminatory act, or
the discovery thereof." D.C. Code § 2-1403.16. "The filing of a
complaint with the [D.C.] Office [of Human Rights] . . . shall
toll the running of the statute of limitations while the
complaint in pending." Id. Defendant argues that plaintiff did
not timely file the DCHRA complaint, and that plaintiff’s
equitable claims are barred by the statute of limitations under
the DCHRA. Plaintiff argues that she did timely file her claims.
Plaintiff filed her claims with OHR on May 19, 2004,
alleging there that the initial discriminatory discharge occurred
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on July 16, 2003. She, therefore, met the one-year deadline for
her initial filing; plaintiff’s claims tolled the statute of
limitations. Her claim, however, was administratively dismissed
on May 24, 2005. Plaintiff’s administrative dismissal was an
error; she presented documentation to the Court documenting the
clerical mistake. A proper right to sue letter was issued on
August 7, 2006, and the case was reopened. Plaintiff then
properly filed suit on November 1, 2006, well within the ninety-
day limit that the EEOC letter announced in its August 7, 2007
right to sue letter.
ii. Settlement Agreement
Defendant also claims that the settlement agreement covers
the claims of discrimination and that plaintiff’s claims are
barred by it. In the settlement agreement, plaintiff agreed to
"release and to not pursue or file any action or complaint of any
nature in any forum regarding her termination." The question is
whether her discrimination claim is covered by this release. It
is not. The language of the settlement agreement indicates that
it only covered her termination. Her termination letter
indicates that she was terminated for insubordination and
violations of two specific sections of the D.C. Fire Code. The
allegations in this suit are age and gender discrimination claims
that have nothing to do with insubordination or violations of the
D.C. Fire Code.
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D. Punitive Damages
Defendant argues that punitive damages against the District
of Columbia are only recoverable in "extraordinary
circumstances." Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637,
658 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The term “extraordinary circumstances”
refers to circumstances “‘where a jurisdiction's taxpayers are
directly responsible for perpetrating the policies that caused
the plaintiff's injuries’ or ‘where a municipality or its
policymakers have intentionally adopted the unconstitutional
policy that caused the damages in question.’” Id. (quoting
Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 447 (D.C. Cir.
2000)). Plaintiff specifically claims that there is a culture of
gender discrimination against female high school principals in
the District of Columbia. If true, plaintiff’s allegations
present circumstances upon which a jury might find that
“extraordinary circumstances” could warrant the awarding of
punitive damages. This issue is not ripe for a motion to
dismiss.
III. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. An appropriate
Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
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Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 16, 2009
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