Stotmeister v. Alion Science and Technology Corporation ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    MARY S. STOTMEISTER, et al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.                                             Civil Action No. 08-01193 (TFH) 1
    ALION SCIENCE & TECH. CORP., et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Pending before the Court is the Joint Motion for Summary Judgment of Alion Science
    and Technology Corporation, Cherry Hill Construction, Inc., Day & Zimmerman Group
    Services, DC Water and M&M Welding & Fabricators, Inc. on the Issue of Frank Stotmeister’s
    Contributory Negligence [ECF No. 160], which urges the Court to grant summary judgment in
    the defendants’ favor on the ground that the doctrine of contributory negligence bars the
    plaintiffs from prevailing on their claims for damages relating to fatal injuries Francis (“Frank”)
    Stotmeister sustained while working on a construction project on April 23, 2004. After the
    1
    On July 8, 2011, the Court issued an order consolidating the following cases: 05-cv-
    00545, 06-cv-00834, 05-cv-00813 and 08-cv-01193. Stotmeister v. Alion Science & Tech. Corp.,
    No. 05-cv-00813, Order (July 8, 2011) [ECF No. 95]. Stipulations of dismissal were later filed
    in 05-cv-00545 and 06-cv-00834, as well as in 10-cv-02280, which was another related case that
    was never consolidated. Consequently, only 08-cv-01193 and 05-cv-00813 remain active. From
    this Court’s perspective, this decision and the accompanying order resolve all remaining claims
    pending in 08-cv-01193, with the exception of a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
    CLARIFICATION [ECF No. 151] that was filed by Day & Zimmerman Services, Inc. on June 7,
    2011. That motion will be addressed separately. With respect to any causes of action pending in
    05-cv-00813, the Court views this decision as rendering moot those causes of action, as indicated
    in the accompanying order.
    --1--
    motion was filed, the plaintiffs entered into settlement agreements with all the moving
    defendants except Day & Zimmerman Group Services (“Day & Zimmerman”) and M&M
    Welding & Fabricators, Inc. (“M&M Welding”). Accordingly, the Court considers the merits of
    the motion only with respect to Day & Zimmerman and M&M Welding. For the reasons set
    forth below, the Court concludes that Frank Stotmeister’s injuries were caused by his own
    contributory negligence so summary judgment in favor of Day & Zimmerman and M&M
    Welding shall be granted. For these same reasons, the Court will deny the Stotmeister Plaintiffs’
    Motion to Reconsider [ECF No. 246] and, accordingly, the Joint Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’
    Motion to Reconsider [ECF No. 249] and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Oral Argument [ECF No. 256]
    will be denied as moot.
    APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 mandates that “[t]he Court shall grant summary
    judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it
    “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
    
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that
    a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 
    Id.
     At the summary judgment
    stage, however, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the
    truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
    Id. at 249
    .
    “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for
    a jury to return a verdict for that party.” 
    Id.
    --2--
    Although “[t]he evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
    party and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,”
    Talavera v. Shah, 
    638 F.3d 303
    , 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011), “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or
    is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted,” Anderson, 
    477 U.S. at 249
    (internal citations omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
    plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
    reasonably find for the plaintiff.” 
    Id. at 252
    . The ultimate inquiry is “whether the evidence
    presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
    that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 
    Id.
    The evidence the Court may consider when passing on a summary judgment motion
    consists of “materials specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) as well as any material
    that would be admissible or usable at trial.” Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 
    651 F.3d 118
    , 145 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to Rule 56(c), the Court
    is not limited to the evidence cited by the parties but also “may consider other materials in the
    record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). In addition, the Rules of the United States District Court for
    the District of Columbia state that “[i]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the court
    may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are
    admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition
    to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1), available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/local-rules.
    THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
    The Court reviewed the extensive volumes of evidence that constitute the record in this
    case and carefully culled and evaluated the facts to determine whether there were any genuine
    --3--
    disputes about facts that could be deemed material to the outcome. On the whole, it frankly is
    surprising how little dispute there is with respect to the facts, particularly in light of the
    realization that most of the evidence involved the testimony of witnesses, many of whom were
    deposed about the same events multiples times, by multiple attorneys, over a period of several
    years. The witnesses in this case were remarkably concordant in their recollections of the events
    that took place during the early morning hours on April 23, 2004, so there quite simply were few
    instances of conflicting evidence that raised genuine disputes. 2 After considering all the
    evidence and the entire record in this case, the Court finds the following facts to be undisputed. 3
    A.      Grunley-Walsh’s Contract with the General Services Administration
    The General Services Administration National Capital Region Heating Operation and
    Transmission District (referred to by its acronym “GSA HOTD”) manages and operates the
    Steam Distribution Complex, which is a “12-mile distribution pipeline that spiders the central
    business district of Washington, D.C.” Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In
    Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 38, Richard Matkins Dep. 16:1-3 (quote), 198:3-198:9 (Dec.
    12, 2007) [ECF No. 204-5]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 103, Carroll Williams Dep. 23:5-23:11 (Oct. 28, 2009)
    2
    As a testament to the fact that there was scant contradictory evidence, the Court was able
    to rely principally on the plaintiffs’ -- i.e., the nonmoving parties’ – evidence as citation sources
    for many, if not most, of the undisputed facts. This evidence includes Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed
    Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2], which the Court notes in most cases disputed only an inference
    that could be drawn from facts set forth in the defendants’ Statement of Material Facts Not In
    Dispute [ECF No. 160-1] but not the facts themselves. See Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material
    Facts ¶¶ 5, 12, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 41, 44, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73 [ECF No.
    196-2]. Consequently, most of the facts in the defendants’ Statement of Material Facts Not In
    Dispute [ECF No. 160-1] remain undisputed and supported by the evidence in the case.
    3
    All facts discussed in other sections of this opinion also were determined by the Court to
    be undisputed unless expressly identified as disputed herein. Any facts omitted from this
    decision were deemed to be immaterial.
    --4--
    [ECF No. 208-6] (confirming that the GSA department that operates high-pressure steam is
    referred to as “HOTD”). 4 The section of the Steam Distribution Complex that runs beneath 17th
    Street provides steam to several federal buildings. Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In
    Dispute ¶ 1 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2]
    (indicating no dispute with paragraph 1).
    In 2002, GSA HOTD entered into a task-order contract with Grunley-Walsh Joint
    Venture, Inc. (“Grunley-Walsh”) that ultimately required Grunley-Walsh to replace a section of
    the Steam Distribution Complex running under 17th Street from the so-called “Point of
    Connection” -- which was located at the intersection of 17th Street and New York Avenue -- to
    Manhole 8. 5 Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 2 [ECF No. 160-1], with
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph
    2); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70,
    Bassem Soueidan Dep. 118:16-124:18, 129:1-136:22, 145:1-145:7 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No.
    206-5]; United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7, Westphal Decl.
    4
    The evidence in the case is voluminous and many documents cited in this decision were
    submitted by the various parties pursuant to other prior proceedings. To assist the parties or
    others who might be reviewing this decision, the Court has identified not only the title of a
    document and pinpoint citation but also the Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) number to facilitate
    efficient cross reference to the record evidence. There also are many individuals whose
    deposition testimony is cited or who otherwise are identified in this decision so, albeit somewhat
    cumbersome, for clarity the Court generally refers to individuals by their full name.
    5
    The 2002 contract originally required Grunley-Walsh to perform asbestos abatement in
    the steam tunnels, replace condensate lines and provide new insulation. Exs. In Supp. of
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan
    Dep. 118:16-120:13, 129:2-129:20, 130:22-131:21, 136:11-136:15 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No.
    206-5]; United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 10, Scope of Work
    ¶ A [ECF No. 122-1]. In 2003, however, a change order modified the contract to require
    replacing the steam system. United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.
    Ex. 1, Scope of Work ¶ 8 [ECF No. 122-1].
    --5--
    ¶ 3 [ECF No. 122-1]; United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 10
    (Order No. P-11-02-YT-0256) [ECF No. 122-1]. The project was referred to as the “17th Street
    Steam Distribution Project” and involved, among other things, excavating 17th Street to remove
    the existing steam and condensate pipes and install new pipes. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’
    Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 118:6-118:8,
    129:15-129:20, 131:7-131:21 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5]; Day & Zimmerman’s Opp’n to
    the United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 10, Greg Westphal Decl. ¶ 4 [ECF No. 94-9].
    Although Grunley-Walsh was the prime contractor responsible for performing the 17th
    Street Steam Distribution Project, Grunley-Walsh entered into subcontracts with other
    companies to assist with the required work. Mem. of P. & A. In Supp. of Pls.’ Partial Opp’n to
    Third Party Def. U.S.A.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 2-3 [ECF No. 97] (stating that Grunley-Walsh was
    hired to be the general contractor); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n
    to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 145:5-145:11 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No.
    206-5]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 73, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 31:1-31:8 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 206-8].
    Grunley-Walsh hired M&M Welding to replace the components of the steam system and install a
    temporary boiler in Manhole 11. Mem. of P. & A. In Supp. of Pls.’ Partial Opp’n to Third Party
    Def. U.S.A.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 3 [ECF No. 97]. Grunley-Walsh also contracted with Cherry
    Hill Construction, Inc. (“Cherry Hill”) to excavate, insulate, and perform back-filling services for
    the 17th Street Steam Distribution Project. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In
    Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 145:1-145:4 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF
    No. 206-5].
    --6--
    After Grunley-Walsh began performing the contract work for the 17th Street Steam
    Distribution Project, GSA HOTD issued a change order that modified Grunley-Walsh’s contract
    to require the installation of an 8-inch water service line between Manhole 7 and Manhole 9 as
    part of an effort to modernize the Old Executive Office Building. Compare Statement of
    Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 34 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material
    Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 34); compare Statement of Material
    Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 13 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF
    No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 13); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of
    P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 133:2-133:22, 136:11-
    136:17 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 33, Thomas Johnson Dep. 340:12-340:16,
    450:3-450:10, 484:3-484:11 (Nov. 17, 2010) [ECF No. 203-5]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 74, Brian Staudenmaier
    Dep. 51:7-52:5 (Mar. 12, 2008) [ECF No. 207-1]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 91, Greg Westphal Decl. ¶ 5(b)
    [ECF No. 207-18]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 28:10-29:17, 30:12-31:12 (Dec. 10,
    2007) [ECF No. 205-15]. The water line tie-in project involved cutting into the existing 20-inch
    main water line to connect or “tap” a new 8-inch water line. Compare Statement of Material
    Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 36 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 36
    [ECF No. 196-2] (asserting that the scope of Cherry Hill’s work was not limited to cutting and
    tapping the water line but otherwise not disputing that “[i]nstallation of the water service line
    required Cherry Hill to tie-into existing 20” and 8” water mains maintained by DC Water”); Exs.
    In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 91, Greg
    Westphal Decl. ¶ 5(b) [ECF No. 207-18]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 94, Greg Westphal Dep. 28:17-28:24 (Apr.
    13, 2010) [ECF No. 207-21]; Ex. 112, Record of Change Order Negotiation (Mar. 12, 2004)
    --7--
    [ECF No. 208-15]. Grunley-Walsh subcontracted the water line tie-in project to Cherry Hill.
    Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 35 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister
    Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 35); Exs. In
    Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell
    Schneider Dep. 28:10-28:20 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15].
    By the time Grunley-Walsh and Cherry Hill were set to begin the water line tie-in project,
    all work on the 17th Street Steam Distribution Project had been completed and the steam system
    was back in service. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 188:15-188:19 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5].
    Grunley-Walsh’s President, Bassem Soueidan, explained that “all of the steam system had been
    completed[,] inspected, tested, punched out – punch list – verified, accepted” and “the only thing
    that was left was, in fact, the installation of the water main, which was a change order.” United
    States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 17, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 49:12-
    49:16 (Jan. 18, 2008) [ECF No. 122-1]; United States. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4, Bassem
    Soueidan Dep. 11:4-11:6 (Jan. 18, 2008) [ECF No. 85-1] (identifying himself as Grunley-
    Walsh’s president). Soueidan confirmed that, because the contractors had finished and turned
    over the steam system, “[n]othing was contemplated that would involve a shutdown of the steam
    line in connection with the work that remained on the [water line tie-in] project.” Third Party
    Def. United States’ Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1, Bassem Soueidan
    Dep. 49:4-49:7 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2].
    --8--
    B.     The Water Line Tie-In Project Begins Late
    On the night of April 22, 2004, Grunley-Walsh and Cherry Hill began work on the water
    line tie-in project. Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶¶ 37, 38 [ECF No.
    160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute
    with paragraphs 37 and 38); Day & Zimmerman’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings Ex. B, Greg
    Westphal Decl. ¶ 5 [ECF No. 32-4]. Grunley-Walsh’s Superintendent, Frank Stotmeister, was
    supervising the water line tie-in project and had oversight responsibility for all the work and
    subcontractors. Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 3 [ECF No. 160-1], with
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph
    3); see also J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, Brian Staudenmaier Dep. 14:6-14:9
    (Mar. 12, 2008) [ECF No. 161-1]. The Cherry Hill supervising personnel who reported to Frank
    Stotmeister that night included Joseph Hudert, who was Cherry Hill’s Superintendent, Dayrell
    Schneider, who was Cherry Hill’s Utility Divisional Manager, and Gary Sims, who was the
    Foreman of the Cherry Hill pipe crew performing the water line tie-in project. Exs. In Supp. of
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider
    Dep. 13:20-13:21, 21:1-22:6, 24:2-24:21 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 66,
    Dayrell Schneider Dep. 70:10-70:16, 205:7-205:8 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1].
    The water line tie-in project began inauspiciously. The District of Columbia Water and
    Sewer Authority (“DC WASA”) crew was late performing the water main shutdown that was
    necessary before the Grunley-Walsh and Cherry Hill contractors could begin cutting the main
    pipe for the water line tie-in project. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In
    Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 28, Dexter Holmes Dep. 136:1-136:3, 148:20-152:17 (Dec. 9,
    --9--
    2010) [ECF No. 202-15]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 32, Thomas Johnson Dep. 96:3-106:22 (Oct. 19, 2010) [ECF
    No. 203-4]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 130:8-131:9 (stating that he was notified that
    the water main was shut down between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m.), 134:20-135:20 (Dec. 10, 2007)
    [ECF No. 205-15]; compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 37 [ECF No. 160-1],
    with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with
    paragraph 37). As a result, the water main was not shut off until between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00
    a.m. on April 23, 2004, which caused concern among the contractors about whether they could
    meet a 5:30 a.m. deadline to complete the water line tie-in project and reopen the street to traffic.
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. Ex. 65,
    Dayrell Schneider Dep. 130:8-131:9, 134:20-135:20, 138:4-138:16 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No.
    205-15]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 31, Thomas Johnson Dep. 136:15-136:17 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 203-3]
    (confirming that the job should have been completed around 5:30 a.m.); 
    id.
     at Ex. 66, Dayrell
    Schneider Dep. 69:14-70:19, 93:5-93:22 (indicating a 5:30 a.m. deadline), 252:4-252:10 (May
    12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]; Joint Mot. for Summ. J. of Alion Science & Technology Corp.,
    Cherry Hill Construction, Inc., Day & Zimmerman Group Servs., DC Water and M&M Welding
    & Fabricators, Inc. On the Issue of Frank Stotmeister’s Contributory Negligence [hereinafter
    cited as “Joint Mot. for Summ. J.”] Ex. K, Gary Sims Dep. 171:4-171:18 (July 7, 2010) [ECF
    No. 162-4]; 
    id.
     at Ex. M, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 39:14-39:16 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 162-6].
    Frank Stotmeister, Dayrell Schneider and Joseph Hudert conferred, however, and agreed to
    proceed with the water line tie-in project notwithstanding the delay. 6 Exs. In Supp. of
    6
    Dayrell Schneider testified that someone from GSA was present for this discussion but he
    was uncertain about that individual’s identity. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P&A
    In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 146:8-146:14 (Dec. 10, 2007)
    --10--
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 32, Thomas Johnson Dep.
    100:22-104:15 (Oct. 19, 2010) [ECF No. 203-4]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 134:20-
    135:20, 138:4-138:16 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15] (explaining that “[i]t was a joint
    decision, Frank, Joe, myself”); 
    id.
     at Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 69:16-70:19, 170:2-171:16,
    252:4-252:18 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1].
    C.     Water Floods the Steam Vault and Causes the Steam Pipes to Hammer
    Between 2:00 a.m. and 2:30 a.m., the contractors began cutting the water main pipe so
    the pipe could drain. Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 38 [ECF No. 160-
    1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with
    paragraph 38); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ.
    J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 71:5-71:12, 144:4-147:6 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15];
    
    id.
     at Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 39:14-40:3 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 67,
    Gary Sims Dep. 79:2-80:15 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No. 206-2]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 91, Greg Westphal Decl. ¶
    5(c) (Apr. 28, 2005) [ECF No. 207-18]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 25, Dexter Holmes Dep. 189:15-189:18 (Dec.
    9, 2010) [ECF No. 202-12]. The water never fully drained, however, and continued to flow from
    the main pipe into the trench where the contractors were working. Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed
    Material Facts ¶ 39 [ECF No. 196-2] (stating that “[t]hroughout the process of Cherry Hill’s
    cutting the water main, water steadily flowed out of the pipe”); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’
    [ECF No. 205-15]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 70:10-70:16, 170:5-171:9, 252:4-
    252:18 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]. In 2008, Thomas Johnson testified that he was present
    when the discussion occurred, Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to
    Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 31, Thomas Johnson Dep. 42:14-44:16 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 203-3],
    but in 2010 he testified that Kevin Moore, an inspector for Alion, was present, 
    id.
     at Ex. 32,
    Thomas Johnson Dep. 102:9-102:18 (Oct. 19, 2010) [ECF No. 203-4]. The identity of the other
    individual who was present is not material to the outcome of this case, however.
    --11--
    Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 171:12-172:21,
    220:11-221:3 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 39:14-
    39:16 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]. As the contractors proceeded to make additional cuts
    into the main pipe a significant amount of water continued to flow and accumulate in the trench
    despite the use of four electric pumps to dewater. 7 Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P.
    & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 151:1-151:21, 154:3-
    155:21, 171:12-172:21 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15].
    Within about thirty minutes of the contractors making the initial cuts to the water main
    pipe, the accumulating water overflowed the trench and began to run into the steam vault toward
    Manholes 9 and 10 where it made contact with the uninsulated steam pipes. Exs. In Supp. of
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider
    Dep. 157:6-157:21, 173:11-173:21, 208:1-208:9 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15]; 
    id.
     at Ex.
    66, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 184:19-185:3 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 67, Gary
    Sims Dep. 128:5-128:10, 175:20-177:10, 213:21-214:22, 224:16-224:22 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No.
    206-2]; J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. L, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 168:9-168:19
    (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 162-5]; 
    id.
     at Ex. M, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 81:19-83:22, 85:5-86:20
    (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 162-6]; Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 72 [ECF No. 196-
    2] (stating that “the water flowing from the 20-inch water main entered the steam vault” and
    “contacted the steam lines”). As a result, steam rose out of the manholes and two steam pipes
    7
    Dayrell Schneider stated that “[t]he volume of water overwhelmed us because even when
    the whole piece was cut out, you still had a 4- or 5-inch flow, which is not normal.” Exs. In
    Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 66, Dayrell
    Schneider Dep. 190:14-190:17 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1].
    --12--
    that were within 10 feet of the contractors began to visibly and audibly hammer, 8 causing
    Dayrell Schneider and Gary Sims, who were in charge of the pipe crew, to fear for their safety. 9
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 72 [ECF No. 196-2] (stating that “the steam pipes
    jumped and made a loud hammering noise”); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A.
    In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 31, Thomas Johnson Dep. 47:19-48:21 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF
    No. 203-3]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 157:6-157:21, 208:1-208:12 (Dec. 10, 2007)
    [ECF No. 205-15]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 83:13-84:6, 86:4-89:20, 101:3-101:21,
    200:12-201:9, 208:8-209:15, 233:21-237:21, 249:19-250:5 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]; 
    id.
    at Ex. 67, Gary Sims Dep. 91:7-94:22, 213:1-214:22 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No. 206-2]; 
    id.
     at Ex.
    68, Gary Sims Dep. 285:12-286:18, 328:2-328:9 [ECF No. 206-3]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 28, Dexter Holmes
    Dep. 169:4-169:19, 171:17-172:2 (Dec. 9, 2010) [ECF No. 202-15]; J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot.
    for Summ. J. Ex. K, Gary Sims Dep. 91:7-94:22 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No. 162-4]; 
    id.
     at Ex. L,
    Dayrell Schneider Dep. 167:21-171:4, 224:1-224:11 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 162-5]; 
    id.
     at Ex.
    M, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 298:14-300:20 (May 12. 2010) [ECF No. 162-6]; compare Statement
    of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 40 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material
    Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 40).
    8
    There is conflicting evidence about whether the hammering was a single incident or
    whether it was ongoing while the water main pipe was being cut. Compare, e.g., Exs. In Supp.
    of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider
    Dep. 101:17-101:21 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1] (agreeing that there was only one water
    hammer that night), with Ex. 67, Gary Sims Dep. 92:7-92:20 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No. 206-2]
    (stating that the hammering lasted “[f]or approximately the entire time” the cuts were being
    made to the water main). The duration of the hammering is, however, immaterial to the outcome
    of this case.
    9
    Dexter Holmes also stated that he found the hammering to be “dangerous to a degree.”
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 28, Dexter
    Holmes Dep. 169:4-169:17, 171:17-172:2 (Dec. 9, 2010) [ECF No. 202-15].
    --13--
    D.     Frank Stotmeister Refuses to Shut Down the Steam System Despite Dayrell
    Schneider’s Multiple Requests
    When the steam pipes hammered, Dayrell Schneider ordered the contractors to get out of
    the trench and asked Frank Stotmeister three times to shut down the steam system so the
    contractors could work safely on the water line tie-in project. Compare Statement of Material
    Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 41 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 41
    [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute that Dayrell Schneider ordered the crew to evacuate the
    trench because he was alarmed); compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 43 [ECF
    No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no
    dispute with paragraph 43); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. L, Dayrell Schneider
    Dep. 167:20-169:14, 223:9-224:19 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 162-5]; 
    id.
     at Ex. M, Dayrell
    Schneider Dep. 298:14-300:20 (May 12. 2010) [ECF No. 162-6]; Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister
    Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 84:3-84:6,
    86:4-86:20, 208:12-209:15, 250:6-250:22 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 67, Gary
    Sims Dep. 213:17-213:20 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No. 206-2]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 68, Gary Sims Dep. 297:18-
    298:17, 328:2-328:13, 329:3-329:11 (Mar. 2, 2011) [ECF No. 206-3]. Frank Stotmeister
    refused, however, to shut down the steam system and, instead, assured Dayrell Schneider that it
    was safe to proceed without turning off the steam:
    Frank came over and basically said that we’re going to be okay, Dayrell. We just
    dealt with mother nature. We have had three inches [of rain]. Look at the
    weather reports.
    --14--
    This steam system is not designed to drain water anytime, anywhere. We’ve seen
    these steam lines jump like that before. This is schedule[] 80. 10 I said, I’m not an
    expert with scheduled 80; but he says, It will be okay.
    I said, Why don’t you just go back to the source and shut the steam line down;
    and we won’t even have this conversation. And he assured me that we’re okay.
    And we made the decision to go back in.
    J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. L, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 170:2-170:15 (Dec. 10,
    2007) [ECF No. 162-5] (capitalization in original). Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In
    Dispute ¶ 43 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2]
    (indicating no dispute with paragraph 43); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. L.,
    Dayrell Schneider Dep. 168:4-168:8 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 162-5]; United States’
    Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7, Greg Westphal Decl. ¶ 5(d) (Apr. 28,
    2005) [ECF No. 122-1] (stating that “Grunley-Walsh Construction Superintendent, Frank
    Stotmeister, instructed Cherry Hill employees that it was safe to continue working and that the
    steam lines . . . could withstand the water hammering”). Rather than shut down the steam
    system, Frank Stotmeister directed the contractors to dump ten tons of recycled material into the
    trench to create a temporary berm to control the water flowing from the water main pipe into the
    steam vault. Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 44 [ECF No. 160-1], with
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 44 [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with the
    facts contained in paragraph 44 but disputing the inference that Cherry Hill controlled the water
    contacting the steam line after the berm was created); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of
    P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 183:11-183:19, 238:1-
    238:15 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 67, Gary Sims Dep. 177:11-177:15 (July 7,
    10
    Frank Stotmeister was referring to the thickness of the metal pipe. Exs. In Supp. of
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider
    Dep. 209:18-22 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1].
    --15--
    2010) [ECF No. 206-2]; J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. K, Gary Simms Dep.
    101:12-103:4 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No. 162-4]; 
    id.
     at Ex. M, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 192:16-
    193:13 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 162-6]; 
    id.
     at Ex. I, Dexter Holmes Dep. 188:1-188:3 (Dec. 9,
    2010) [ECF No. 162-2] (indicating that the berm was created after the contractors evacuated the
    trench). Despite the berm, though, water continued to accumulate in the trench and overflow
    into the steam vault. Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 44 [ECF No. 196-2] (stating
    that water continued to flow into the steam vault after the berm was created).
    E.     Water Condensation Causes the Steam Pipes in the New Executive Office Building
    to Hammer, Which Damages the Steam System and Sets Off a Fire Alarm
    The New Executive Office Building (“NEOB”) is heated by a steam station that is
    connected to the 17th Street steam line via a six-inch line that branches from Manhole 11.
    Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 45 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister
    Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 45); J.A. In
    Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. N, James Plakas Dep. 20:8-21:1 (Oct. 6, 2009) [ECF No.
    162-7]. At around the same time the contractors in the trench observed steam pipes hammering,
    a fire alarm went off at the NEOB. J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. KK, Letter from
    Tisa B. Smith, Information and Privacy Officer, D.C. Fire/EMS Dept., to James Jordan (May 3,
    2010) [ECF No. 163-16] (attaching an incident log reflecting an emergency contact around 3:00
    a.m. at the NEOB); 
    id.
     at Ex. P, Thomas Johnson Dep. 356:13-356:19 (Nov. 17, 2010) [ECF No.
    162-9]; Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex.
    31, Thomas Johnson Dep. 54:16-55:7 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 203-3]; 
    id.
     at Ex. 32, Thomas
    Johnson Dep. 155:4-156:21 (Oct. 19, 2010) [ECF No. 203-4]; compare Statement of Material
    Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 46 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF
    --16--
    No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 46). Plumbers working at the NEOB
    discovered that a pressure-relief valve at the NEOB steam station was blowing steam and water,
    which was unusual and indicated that the steam system was full of condensation. Compare
    Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 46 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’
    Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 46); J.A. In
    Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. Q, Darrell Jackson Dep. 22:1-28:22 (Jan. 28, 2010) [ECF
    No. 162-10]; 
    id.
     at Ex. R, Marion Christopher Yewell Dep. 25:2-32:13, 35:21-36:9, 37:3-37:14
    (Dec. 3, 2009) [ECF No. 162-11]; 
    id.
     at Ex. T, Richard Julian Dep. 38:7-15 (Oct. 9, 2009) [ECF
    No. 162-13]. The steam released from the damaged pressure-relief valve had caused heat
    detectors in the steam station to activate the fire alarm. Compare Statement of Material Facts
    Not In Dispute ¶ 46 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No.
    196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 46).
    The plumbers at the NEOB shut off the steam system isolation valves to prevent steam
    from entering the NEOB steam station and then proceeded to drain the condensation out of the
    pipes. Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 47 [ECF No. 160-1], with
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph
    47); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. R, Marion Christopher Yewell Dep. 32:14-
    35:12, 40:3-41:3 (Dec. 3, 2009) [ECF No. 162-11]. After the condensation was drained from the
    system, the plumbers replaced a gasket that had been blown out of the pressure-relief valve and
    then the plumbers attempted to slowly turn the valve back on to reestablish steam. Compare
    Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 49 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’
    Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 49); J.A. In
    --17--
    Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. R, Marion Christopher Yewell Dep. 35:6-41:11 (Dec. 3,
    2009) [ECF No. 162-11]; 
    id.
     at Ex. T, Richard Julian Dep. 42:6-42:8 (Oct. 9, 2009) [ECF No.
    162-13]; Exs. In Supp. of Pls.’ Partial Opp’n to United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 14, Marion
    Christopher Yewell Dep. 135:3-135:5 (Dec. 3, 2009) [ECF No. 97-14]. When the plumbers tried
    to reestablish steam, however, the steam pipes began to hammer so dramatically that the valve
    wheel started turning on its own. Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 49
    [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no
    dispute with paragraph 49); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. R, Marion Christopher
    Yewell Dep. 42:6-44:19, 71:5-72:21 (Dec. 3, 2009) [ECF No. 162-11]; 
    id.
     at Ex. T, Richard
    Julian Dep. 42:9-45:14, 47:15-47:21 (Oct. 9, 2009) [ECF No. 162-13]. Frightened by what was
    happening at the NEOB steam station, the plumbers quickly left the building. Exs. In Supp. of
    Pls.’ Partial Opp’n to Unites States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 14, Marion Christopher Yewell Dep.
    135:3-135:18 (Dec. 3, 2009) [ECF No. 97-14]; J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. Q,
    Darrell Jackson Dep. 28:13-28:22 (Jan. 28, 2010) [ECF No. 162-10]; 
    id.
     at Ex. T, Richard Julian
    Dep. 47:19-47:21 (Oct. 9, 2009) [ECF No. 162-13].
    F.     Frank Stotmeister Closes the Feeder Valve In Manhole 11
    On the street, the plumbers ran into Thomas Johnson, who was a government contractor
    employed by Alion Science and Technology Corporation (“Alion”). Def./Cross Def.’s
    Submission In Resp. to Order of April 12, 2011 1 [ECF No. 120-1]; Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister
    Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 40, Larry Melton Dep. 37:11-38:5
    (Mar. 9, 2010) [ECF No. 204-7]; Pls.’ Partial Opp’n to United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 15,
    --18--
    James D. Rosenberger Dep. 49:19-49:21, 156:4-156:7 (Dec. 1, 2009) [ECF No. 97-15]. Alion 11
    had a contract with the GSA’s White House Project’s Office to perform construction
    management services for certain designated projects pursuant to work orders issued under the
    contract. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex.
    2, Alion Contract IB1-IC1 (ALI 00017-20) [ECF No. 201-2]; Def./Cross Def.’s Submission In
    Resp. to Order of April 12, 2011 1 [ECF No. 120-1]. Thomas Johnson was on 17th Street the
    night of April 23, 2004, because he was supervising a water-fountain construction project at the
    NEOB for the White House Service Center. Pls.’ Partial Opp’n to United States’ Mot. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 17, Thomas Johnson Dep. 49:4-49:12 (Oct. 19, 2010) [ECF No. 97-17]; United
    States’ Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 6, Thomas Johnson Dep. 433:1-
    433:21 (Nov. 17, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2]. Thomas Johnson also had been a Project Manager for
    the 17th Street Steam Distribution Project. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In
    Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 40, Larry Melton Dep. 37:11-38:5, 39:9-40:5 (Mar. 9, 2010)
    [ECF No. 204-7]; Third Party Def.’s Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1,
    Bassem Soueidan Dep. 31:9-31:15 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2]; United States’
    Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2, Greg Westphal Dep. 379:3-379:9 (Apr.
    13, 2010) [ECF No. 122-1].
    11
    The indefinite-delivery-indefinite-quantity contract was executed by Alion’s predecessor,
    ANADAC, Inc., and the GSA. Def./Cross Def.’s Submission In Resp. to Order of April 12,
    2011 Ex. 1 [ECF No. 120-1].
    --19--
    One of the plumbers 12 told Thomas Johnson about the hammering at the NEOB steam
    station and asked to have the steam to the NEOB shut off in the street so the plumbers could
    change a valve. Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 50 [ECF No. 160-1],
    with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with
    paragraph 50); Pls.’ Partial Opp’n to United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 15, James D.
    Rosenberger Dep. 49:19-50:9, 156:4-157:17, 161:2-162:14 (Dec. 1, 2009) [ECF No. 97-15]; J.A.
    In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. T, Richard B. Julian Dep. 54:13-55:2 (Oct. 9, 2009)
    [ECF No. 162-13]; 
    id.
     at Ex. O, Thomas Johnson Dep. 87:10-87:22 (Mar. 12, 2007) [ECF No.
    162-8]; Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex.
    30, Thomas Johnson Dep. 20:7-20:20, (Mar. 12, 2007) [ECF No. 203-2]. Thomas Johnson
    relayed the plumbers’ request to Frank Stotmeister and asked Stotmeister to shut the steam off. 13
    12
    It is unclear from the evidence who actually told Thomas Johnson about the hammering
    but that detail is immaterial and there is no dispute that one of the plumbers did. Compare
    Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 50 [ECF No. 160-1] (stating that James
    Rosenberger told Thomas Johnson about the hammering), and Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed
    Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 50), with Pls.’ Partial
    Opp’n to United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 15, James D. Rosenberger Dep. 161:10-161:17,
    162:1-162:6 (Dec. 1, 2009) [ECF No. 97-15] (stating that he could not recall whether he told
    Thomas Johnson about the hammering).
    13
    There is a factual dispute about whether Thomas Johnson asked Frank Stotmeister to shut
    the steam off at Manhole 7 or Manhole 11. Compare J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J.
    Ex. P, Thomas Johnson Dep. 120:4-121:1 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 162-9] (stating “I just asked
    if it could be shut down at manhole 7”), with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 51 [ECF
    No. 196-2] (disputing paragraph 51 of the defendants’ Statement of Material Facts Not In
    Dispute and stating that “Tom Johnson asked Frank Stotmeister to shut off the steam in Manhole
    11”). The dispute arises from conflicts between Thomas Johnson’s deposition testimony and
    Bassem Soueidan’s deposition testimony. Thomas Johnson asserts that he asked Frank
    Stotmeister whether it was possible to turn the steam off at Manhole 7. J.A. In Supp. of Joint
    Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. P, Thomas Johnson Dep. 121:8-123:3 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 162-9]; 
    id.
    at Ex. O, Thomas Johnson Dep. 88:6-88:22 (Mar. 12, 2007) [ECF No. 162-8] (stating “yes, I did
    walk up to Frank and ask him if he could shut down the steam in manhole number 7”). Bassem
    --20--
    Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶¶ 51, 52 [ECF No. 160-1], with
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with
    paragraphs 51 and 52); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. T, Richard B. Julian Dep.
    54:13-55:2 (Oct. 9, 2009) [ECF No. 162-13]; 
    id.
     at Ex. O, Thomas Johnson Dep. 87:10-88:22
    (Mar. 12, 2007) [ECF No. 162-8]; 
    id.
     at Ex. P, Thomas Johnson Dep. 95:1-95:9 (Feb. 4, 2008)
    [ECF No. 162-9]. A couple of hours later, Frank Stotmeister told Thomas Johnson that the
    steam to the NEOB had been shut off at Manhole 11. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of
    P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 31, Thomas Johnson Dep. 142:18-144:14 (Feb. 4,
    2008) [ECF No. 203-3].
    Souiedan, on the other hand, stated during depositions that Thomas Johnson directed Frank
    Stotmeister to turn the steam off at Manhole 11. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. &
    A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 71, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 101:4-101:6 (Jan. 18, 2008)
    [ECF No. 206-6] (stating that Johnson “asked Frank to see what they can do and asked him to
    shut the -- the shut-off valve at Manhole 11”). Bassem Soueidan later conceded during a
    deposition, however, that he could not recall Thomas Johnson’s specific words and implied that
    he inferred that Thomas Johnson meant Manhole 11 because Johnson “knew full well” that was
    “the only place to shut the steam off”:
    Specific words I probably would not remember. But if you are asking me if he
    said, Frank, go inside Manhole 11 and turn the steam off, I don’t think I’m in a
    position to say that these were his exact words. But he did say, I asked Frank to
    shut the steam off knowing full well that the only place to shut the steam off is in
    fact inside Manhole 11.
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 72,
    Bassem Soueidan Dep. 146:15-146:22 (Mar. 27, 2008) [ECF No. 206-7]. Ultimately, though,
    this disputed fact is immaterial to the outcome, as discussed infra.
    The parties also dispute whether Thomas Johnson directed Frank Stotmeister to turn the
    steam off or simply asked whether it was possible to do so. Statement of Material Facts Not In
    Dispute n.3 [ECF No. 160-1]. For the purpose of resolving the pending motion, however, the
    defendants conceded “that Johnson told Stotmeister to turn the steam off.” 
    Id.
    --21--
    G.     Frank Stotmeister Attempts to Turn On the Steam-Line Valve in Manhole 11,
    Which Causes a Water Hammer and Massive Steam Explosion
    By around 6:30 a.m., the Cherry Hill crew had finished the water line tie-in project and
    was cleaning up the site. J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. L, Dayrell Schneider Dep.
    174:19-175:17, 186:1-187:20 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 162-5]; 
    id.
     at Ex. K, Gary Sims Dep.
    301:7-302:2 (Mar. 2, 2011) [ECF No. 162-4]; Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A.
    In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 28, Dexter Holmes Dep. 189:11-189:14, 195:11-195:19
    (Dec. 9, 2010) [ECF No. 202-15]; Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 57 [ECF No. 196-
    2] (arguing that the water line tie-in was not completed until between 6:30 a.m. and 7 a.m. and
    citing Dexter Holmes’ deposition testimony stating that “they had the T and mechanical pieces in
    place around 6:30 a.m., I think”). Shortly thereafter, Thomas Johnson alerted Frank Stotmeister
    that the GSA plumbers were done fixing the valve in the NEOB steam station and asked
    Stotmeister to turn the steam back on. 14 Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶
    59 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating
    no dispute with paragraph 59).
    At approximately 8:48 a.m., Frank Stotmeister descended the ladder into Manhole 11 and
    Joseph Hudert was halfway down the ladder holding a flashlight. Compare Statement of
    Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 62 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material
    Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 62). Frank Stotmeister
    14
    For the purpose of resolving the pending motion the defendants do not dispute “that
    Johnson told Stotmeister to turn the steam on.” Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 60
    n.4 [ECF No. 160-1].
    --22--
    subsequently “began to open the isolation valve in Manhole 11” to turn the steam back on. 15
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶¶ 72, 73 [ECF No. 196-2] (paragraph 72 contains the
    quoted language and both paragraphs support the fact that Frank Stotmeister opened the isolation
    valve to turn the steam back on). As a result, a “steam-condensate water hammer” exploded
    from the steam line in a “massive eruption” of steam that fatally injured Frank Stotmeister and
    Joseph Hudert. Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 72 [ECF No. 196-2].
    DISCUSSION
    Day & Zimmerman and M&M Welding contend that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their
    claims for compensatory damages arising from Frank Stotmeister’s death because Stotmeister
    was contributorily negligent by failing to act with reasonable care for his own safety, knowingly
    putting himself in a dangerous situation, and failing to take reasonable steps to protect himself
    from harm. Mem. of P. & A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 1-15 [ECF No. 160-2]. Aside
    from the contention that there are material facts in dispute, the plaintiffs’ principal counter
    argument is that Frank Stotmeister’s actions opening and closing the steam-line valve in
    Manhole 11 were reasonable because he was directed to do so by Thomas Johnson, who the
    plaintiffs assert was the government’s representative. Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n To Defs.’
    Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 5-26 [ECF No. 196].
    15
    The plaintiffs equivocate about whether Frank Stotmeister turned the steam valve off or
    on, stating that “no direct evidence has been presented that he did . . . .” Pls. Mem. of P&A In
    Opp’n to Defs.’ Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 6 [ECF No. 196]. The undisputed circumstantial
    evidence, however, reflects that Frank Stotmeister was the only person who was observed in
    Manhole 11 that morning (Joseph Hudert was only ever observed standing on the ladder
    descending into the manhole). Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to
    Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 50, Kevin Moore Dep. 118:1-118:13 (Jan. 11, 2011) [ECF No. 204-17];
    United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1, Edwin Reyes Dep. 104:6-105:3, 105:16-105:22, 107:14-
    107:21, 109:3-109:16 (Jan. 15, 2008) [ECF No. 85-1].
    --23--
    I.
    “The District of Columbia is one of the few jurisdictions in which the claimant’s
    contributory negligence can act as a complete defense to the defendant’s liability for
    negligence.” Jarrett v. Woodward Bros., Inc., 
    751 A.2d 972
    , 985 (D.C. 2000). “To establish
    contributory negligence, the party asserting the defense must prove by a preponderance of the
    evidence that the opposing party’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing his or her
    injury, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
    consequence of the negligent act or omission.” Durphy v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-
    Atlantic States, Inc., 
    698 A.2d 459
    , 465 (D.C. 1997). Contributory negligence is “conduct
    ‘which falls below the standard to which a plaintiff should conform for his own protection’ and
    contributes to the plaintiff’s injury.” Scoggins v. Jude, 
    419 A.2d 999
    , 1004 (D.C. 1980) (quoting
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496E, Comment a (1965)). It is “the failure to act with the
    prudence demanded of an ordinary reasonable person under like circumstances.” Stager v.
    Schneider, 
    494 A.2d 1307
    , 1311 (D.C. 1985). “[T]he defense of contributory negligence
    requires a determination of what the plaintiff should have known and acted upon in the exercise
    of reasonable care for his own safety,” Morrison v. MacNamara, 
    407 A.2d 555
    , 566 (D.C. 1979),
    and “generally involves inadvertence or failure to observe or act,” Harris v. Plummer, 
    190 A.2d 98
    , 100 (D.C. 1963).
    Unlike the assumption-of-risk doctrine, which operates only when the plaintiff actually
    knows the full scope and magnitude of a danger but voluntarily exposes himself to it,
    contributory negligence applies “’when a party knows or by the exercise of ordinary care should
    have known a particular fact or circumstance . . . .” Stager, 
    494 A.2d at 1311
     (quoting Sierra
    --24--
    Pacific Power Co. v. Anderson, 
    358 P.2d 892
    , 894 (Nev. 1961)) (emphasis in original). The
    contributory negligence framework also applies in cases of unreasonable risk taking, District of
    Columbia v. Mitchell, 
    533 A.2d 629
    , 639 (D.C. 1987), involving allegations that a plaintiff
    voluntarily but unreasonably accepted a known risk, in which case “the focus . . . is on the
    reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct rather than the voluntariness of it.” Phillips v. Fujitec
    America, Inc., 
    3 A.3d 324
    , 328 (D.C. 2010).
    “Whether a plaintiff is contributorily negligent is usually a question for the jury” and “it
    is the rare case with evidence so clear and unambiguous that contributory negligence should be
    found as a matter of law.” Paraskevaides v. Four Seasons Washington, 
    292 F.3d 886
    , 893 (D.C.
    Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). That being said, “[s]ome fact patterns allow [the
    court] to take the question away from the jury.” Phillips, 
    3 A.3d at
    329 n.16. Accordingly, when
    “reasonable persons, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
    can draw but one inference from those facts, and where that one inference points ‘unerringly’ to
    the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to act reasonably under the circumstances, [the court] may
    find that [the plaintiff] was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Starks v.
    North East Ins. Co., 
    408 A.2d 980
    , 982 (D.C.1979)). The burden of proving contributory
    negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, however, rests with the defendants. Aetna Cas.
    & Sur. Co. v. Carter, 
    549 A.2d 1117
    , 1119 (D.C. 1988); Poyner v. Loftus, 
    694 A.2d 69
    , 71 (D.C.
    1997).
    --25--
    II.
    The undisputed evidence reveals that there are three instances when Frank Stotmeister’s
    own negligence contributed to his injury and death. First, when the water from the cut water-
    main pipe began to overflow the trench and flood the steam vault and manholes, Frank
    Stotmeister should have exercised his authority as the superintendent of the water line tie-in
    project to (A) halt the project entirely, (B) notify officials at GSA HOTD about the abnormal
    situation involving the steam system and/or (C) shut down the steam system at the Point of
    Connection. Instead, Frank Stotmeister acted unreasonably by failing to notify GSA HOTD
    officials that the steam system was being exposed to an unusual amount of water from the cut
    water-main pipe, directing the contractors to continue working in the trench despite all signs that
    the abnormal circumstances were creating a hazard, and failing to shut down the steam system to
    eliminate the risk of a steam leak or explosion posed by the hammering steam pipe.
    The plaintiffs do not dispute that, as Grunley-Walsh’s superintendent, Frank Stotmeister
    was responsible for all the construction activities and subcontractors on site the morning of the
    steam explosion. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 71, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 15:20-16:6 (Jan. 18, 2008) [ECF No. 206-6] (stating
    that Frank Stotmeister’s responsibilities as superintendent were to “[b]asically oversee all of the
    construction activities, coordinate the subcontractors, coordinate with the client to a certain
    extent, and make sure that scheduled milestones are met” and he was “basically the front man for
    Grunley-Walsh on a day-to-day basis, or in this case a night-to-night basis since the job was
    done at night”); accord J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, Brian Staudenmaier Dep.
    14:4-14:9 (Mar. 12, 2008) [ECF No. 161-1] (stating that he was Frank Stotmeister’s immediate
    --26--
    supervisor but that Stotmeister “had the day-to-day responsibility, oversight of the job and the
    contractors on the site”). It also is undisputed that Frank Stotmeister was responsible for safety
    at the job site and was “authorized to immediately stop work at the job-site if any . . . safety
    hazard is observed . . . .” United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex.
    10, Grunley-Walsh Joint Venture, Price Proposal, Section 2.H Safety Program at 43 [ECF No.
    122-1]. Frank Stotmeister also was contractually responsible for administering and enforcing
    Grunley-Walsh’s Safety and Accident Prevention Plan, including “[a] thorough and continuing
    analysis of potential hazards.” Id. at 42. Moreover, in the event of an emergency, Grunley-
    Walsh’s contract authorized Frank Stotmeister to shut down the entire steam system at the Point
    of Connection located in the vault at the intersection of 17th Street and New York Avenue. 16
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 25,
    Expert Witness Report of Suzanne H. Harness 8 (Apr. 29, 2010) [ECF No. 202-12]; United
    States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 11, Robert Hixon Dep. 215:9-
    215:19 (Mar. 1, 2011) [ECF No. 122-1]; United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2, Greg Westphal
    Dep. 309:18-310:4 (March 11, 2010) [ECF No. 85-1].
    The plaintiffs concede that the water flooding the steam vault was “abnormal and
    problematic.” 17 Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 39 [ECF No. 196-2]. Frank
    16
    See discussion infra Part III describing this authority.
    17
    After the contractors performing the water line tie-in project began cutting the water-
    main pipe it became apparent that the pipe never fully drained and was continuing to flow at a
    rate that subcontractor Dayrell Schneider found to be “alarming” and “overwhelming.” Exs. In
    Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 66, Dayrell
    Schneider Dep. 50:1-50:4; 188:4-188:5 (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]; accord Stotmeister
    Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 39 [ECF No. 196-2] (stating that “[a]ccording to . . . Dayrell
    --27--
    Stotmeister knew or should have known that the hammering in the steam pipe was being caused
    by this abnormal flooding. Frank Stotmeister knew that the water from the water-main pipe was
    overflowing the trench and flooding the steam tunnel toward Manhole 10 because it was visible
    from where he stood at the trench. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n
    to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 157:6-157:21 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No.
    205-15]; J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. K, Gary Sims Dep. 100:16-100:22 (July 7,
    2010) [ECF No. 162-4] (stating that he did not inform anyone that the berm was leaking because
    “Mr. Frank . . . was standing right over top of the hole”). Steam also could be seen rising out of
    the manholes, Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ.
    J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 208:1-208:12 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15], and Dayrell
    Schneider testified that Frank Stotmeister said that water was running down the tunnel into
    Manhole 10, id. at Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 157:11-157:13 (“And you have Joe and Frank
    saying, [w]e’re getting water in 10 coming down the tunnel.”). The steam pipe began
    hammering only after the water from the water-main pipe overflowed the trench and made
    contact with the steam pipe, indicating that the hammering was being caused by the overflowing
    water. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex.
    65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 208:1-208:12 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15]; id. at Ex. 66,
    Dayrell Schneider Dep. 83:13-84:6, 89:4-89:20, 101:3-101:21, 200:12-201:9, 233:21-237:21
    (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]; id. at Ex. 67, Gary Sims Dep. 91:7-94:22 (July 7, 2010) [ECF
    No. 206-2]; id. at Ex. 68, Gary Sims Dep. 285:12-286:18, 328:2-328:9; id. at Ex. 28, Dexter
    Holmes Dep. 169:4-169:17, 171:17-172:2 (Dec. 9, 2010) [ECF No. 202-15]; J.A. In Supp. of
    Schneider . . . the amount of water pouring out of the water main was unusual, unacceptable, and
    even alarming”).
    --28--
    Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. K, Gary Sims Dep. 91:7-94:22 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No. 162-4]; id.
    at Ex. L, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 167:21-171:4, 224:1-224:11 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 162-5];
    id. at Ex. M, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 298:14-300:20 (May 12. 2010) [ECF No. 162-6]; compare
    Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 40 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’
    Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with paragraph 40). The
    plaintiffs concede that “[t]he water flowing from the 20-inch water main entered the steam vault”
    and “contacted the steam lines[,]” which “caused condensate to form rapidly and mix with the
    steam in the steam lines” and “[w]hen that happened, the steam pipes jumped and made a loud
    hammering noise.” Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 72 [ECF No. 196-2].
    Frank Stotmeister also knew or should have known that the hammering steam pipe was a
    danger. When the steam pipe started hammering, Dayrell Schneider (1) ordered the
    subcontractors to evacuate the trench, (2) told Frank Stotmeister that he felt the situation was
    hazardous, 18 and (3) asked Stotmeister three times to shut down the steam system, 19 putting
    18
    Indeed, one of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses stated that he “understood [the contractors]
    were pretty scared.” Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 56, Roland O’Brien-Bills Dep. 358:14-358:15 (June 3, 2011) [ECF No. 205-6].
    And the only logical interference to be drawn from Frank Stotmeister’s assurances that the steam
    pipe had survived prior rain water, he had seen the steam pipes hammer on other occasions, and
    the steam pipes were schedule 80 -- which was a reference to the thickness of the pipes, see
    supra n. 10 -- is that he knew that the hazard at issue was a pipe leak or explosion.
    The plaintiffs argue that this cumulative evidence “creates an inference that Mr.
    Stotmeister did not fully appreciate the nature of or risks associated with water hammer.” Pls.’
    Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Defs.’ Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 23 [ECF No. 196]. Frank
    Stotmeister’s reference to the thickness of the pipe belies the plaintiffs’ theory, though. In light
    of all the circumstances then occurring, the only rational reason to mention the thickness of the
    pipe would have been to support Frank Stotmeister’s belief that, because of its thickness, the
    pipe would not crack or burst. Absent concerns about the risk of cracking or bursting, which
    would lead to a steam escape or explosion, there simply is no other logical relevance to be
    associated with the thickness of the pipe in this Court’s view.
    --29--
    Stotmeister on notice that Schneider believed the situation was dangerous. 20 Furthermore, after
    Dayrell Schneider asked Frank Stotmeister to shut down the steam system, Stotmeister ordered
    the contractors to create a berm out of backfill to prevent water from flowing into the steam
    tunnel. 21 Frank Stotmeister’s actions in this regard lead to the logical inference that Stotmeister
    knew there was a correlation between the water flooding the steam tunnel and the hammering
    19
    J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. L, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 167:20-169:14,
    223:9-224:19 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 162-5]; id. at Ex. M, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 298:14-
    300:20 (May 12. 2010) [ECF No. 162-6]; Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In
    Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 238:17-238:21 (Dec. 10, 2007)
    [ECF No. 205-15]; id. at Ex. 66, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 84:3-84:6, 86:4-86:20, 208:12-209:15
    (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 206-1]; id. at Ex. 67, Gary Sims Dep. 213:17-213:20 (July 7, 2010)
    [ECF No. 206-2]; id. at Ex. 68, Gary Sims Dep. 297:18-298:17, 328:2-328:13, 329:3-329:11
    (Mar. 2, 2011) [ECF No. 206-3]; compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 43 [ECF
    No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no
    dispute with paragraph 43).
    20
    Dayrell Schneider testified that he believed the hammering was dangerous:
    Q       I -- I -- I take it you believed that was dangerous?
    A       I -- you know, with all my experience, yes.
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 66,
    Dayrell Schneider Dep. 208:21-209:2 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 206-1]. Gary Sims also testified
    that he was personally afraid when the pipes started hammering. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister
    Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 68, Gary Sims Dep. 328:2-328:9
    [ECF No. 206-3].
    21
    Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute ¶ 44 [ECF No. 160-1], with
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 44 [ECF No. 196-2] (indicating no dispute with the
    fact that “Sostmeister directed that backfill material be placed into the excavation trench to create
    a berm to stop the water from exiting the excavation trench”); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’
    Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 176:1-176:10
    (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15] (“And then Frank had us put up a whole load of RC6 to dam
    on the top of the steam line to dump a whole load in there and actually make a temporary dam to
    eliminate some of the water.”); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. K, Gary Sims Dep.
    101:12-103:4 (July 7, 2010) [ECF No. 162-4].
    --30--
    that was occurring in the steam pipe -- and he recognized that the situation was problematic;
    otherwise, there would have been no reason to take the precaution of building a berm.
    The plaintiffs’ own expert witness explained that once the water hammering occurred
    there was “a high degree of risk” that warranted evaluation by “the [GSA] HOTD people, who
    are experts in their system” to determine why the water hammer was occurring and “[w]hat is the
    damage as a consequence of all this water getting in -- in the steam tunnels[.]” United States’
    Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 11, Robert Hixon Dep. 185:5-20 (Mar. 1,
    2011) [ECF No. 122-1]. Another of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses characterized the water
    hammering in the steam pipe as “a dangerous condition,” Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’
    Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 58, Roland O’Brien-Bills Report 2 (Jan.
    20, 2011) [ECF No. 205-8], and found that “[t]he development of the water hammer in the high-
    pressure steam piping along 17th Street NW should have constituted an emergency,” id. at 79.
    Significantly, that same expert witness also concluded that “[t]he reasonable standard of care . . .
    was to secure the large steam-stop valve in the steam tunnel [at] New York Avenue and 17th
    Street NW when water started to enter the steam tunnel crawl-space and manholes[,]”22 id. at 79
    22
    Although this finding stated that Day & Zimmerman employees should have shut the
    steam down at the Point of Connection, there is no evidence that anyone from Day &
    Zimmerman was at the work site at the time the water line tie-in project was taking place and
    there is no evidence that Frank Stotmeister or any other contractor attempted to contact anyone at
    Day & Zimmerman to alert them about the situation. Regardless, the relevant point is that if the
    steam system had been shut down at the Point of Connection at the time the water began
    flooding the steam tunnel, the explosion that killed Frank Stotmeister and Joseph Hudert might
    not have happened. And the evidence in the record reveals that, at the time the water line tie-in
    project was taking place, Frank Stotmeister was the individual with both the knowledge of the
    situation and the contractual authority to shut down the steam system at the Point of Connection.
    Frank Stotmeister nonetheless made the decision to proceed with the water line tie-in project
    without shutting down the steam system despite Dayrell Schneider’s request that the steam be cut
    off to ensure the contractors’ safety.
    --31--
    (emphasis added). The plaintiffs’ expert also found that “[t]he simple decision of closing the
    steam-stop [valve] at the steam tunnel at New York Avenue and 17th Street NW [the Point of
    Connection] at around 2:30-AM when the hammer first occurred would have prevented the
    steam-condensate water hammer that occurred after 2-AM to 8:51-AM.” Id. at 79. In other
    words, given that an emergency was occurring, if Frank Stotmeister had exercised his authority
    to shut the steam down at the Point of Connection when Dayrell Schneider thrice asked him to
    do so the steam explosion that killed Stotmeister and Joseph Hudert might not have occurred.
    The same expert who found that the tragedy might have been avoided by shutting the
    steam system down at the Point of Connection when water began flooding the steam tunnels also
    concluded that “[f]looding from the water main(s) into the steam tunnel crawl space and
    manholes and on the steam pipe caused the steam-condensate water hammer.” Id. at 80. The
    expert further stated during a deposition that the conditions during the water line tie-in project
    were “abnormal” and no particular training would be needed to understand that if the steam vault
    and manholes were being flooded with water there might be condensate forming in the steam
    line. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 57,
    Roland O’Brien-Bills Dep. 848:4-849:14 (June 8, 2011) [ECF No. 205-7] (stating “I don’t think
    you need particular training to understand the physics, especially when it’s first pointed out”).
    Consistent with the expert’s testimony, Dayrell Schneider stated during a deposition that, with
    respect to the water flowing into the steam tunnel, he viewed the situation to be “not normal.”
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 65,
    Dayrell Schneider Dep. 173:11-173:21 (Dec. 10, 2007) [ECF No. 205-15].
    --32--
    As the superintendent of the water line tie-in project Frank Stotmeister was the
    responsible contractor on site who had the authority to halt the project, call GSA HOTD
    personnel to advise them about the abnormal flooding in the steam system and confirm whether
    it was safe to proceed with the project, or shut down the steam system at the Point of Connection
    when the steam pipes started hammering and Dayrell Schneider asked him three times to do so. 23
    Frank Stotmeister could see that the steam tunnel was being flooded by the water overflowing
    the trench and was on notice that the subcontractors considered the situation to be dangerous. By
    exercising his authority to shut down the steam system or halt the work at that point in time,
    Frank Stotmeister could have eliminated the risk of danger posed by the steam pipe and
    prevented the tragic explosion that ultimately killed him. Instead, Frank Stotmeister directed the
    contractors to dump backfill into the trench and continue working, despite all indications that a
    dangerous situation had evolved, and without ever notifying officials at GSA HOTD about the
    water flooding the steam tunnel. As a consequence, the water continued to overflow the trench,
    flood the steam tunnel, and cause condensation to build in the steam pipe, which ultimately led to
    the water-hammer blast that exploded from the drip leg in Manhole 11 and killed Frank
    Stotmeister and Joseph Hudert. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to
    Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 57, Roland O’Brien-Bills Dep. 812:1-812:20 (June 8, 2011) [ECF No.
    23
    From the Court’s vantage point, Dayrell Schneider modeled the behavior of a reasonable
    person under the circumstances. Although he was not a steam specialist, he sensibly recognized
    that an unusual and potentially dangerous situation was occurring in light of the volume of water
    flooding the trench and steam tunnel, the steam rising from the manholes, and the hammering of
    the steam pipe. He immediately halted the subcontractors’ work on the water line tie-in project
    and ordered the subcontractors to evacuate the trench to ensure their safety. He then sought out
    the superintendent, expressed his concern about the hazard posed by the hammering steam pipe,
    and requested that the steam system be shut down to eliminate the risk of danger to the
    subcontractors. See factual sources cited supra Parts C, D.
    --33--
    205-7] (stating that excess condensation was forming in the steam pipes as a result of the water
    overflowing from the main); id. at Ex. 58, Roland O’Brien-Bills Report 54 (Jan. 20, 2011) [ECF
    No. 205-8] (stating that shock waves from the mixing of condensation and steam in the pipe
    blew the drip leg). Under the circumstances, Stotmeister’s failure to halt the water line tie-in
    project, shut down the steam system, or contact GSA HOTD to confirm the safety of the flooded
    steam system was both unreasonable and imprudent. 24
    III.
    The second instance when Frank Stotmeister’s negligence contributed to the cause of his
    injury and death occurred when Stotmeister shut off the steam-line valve in Manhole 11 at the
    behest of Thomas Johnson and the plumbers who were attempting to repair damage to the NEOB
    steam station caused by the steam system water hammering. When requested to shut off the
    steam, Frank Stotmeister did so unreasonably by (1) entering Manhole 11 without authority and
    (2) operating the steam-line valve located in Manhole 11 without authority.
    Frank Stotmeister had no authority to enter Manhole 11 because it was restricted federal
    property that was outside the scope of work for the water line tie-in project. United States’ Mot.
    24
    Particularly if, as the plaintiffs argue, Frank Stotmeister “was not a steam expert” and
    “evidently he knew nothing about water hammer and how dangerous it is.” Pls.’ Mem. of P&A
    In Opp’n to Defs.’ Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 13 [ECF No. 196] (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Once Dayrell Schneider notified Frank Stotmeister that he viewed the steam pipe hammering to
    be a danger, the reasonable course of action would have been for Stotmeister to confirm whether
    a danger actually existed -- as he was contractually required to do, see supra Part II at 27
    (describing the contractual requirement to thoroughly analyze potential hazards -- rather than
    relying on his own inexpert opinion. Confirmation about the safety of the steam pipe could have
    been quickly accomplished by calling officials at GSA HOTD or even Grunley-Walsh’s own
    subcontractor, M&M Welding, which Bassem Soueidan characterized as “a steam specialist.”
    J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 124:1-124:3 (Jan. 18,
    2008) [ECF No. 161-3].
    --34--
    for Summ. J., Supplemental Decl. of Greg Westphal ¶ 4 [ECF No. 106-1] (stating that “[e]ntry
    into the Steam Distribution Complex (‘SDC’) is highly restricted”); United States’ Mot. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 2, Greg Westphal Dep. 1128:2-1128:8 (June 1, 2010) [ECF No. 85-1] (“Nobody
    was authorized to go into that manhole at any time. There was no work being performed in that
    manhole. They had no authority -- they had no business being in that manhole . . . regardless.”);
    id. at 1128:9-1128:21 (“Nobody had permission to go down in the manhole. There was no work
    being performed.”); Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 188:15-188:19 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5] (“I
    can tell you that, prior to the date of the incident, all contract work related to the Steam Line
    Replacement Project, specifically as it relates to that portion of the work, was completed and
    back on service.”); United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3, Dayrell Schneider Dep. 226:6-227:13
    (May 12, 2010) [ECF No. 85-1] (affirming that there was no work involving Manhole 11 and
    there was no reason for the contractors to be in that manhole the morning of April 23); United
    States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 5, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 167:14-
    167:16 (Mar. 27, 2008) [ECF No. 122-1] (“After we turned the steam over two to three weeks
    prior to the date . . . we had no business touching the steam system”).
    Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that Frank Stotmeister was authorized
    to enter Manhole 11, it is undisputed that he was never authorized to manipulate the steam-line
    valve located in that manhole, regardless of whether he was directed to do so by the government.
    J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 151:16-152:12 (Mar. 16,
    2007) [ECF No. 161-2] (stating that, with respect to Grunley-Walsh, “[w]e were not allowed to
    turn a valve on or off . . . by contract”); United States’ Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for
    --35--
    Summ. J. Ex.7, Mark Middleton Dep. 181:8-182:20 (Apr. 12, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2] (agreeing
    that when the steam system needed to be shut off or on that it was to be done by GSA and no one
    else); id. at Ex. 6, Thomas Johnson Dep. 435:7-435:13 (Nov. 17, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2] (stating
    that contractors “cannot operate the steam valves”); Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n To Defs.’
    Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 21 [ECF No. 196] (noting Bassem Soueidan’s testimony that Grunley-
    Walsh does not operate systems for owners). Indeed, Frank Stotmeister’s boss, Bassem
    Soueidan, 25 confirmed that “with or without direction from the government, we as a contractor
    don’t typically handle life systems,” United States’ Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ.
    J. Ex. 1, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 71:3-71:5 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2] (emphasis added),
    and “[w]e were not authorized . . . to do either, de-energize or energize the steam line,” using the
    feeder and shut-off valves along the steam line, id. at 52:5-6. Accord Exs. In Supp. of
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan
    Dep. 188:2-188:8 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5] (confirming that Grunley-Walsh was not
    allowed to turn steam on or off at the job site because “by contract, that’s not our scope of work
    to do”). This point is further corroborated by an expert report submitted by the plaintiffs that
    states that “[c]ontractors do not have the authority to operate GSA steam valves . . . .” Exs. In
    Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 25, Expert
    Witness Report of Suzanne H. Harness 8 (Apr. 29, 2010) [ECF No. 202-12].
    There is no question that Frank Stotmeister knew he was not authorized to manipulate the
    steam-line valve in Manhole 11 for the purpose of shutting off the steam because Grunley-Walsh
    25
    Exs. In Supp. of United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 15:5-
    15:22 (March 16, 2007) [ECF No. 175-1] (stating that Frank Stotmeister reported to Bassem
    Soueidan).
    --36--
    employees were twice rebuked when Grunley-Walsh’s subcontractor, M&M Welding, shut off
    steam while performing work for the 17th Street Steam Distribution Project. During the first
    occurrence, M&M Welding shut down a temporary boiler connected to Manhole 11 that was
    supplying steam to the New Executive Office Building, 26 after which Grunley-Walsh and its
    contractors were “reprimanded very heavily” by GSA officials. United States’ Supplemental
    Mem. In Support of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 36:7-36:9 (Mar. 16, 2007)
    [ECF No. 122-1]. It is undisputed that, as a result, Frank Stotmeister attended a meeting during
    which GSA officials admonished the contractors about the steam shut down, 27 J.A. In Supp. of
    Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 58:14-60:18 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No.
    161-4], and Bassem Soueidan told Stotmeister that shutting off the steam was not to be done
    again, id. at 71:10-72:15. In addition, Brian Staudenmaier, Frank Stotmeister’s direct supervisor
    at Grunley-Walsh, testified during a deposition that, after the incident, he forwarded to
    Stotmeister a copy of a January 14, 2004, email from a GSA HOTD official stating that the
    contractors could contact identified GSA HOTD personnel if they needed an “unexpected or
    unplanned shutdown of the steam.” United States’ Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ.
    J. Ex. 5, Brian Staudenmaier Dep. 67:5-67:18 (Mar. 12, 2008) [ECF No. 106-2]. That email
    26
    Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Def.’s Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 17 [ECF No. 196]
    (describing the circumstances of the steam shut down); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J.
    Ex. B, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 161:1-163:20 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 161-2] (stating that “what
    we did here was shut down the boiler . . . [w]e didn’t touch any GSA systems”); id. at Ex. B,
    Letter from Brian Staudenmaier to Thomas Johnson (Jan. 12, 2004) and Letter from Mark
    Middleton to Brian Staudenmaier (Jan. 12, 2004) [ECF No. 161-2] (deposition exhibits).
    27
    M&M’s Project Manager, Mark Middleton, testified that Frank Stotmeister was informed
    that the contractors could not shut down the steam without first notifying GSA HOTD. Exs. In
    Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 42, Mark
    Middleton Dep. 226:20-227:18 (Apr. 12, 2010) [ECF No. 204-9].
    --37--
    stated that Grunley-Walsh should contact the specified GSA HOTD officials “[f]or emergencies
    when you need valves to be opened/closed.” J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B,
    Email from Greg Westphal to Brian Staudenmaier (Jan. 14, 2004) [ECF No. 161-2] (deposition
    exhibit).
    Another unauthorized occurrence took place about two weeks later and involved M&M
    Welding shutting down and re-opening the steam valve located in Manhole 7, which caused a
    steam pressure drop at the Old Executive Office Building. J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ.
    J. Ex. B, Email from Joel Klotz to Thomas Johnson with copies to Leonard Weiser, Greg
    Westphal and John Bright (Jan. 30, 2004) [ECF No. 161-2] (deposition exhibit); Exs. In Supp. of
    Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan
    Dep. 45:4-46:3 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5]. After that occurrence, emails between
    Grunley-Walsh officials and GSA officials indicated that, in the case of an emergency, Grunley-
    Walsh was authorized to enter the steam vault at the Point of Connection for the purpose of
    shutting down the entire steam system. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In
    Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 3, Email from Brian Staudenmaier to Greg Westphal (Feb. 25,
    2004) [ECF No. 201-3]; United States’ Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3,
    Email from Brian Staudenmaier to Greg Westphal (Feb. 25, 2004) [ECF No. 106-1] (declaration
    exhibit).
    Although GSA HOTD provided Grunley-Walsh with limited authority to shut down the
    entire steam system during an emergency, that authority applied only to the valve located at the
    Point of Connection and not to any valves located in manholes along the steam line. Exs. In
    Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 3 [ECF No. 201-
    --38--
    3] (stating that “[d]uring a steam emergency, and an emergency shutdown of the steam, GW will
    promptly be entering the vault at POC”); Exs. In Supp. of Pls.’ Partial Opp’n to United States’
    Mot. for Summ. J. Ex 7, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 39:16-39:20, 41:1-42:15 (May 25, 2010) [ECF
    No. 97-7] (agreeing that the grant of authority to shut down the steam was limited to the valve at
    the Point of Connection). Notably, Frank Stotmeister’s boss testified during a deposition that the
    need for an emergency shut-down at the Point of Connection would be determined by Frank
    Stotmeister, albeit in consultation with the project team:
    Q       Who was it that was to determine whether or not there was a need for an
    emergency steam shutdown? Who would have made that decision?
    A       I would say that would be the general contractor if we felt there was an
    emergency.
    Q       And who for you at Grunley-Walsh, the general contractor, would have
    made that determination?
    A       I would say that it would be – you know, our Project Superintendent, in
    this case Frank, and work together [sic] with the entire team. It was a
    team effort.
    J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 71:13-72:2 (Mar. 16,
    2007) [ECF No. 161-2]. 28 Aside from determining that an emergency steam shutdown at the
    Point of Connection was warranted, 29 however, the undisputed evidence is that Frank Stotmeister
    was not authorized to operate the steam-line valves in a manhole “with or without direction from
    28
    Given that Frank Stotmeister would have determined whether or not there was a need for
    an emergency shut down there is no merit to the plaintiffs’ assertion that it was reasonable for
    Stotmeister to assume that, because Thomas Johnson did not give Stotmeister the key to the
    Point of Connection, Johnson did not view the situation to be an emergency, in which case
    Stotmeister need not employ the emergency procedure. Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Defs.’
    Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 11-12 [ECF No. 196].
    29
    Which Frank Stotmeister failed to do. See supra Part II.
    --39--
    the government.” United States’ Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1, Bassem
    Soueidan Dep. 71:3-71:5 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2].
    IV.
    The third instance when Frank Stotmeister’s negligence contributed to the cause of his
    injury and death occurred when he opened the steam-line valve in Manhole 11. It remains
    entirely undisputed that, in nonemergency situations, no contractor was ever authorized to open a
    steam-line valve -- whether at the Point of Connection or in a manhole on 17th Street. Exs. In
    Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 25, Expert
    Witness Report of Suzanne H. Harness 8 (Apr. 29, 2010) [ECF No. 202-12] (stating that “[n]o
    procedures allowed a contractor to turn the steam back on”); id. at Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan
    Dep. 188:2-188:8 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5] (stating that Grunley-Walsh was not
    permitted by the contract to turn steam on or off because doing so was “not our scope of work to
    do”); id. at Ex. 73, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 37:3-37:9 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 206-8] (agreeing
    that Grunley-Walsh and its employees were not authorized to operate the steam-line valves along
    17th Street except); United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 11,
    Robert Hixon Dep. 215:17-215:19, 248:5-248:11 (Mar. 1, 2011) [ECF No. 122-1] (deposition
    testimony by the plaintiffs’ expert witness confirming that “Stotmeister certainly knew that the
    protocol was that HOTD gets called; they turn on the system; we don’t touch it”); id. at Ex. 5,
    Bassem Soueidan Dep. 167:13-167:16 (Mar. 27, 2008) [ECF No. 122-1] (stating that “[a]fter we
    turned the steam over . . . we had no business touching the steam system”). The uncontroverted
    evidence reveals that there was no emergency at the time Frank Stotmeister attempted to turn the
    steam back on by manipulating the steam-line valve in Manhole 11. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister
    --40--
    Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 72, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 182:15-
    183:1 (Mar. 27, 2008) [ECF No. 206-7] (“I would not consider that turning the valve back on is
    in fact an emergency”); id. at Ex. 73, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 167:7-167:8, 195:2-195:3 (May 25,
    2010) [ECF No. 206-8] (stating “[a]t the time of the reopening, I don’t believe there was an
    emergency”); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 166:19-
    167:8 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 161-4]; United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 11, Robert Hixon Dep. 246:11-246:17 (Mar. 1, 2011) [ECF No. 122-1] (deposition
    testimony by one of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses affirming that “there was no emergency at
    the time that Stotmeister turned on the valve in manhole 11 to reenergize the system”); United
    States’ Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 194:17-
    195:3 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2] (“At the time of the reopening, I don’t believe there was
    an emergency.”).
    It can be logically inferred from the undisputed evidence that the reason no contractor
    was authorized to open a steam-line valve was to ensure safety because of the danger presented
    by high-pressure steam. As one of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses acknowledged, “with high
    pressure steam . . . there’s great risk and there needs to be a process to ensure that you [turn it on]
    safely” because “it’s very dangerous.” United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 11, Robert Hixon Dep. 213:16-213:20 (Mar. 1, 2011) [ECF No. 122-1]; accord
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 43, Mark
    Middleton Dep. 278:3-281:21 (May 18, 2010) [ECF No. 204-10] (stating that the process to open
    high-pressure steam valves was for safety and high-pressure steam must be handled properly to
    avoid water hammer and other complications). For more than a century federal courts have
    --41--
    recognized that steam, and the “escape of live steam,” is dangerous, Viscount De Valle Da Costa
    v. Southern Pac. Co., 
    176 F. 843
    , 845 (1st Cir. 1910) (noting that piping and valves permitted
    “the improper and dangerous escape of live steam”) and Frank Stotmeister’s boss stated that
    “anybody would” appreciate the dangers associated with working on a steam system, Ex. 73,
    Bassem Soueidan Dep. 133:3-133:8 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 206-8]. Thus, according to the
    plaintiffs’ expert witness, “only people skilled in that process [of safely turning on steam] should
    be attempting to reenergize a steam system.” United States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of
    Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 11, Robert Hixon Dep. 213:21-214:2 (Mar. 1, 2011) [ECF No. 122-1]
    (stating “[t]hat’s true” and “I agree”).
    The undisputed evidence reveals that Frank Stotmeister was not skilled in the process of
    safely turning on steam. Frank Stotmeister reportedly knew a lot about steam, the dangers
    associated with steam systems, and the procedures to safely turn on steam by slowly opening the
    valves, but he was not a steam expert. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In
    Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 43, Mark Middleton Dep. 278:3-281:21 (May 18, 2010) [ECF
    No. 204-10] (stating that Frank Stotmeister knew the procedure to open and drain the steam
    system and that the procedure was for “safety’s sake”); 30 
    id.
     at Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep.
    30
    The plaintiffs challenge Mark Middleton’s deposition testimony that Frank Stotmeister
    understood the procedure by arguing that Middleton’s testimony was only about the “chain of
    command” for re-energizing so Stotmeister was not aware of the “specific re-energization
    procedures used by HOTD.” Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Defs.’ Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 20
    [ECF No. 196]. The plaintiffs apparently overlook, though, Mark Middleton’s testimony that
    Frank Stotmeister was aware of the technical procedure that involved cracking a valve and
    draining the condensate and that Stotmeister knew that procedure was for safety. Exs. In Supp.
    of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 43, Mark Middleton
    Dep. 281:2-281:21 (May 18, 2010) [ECF No. 204-10]. The plaintiffs also fail to cite any other
    evidence to contradict Mark Middleton’s testimony; as a result, it remains undisputed that Frank
    --42--
    145:12-22 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5] (“Frank been [sic] around mechanical systems for
    many, many years. I believe he was a master plumber and a master HVAC. That does not
    qualify him as a steam expert, but he’s been around steam lines.”); 
    id.
     at Ex. 73, Bassem
    Soueidan Dep. 132:13-132:14 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 206-8] (“I would not say he’s a steam
    expert, but he’s experienced, yes.”); id. at 133:3-133:8 (confirming that Frank Stotmeister
    appreciated the dangers associated with working on steam systems); J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot.
    for Summ. J. Ex. A, Brian Staudenmaier Dep. 65:5-65:13 (Mar. 12, 2008) [ECF No. 161-1]
    (stating that Frank Stotmeister “knew a lot about steam”). Although Frank Stotmeister’s boss
    stated that Stotmeister “knew about steam systems and knew how the system functions,” J.A. In
    Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 122:19-123:3 (Mar. 27, 2008)
    [ECF No. 161-3], the plaintiffs nevertheless concede that Stotmeister’s experience “did not
    include turning steam on and off,” Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 10 [ECF No. 196-
    2], and “Frank Stotmeister had never turned on or turned off a steam valve on the 17th Street
    Steam system before April 23, 2004,” id. at ¶ 73; accord J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ.
    J. Ex. C, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 122:14-123:3 (Jan. 18, 2008) [ECF No. 161-3] (stating that, to
    his knowledge, Frank Stotmeister had never personally turned steam on or off). It goes without
    saying that someone who has no experience turning a steam system on is not “skilled” -- as that
    term is commonly defined 31 -- in the process of safely turning on steam.
    Stotmeister knew the technical procedure for opening a steam-line valve and that the purpose for
    the procedure was safety.
    31
    The term “skilled” is defined as “having acquired mastery of or skill in something (as a
    technique or a trade).” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1100 (10th ed. 1999).
    --43--
    Ultimately, though, whether Frank Stotmeister qualified as “skilled” is of no moment in
    light of the deposition testimony by one of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses who stated that no
    specialized training was necessary to understand that, if steam lines are being flooded with water,
    as happened in this case, there might be condensate forming in the steam lines and, furthermore,
    it would violate a reasonable standard of care to open a steam-line valve knowing that the steam
    line was flooded with condensate. Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n To Defs.’ Joint Mot. for
    Summ. J. 25 [ECF No. 196] (identifying Roland O’Brien-Bills as “the Stotmeisters’ expert”);
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 57,
    Roland O’Brien-Bills Dep. 763:12-764:5, 848:22-849:14 (June 8, 2011) [ECF No. 205-7]. The
    undisputed evidence shows that Frank Stotmeister knew that the steam lines were being flooded
    with water, see discussion supra Part II, in which case he should have known that condensate
    might be forming in the steam lines, Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n
    to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 57, Roland O’Brien-Bills Dep. 763:12-764:5; 848:22-849:14 (June 8,
    2011) [ECF No. 205-7]. The plaintiffs do not dispute that water condensate must be drained
    from a steam line before the steam is turned back on “or a dangerous situation is created which
    may cause water hammer or pipes to rupture.” Compare Statement of Material Facts Not In
    Dispute ¶ 30 [ECF No. 160-1], with Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 30 [ECF No.
    196-2] (disputing that “the technical or engineering reasons for turning off steam at the POC
    applied to Frank Stotmeister on the morning of April 23, 2004” but otherwise not disputing that
    the failure to drain condensate from a steam line creates a dangerous situation and might cause a
    water hammer). The plaintiffs’ expert witness confirmed that such a dangerous situation
    materialized when he testified that Frank Stotmeister’s act of opening the steam-line valve in
    --44--
    Manhole 11 created a “pressure difference” that increased the steam flow toward Manhole 11
    and, when the steam mixed with water condensate, caused the “shock waves” or “blasting” that
    exploded from the drip leg in Manhole 11. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In
    Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 58, Report from Roland O’Brien-Bills to William P. Lightfoot
    54 Figure 11 (Jan 20, 2011) [ECF No. 205-8] (the quoted language is contained in the section of
    the expert report titled “Evidence, Observations and Findings”).
    Consequently, knowing that the steam lines had been flooded with water, it was
    unreasonable and dangerous for Frank Stotmeister to open the steam-line valve in Manhole 11,
    particularly when he had no authority to do so, no experience doing so, and had not first drained
    the water condensate from the steam system. Stotmeister’s actions are inexplicable in light of
    the undisputed fact that GSA HOTD officials were “on call” in the event of an emergency the
    morning of the water line tie-in project, so Stotmeister could have contacted a GSA HOTD
    official before taking matters into his own hands. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P.
    & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 87, United States’ Response to D&Z’s First Set of
    Interrogs. 11 [ECF No. 207-14] (stating in response to Interrogatory No. 15 that more than nine
    GSA or HOTD employees “remain[ed] ‘on call’ in the event of an emergency, and, as reflected
    in the email from Greg Westphal dated January 14, 2004 . . . the contractors working along 17th
    Street, N.W. on the morning of April 23, 2004, had been provided telephone numbers of certain
    HOTD supervisors to contact in the event of an emergency”). Alternatively, Frank Stotmeister
    could have contacted officials at M&M Welding for assistance turning the steam-line valve on or
    off given that they were “steam specialist[s]” who Grunley-Walsh subcontracted with because of
    their expertise. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J.
    --45--
    Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 145:1-145:4 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5]; J.A. In Supp. of
    Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 124:2-124:3 (Jan. 18, 2008) [ECF No.
    161-3] (stating “I would consider M&M a steam specialist”). Frank Stotmeister’s operation of
    the steam line by opening the valve in Manhole 11 in the absence of skill, experience or authority
    was unreasonable. 32
    V.
    The plaintiffs contend that Frank Stotmeister’s actions shutting down and re-opening the
    steam-line valve in Manhole 11 was reasonable because he acted at the direction of Thomas
    Johnson, who the plaintiffs assert was the “project manager and on-site representative of GSA”
    and who Stotmeister viewed as a client. Stotmeister Pls.’ Disputed Material Facts ¶ 6 [ECF No.
    196-2]; Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Defs.’ Joint Mot. for Summ. J. 5-7 [ECF No. 196]
    (quoted language on page 5). Even assuming that Frank Stotmeister viewed Thomas Johnson to
    be a “government representative” or “client,” the plaintiffs cited no legal authority to support the
    proposition that, in the District of Columbia, a contractor may blindly follow a client’s order and
    be immune from all liability for contributory negligence in carrying out the order. The plaintiffs
    likely cited no authority for this proposition because it appears that none exists in this
    jurisdiction -- as far as this Court can determine, the precise question of whether an exception to
    contributory negligence applies when a contractor’s negligence occurs while carrying out a
    client’s or superior’s order has never been addressed by the District of Columbia Court of
    Appeals. For the foregoing reasons, though, the Court concludes that, even if such an exception
    32
    As Frank Stotmeister’s boss testified, “you need a steam expert for operations . . . .” Exs.
    In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem
    Soueidan Dep. 147:10-147:17 (Mar. 16, 2007) (explaining that a steam expert was not necessary
    to replace piping but was necessary to operate the steam line) [ECF No. 206-5].
    --46--
    existed, the particular facts of this case would not warrant its application because there were
    alternative methods Frank Stotmeister could have employed to reasonably execute an order to
    shut down or open the steam-line valve, but he chose to proceed in a way that demonstrated a
    lack of due care for his own safety.
    As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Thomas Johnson was contractually prohibited
    from directing Grunley-Walsh’s employees, including Frank Stotmeister, about the means,
    methods or procedures to accomplish a project. The Alion government contract under which
    Thomas Johnson was employed stated that “[t]he construction contractors are solely responsible
    for construction means, methods, sequences and procedures used in the construction of the
    projects, and for related performance in accordance with their contracts with the Government.” 33
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 2 at I-C-2
    (subparagraph (g)) [ECF No. 201-2]; J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. P, Thomas
    Johnson Dep. 671:11-673:14 (Nov. 17, 2010) [ECF No. 162-9] (confirming that Exhibit 2 of the
    Exhibits in Support of Stotmeister Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities In
    Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 201-2] consists of excerpts of Alion’s
    contract and accurately reflects Alion’s role on both the 17th Street Steam Distribution Project
    and the water line tie-in project). It therefore follows that, if Thomas Johnson told Frank
    Stotmeister to shut down or open the steam-line valve at Manhole 11, it was Frank Stotmeister’s
    prerogative to determine the means, methods and procedures to accomplish that task. As already
    noted, supra Parts III and IV, Frank Stotmeister had only two reasonable means or methods to
    33
    There was no contract between Alion and Grunley-Walsh. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister
    Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 74, Brian Staudenmaier Dep. 43:10
    (Mar. 12, 2008) [ECF No. 207-1].
    --47--
    accomplish a shut down of any part of the steam system, one that applied in cases of emergency
    and one that applied in all other circumstances. In the case of an emergency, Frank Stotmeister
    was authorized to shut down the entire steam system at the Point of Connection only. In all other
    cases, the only means by which Frank Stotmeister could shut down any part of the steam system
    was by contacting GSA HOTD and requesting that GSA HOTD perform the task. Again, under
    no circumstance, whether in the case of an emergency or otherwise, was Frank Stotmeister
    authorized to reenergize the steam system or open a steam-line valve.
    To the extent that Thomas Johnson could direct Frank Stotmeister to do anything, that
    direction was limited to matters within the scope of work of Grunley-Walsh’s contract, and
    turning steam on or off was not within that scope. As Bassem Soueidan explained, Thomas
    Johnson “can’t direct [Frank Stotmeister] to do anything outside the contract.” Exs. In Supp. of
    United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 55:5-55:6 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF
    No. 175-1]. The contracting officer for the 17th Street Steam Distribution Project also confirmed
    that a construction manager or project manager never has the authority to direct anyone to
    exceed the scope of work under a contract. Third Party Def. United States’ Combined Reply In
    Support of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3, Michael Vrobel Dep. 194:3-194:7 (Sept. 7, 2010) [ECF No.
    106-2]. At best, Thomas Johnson could only “direct [Frank Stotmeister] to do things within the
    contract terms . . . .” Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 2, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 55:6-55:7 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5]. Bassem
    Soueidan confirmed that turning the steam on or off at the job site was not within the scope of
    Grunley-Walsh’s contract. Id. at 188:2-188:8 (“We were not -- by contract, that’s not our scope
    of work to do.”). In fact, according to Bassem Soueidan, because the work on the steam system
    --48--
    had been completed by the time the water line tie-in project was underway, Grunley-Walsh
    employees, including Frank Stotmeister, “had no business touching the steam system.” United
    States’ Supplemental Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 5, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 167:14-
    167:16 (Mar. 27, 2008) [ECF No. 122-1].
    It also remains undisputed that Thomas Johnson lacked any authority to grant Frank
    Stotmeister access to the “highly restricted” Steam Distribution Complex, including the steam
    tunnels and manholes. United States’ Mot. for Summ. J., Supplemental Decl. of Greg Westphal
    ¶¶ 4, 5 [ECF No. 106-1]. The Alion contract that Thomas Johnson worked under involved
    projects for the GSA White House Projects Office, 34 which “is a distinct division of GSA from
    HOTD.” Id. at ¶ 5. “Personnel in the White House Center do not have authority to permit access
    into the SDC.” Id. “Only HOTD personnel have authority to permit access into the manholes
    that are part of the SDC, such as manhole 11 on 17th Street.” Id. at ¶ 6. The plaintiffs proffered
    no evidence to the contrary and there is no evidence that Thomas Johnson was ever held out to
    be a GSA HOTD (versus White House Center) representative or employee. Grunley-Walsh
    officials obviously did not view Thomas Johnson to be a GSA HOTD employee or representative
    given Bassem Soueidan’s testimony failing to identify Johnson when asked whether there were
    any GSA HOTD personnel on site the morning of the accident:
    Q       On the night before and the morning of the accident, do you know if
    HODT [sic] personnel were on the job site?
    A       Not to my knowledge, I don’t believe there would have been a need for
    them.
    34
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 2
    (Alion’s contract) [ECF No. 201-2]; Third Party Def. U.S.’s Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot.
    for Summ. J. Ex. 6, Thomas Johnson Dep. 433:1-433:21 (Nov. 17, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2].
    --49--
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem
    Soueidan Dep. 189:14-189:19 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5]. Because there is no dispute
    that Thomas Johnson was not a GSA HOTD employee or representative, a fortiori, there
    likewise can be no dispute that he lacked the authority to grant Frank Stotmeister access to
    Manhole 11. 35
    Even if Thomas Johnson directed Frank Stotmeister to shut down or turn on the steam-
    line valve in Manhole 11 it was unreasonable for Stotmeister to take it upon himself to
    accomplish that task under the circumstances. The evidence reflects that Thomas Johnson lacked
    any expertise to direct the specific means by which the steam system or a steam-line valve
    should be shut down or turned back on. Thomas Johnson did not “have any role on the job with
    respect to turning steam on or off” -- he simply “coordinate[d]” steam shutdowns when Grunley-
    Walsh needed them. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 70, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 182:5-182:11 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 206-5].
    Thomas Johnson’s role with respect to the 17th Street Steam Distribution Project was managerial
    and involved administrative responsibilities like scheduling, the approval of requisitions, and
    negotiating change orders. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots.
    35
    It is a long-standing principle of government contracting that “[w]hatever the form in
    which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government
    takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government
    stays within the bounds of his authority.” Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 
    332 U.S. 380
    , 384
    (1947). “And this is so even though . . . the agent himself may have been unaware of the
    limitations upon his authority.” 
    Id.
     Consequently, even assuming for the sake of argument that
    Thomas Johnson could be deemed a government agent or representative, because Johnson’s
    request to shut down and turn on the steam was outside the scope of Grunley-Walsh’s contract,
    the request arguably would have constituted a new request for work, which would have resulted
    in a new agreement (whether by a change order or otherwise) for which Grunley-Walsh, and
    Frank Stotmeister, bore the burden of ensuring that Johnson was acting within the bounds of his
    actual authority. 
    Id.
    --50--
    for Summ. J. Ex. 71, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 110:11-110:16 (Jan. 18, 2008) [ECF No. 206-6]; 
    id.
    at Ex. 38, Richard Matkins Dep. 182:8-182:14 (Dec. 12, 2007) [ECF No. 204-5] (stating that
    Thomas Johnson “was in management” and “was suit and tie” versus working in manholes).
    Thomas Johnson had no steam experience, no understanding about the implications of, or the
    purpose for, the GSA plumbers’ request to turn the steam off on April 23, 2004, and he did not
    understand what water hammering was. J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. P, Thomas
    Johnson Dep. 96:6-96:19, 121:8-123:17, 151:2-151:17 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 162-9]; Third
    Party Def. U.S.’s Combined Reply In Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 6, Thomas Johnson Dep.
    427:8-427:17 (Nov. 17, 2010) [ECF No. 106-2]. As Bassem Soueidan explained, Thomas
    Johnson did not “manage [Grunley-Walsh’s] operations” but, instead, “basically” acted as “the
    liaison between the Government and the contractor.” J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J.
    Ex. B, Bassem Soueidan Dep. 70:9-70:16 (Mar. 16, 2007) [ECF No. 161-2]. There is no
    evidence to contradict this.
    There also is no evidence indicating that Thomas Johnson ordered Frank Stotmeister to
    personally operate the steam-line valve in Manhole 11. To the contrary, the record reflects that
    Thomas Johnson understood that only GSA HOTD could turn the steam on and off 36 and that
    Frank Stotmeister did “whatever was in the requirements to have it turned off at manhole number
    11,” 37 implying that Johnson believed Stotmeister followed Grunley-Walsh’s contract
    requirement to contact GSA HOTD to request a steam-system shut down or to turn on the steam-
    36
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex.
    30, Thomas Johnson Dep. 66:6-66:11 (stating that “[i]t’s their system” so “[t]hey have to turn it
    on and off”), 81:5-81:15 (Mar. 12, 2007) [ECF No. 203-2].
    37
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex.
    31, Thomas Johnson Dep. 143:8-143:21 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 203-3].
    --51--
    line valve in Manhole 11. The evidence shows that Thomas Johnson did not view himself as
    having either the contractual responsibility or the contractual authority to contact GSA HOTD to
    request a steam shut down during the water line tie-in project because there was no contract
    between his employer, Alion, and GSA HOTD, whereas there was such a contract between
    Frank Stotmeister’s employer, Grunley-Walsh, and GSA HOTD:
    Q       As you know, in the GSA report they indicate that only HODT [sic] was
    to turn off the steam, correct?
    A       Correct.
    Q       And you read that in the report, right?
    A       That’s correct.
    Q       And did you know that on April the 22nd of --
    A       I did.
    Q       Knowing that, did you call HODT [sic] to ask about turning off the steam?
    A       No.
    Q       Knowing that, did you call anybody from GSA about turning off the
    steam?
    A       No.
    Q       Knowing that, why did you not ask somebody from HODT [sic] to turn off
    the steam?
    A       Because I wasn’t involved in the [water line tie-in] project, so how could I
    ask them to turn something off in a project that I’m not involved in? They
    would not have recognized it. They would not have known who I -- they
    may not know who I was. They understood who Frank was. They
    understood that Frank had a project going on out there, so he was the
    contact between HODT [sic] and the steam at the time.
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 31,
    Thomas Johnson Dep. 97:13-98:16 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 203-3]. The evidence further shows
    --52--
    that Thomas Johnson’s only prior communications with GSA HOTD regarding steam system
    shut down requests were purely ministerial to confirm that White House officials approved of the
    timing of a shut down that Grunley-Walsh had requested from GSA HOTD during a project
    progress meeting. Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for
    Summ. J. Ex. 31, Thomas Johnson Dep. 98:17-106:20 (Feb. 4, 2008) [ECF No. 203-3]. The
    record is devoid of any evidence that Thomas Johnson ever made such a request himself. As
    Greg Westphal, the GSA HOTD mechanical engineer responsible for “coordinating steam
    outages with customer buildings” 38 testified:
    Q       And, as of April 2004, was Tom Johnson, as project manager of the 17th
    Street project, allowed to ask the government for a steam shutdown?
    A       The contractor [Grunley-Walsh] would request the shutdown during our
    progress meetings, so he [Johnson] wouldn’t actually make the request.
    The contractor would – would made the request to the government.
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 94, Greg
    Westphal Dep. 33:8-33:16 (Apr. 13, 2010) [ECF No. 207-21].
    Furthermore, even if Frank Stotmeister believed that he was being directed to personally
    operate the steam-line valve in Manhole 11, it was unreasonable for him to do so without ever
    alerting Thomas Johnson that he lacked the expertise, experience or contractual authority to do
    so. There are times when common sense must prevail and this certainly was one of them in light
    of the unusual circumstance involving the steam tunnel flooding, the danger involved, the fact
    that Frank Stotmeister was the supervising contractor responsible for the construction activities --
    38
    Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex.
    91, Greg Westphal Decl. ¶ 2 [ECF No. 207-18] (stating that “I was the mechanical engineer for
    Steam Distribution, with duties that included managing projects, coordinating steam outages
    with customer buildings, and locating drawings for other utilities working near the system”).
    --53--
    and safety -- at the time, and the fact that Frank Stotmeister was knowledgeable about steam
    systems, whereas Thomas Johnson was not. If Frank Stotmeister was being asked to do
    something he did not know how to do he should have notified Thomas Johnson of that fact or
    sought appropriate guidance about how to safely accomplish the task by contacting officials at
    GSA HOTD or perhaps even subcontractor M&M Welding.
    The notion that Grunley-Walsh officials, including Frank Stotmeister, were patsies who
    felt obligated to blindly follow government directives simply does not hold up against the
    evidence. From the outset of Grunley-Walsh’s contracting relationship with GSA, Grunley-
    Walsh officials questioned government directives or performed in a manner that contravened
    government orders. For example, about six months after Grunley-Walsh was awarded the
    contract for the 17th Street Steam Distribution Project, Grunley-Walsh officials refused to
    perform the contract as awarded and told GSA “there is no way we can do what they’re asking
    for.” Exs. In Supp. of Stotmeister Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. In Opp’n to Mots. for Summ. J. Ex. 70,
    Bassem Soueidan Dep. 118:16-118:21 (confirming date contract was awarded), 120:19-20
    (quote) [ECF No. 206-5]. In addition, as discussed supra Part III, Grunley-Walsh officials,
    including Frank Stotmeister, 39 were twice rebuked for shutting down parts of the steam system
    contrary to government directives prohibiting them from doing so. The Court therefore is not
    swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument that “Mr. Stotmeister may even have believed that he would
    be labeled as uncooperative if he objected to the request” made by Thomas Johnson to turn the
    39
    Bassem Soueidan testified that Frank Stotmeister attended a meeting during which the
    prohibition on shutting down steam was discussed and Soueidan himself told Stotmeister that the
    steam was not to be shut down again. J.A. In Supp. of Joint Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. D, Bassem
    Soueidan Dep. 58:8-60:18, 71:10-72:15 (May 25, 2010) [ECF No. 161-4].
    --54--
    steam off or on. Pls.’ Mem. of P&A In Opp’n to Defs.’ J. Mot. for Summ. J. On Issue of
    Contributory Negligence 7 [ECF No. 196].
    Generally, the law has been reluctant to endorse a plaintiff’s blind adherence to an order
    or directive when alternative methods to execute the directive are available but the plaintiff
    chooses to proceed in a way that demonstrates a lack of due care for his own safety. Thus, for
    example, in Wasilko v. United States, 
    300 F. Supp. 573
     (N.D. Ohio 1967), a federal district court
    held that a pilot who was killed when his plane crashed after taking off from an airport runway in
    the wake of a large airliner was not relieved of his own contributory negligence despite relying
    on a clearance that control-tower personnel negligently issued without warning the pilot of the
    risk of airliner wake turbulence. 
    300 F. Supp. at 598
    . The court in Wasilko concluded that:
    The clearance to use an intersection takeoff did not relieve Pilot Wasilko from his
    final authority and responsibility in the control and operation o[f] his plane. Nor
    was the intersection takeoff clearance an order that he was blindly bound to
    follow. He had the right to ‘use either another point on the runway or the full
    length of the runway,’ FAA Flight Information Manual, Air Traffic Control
    Procedures, promulgated September, 29, 1961, and Tower Information Bulletin,
    Cleveland Hopkins FAA Tower Facility. To pilot his plane under the
    circumstances found to have then existed, knowingly behind TWA 224 and
    beneath its flight path, was a failure to exercise care for his own safety and
    constituted negligence on the part of Pilot Wasilko.
    
    Id. at 598
    .
    Likewise, in Gish v. CSX Transp., Inc., 
    890 F.2d 989
    , 992-93 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh
    Circuit affirmed a district court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to support a
    jury verdict finding that a pipefitter was contributorily negligent for the back injuries he suffered
    when he tried to remove a wedged manhole cover to execute an order to clear a clogged sewer
    line. The Seventh Circuit noted in Gish that there were multiple methods to remove the lid
    --55--
    safely and the jury was not required to believe that the supervisor ordered the pipefitter to
    proceed in the manner the pipefitter chose. 
    890 F.2d at 993
    .
    Consistent with these cases, in Alholm v. American Steamship Co., 
    144 F.3d 1172
    , 1179
    (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s argument on appeal that “because he was
    following orders the jury should not have been permitted to find him comparatively negligent or
    to consider whether there was a safe alternative course of action at the time . . . .” In Alholm, the
    plaintiff was a deckhand on a ship who suffered back injuries after holding a heavy cable while
    the ship was being re-docked. 
    144 F.3d at 1179
    . After stating that precedent did “not establish a
    blanket rule precluding a seaman from being found contributorily negligent when acting at the
    direction of a supervisor,” the Eighth Circuit went on to find that there was sufficient evidence
    for the jury to conclude that the plaintiff chose the method of accomplishing the task and chose a
    less safe alternative that contributed to his injury. 
    Id.
    In a more recent case, albeit one that is unpublished, the Fifth Circuit in Pallis v. United
    States, No. 09-40088, 
    2010 WL 785171
     (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), reviewed a district court’s
    determination that a seaman was 75% contributorily negligent for injuries to his knee sustained
    while carrying out a supervisor’s order to move trash on a ship. 
    2010 WL 785171
     at **2-3. The
    facts revealed that, after being directed to move the trash, the seaman asked for help with bulky
    items and inquired about using a crane but was told that assistance was not available, the crane
    was not working, and chainfalls could be found throughout the ship to lift heavy objects. Id. at
    **1. The seaman was injured while carrying a 50-pound steel plate to an upper deck and argued
    on appeal that he had no obligation to find the safest means to perform the supervisor’s directive
    to move trash. Id. at **1, 3. Unpersuaded by the seaman’s argument that “the district court
    --56--
    erred when it found him contributorily negligent because he was following orders,” the Fifth
    Circuit quipped that the plaintiff’s argument “would make automatons of seaman” and conflicted
    with its prior precedent holding that “[a]lthough a seaman may not be obligated to find the safest
    method of performance . . . he has a duty to exercise the judgment and acumen of a seaman with
    like experience in like circumstances.” Id. at **3 (citing Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc.,
    
    107 F.3d 331
     (5th Cir.1997) (en banc)). Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
    court’s conclusions that “because [the seaman] elected to move the object that caused his injury,
    rather than moving lighter items until assistance became available, he contributed to his injury”
    and “[he] could have used available chainfalls, but chose not to do so.” 
    Id.
    In Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Seamas, 
    201 F.2d 140
     (9th Cir. 1952), the Ninth Circuit
    explained that, when an employee receives a general order about what is to be done, but not a
    specific order about how to do it, “an employee must use ordinary care in its execution, and the
    giving of the order does not affect the question of whether the servant has been negligent in his
    manner of carrying it out, where there is a choice open to him.” 
    201 F.2d at 144
    . The Ninth
    Circuit’s decision in Jenkins v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 
    22 F.3d 206
    , 211 (9th Cir. 1994) is in
    accord, stating “[w]e continue to adhere to the traditional rule that when an employee carries out
    his supervisor’s general order in an unsafe manner, he is responsible under [the Federal
    Employer’s Liability Act] for his own contributory negligence.” 40
    Courts have, however, carved out an exception to contributory negligence when an
    employee is complying with a superior’s specific order, which applies when the employee is
    40
    In Collins v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
    9 A.3d 56
     (Md. 2010), the Court of Appeals
    of Maryland cited with favor the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jenkins, suggesting that Maryland
    courts would follow the specific order versus general order principle, at least as that principle
    applies to contributory negligence for claims asserted pursuant to FELA.
    --57--
    “following a direct order to perform a task in a specific manner . . . .” Jenkins v. Union Pacific
    R.R. Co., 
    22 F.3d 206
    , 211 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Accord Stewart v. Illinois, 
    41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 156
     (Ill. Ct. Cl. 1989) (inmate absolved of contributory negligence for burns received
    when he was ordered to remove trays from an oven but the shelf holding the trays came loose
    and caused hot grease to spill on the inmate). Similarly, at least one state has created an
    exception when an employee’s only choices are to perform under dangerous circumstances, lose
    his job or quit. Miller v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 
    349 So.2d 1353
    , 1361-62
    (La. Ct. App. 1977) (summarizing several such cases). When, however, an employee has control
    over the manner of executing the ordered assignment the exception has not been applied. 
    Id. at 1362
     (finding that the plaintiff had “as great or greater knowledge” about the risk as the foreman
    and the plaintiff “had control of the specific manner in which the assignment was carried out”
    and voluntarily chose the method used).
    Although nearly all of these cases involve tort actions by seamen and railway employees
    pursuant to the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”) or the Jones Act, and none of these
    cases is controlling, they nevertheless are instructive and serve as cautionary examples that
    suggest to the Court that it should hesitate before adopting the plaintiffs’ theory that Frank
    Stotmeister should be shielded from all contributory negligence for acts taken to execute an order
    from Thomas Johnson. Particularly when the plaintiffs cited no legal authority for their theory,
    no evidence demonstrating that Thomas Johnson had the actual authority to order Frank
    Stotmeister to personally shut down or turn on the steam-line valve in Manhole 11, no facts to
    show that Johnson ordered Stotmeister to personally operate the steam-line valve, and no
    evidence indicating that Johnson specified the method by which Stotmeister should accomplish
    --58--
    the shutting down or turning on of the steam system. The plaintiffs are, in essence, asking this
    Court to create a new rule that has never been suggested by District of Columbia courts and is
    not warranted in light of the undisputed facts in this case.
    VI.
    In the final analysis, the plaintiffs do not dispute that “[t]he cause of the steam release”
    that killed Frank Stotmeister can be attributed to the “water that flowed from the cut water main”
    and “inundate[ed] nearby steam lines” and that “[w]hen Mr. Stotmeister began to open the
    isolation valve in Manhole 11, the mixture of condensate and steam surged” and resulted in
    “high-pressure shock waves, known as steam-condensate water hammer” that “caus[ed] the
    massive eruption that fatally injured Messrs. Stotmeister and [Joseph] Hudert.” Stotmeister Pls.’
    Disputed Material Facts ¶ 72 [ECF No. 196-2]. This is a tragic case and there is no indication
    that Frank Stotmeister acted with anything other than the intent to ensure that the water line tie-in
    project was completed as quickly as possible so the streets could be reopened. After considering
    all the undisputed facts, however, the inescapable conclusion is that Frank Stotmeister’s
    decisions and actions while supervising the water line tie-in project -- particularly his profound
    failure to act to have the work suspended, the steam system shut down or the steam system
    evaluated when it became apparent that water from the water line tie-in project was causing an
    abnormal flooding of the steam vault -- were unreasonable and the proximate cause of the steam
    explosion that killed him. Lest it be forgotten, Frank Stotmeister’s unreasonable decisions and
    actions also resulted in the death of Joseph Hudert and serious injury to another contractor.
    Although he might simply have been doing his best to assist and accommodate Thomas Johnson
    when he twice operated the steam-line valve in Manhole 11, the fact of the matter is that the
    --59--
    catalyst for the tragedy was Frank Stotmeister’s unreasonable decision to proceed with the water
    line tie-in project after it became clear that the water main pipe had not fully drained and the
    water was overflowing the excavation trench and flooding the steam system. Once Frank
    Stotmeister elected to press on with the project without notifying anyone at GSA HOTD about
    the unusual flooding, the die was cast for the disaster that occurred when he attempted to open
    the steam-line valve in Manhole 11 without the authority or skill to do so safely.
    CONCLUSION
    For all the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that there is no genuine dispute as to any
    material fact and the preponderance of the evidence shows that Frank Stotmeister’s negligence
    was a substantial factor in causing his injuries and death. The Court further holds that Frank
    Stotmeister’s injuries and death were a direct result or reasonably probable consequence of his
    negligent acts or omissions. As a result, the Court will grant the Joint Motion for Summary
    Judgment of Alion Science and Technology Corporation, Cherry Hill Construction, Inc., Day &
    Zimmerman Group Services, DC Water and M&M Welding & Fabricators, Inc. on the Issue of
    Frank Stotmeister’s Contributory Negligence [ECF No. 160] and judgment will be entered in
    favor of Day & Zimmerman and M&M Welding. The foregoing reasons also compel the Court
    to deny the pending Stotmeister Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider [ECF No. 246], 41 which was
    filed after the Court entertained oral arguments regarding the motion for summary judgment that
    41
    A motion to reconsider “is discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court
    finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
    the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Dyson v. District of Columbia,
    
    710 F.3d 415
    , 420 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court finds that
    there is no intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to
    correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice in light of the reasons announced by the Court
    in this decision.
    --60--
    is the subject of this decision. Finally, the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration
    renders moot the Joint Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider [ECF No. 249] and
    Plaintiffs’ Motion for Oral Argument [ECF No. 256]. An appropriate order shall accompany this
    memorandum opinion.
    August 25, 2014                                   __________________________________
    Thomas F. Hogan
    Senior United States District Judge
    --61--