Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. United States Department of Transportation ( 2016 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT
DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.
Civil Action No. 12-1158 (BAH)
Plaintiffs,
Consolidated with:
v. Civil Action No. 14-548 (BAH)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell
TRANSPORTATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiffs, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. (“OOIDA”), which
is an organization that represents professional truck drivers and small business trucking
companies, and five of its individual members, who are commercial truck drivers, brought this
lawsuit against the defendants, the United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”),
Anthony Foxx,1 in his official capacity as Secretary of the DOT (“Secretary”), the FMCSA, and
Anne S. Ferro, in her official capacity as Administrator of the FMCSA (collectively, “DOT” or
“defendants”), in an effort to protect against the dissemination to potential employers of
information in a federal database about state citations issued against them that were dismissed or
resolved in their favor. Pending before the Court are three motions: the plaintiffs’ Motion for
Leave to Conduct Discovery, ECF No. 53, and cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the
parties, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 60; Pls.’ Cross-Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 64. For the
reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs fail to allege or demonstrate any harm as a result of the
1
During the pendency of this lawsuit, Anthony Foxx succeeded Raymond H. Lahood as the DOT’s
Secretary and, thus, Mr. Foxx is automatically substituted in place of Mr. Lahood as a named party to this action.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).
1
defendants’ actions, and as such, they have not shown an injury in fact sufficient to support
standing. The Court therefore lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, which it must
dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
The legal framework governing consideration of the pending motions is addressed first
before turning to the factual allegations underlying the plaintiffs’ complaint and the procedural
history of this matter.
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
The Federal Motor Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) was created by the Congress as
“an administration of the Department of Transportation” and tasked with giving “the highest
priority” to carrying out congressional intent in “the furtherance of the highest degree of safety in
motor carrier transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 113(a)-(b). As part of this statutory mandate, the
FMCSA maintains the Motor Carrier Management Information System (“MCMIS”), a database
containing information on commercial truck drivers’ safety records, which includes “accident
reports and other safety violations.” See Weaver v. FMCSA, 744 F.3d 142, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(discussing creation of MCMIS). The states serve as the primary collectors and reporters to
FMCSA of the data contained in the MCMIS, and are required to ensure that this data is
“accurate, complete, and timely motor carrier safety data.” 49 U.S.C. § 31102(b)(2)(Q)(i). DOT
is ultimately responsible for “ensur[ing], to the maximum extent practical, all the data is
complete, timely and accurate,” id. § 31106(a)(3)(F), and “prescrib[ing] technical and
operational standards to ensure uniform, timely, and accurate information collection and
reporting by the States,” id. § 31106(a)(4)(A).
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The FMCSA is statutorily required to make certain information contained in the MCMIS
electronically available to potential employers of commercial drivers for preemployment
screening, namely: “(1) Commercial motor vehicle accident reports[;] (2) Inspection reports that
contain no driver-related safety violations[; and] (3) Serious driver-related safety violation
inspection reports.” Id. § 31150(a). This access is to be provided to assist “in assessing an
individual operator’s crash and serious safety violation inspection history as a preemployment
condition” and “may only be used during the preemployment assessment of an operator-
applicant.” Id. § 31150(c). The law requires that the MCMIS be operated in a manner ensuring
dissemination “in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act [(“FCRA”)] (15 U.S.C. 1681 et
seq.) and all other applicable Federal law.” Id. § 31150(b)(1). In addition, FMCSA must
“provide a procedure for the operator-applicant to correct inaccurate information in the System
in a timely manner.” Id. § 31150(b)(4). FMCSA has implemented the preemployment screening
access through a program known as the Pre-Employment Screening Program (“PSP”). Admin.
Record (“AR”) 25.
“To meet the statutory mandate of providing a correction mechanism” for violation
reports stored in the MCMIS, “FMCSA established ‘DataQs,’ a web-based dispute resolution
procedure that allows an individual to challenge data maintained by FMCSA.” Weaver, 744
F.3d at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Silverado Stages, Inc. v. FMCSA, 809
F.3d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (describing DataQs). When a challenge is made to a reported
safety violation by a driver, the FMCSA forwards it to the issuing state and “state officials also
decide how to respond when a driver challenges a citation's inclusion in the database.” Weaver,
744 F.3d at 143. FMCSA is not authorized to direct a State to change or alter MCMIS data for
violations or inspections originating within a particular State. Id. at 143-44. “Once a State office
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makes a determination on the validity of a challenge,” the FMCSA is bound by the state
reporting as the “final resolution of the challenge.” Id. at 144.
In 2014, after this case was initially filed, the FMCSA adopted a significant change to the
DataQs system. Under the new system, the MCMIS allows inclusion of adjudicated citation
results associated with violations documented during an inspection. Motor Carrier Management
Information System (MCMIS) Changes to Improve Uniformity in the Treatment of Inspection
Violation Data, 79 Fed. Reg. 32,491 (Jun. 5, 2014) (“2014 Interpretative Rule and Statement of
Policy”). Prior to this rule, MCMIS included only inspection and violation data from the initial
inspection report, and did not have a field in which to enter the result of an adjudicated citation.
Id. 2
B. Factual History
Between March 2010 and February 2013, five professional truck drivers, Brian E. Kelley,
Robert Lohmeier, Klint L. Mowrer, J. Mark Moody, and Fred Weaver, Jr. (collectively, the
“individual plaintiffs”), each received one or more citations from state law enforcement
authorities for having allegedly violating safety regulations while driving. See AR at 23-24
(Mowrer), 30 (Lohmeier), 120 (Kelley), 125 (Weaver), 180-181 (Moody). The individual
plaintiffs successfully challenged these citations in state court: the cases against Kelley,
Lohmeier, Moody and Weaver were ultimately dismissed, Am. Compl. ¶ 120, ECF No. 35
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The plaintiffs claim that the FMCSA has not yet implemented the 2014 Interpretative Rule and Statement
of Policy and that, as of February 4, 2016, the MCMIS contains no new fields for the results of adjudicated citations.
Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 5, ECF No. 64-1; Pls.’
Reply Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Reply”) at 10-11, ECF No. 74. The defendants respond that a publicly
available FMCSA document titled “DataQs Analyst Guide. Best Practices for Federal and State Agency Users”
(available at https://dataqs.fmcsa.dot.gov/Data/Guide/DataQs_Users_Guide_and_Best_Practices_Manual.pdf)
shows the procedures now in place for processing requests under the 2014 Interpretative Rule and Statement of
Policy. Defs.’ Opp’n Pls.’ Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Reply Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ J. (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 22, ECF
No. 70. This factual dispute need not be resolved as it has no bearing on the plaintiffs’ standing.
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(Moody);3 AR at 119 (Kelley), 144 (Lohmeier), 256 (Weaver), and Mowrer was found not guilty
after a trial, AR at 132. Subsequently, all the plaintiffs but Moody requested through DataQs the
removal of the violation reports related to these citations in the MCMIS. See AR at 116-17
(Kelley), 122-23 (Lohmeier), 133 (Mowrer), 249-50 (Weaver). In each case, the intervening
state authority rejected the request because the MCMIS system at the time did not display
adjudicatory outcomes, only that an initial citation was made.
In a letter dated July 8, 2011, OOIDA wrote to the FMCSA’s Administrator on behalf of
Kelley, Lohmeier and Mowrer, asking that the violation reports corresponding to the successfully
challenged citations “be removed from all FMCSA databases.” Id. at 126-29. Consistent with
the statutory and regulatory requirement making the states the final arbiters of MCMIS
information, the FMCSA’s Administrator forwarded the requests to the appropriate state
authorities. Id. at 174-77. The challenges were again rejected by the respective states for each
plaintiff, and the FMSCA’s Administrator reported these rejections to OOIDA, noting that the
FMCSA “concur[red] with the State responses to these DataQs.” Id. at 178-79.
C. Procedural History
In 2011, the plaintiffs, with the exception of Weaver, initiated the instant lawsuit
asserting five related claims, four under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§
701 et seq., and one under the FCRA, all of which are predicated on the maintenance and
dissemination of allegedly incomplete data in the MCMIS database. Soon after the case was
filed, DOT moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8, but the
case was stayed, over plaintiffs objections4, when a nearly identical case was filed by plaintiff
3
Unlike the other individual plaintiffs, the record does not contain evidence showing that the case against
Moody was dismissed. Nevertheless, because the merits of the claims are not reached, the citation to the complaint
is included for completeness of the factual history.
5
Weaver directly in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The Circuit ultimately concluded
that original jurisdiction in the appellate court was lacking and transferred the case to this Court,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Weaver, 744 F.3d at 148.
After consolidation of plaintiff Weaver’s case with the instant case, the plaintiffs filed, by
consent, an amended consolidated complaint, First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 35, alleging,
under the APA, that the defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or in excess of
statutory authority, by: (1) maintaining in the MCMIS and releasing through the PSP violation
reports related to citations that were adjudicated in the driver’s favor without reference to the
subsequent adjudications, FAC ¶¶ 144-49 (Count I); (2) releasing through the PSP reports of
violations that were not previously determined to be “serious,” id. ¶¶ 150-58 (Count II); (3)
maintaining in the MCMIS reports of alleged safety violations that were not yet adjudicated in
court, id. ¶¶ 159-69 (Count III); and (4) improperly delegating their responsibility to ensure
accuracy in the MCMIS data to the states participating in the MCSAP through the DataQs
system, id. ¶¶ 170-79 (Count IV). The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants willfully and/or
negligently violated various provisions of the FCRA by maintaining allegedly incomplete
information in the MCMIS and the dissemination of that information through the PSP. Id. ¶¶
180-93 (Count V). Notably, by contrast to the original complaint, which generally described
each plaintiff’s harm as including “los[t] business opportunities” and “loss of income,” see
Compl., ¶ 70, 85, 102, 113. ECF No. 1, the First Amended Complaint omitted any reference to
pecuniary or professional harm, stating merely that each individual plaintiff was “adversely
affected or aggrieved” by the defendants’ conduct, see FAC ¶¶ 70, 99, 115, 125,138.
The defendants renewed their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 37, which this Court denied, mindful of the D.C.
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Circuit’s pointed observation that FMCSA “had ‘not compiled a record with an eye toward
judicial review—indeed, they have insisted that they have no role to play in the MCMIS
process,’” Mem. Op. and Ord. (quoting Weaver, 744 F.3d at 147), ECF No. 46, at 3, despite
concluding that “[t]he defendants ma[de] a colorable challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing,” id. at
6. DOT subsequently filed a certified list of the contents of the Administrative Record, ECF No.
49, which the plaintiffs described as “woefully inadequate,” prompting their motion for
discovery. Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. for Discovery at 3, ECF No. 53-1. In addition to that motion,
as noted, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which are now ripe for
review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of federal courts to hear only “Cases”
and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Indeed, federal courts are “forbidden . . .
from acting beyond [their] authority,” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir.
2008), and “have an affirmative obligation ‘to consider whether the constitutional and statutory
authority exist for [them] to hear each dispute,’” James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82
F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 196
(D.C. Cir. 1992)). Absent subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, the Court must dismiss it.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506–07 (2006).
“The doctrine of standing gives meaning to these constitutional limits by ‘identify[ing]
those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.’” Susan B. Anthony
List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138,
1146 (2013) (“‘One element of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must
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establish that they have standing to sue.’” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997))).
This “doctrine limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to
seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” i.e., “an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent.”
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of,” i.e., the injury alleged must be fairly
“traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” Id. Third, it must be likely that “the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).5
The Supreme Court in Spokeo recently emphasized the need for careful examination of
the first step of standing analysis, instructing that, in performing the injury in fact analysis,
“particularization” and “concreteness” are distinct requirements that must be met. 136 S. Ct. at
1548. “For an injury to be particularized,” the Court explained, “it must affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way.” Id. Particularization requires that plaintiff show he “personally
has suffered some actual or threatened injury,” id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)), and requires a plaintiff
to raise more than a “generalized grievance[],” id. at 1555 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573). The
Court, however, made clear that while “[p]articularization is necessary to establish injury in fact,
. . . it is not sufficient.” Id. at 1548. “An injury in fact must also be concrete.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
5
For an association—like OOIDA in the instant case—to have standing, it must show that “one or more of
its members” would have standing to sue. Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Bowser, 815 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(citing Hunt v. Wash. Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977)).
8
Concreteness requires that an alleged violation actually result in an injury. Spokeo, 136
S. Ct. at 1548; see also Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., No. 14-7047, 2016 WL 3996710, at *3
(D.C. Cir. July 26, 2016) (applying Spokeo). “A concrete injury must be de facto; that is, it must
actually exist.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted). Though
intangible harms “can nevertheless be concrete,” id. at 1549, concrete injury requires showing
something more than an individual’s interest in not seeing a statute violated. See Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (“[A]n asserted right to have the government act in accordance with
law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”), abrogated on
other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
The concreteness requirement means that, in simple terms, some statutory violations “could
‘result in no harm,’” i.e., not create an injury in fact, “even if they involved . . . [technical]
violat[ions of] the law.” Hancock, 2016 WL 3996710, at *3 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550).
The question of the plaintiffs’ standing is a “threshold jurisdictional question,” Holistic
Candlers & Consumers Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Byrd v. EPA,
174 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1999)), that must be addressed before reaching the merits of the
their claims, see Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. Of Columbia, 486 F.3d 1342, 1346
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“‘Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question’ to be answered prior
to any merits inquiry.” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101
(1998))).
III. DISCUSSION
DOT raises several arguments for judgment in its favor on the plaintiffs’ APA and FCRA
claims, including that the plaintiffs lack standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. See
generally Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”), ECF No. 61; Defs.’ Opp’n Pls.’
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Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Reply Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ J. (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 70. The
plaintiffs contest all of DOT’s arguments and, further, have moved for discovery on their FCRA
claim.6 See generally Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.
(“Pls.’ Mem.”), ECF No. 64-1; Pls.’ Reply Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Reply”), ECF No.
74. The plaintiffs have failed, however, to make any showing of a concrete injury in fact and
this is fatal to all of their claims.
Each of the plaintiffs’ claims are predicated on the same underlying conduct of DOT: the
maintenance of allegedly incomplete data in the MCMIS database that may be disseminated to
potential employers through the PSP, and DOT’s alleged abdication of its duty to ensure the
MCMIS has accurate information by permitting states to determine whether violations are
removed from the system. Yet, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that either the maintenance
or dissemination of allegedly incomplete data, even if this amounts to a violation of DOT’s
statutory responsibilities, has harmed them in any way. The Supreme Court’s instruction in
Spokeo is clear: a plaintiff cannot “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
The D.C. Circuit’s application of Spokeo in Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., No. 14-
7047, 2016 WL 3996710 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2016), is dispositive on the plaintiffs’ lack of a
concrete injury sufficient for standing in this case. In Hancock, two plaintiffs alleged that
requests by stores for the plaintiffs’ zip codes when processing credit card information
constituted a violation of a D.C. consumer protection law and created an injury sufficient to
6
The parties disagree whether the government agencies are subject to the requirements of the FCRA and
whether sovereign immunity bars FCRA claims against an agency. Pls.’ Mem. at 34-41; Defs.’ Mem. at 36-41.
Even assuming, as the Supreme Court did in Spokeo, that the FCRA applies in this case, 136 S. Ct. at 1546 n.4, the
applicability of the FCRA to government agencies need not be addressed, since the plaintiffs’ claims fail the
standing inquiry.
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support standing. Id. at *2. The Court observed that the plaintiffs did not allege a concrete,
cognizable injury, “for example, any invasion of privacy, increased risk of fraud or identity theft,
or pecuniary or emotional injury,” id. at *7, but instead alleged that the violation of the law itself
gave rise to standing, see id. at *2. The Court, citing Spokeo, concluded that without a concrete
injury, the plaintiffs had merely identified “a statutory violation [that] result[ed] in no harm,” id.
at *7, and that because there was no concrete harm alleged, the plaintiffs lacked standing,
requiring dismissal of their claims, id. at *6-8.
Similarly, the plaintiffs in this case do not allege or provide evidence of a concrete harm
resulting from DOT’s actions. No plaintiff has alleged that his employment or employment
opportunities were adversely affected in any way by the maintenance of the MCMIS or by the
dissemination of reports through the PCP. The plaintiffs have also failed to identify anything in
the administrative record or joint appendix that would support the requisite finding of a concrete
harm. See Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., No. 14-5195, 2016 WL 4608153, at *6
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 6, 2016) (noting that at the summary judgment stage, a party “must” have
introduced evidence into the record to support facts necessary to find standing). To the contrary,
the record reveals that, of the individual plaintiffs, only Mowrer and Weaver have even had their
records requested by a third party during the relevant time period, AR at 332, and neither
Mowrer nor Weaver make any claim, in the pleadings or briefs, as to the impact of these requests
and subsequent disclosures.7
Further, the absence of the allegations of any concrete harm is all the more noticeable in
the First Amended Complaint, where instead of providing more detail about actual harm, the
7
While both Spokeo and Hancock addressed claims under the FCRA, rather than under the APA, the
difference in the statutory basis for the claims is immaterial. No matter the legal claim, the underlying factual
allegations must adequately show an injury in fact to support standing.
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plaintiffs’ allegations of injury were diluted to generic language about being “adversely affected
or aggrieved.” See, e.g., FAC ¶ 70. Rather than argue for the existence of a concrete injury,
Plaintiffs argue that an “injury in fact may exist solely by virtue of legal rights created by
statute,” Pls.’ Mem. at 24, and that deprivation of a statutory right is necessarily an injury “which
creates standing,” id. Under this legal theory, plaintiffs assert that they “have standing based on
the invasion of [their asserted] statutory rights.” Id. This argument was squarely rejected in
Spokeo. Hancock, 2016 WL 3996710 at *6.8
Plaintiffs also argue that the potential broad uses of their data, in the “Driver Information
Resource, Driver Safety Measurement System, Carrier Safety Measurement System” and other
government databases create an injury in fact, and that this risk of injury persists if the
information is maintained in a database or disclosed in the future. Pls.’ Mem. at 23, 27. These
arguments fail, however, for the same reason as the first: the plaintiffs do not explain how these
asserted violations currently cause, or could imminently cause, a concrete harm. Without any
concrete harm demonstrated, or even alleged, the plaintiffs do not satisfy the injury in fact
requirement, and lack standing to bring these claims against DOT.9
8
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Hancock were issued
after completion of briefing in this case, no party provided notice of this controlling authority or made any effort to
supplement the briefing to address these cases since their issuance. This may explain why the plaintiffs’ briefing
asserts plainly incorrect statements of the applicable law. Nevertheless, this Court is obliged to reach questions of
subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even if not addressed by the parties, since review of the merits of a dispute
may only be undertaken if the Court is satisfied such jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel,
424 U.S. 737, 740 (1976).
9
This case is dismissed due to the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the injury in fact requirement and, thus,
discussion of the other requisite elements of standing is unnecessary. Notably, however, the plaintiffs’ showing on
causation and redressability are also tenuous at best. For example, while the plaintiffs seek to have information
contained in the MCMIS updated or amended, the FCSMA does not have the power to amend MCMIS data that has
been reported by a state, meaning that any order directed to the defendants currently before this Court may not affect
the MCMIS in any way. See Weaver, 744 F.3d at 143-44. Additionally, the fact that the states are the final arbiters
of the information entered into MCMIS raises significant question whether DOT’s actions caused the plaintiffs’
asserted injuries at all. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Having concluded that the plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their claims, the Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the parties’ pending cross-motions for
summary judgment and the plaintiffs’ discovery motion, and must instead dismiss the plaintiff’s
complaint. See Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235, 238 (vacating summary
judgment where the plaintiff lacked standing and remanding with instructions to dismiss the
complaint); Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same). Dismissing the
complaint without reaching the parties’ pending motions “clears the path for future relitigation of
the issues” should the plaintiffs later establish their standing to sue. See Maydak v. United
States, 630 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ramallo v.
Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in
part with respect to their argument that the plaintiffs lack standing and denied in all other
respects. The plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment and motion for discovery are
denied.
Digitally signed by Hon. Beryl A.
Howell
DN: cn=Hon. Beryl A. Howell,
o=U.S. District Court for the
Date: September 30, 2016 District of Columbia, ou=United
States District Court Judge,
email=howell_chambers@dcd.u
scourts.gov, c=US
Date: 2016.09.30 18:25:44 -04'00'
__________________________
BERYL A. HOWELL
United States District Judge
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