Abrams v. Stuckey ( 2014 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR. and *
R.C. ABRAMS, *
*
Plaintiffs, *
*
v. ' * CV 114-190
*
C. BRIAN STUCKEY, District
Director, Farm Service Agency,
United States Department Of
Agriculture,
Defendant.
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to
transfer venue, with Plaintiff's consent, to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia (Doc. 4) . For the
reasons stated herein, the motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter comes before the Court on removal, following
Plaintiffs' motion for entry of a temporary restraining order
("TRO"), which was granted in the Superior Court of Burke County,
Georgia. (Doc. 1.) There, Plaintiffs sought a TRO to prevent
foreclosure on a 350-acre tract of land due to nonpayment of loans
from the Farm Service Agency and United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA") . (Doc. 1, Ex. 1.) The motion for a TRO was
based upon a pending motion to vacate and set aside an arbitrator's
decision filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia,
which, if granted, would allegedly prevent foreclosure. (Doc. 4.)
A brief background into the arbitrator's decision is helpful
to understand the underlying claims. In 1998, the District Court
for the District of Columbia certified a class of African-American
farmers who alleged that the USDA discriminated against them in
applications for farm loans and benefit programs. (Doc. 4.) That
court allowed individual claimants to resolve claims through
decisions by a third-party neutral. (Id.) Lucious Abrams, Jr.1
submitted one of these so-called "Pigford claims," which was
dismissed by the arbitrator for failure to show a prima facie case
of discrimination. (Id.) On October 14, 2008, Lucious Abrams, Jr.
filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of
Columbia alleging the dismissal of his Pigford claim violated due
process, which the court dismissed on August 24, 2009. (Id.) On
September 18, 2014, Lucious Abrams, Sr. and Sons, the partnership,
and Lucious Abrams, Jr. filed a complaint to set aside the
arbitrator's decision dismissing the Pigford claim. On October 8,
2014, the court ordered the United States to file a response by
October 24, 2014. (Id.)
1 Plaintiffs inherited the land at issue from their father, the late
Lucious Abrams, Sr. ("Mr. Abrams"). Mr. Abrams, through a partnership with
three of his sons, Lucious Abrams, Jr., Herbert Abrams, and R.C. Abrams
operated a partnership known as Lucious Abrams, Sr. & Sons. The partnership
received federal farm loans to assist in the operation of the farm's
business. Five of Mr. Abrams' daughters brought an identical complaint in
the Superior Court of Burke County, which was also removed to this Court.
See Zennie Houston, Betty Turner, Frances Ross, Jesse Mae Abrams, and Florine
Watson v. C. Brian Stuckey, No. l:14-cv-191, Doc. 1 (S.D. Ga. 2014).
2
II. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that venue in the
Southern District of Georgia is proper, as a "substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated" in this
district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Even so, a district court may
transfer an action to any other district where the action may have
been brought or to any district to which all parties have consented
"[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the
interest of justice[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This inquiry thus
requires a two-part analysis: (1) the Court must determine if this
action could have been brought in the alternate venue; and (2) the
Court must determine whether the convenience of parties and
witnesses, as well as the interest of justice, require transfer.
Addressing the first part, this action could have initially
been brought in the District of Columbia. See Game Controller Tech
LLC v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1272-73
(S.D. Fla. 2014) ("An action might have been brought in a
transferee district if that district has subject matter
jurisdiction over the action, venue is proper, and the parties are
amenable to service of process in the transferee forum.")
Personal and subject matter jurisdiction are both proper in the
District of Columbia, as Plaintiffs have (1) consented to the
transfer and (2) sued an agency of the United States in which a
contract governs the relationship. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2);
Baragona v. Kuwait & Gulf Link Transp. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1351,
1360 (N.D. Ga. 2009) ("An individual may voluntarily subject
himself to the jurisdiction of a court by appearance or may
contract in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given
court."). Additionally, venue is proper because the USDA is
headquartered in Washington, D.C. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)
(venue is proper in any district where a defendant resides).
Finally, the Court finds that the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia is a more convenient forum and that
transfer is in the interest of justice. Here, the facts and
circumstances that form the basis for the TRO presently are being
litigated in the District of Columbia. The TRO is thus
inextricably tied to the pending action in the District of
Columbia, and this Court finds transfer proper in order "to avoid
unnecessary inconvenience . . . and to conserve time, energy, and
money." Gonzalez v. Pirelli Tire LLC, No. 07-80453-CIV, 2008 WL
516847, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2008).
Accordingly, and in light of Plaintiffs' consent to transfer,
Defendant's motion to transfer venue is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk
is DIRECTED to TRANSFER this case to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Following transfer, the Clerk
is shall terminate all deadlines and motions, and CLOSE this case.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this_(Q^ ' day of October,
2014.
HONORABJlE-