Houston v. Stuckey ( 2014 )

IN TEE I,NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
E1OR TEE SOUTEERN DISTRTCT OE' GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
ZENNIE HOUSTON, BETTY TURNER,
FRANCES ROSS, JESSE MAE ABRAMS,
ANd FLORINE WATSON,
Plaintiffs, Case No. : 1:14-cv-191
v.
C. BRIAN STUCKEY, District
Director, Farm Service AgencY,
United States Department Of
Agriculture,
Defendant.
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to
transfer venue, with Plaintiff's consent, to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia (Doc. 4). For the
reasons stated herein, the motion is GRAI{ITED.
I. BACKGROT'IID
This matter comes before the Court on removal, following
Plaintiffs' motion for entry of a temporary restraining order
(*TRO"), which was granted in the Superior Court of Burke County'
Georgia. (Doc. 1.) There, Plaintiffs sought a TRO to prevent
foreclosure on a 350-acre tract of land due to nonpayment of loans
from the Farm Service Agency and United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA"). (Doc. )., Ex. 1.) The motion for a TRO was
based upon a pending motion to vacate and set aside an arbitrator's
decision filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia,
which, if granted, would allegedly prevent foreclosure. (Doc. 4.1
A brief background into the arbitrator's decision is helpful
to understand the underlying claims. In 1998, the District Court
for the District of Columbia certified a class of African American
farmers who alleged that the USDA discriminated against them in
applications for farm loans and benefit programs. (Doc. 4.) That
court allowed individual claimants to resolve claims through
decisions by a third*party neutral. (Id. ) Lucious Abrams, Jr.t
submitted one of these so-called "Pigford claims, " which was
disrnissed by the arbitrator for faj-Iure to show a prima facie case
of discrimination. (Id.) On October L4, 2008, Lucious Abrams, Jr.
f iled a cornplaint in the Distri.ct Court f or the District of
Columbia alleging the dismissal of his Piqford claim violated due
process, which the court dismissed on August 24, 2OO9. (Id. ) On
September 18, 20L4, Lucious Abrams and Sons and Lucious Abrams, Jr.
filed a complaint to set aside the arbitrator's decision dismissing
the Pigford claim. On October 8, 2014, the court ordered the
United States to file a response by October 24' 2OL4- (Id.)
r The land at issue was given to Plaintiffs by their father, the late
LuciousAbrams,sr.("Mr.Abrams").Mr.AbramsrthroughaPartnershipwith
three of his sons, Lucj.ous Abrams, Jr., Herbert Abrams, and R.C. Abrams
operated a partnership k n o w n a s L u c i o u s A b r a m s , S r . & Sons. The partnership
received f e d e r a l f a r m l o a n s t o a s s i s t i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of the farrn's
business. Lucious Abrams, Jr. and R.C. Abrams brought an identical complaint
in the Superior Court of Burke County, which was also removed to this Court.
See Lucious Abrams, Jr. 6, R.C. Abrams v. C. Brian Stuckev, No. 1:L4-cv-190,
Doc. 1 (S.D. Ga. 20I4r.
2
II. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that venue in the
Southern District of Georgia is proper, as a "substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated" in this
district. 28 U.S.C. S 1391(b) (2). Even sor a district. court may
transfer an action to any other district where the action may have
been brought or to any district to which aI1 parties have consented
"If]or the convenience of parties and witnesses Iand] in the
interest of justice[.]" 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a). This inquiry thus
requires a two-part analysis: (1) the Court must determine if this
action could have been brought in the alternate venue; and (2) the
Court must determine whether the convenience of parties and
witnesses, as well as the interest of justice, require transfer.
Addressing the first part, this action could have initially
been brought in the District of Columbia. See Game Contro]ler Tech
LLC v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 994 F. SuPp. 2d L268, L272-13
(S.D. Fla. 2074) ("An action might have been brought in a
transferee district if that district has subject matter
jurisdiction over the action, venue is proper, and the parties are
amenable to service of process in the transferee forum. ")
Personal and subject matter jurisdiction are both proper in the
District of Columbia, ds Plaintiffs have (1) consented to the
transfer and (2) sued an agency of the United States in which a
contract governs the relationship. 28 u.S.c. S 1346(al(2);
Baragona v. Kuwait e Gulf Link Transp. Co. , 594 F. Supp. 2d 1351'
1360 (N.D. Ga. 2OO9; (trAn individual may voluntarily subject
hirnself to the jurisdiction of court by appearance or may
contract in advance to submit to t.he j urisdiction of a given
court."). Additionally, venue IS proper because the USDA is
headquartered in Washington, D.C. See 28 U.S.C. S 1391(e) (1)
(venue is proper in any district where a defendant resides).
Fina11y, the Court finds that the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia is a more convenient forum and that
transfer is in the interest of justice. Here, the facts and
circumstances that form the basis for the TRO are presently being
Iitigated in the District of Columbia. The TRO is thus
inextricably tied to the pending action in the District of
Columbia, and this Court finds transfer proper in order "to avoid
unnecessary inconvenience . and to conserve time, energlr and
money." Gonzalez v. Pirelli Tire LLC, No. 07-80453-CIV, 2008 WL
516847, at *1 (S.D, Fla. Feb. 22, 2008).
Accordingly, and in liqht of Plaintiffs' consent to transfer'
Defendant's motion to transfer venue is hereby GRA$IIED. The Clerk
is DIRECTED to TRAIISEER this case to the United States Distriet
CourL for ttre District of CoJ.umbia. Fo1lowing transfer, the Clerk
shall terminate all deadlines and motions, and CLOSE this case.
ORDER ENITRED at Augusta, Georgia, t E ou, of october,
2014 "
UNITED TES D RICT JUDGE
D I S T R I C T OF GEORGIA