Owens v. Republic of Sudan ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    JAMES OWENS, et al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.                                    Civil Action No. 01-2244 (JDB)
    REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Over sixteen years ago, simultaneous suicide bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es
    Salaam, Tanzania, devastated two United States embassies, killed hundreds of people, and
    injured over a thousand more. This Court has entered final judgment on liability under the
    Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) and District of Columbia law in this and other civil
    actions—brought by victims of the bombings and their families—against the Republic of Sudan,
    the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Sudan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
    Iranian Ministry of Information and Security for their roles in these unconscionable acts. And
    with the help of special masters, the Court has assessed and awarded damages to most of the
    individual plaintiffs in these cases. See, e.g., Mar. 28, 2014 Mem. Op. [ECF No. 300] at 3. But
    a few plaintiffs remain.      Currently before the Court are a special master’s award
    recommendations for these remaining plaintiffs.
    Plaintiffs—the so-called “Aliganga plaintiffs,” who take their name from Jesse Nathanael
    Aliganga, a United States Marine Corps sergeant who died in the 1998 attack—are twelve
    United States citizens injured or killed in the Nairobi bombing and their immediate family
    members. See Am. Compl. in Intervention [ECF No. 262] (“Am. Compl.”) at 9; Apr. 11, 2014
    1
    Mem. Op. at 1. Although these plaintiffs did not participate in the opening stages of the original
    Owens lawsuit, this Court allowed them to intervene in this case. July 23, 2012 Order [ECF No.
    233] at 1.    By that time, other plaintiffs had already served process on each defendant,
    defendants had failed to respond, and the Court had entered a default against defendants.
    Moreover, this Court had already held that it has jurisdiction over defendants and that the United
    States national plaintiffs have a federal cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), while the
    foreign-national family members of the bombing victims may pursue their claims under the laws
    of the District of Columbia. 1 See Owens v. Rep. of Sudan, 
    826 F. Supp. 2d 128
    , 148–51, 153–57
    (D.D.C. 2011). Finally (and perhaps most importantly), this Court had already found that
    defendants were responsible for supporting, funding, or otherwise carrying out the Nairobi
    bombing, and it therefore entered final judgment on liability against them pursuant to the FSIA.
    See 
    id. at 135–47,
    157.
    The Court then referred the Aliganga plaintiffs’ claims to a special master, Paul G.
    Griffin, to prepare proposed findings of fact and damages recommendations for each plaintiff.
    Sept. 18, 2012 Order [ECF No. 253] at 1. The special master has now filed his reports, which
    rely on sworn testimony, expert reports, medical records, and other evidence. See Reports of
    Special Master [ECF Nos. 332–39, 341–42]; see also Filing of Special Master [ECF No. 344]
    (“Wolf Expert Report”). The reports describe the facts relevant to each plaintiff and carefully
    analyze each plaintiff’s claim for damages under the framework established in other mass-tort-
    terrorism cases from this District. The Court thanks Special Master Griffin for his work.
    The Court hereby adopts all facts found by the special master relating to plaintiffs in this
    case. Where the special master has received evidence sufficient to find that a plaintiff is a United
    1
    Amongst the Aliganga plaintiffs, only one—Egambi Fred Kibuhiru Dalizu—is not a United States
    national. See Am. Compl. at 44; see also infra at 5.
    2
    States national and is thus entitled to maintain a federal cause of action, the Court adopts that
    finding.     In addition, the Court adopts the special master’s finding that each plaintiff has
    established the familial relationship necessary to support standing under the FSIA. See 28
    U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii); see also 
    Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 149
    . The Court also adopts all
    damages recommendations in the reports—with the exception of the few adjustments described
    below. See Valore v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d 52
    , 82–83 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Where
    recommendations deviate from the Court’s damages framework, those amounts shall be altered
    so as to conform with . . . the framework.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result, the
    Court will award the Aliganga plaintiffs a total judgment of over $622 million.
    This opinion and judgment brings to a close this Court’s role in assessing the
    responsibility for, and the damages recoverable as a result of, the 1998 embassy bombings. But
    the story is hardly over for the victims of these attacks, who not only must continue the effort to
    actually recover their awarded damages, but, more importantly, must also continue to live with
    the devastating consequences of these callous acts. That, after all, is the design of such terrorist
    activity—to inflict present and future fear and pain on individuals and governments. The Court
    commends the dedicated, creative, and courageous resolve of all plaintiffs—and their
    conscientious attorneys—in the cases brought against the terrorists responsible for the embassy
    bombings and their supporters. They have helped to ensure that terrorism, and its support by
    defendants, will not ultimately succeed in achieving its long-term goals.
    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    Defendants’ liability in this case under both the FSIA and District of Columbia law was
    decided long ago. 2 See 
    Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 157
    . But two questions remain. First, what
    2
    It bears repeating from previous opinions in this case that “for plaintiffs’ federal claims under § 1605A(c),
    the Court [was] presented with the difficulty of evaluating the[] claims under the FSIA . . . which does not spell out
    3
    kinds of damages may plaintiffs recover from the (now liable) defendants? And second, what
    damages awards are appropriate for each plaintiff?
    I.       PLAINTIFFS MAY RECOVER DAMAGES UNDER EITHER 28 U.S.C. § 1605A OR DISTRICT
    OF COLUMBIA LAW
    Both the FSIA and District of Columbia law provide a basis for damages awards here.
    Start with the FSIA. That statute allows United States national plaintiffs to recover various types
    of damages, including “economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.”
    28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). But “[t]o obtain damages in an FSIA action, the plaintiff must prove that
    the consequences of the defendants’ conduct were reasonably certain (i.e., more likely than not)
    to occur, and must prove the amount of the damages by a reasonable estimate consistent with this
    Circuit’s application of the American rule on damages.” 
    Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 83
    (internal
    quotation marks and alterations omitted).
    The Aliganga plaintiffs satisfy these requirements. As discussed in this Court’s previous
    opinions, plaintiffs have proven that the consequences of defendants’ conduct were reasonably
    certain to—and indeed intended to—cause plaintiffs’ injuries. See 
    Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 135
    –47. According to the FSIA’s remedial scheme, then: “[T]hose who survived the attack may
    recover damages for their pain and suffering, as well as any other economic losses caused by
    their injuries; estates of those who did not survive can recover economic losses stemming from
    wrongful death of the decedent; [and] family members [so long as they are United States
    the [applicable] elements of these claims . . . . Hence, the Court [was] forced to apply general principles of tort law.”
    
    Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 157
    n.3 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); see also Mar. 28,
    2014 Mem. Op. at 4–5 (concluding that plaintiffs are entitled to damages under the FSIA). Plaintiffs, here, proffered
    various theories of recovery under the FSIA that typically sound in tort, including wrongful death and intentional
    infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Am. Compl. at 29–31. In this Court’s judgment, plaintiffs met their
    burden regarding these claims. As other terrorism cases explain, “there is no but-for causation requirement under
    the FSIA; proximate cause is sufficient.” 
    Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 75
    . And there is no doubt—based on this
    Court’s earlier factual findings—that defendants proximately caused the wrongful, “premature death” of several
    plaintiffs. 
    Id. at 78
    (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
    Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 135
    –47. The family
    members of the injured or killed plaintiffs also satisfied the traditional intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress
    test, because acts of terrorism “by their very definition” amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. Valore, 700 F.
    Supp. 2d at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    4
    nationals] can recover solatium for their emotional injury.” Oveissi v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 
    879 F. Supp. 2d 44
    , 55 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Amduso v. Rep. of Sudan, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 
    2014 WL 3687126
    , at *2 (D.D.C. July 25, 2014) (limiting solatium-damages awards under the FSIA
    to United States national family members).          The Court will therefore award plaintiffs
    “reasonable” economic, pain-and-suffering, and solatium damages, as appropriate.
    This conclusion covers all but one of the Aliganga plaintiffs. And District of Columbia
    law suffices to cover the damages claim of the sole remaining plaintiff: Egambi Fred Kibuhiru
    Dalizu, who is a national of the Republic of Kenya, and who was the husband of Jean Rose
    Dalizu, a United States citizen and embassy employee killed in the Nairobi attack. Am. Compl.
    at 44. Dalizu hopes to recover solatium damages under District of Columbia law, because, he
    alleges, defendants’ actions amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress. As this
    Court has previously held, District of Columbia law applies to Dalizu’s claim. Owens, 826 F.
    Supp. 2d at 153–57. A prima facie claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under
    that jurisdiction’s law requires Dalizu to show: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part
    of defendants which, (2) either intentionally or recklessly, (3) causes him severe emotional
    distress. Larijani v. Georgetown Univ., 
    791 A.2d 41
    , 44 (D.C. 2002).
    Dalizu meets every element of this tort. Here, just as in the FSIA context, acts of
    terrorism “by their very definition” amount to extreme and outrageous conduct, Valore, 700 F.
    Supp. 2d at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the facts in this case prove that defendants
    acted intentionally and recklessly, causing Dalizu severe and lasting emotional trauma, see
    Report of Special Master [ECF No. 339] (“Dalizu Report”) at 3–6, 25; see also Owens, 826 F.
    Supp. 2d at 135–46; Murphy v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 
    740 F. Supp. 2d 51
    , 74–75 (D.D.C. 2010)
    (describing an immediate family member’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim in
    5
    the state-sponsored-terrorism context). Because Dalizu presented evidence sufficient to prove
    his intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim under District of Columbia law, and
    because that law allows spouses to recover solatium damages, see D.C. Code § 16-2701, the
    Court concludes that he is entitled to recover such damages here.
    II.     DAMAGES
    Having established that plaintiffs are entitled to damages, the Court will now assess the
    type and amount of damages to award each plaintiff. This issue requires the Court to consider
    the recommendations of the special master and to weigh the severity and extent of plaintiffs’
    injuries against those alleged by other plaintiffs in other terrorism cases. See, e.g., Mwila v.
    Islamic Rep. of Iran, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 
    2014 WL 1284978
    , at *3–7 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2014).
    The Court will accept most (but will reject or adjust some) of the special master’s recommended
    awards. A complete list of the damages awarded each plaintiff can be found in the table attached
    to the Order separately issued on this date.
    a.       Compensatory Damages
    1.      Economic damages
    Under the FSIA, injured victims and the estates of deceased victims may recover
    economic damages, which typically include lost wages, benefits and retirement pay, and other
    out-of-pocket expenses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). The special master recommended that the
    Court award economic damages to the estates of eleven deceased plaintiffs. 3 See Wolf Expert
    Report at 6. To determine the economic losses resulting from each plaintiff’s death, the special
    master relied on a report submitted by Steven A. Wolf, an accounting and financial forensics
    expert. See, e.g., Dalizu Report at 3, 22; Wolf Expert Report at 18. Wolf’s report, in turn, relied
    3
    They are: Jesse Nathanael Aliganga, Julian Leotis Bartley, Sr., Julian Leotis Bartley, Jr., Jean Rose
    Dalizu, Molly Huckaby Hardy, Kenneth Ray Hobson II, Prabhi Guptara Kavaler, Arlene Bradley Kirk, Mary Louise
    Martin, Ann Michelle O’Connor, and Sherry Lynn Olds. See Am. Compl. at 9.
    6
    on such factors as each plaintiff’s annual income, expected future income, and work-life
    expectancy.    Wolf Expert Report at 6–11 (explaining methodology used to calculate the
    economic losses for each plaintiff). The Court will adopt the findings and recommendations of
    the special master and award economic damages to the estates of these eleven victims in the
    amounts calculated and recommended.
    2.     Pain and suffering awards
    Courts determine pain-and-suffering awards for injured and killed victims based on
    factors including “the severity of the pain immediately following the injury, the length of
    hospitalization, and the extent of the impairment that will remain with the victim for the rest of
    his or her life.” O’Brien v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 
    853 F. Supp. 2d 44
    , 46 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also Haim v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 
    425 F. Supp. 2d 56
    , 71 (D.D.C.
    2006).    But when calculating damages awards, “the Court must take pains to ensure that
    individuals with similar injuries receive similar awards.” Peterson v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 515 F.
    Supp. 2d 25, 54 (D.D.C. 2007), abrogation on other grounds recognized in Mohammadi v.
    Islamic Rep. of Iran, 
    947 F. Supp. 2d 48
    , 65 (D.D.C. 2013). Courts in this District have
    therefore developed a general framework for assessing pain-and-suffering awards for victims of
    terrorist attacks. Plaintiffs who suffer serious physical injuries tend to receive a $5 million
    award; plaintiffs who suffer relatively more serious or numerous injuries may receive $7 million
    (or more); and plaintiffs whose injuries are relatively less serious or who only suffer emotional
    injuries may receive something closer to $1.5 million. See 
    Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 84
    –85;
    
    O’Brien, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 47
    .
    The special master has recommended that the Court award pain-and-suffering damages to
    three Aliganga plaintiffs. One recommended award—advising the Court to award $1.5 million
    to Howard Charles Kavaler, who worked in the Nairobi embassy at the time of the attack, and
    7
    who continues to suffer severe post-traumatic stress syndrome as a result of the bombing, see
    Report of Special Master [ECF No. 338] (“Kavaler Report”) at 3–4, 11—complies with this
    District’s general damages framework. The Court will therefore adopt the special master’s
    recommendation regarding Kavaler.
    Two recommended awards, however, depart from this District’s framework and require
    significant adjustment. The first relates to Jesse Nathanael Aliganga, the Marine killed in the
    Nairobi attack. The special master recommended that the Court award Aliganga $12 million in
    pain-and-suffering damages, because he “suffered severe physical injuries prior to his death.”
    Report of Special Master [ECF No. 333] (“Aliganga Report”) at 10. But while there is no doubt
    that Aliganga’s injuries were severe, this recommendation ignores that the touchstone of any
    pain-and-suffering award is whether the victim suffered “conscious pain” for some period of
    time. 
    Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 53
    ; see also Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co., 
    127 F.3d 43
    , 56
    (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he key factual dispute [in pre-death pain-and-suffering cases] turns on
    whether the [victim was] immediately rendered unconscious.” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)). In other words, if the victim was conscious after suffering injury, then a pain-and-
    suffering award might be appropriate; if not, then not. Here, all the available evidence suggests
    that Aliganga’s injuries put him on the inappropriate side of the divide. As the special master
    recognized, Aliganga’s “head was crushed in the bombing and his brain avulsed [i.e., separated]
    from his skull.” Aliganga Report at 3. And though the Marines initially told Aliganga’s family
    that he was “alive but injured,” no one testified that Aliganga was conscious at any point before
    dying from his wounds. See 
    id. at 4–5.
    The Court therefore cannot award Aliganga’s estate any
    pain-and-suffering damages.
    8
    The second problematic award presents a similar issue. The special master recommended
    that the Court award $12 million to the estate of Julian Leotis Bartley, Jr., because he “endured
    bodily pain and suffering after the attack and prior to his death.” Report of Special Master [ECF
    No. 342] at 11–12. There is some basis for awarding pain-and-suffering damages in Bartley’s
    case. After all, he “suffered horrific injuries and terrible pain when both his legs were . . .
    amputated in the explosive blast.” 
    Id. at 12.
    But the special master admitted that “it is unclear
    how long [Bartley] suffered before succumbing to his injuries,” and he could only conclude that
    Bartley did not die “immediately,” but instead died some time later “due to a severe loss of
    blood.” 
    Id. Though Bartley’s
    injuries were undeniably terrible, in cases like this—“[w]hen the
    victim endured extreme pain and suffering for a period of several hours or less”—the courts will
    “rather uniformly award[] $1 million” in damages. 
    Haim, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 71
    (emphasis
    added). Indeed, courts will sometimes settle on smaller awards, if the evidence suggests that the
    victim suffered for only a very brief period. See, e.g., 
    Peterson, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 53
    . Here,
    Bartley almost certainly survived for less than several hours. The Court will therefore adopt the
    usual award for such cases: $1 million.
    3.      Solatium
    “In determining the appropriate amount of compensatory damages, the Court may look to
    prior decisions awarding damages for . . . solatium.” Acosta v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 574 F.
    Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 2008). Only immediate family members—parents, siblings, spouses,
    and children—are entitled to solatium awards. See 
    Valore 700 F. Supp. 2d at 79
    ; see also D.C.
    Code § 16-2701 (allowing recovery by “the spouse or domestic partner and the next of kin of the
    deceased person”). The commonly accepted framework for solatium damages in this District’s
    FSIA terrorism cases is that used in Peterson, where spouses of deceased victims receive $8
    million, parents of deceased victims receive $5 million, and siblings of deceased victims receive
    9
    $2.5 
    million. 515 F. Supp. 2d at 52
    . And where the victim does not die, but instead only suffers
    injury, the solatium awards are halved: Spouses receive $4 million, parents receive $2.5 million,
    and siblings receive $1.25 million. 
    Id. Moreover, this
    Court has previously held that children of
    deceased and injured victims should receive awards akin to those given to parents (i.e., $5
    million where the victim died, and $2.5 million where the victim suffered injury). See, e.g.,
    Mwila, 
    2014 WL 1284978
    , at *5 (“[C]hildren who lose parents are likely to suffer as much as
    parents who lose children.”). Although these amounts are guidelines, not rules, see 
    Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85
    –86, the Court finds the distinctions made in Peterson and other cases to be
    reasonable, and thus will adopt this framework for determining solatium damages here.
    For most plaintiffs, the special master properly applied the preceding framework in
    making his damages calculations, and the Court will therefore accept the bulk of his
    recommendations. But there are a few exceptions. One is straightforward. The special master
    recommended a $5 million solatium award to the estate of Frederick Arthur Bradley, the father
    of a deceased victim of the Nairobi attack. See Report of Special Master [ECF No. 334] at 20.
    But there is a significant problem with this award: Frederick Arthur Bradley is no longer a
    plaintiff in this case, as he voluntarily dismissed his claim in 2012. See Notice of Vol. Dismissal
    [ECF No. 258] at 1. The Court therefore declines to award Bradley any damages.
    Four other solatium awards also require adjustment. Other courts in this District have
    held that it is inappropriate for the solatium award of a family member to exceed the pain-and-
    suffering award of the surviving victim. See, e.g., Davis v Islamic Rep. of Iran, 
    882 F. Supp. 2d 7
    , 15–16 (D.D.C. 2012). This Court has followed that approach in previous embassy-bombing
    cases, see, e.g., Mwila, 
    2014 WL 1284978
    , at *6, and it will do the same here. Therefore, the
    solatium awards for several family members of Howard Charles Kavaler—who suffered severe
    10
    emotional injury after the bombing, and who the Court has awarded $1.5 million in pain-and-
    suffering damages—must be modified. The special master recommended awarding $2.5 million
    each to Tara and Mary Kavaler (Howard’s daughters) and to the estates of Pearl and Richard
    Kavaler (Howard’s parents). See Kavaler Report at 13–14. But $2.5 million is obviously greater
    than $1.5 million, and so the Court will reduce these family members’ awards to match
    Howard’s pain-and-suffering compensation. 4
    b.       Pre-Judgment Interest
    Plaintiffs are not only entitled to damages in this case. They are also owed pre-judgment
    interest at the prime rate on most of those damages. See 
    Oldham, 127 F.3d at 54
    ; Forman v.
    Korean Air Lines Co., 
    84 F.3d 446
    , 450–51 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The special master already
    adjusted the recommended economic loss figures for each plaintiff to reflect the present
    discounted value of those awards, see, e.g., Aliganga Report at 9; see also District of Columbia
    v. Barriteau, 
    399 A.2d 563
    (D.C. 1979), but he did not adjust the recommended awards for pain
    and suffering and solatium. These awards therefore do not account for the time that has elapsed
    since the 1998 attacks, meaning plaintiffs have lost the use of this money which should have
    been theirs immediately after the bombings. Moreover, denying pre-judgment interest on these
    damages would allow defendants to profit from their use of these funds over the intervening
    sixteen years. The Court will therefore award pre-judgment interest on plaintiffs’ pain-and-
    suffering and solatium awards—which should suffice to place plaintiffs in the same position they
    would have been in had they received (and invested) their damages awards in 1998. See, e.g.,
    4
    The special master actually recommended that each of Howard’s daughters receive $7.5 million in
    solatium damages, because their mother (Prabhi Guptara Kavaler) died in the bombing, which entitles them to an
    additional $5 million under this District’s solatium-damages framework. This $5 million award is entirely
    appropriate, and the Court’s reduction of their award only applies to the solatium damages stemming from their
    father’s injury. The Court therefore awards each daughter $6.5 million in solatium damages: $5 million based on
    their mother’s death and $1.5 million based on their father’s injury. See, e.g., 
    Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 86
    (awarding solatium damages for each lost relationship).
    11
    Doe v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 
    943 F. Supp. 2d 180
    , 184–85 (D.D.C. 2013); Reed v. Islamic Rep.
    of Iran, 
    845 F. Supp. 2d 204
    , 214–15 (D.D.C. 2012). But see 
    Oveissi, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 30
    n.12
    (declining to award pre-judgment interest on solatium damages). 5
    The Court will calculate the applicable interest using the prime rate for each year. The
    D.C. Circuit has explained that the prime rate—the rate banks charge for short-term, unsecured
    loans to creditworthy customers—is the most appropriate measure of pre-judgment interest. See
    
    Forman, 84 F.3d at 450
    –51. Although the prime rate, applied over a period of several years, can
    be measured in different ways, this Circuit has approved an award of pre-judgment interest “at
    the prime rate for each year between the accident and the entry of judgment.” 
    Id. at 450.
    Using
    the prime rate for each year is more precise than, for example, using the average rate over the
    entire period. See 
    Doe, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 185
    (noting that this method is a “substantially more
    accurate market-based estimate” of the time value of money (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Moreover, calculating interest based on the prime rate for each year is a simple matter. 6 Using
    the prime rate for each year results in a multiplier of 2.26185 for damages incurred in 1998, 7 and
    the Court will use this multiplier to calculate the total award for each plaintiff in this case. 8
    5
    In Oveissi, the court awarded damages in amounts above and beyond the usual solatium framework (i.e.,
    the framework called for a $5 million award for plaintiff, but the court awarded $7.5 
    million). 768 F. Supp. 2d at 30
    . And the court in that case denied plaintiff’s request for pre-judgment interest, because its “upward adjustments”
    from the usual framework sufficed “to fully compensate [plaintiff] for the enormous loss he sustained.” 
    Id. at n.12
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike Oveissi, this Court has not made any “upward adjustments” from the
    usual framework, and the Court therefore finds that pre-judgment interest on plaintiffs’ solatium awards is required
    if plaintiffs are to be “fully compensate[d].”
    6
    To calculate the multiplier, the Court multiplied $1.00 by the prime rate in 1999 (8%) and added that
    amount to $1.00, yielding $1.08. Then, the Court took that amount and multiplied it by the prime rate in 2000
    (9.23%) and added that amount to $1.08, yielding $1.17968. Continuing this iterative process through 2014 yields a
    multiplier of 2.26185.
    7
    The Court calculated the multiplier using the Federal Reserve’s data for the average annual prime rate in
    each year between 1998 and 2014. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Historical Data, available at
    http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (last visited October 14, 2014). As of the date of this opinion,
    the Federal Reserve has not posted the annual prime rate for 2014, so the Court will conservatively estimate that rate
    to be 3.25%, the rate for the previous five years.
    8
    The product of the multiplier and the base damages amount includes both the pre-judgment interest and
    the base damages amount. In other words, applying the multiplier calculates not the pre-judgment interest but the
    base damages amount plus the pre-judgment interest—or the total damages award.
    12
    CONCLUSION
    The August 7, 1998, embassy bombings shattered the lives of thousands—including
    the seventy-one plaintiffs in this case. Reading plaintiffs’ personal stories reveals that, even after
    some sixteen years, they each still feel the horrific effects of that awful day. Damages awards
    cannot fully compensate these innocent people, who have suffered so much. But they can offer a
    helping hand. That is the very least that plaintiffs are owed—and that is what this Court seeks to
    accomplish.
    A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion has issued on this date.
    /s/
    JOHN D. BATES
    United States District Judge
    Dated: October 15, 2014
    13