Johnson v. Metropolitan Direct Property & Casualty Insurance Company ( 2018 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 18-1715 (JEB)
METROPOLITAN DIRECT PROPERTY
& CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
If truth is in the eye of the beholder, this case appears to feature very different beholders.
Plaintiff Joe Johnson alleges that a car driven by Defendant Mark Johnson (no apparent relation)
struck his vehicle on a District freeway and that Defendant Johnson then assaulted him and fled
with another passenger, Defendant Nneka Grimes. To add insult to injury, he alleges that these
two then provided an entirely different account to their insurance company, Defendant
Metropolitan Direct Property & Casualty Insurance Company (MetLife). In Defendants’
version, Plaintiff was the transgressor who twice struck their vehicle and himself fled the scene.
Plaintiff thus brought this pro se action against those three Defendants, the owner of the
car, and a MetLife claims adjuster, Christian Hayman, alleging myriad causes of action, some
conceivable and others less so. MetLife and Hayman now move to dismiss four counts against
them for failing to state a claim and separately seek a more definite statement on two others. As
Plaintiff’s counts against these two Defendants are either facially deficient or in need of further
clarification, the Court will grant both Motions.
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I. Background
Considering the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint as true, as is required at
this stage, the Court observes that the dispute here centers around an automobile accident on the
Southeast Freeway here in Washington on November 20, 2017. Plaintiff alleges that he was
rear-ended by Defendant Johnson, who then approached Plaintiff’s vehicle on foot, threatened to
kill him, grabbed Plaintiff’s cell phone, punched him in the face, and then fled the scene. See
Am. Compl. at 3. An arrest warrant, he believes, was subsequently issued for Defendant
Johnson. Id. Defendants Nneka Grimes (a passenger in the car) and Patricia Grimes (the owner
of the car who was not present at the accident), meanwhile, had a fundamentally contradictory
story to recount. Plaintiff alleges that they falsely told MetLife that he was the one at fault, that
his car had struck theirs on two occasions, and that he had tried unsuccessfully to flee. Id. at 4.
MetLife and its employee, Christian Hayman, then “relied upon [these false reports] and
republished them to third parties without conducting any investigation to determine [their] truth
and accuracy.” Id.
Plaintiff never provides the upshot of these conflicting narratives, who was forced to pay
whom for the incident, or if anyone ended up being criminally charged. He nonetheless asserts
ten causes of action against myriad Defendants: Negligence against Johnson (Count I),
Assault/Battery and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Johnson (II), Defamation
against Patricia and Nneka Grimes (III), Libel against the Grimeses (IV), Republication of
Defamation against MetLife and Hayman (V), Republication of Libel against MetLife and
Hayman (VI), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against MetLife, Hayman, and the
Grimeses (VII), Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against MetLife and Hayman (VIII),
Negligent Hiring, Training & Supervision against MetLife (IX), and Civil Conspiracy against all
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Defendants (X). Id. at 5-13. He asserts that he has “suffered severe bodily injuries, loss of sleep,
headaches, severe mental pain, humiliation, embarrassment, [and] depression” as a result. Id., ¶
21.
Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is either an attorney himself or has likely
received substantial assistance from an attorney, as his pleadings are professionally presented,
even if a number of claims are evanescent. The Court thus affords him some leeway as a pro se
party but need not bend over backwards to indulge his pleadings.
MetLife and Hayman have now filed a Motion to Dismiss as to Counts VII-X and a
separate Motion for More Definite Statement as to Counts V-VI.
II. Legal Standard
In evaluating Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court “must treat the complaint's
factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); see also
Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court
need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an
inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d
178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a
complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual
allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For
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a plaintiff to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555–56 (2007).
Rule 12(e) permits a defendant to move for a more definite statement if “a pleading . . . is
so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” “[W]hen a
defendant is unclear about the meaning of a particular allegation in the complaint, the proper
course of action is not to move to dismiss but to move for a more definite statement.” Hilska v.
Jones, 217 F.R.D. 16, 21 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Am. Nurses’ Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716,
725 (7th Cir. 1986)). “Normally, of course, the basis for requiring a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e) is unintelligibility, not mere lack of detail.” Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. and Dev.
Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 110 (D.D.C. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Indeed, “a plaintiff need not allege all the facts necessary to prove its claim so long as [he]
provides enough factual information to make clear the substance of that claim.” Wilson v. Gov’t
of D.C., 269 F.R.D. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable &
Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
III. Analysis
The Court begins with Defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement as to Counts V-
VI and then addresses their Motion to Dismiss as to Counts VII-X.
A. Motion for More Definite Statement
Counts V (Republication of Defamation) and VI (Republication of Libel) are essentially
identical. The former alleges that “[o]n or around January 30, 2018, Defendant, MetLife, by and
through its agent, employee and servant, Defendant, Hayman, republished unprivileged false
statements of fact in the District of Columbia to third parties, both known and unknown, to the
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effect” that Plaintiff was at fault in the accident. See Am. Compl., ¶ 35. “Defendants either
knew that the statements were false or conducted no investigation concerning the truth or
veracity of the defamatory statements with the sole purpose of impugning Plaintiff.” Id., ¶ 38.
The latter count is more cursory, simply incorporating the former and repeating that Defendants
“republished or caused to be republished unprivileged false statements of fact in the District of
Columbia . . . either negligently or knowing full well that they were false . . . in bad faith for the
sole purpose of injuring the Plaintiff.” Id., ¶¶ 42-44.
In seeking a more definite statement, Defendants correctly point out that such allegations
are hardly specific enough for a defamation claim. To begin, there is no allegation of the form or
forum in which these statements were published; we know only the general content of the
statement. Equally absent is any identification of the listener beyond “third parties, both known
and unknown.” Id., ¶ 35. These two signal omissions are sufficient to warrant amendment. As
this Court has explained, “Defamation under D.C. law requires a plaintiff to show a defamatory
statement, publication to a third party, negligence, and either that the statement is actionable as a
matter of law or that publication caused the plaintiff special harm.” Kenley v. Dist. of Columbia,
83 F. Supp. 3d 20, 48 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Publication, moreover “requires making a statement to at least one other person.” Westfahl v.
Dist. of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d 365, 375 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Charlton v. Mond, 987 A.2d
436, 438 n.4 (D.C. 2010); Von Kahl v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 204, 218–
19 (D.D.C. 2013)).
If Plaintiff decides to amend his Complaint, he must therefore specifically allege the form
of the statement – e.g., email, letter, conversation – and he must state at least generally to whom
the statement was published. Finally, the Court does not understand his distinction between
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“Republication of Defamation” and “Republication of Libel.” Libel is a written form of
defamation, and slander is an oral form, but there is no basis to assert claims for both libel and
defamation. If Plaintiff wishes to assert two separate counts, he must explain the difference.
B. Motion to Dismiss
As the Motion to Dismiss covers four separate counts, the Court treats them sequentially.
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VII)
Johnson’s allegations relating to his IIED count are rather strained. He claims that
Defendants “knew . . . [the other Defendants’] report was false or conducted no investigation
concerning the truth or veracity of the report.” Am. Compl., ¶ 49. They thus “intentionally
caused injury to the Plaintiff by making reports that they knew were false in an effort to have the
Plaintiff indicted and punished for fleeing the scene of an accident.” Id., ¶ 50. There are no
allegations about to whom Defendants sent the report or what happened to Plaintiff thereafter –
except for this aside about an indictment, which does not appear in the statement of facts. At
bottom, then, the claim is that Defendants were negligent in accepting other Defendants’ version
of the accident. That does not even approach the standard for IIED.
“The elements of IIED are (1) extreme or outrageous conduct [that] (2) intentionally or
recklessly causes (3) severe emotional distress to another.” Nagy v. Corrections Corp. of Am.,
79 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The
conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Amobi v. Dist. of
Columbia Dep't of Corrections, 755 F.3d 980, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (defining such conduct as
going “beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
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intolerable in a civilized community”) (citation omitted). It is pellucid that Johnson has not
cleared the bar.
Plaintiff nonetheless contends that IIED may exist where a party files a false police
report. See Pl. MTD Opp. at 4. Even if such a principle extended to insurance reports, these
Defendants engaged in no such action; on the contrary, they merely accepted a report that
Johnson contends was not true. As there is a world of difference between these two acts, this
count will be dismissed.
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VIII)
To prevail on an NIED claim, conversely, Plaintiff “must prove (1) that [Defendant]
acted negligently, (2) that [he] suffered either a physical impact or [was] within the ‘zone of
danger’ of the [Defendants’] actions, and (3) that [he] suffered emotional distress that was
‘serious and verifiable.’” Wright v. United States, 963 F. Supp. 7, 18 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting
Jones v. Howard University, Inc., 589 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C. 1991)); see also Asare v. LM-DC
Hotel, LLC, 62 F. Supp. 3d 30, 34–35 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Negligent infliction, first, is a cause of
action based on physical harm, and although ‘[a] plaintiff need not show actual physical impact’
to prove that a defendant negligently caused her distress, ‘she must show that she actually feared
for her [physical] safety as a result of [the defendant's] conduct.’”) (quoting Hollis v. Rosa
Mexicano DC, LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2008)).
Plaintiff here makes no allegation that he suffered any kind of direct physical injury from
these Defendants’ actions, even though he might have been struck by other Defendants. Nor is
there any real allegation that he stood within any zone of danger of these Defendants’ actions.
Instead, he argues that an exception to the injury/danger-zone requirement exists when there is a
“special relationship” between the parties. See Pl. MTD Opp. at 5 (citing Hedgepeth v. Whitman
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Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 810-11 (D.C. 2011) (en banc)). He is correct inasmuch as “a
plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the plaintiff can show that
(1) the defendant has a relationship with the plaintiff, or has undertaken an obligation to the
plaintiff, of a nature that necessarily implicates the plaintiff's emotional well-being, (2) there is
an especially likely risk that the defendant's negligence would cause serious emotional distress to
the plaintiff, and (3) negligent actions or omissions of the defendant in breach of that obligation
have, in fact, caused serious emotional distress to the plaintiff.” Hedgpeth, 22 A.3d at 810-11.
Hedgepeth involved an HIV misdiagnosis by a medical clinic, and the D.C.C.A. found
that “a doctor’s breach of duty in misdiagnosing a patient with HIV-infection would result in
serious emotional harm.” Id. at 820. No such special relationship can be said to exist between
an individual and another person’s automobile insurer. Indeed, Johnson never even argues the
point, merely positing that Defendant must rebut his theory. The NIED claim thus founders as a
matter of law.
3. Negligent Hiring, Supervision & Training (Count IX)
Next up is Johnson’s cause of action for MetLife’s negligent hiring, supervision, and
training of Hayman. To state such a claim, a “plaintiff must allege facts showing that the
employer knew or should have known that the employee was incompetent, and that the
employer, despite this actual or constructive knowledge, [hired or] failed to adequately supervise
the employee.” Stevens v. Sodexo, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Thorp
v. Dist. of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2018) (“To prevail on either claim, a
plaintiff must show an employer knew or should have known its employee behaved in a
dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, and that the employer, armed with that actual or
constructive knowledge, failed to adequately supervise the employee.”) (internal citation and
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quotation marks omitted); Rawlings v. Dist. of Columbia, 820 F. Supp. 2d 92, 115 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“Plaintiff must show . . . that [Defendant] engaged in behavior before the [incident here] that
should have put his employer on notice that he required additional training.”).
Once again, Johnson comes up short given that he has alleged no facts regarding
Hayman’s behavior that should have put the company on notice that he should not have been
hired or should have been supervised more closely or trained more extensively. Instead, Plaintiff
appears to believe that any negligent act by an employee can give rise to this cause of action,
when what is actually required is prior notice. See Pl. MTD Opp. at 8. This count also falls by
the wayside.
4. Civil Conspiracy
In his final cause of action – for civil conspiracy – Johnson alleges that “Defendants and
John Does 1 and 2 entered into an agreement to commit tortious acts including defamation, libel
and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Plaintiff.” Am. Compl., ¶ 61. In the
District of Columbia, “[t]o establish a prima facie case of civil conspiracy, [a plaintiff] ha[s] to
prove (1) an agreement between two or more persons (2) to participate in an unlawful act, and
(3) an injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the agreement
pursuant to, and in furtherance of, the common scheme.” McMullen v. Synchrony Bank, 164 F.
Supp. 3d 77, 96-97 (D.D.C. 2016) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
It is entirely unclear why, with five current Defendants, Plaintiff feels the need to add
more in the guise of Does. Who these Does are, what position(s) they hold, and what they could
have done are not illuminated in the Complaint. The broad allegation that all Defendants plus
two unknown individuals somehow entered into this agreement to harm Plaintiff does not
sufficiently put Defendants on notice of who actually agreed to what. The Court, however, will
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give Plaintiff another opportunity to state this claim with more specificity to see if he can
sufficiently allege an actual conspiracy.
IV. Conclusion
The Court, accordingly, will grant Defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement and
require Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint if he wishes to proceed with a defamation claim
against these Defendants. In addition, it will grant their Motion to Dismiss, but give leave for
Johnson to amend his Civil Conspiracy claim. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: October 15, 2018
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