Davis v. Winn, Jr. ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________
)
DONALD LEWIS DAVIS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-0613 (RBW)
)
LOUIS W. WINN, JR., )
)
Respondent. )
__________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The petitioner has filed a form petition captioned: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by
a Person in Custody in the District of Columbia (“Pet.”) [Dkt. # 1]. Although the petitioner is
incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona, and, thus, is not “in the District
of Columbia,” he is challenging a prison sentence of 25 years imposed by the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia on March 30, 2012, following a plea of guilty. See Pet. at 2. Having
considered the petition, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction and will dismiss this case.
The petitioner’s stated grounds for relief are as follows:
GROUND ONE: . . . The Constitution of the United States has no
inherent authority over me, and I am not a party to it.
GROUND TWO: . . . I am a (natural born) Human-Being and not a
surety/agent.
GROUND THREE: . . . [The] Public Defender . . . did not consider,
nor examine and investigate any possible mental health issues concerning
me.
GROUND FOUR: . . . I was not legally competent to sign a
reasonable and obligatory plea agreement, nor was I legally competent to
make a plea.
Pet. at 5-6. These grounds constitute a collateral challenge to the petitioner’s Superior
Court conviction and sentence.
1
It is settled that unlike federal and state prisoners, “a District of Columbia prisoner has no
recourse to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention’ ” Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal
footnote omitted); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993
(1986). This is so because D.C. Code § 23–110 (2001) authorizes a District of Columbia
prisoner to file a motion “to vacate, set aside, or correct [a] sentence on any of four grounds”
challenging its constitutionality, Alston v. United States, 590 A.2d 511, 513 (D.C. 1991), and this
local remedy “has been found to be adequate and effective because it is coextensive with habeas
corpus.” Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C. 1992) (citing Garris, 794 F.2d at 725;
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 377-82 (1977)).
A motion under § 23-110 must therefore be filed in the Superior Court, and
[an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be
entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that the Superior
Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
D.C. Code § 23-110(g); see Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Section
23–110(g)’s plain language makes clear that it only divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
habeas petitions by prisoners who could have raised viable claims pursuant to section 23-
110(a).”). Because the petitioner has raised claims that are cognizable under § 23-110 and has
not alleged, let alone shown, that the local remedy is ineffective or inadequate, the Court
concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the instant petition. 1
_______s/______________
Reggie B. Walton
DATE: June 25, 2014 United States District Judge
1
A separate Order of dismissal accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
2