Largan Precision Co., Ltd. v. Fisch Sigler, LLP ( 2022 )


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  •                               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    LARGAN PRECISION CO., LTD.,
    Movant,
    v.                             Case No. 1:22-mc-00049 (TNM)
    FISCH SIGLER LLP,
    Respondent.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Largan Precision Co., Ltd., moves to stay arbitration over a bonus payment to its former
    counsel, Fisch Sigler LLP. Largan, a Taiwanese company, hired Fisch Sigler to file a patent
    infringement case in the United States. The parties agreed to arbitrate any future disputes over
    fees. When Largan won an award in parallel Taiwanese litigation, Fisch Sigler sought a portion
    of the award as a contractual bonus payment. Largan refused because Fisch Sigler did not
    participate in the Taiwanese litigation. After months of unsuccessful negotiation, Fisch Sigler
    tried to force Largan to arbitrate the issue in Washington, D.C. Largan says the agreement to
    arbitrate “fees” does not cover a dispute about bonus payments. Fisch Sigler disagrees and also
    argues that this Court is not the proper forum to decide the dispute over arbitrability.
    Because federal courts determine whether parties have agreed to arbitrate and the scope
    of that agreement, this Court is the proper forum. And because the contract carves out bonus
    payments from the agreement to arbitrate, the Court will stay the arbitration.
    I.
    Largan is a Taiwan-headquartered, publicly traded company that manufactures camera
    lenses. Mot. to Stay ¶ 1 (Mot.), ECF No. 1; Mem. in Opp’n at 8 (Opp’n), ECF No. 9. 1 Largan’s
    customers include the world’s largest technology companies, such as Apple, Google, Microsoft,
    and Samsung. Opp’n at 8. Based in the District, Fisch Sigler is a nationally recognized law firm
    that specializes in patent litigation. Id. at 7.
    In 2013, Largan filed a trade secrets lawsuit in Taiwan against another Taiwanese
    company, Ability Opto-Electronics Technology Co., Ltd. (AOET). Mot. ¶ 4. Six years later,
    with the Taiwanese lawsuit still ongoing, Largan hired Fisch Sigler to file a patent infringement
    lawsuit against AOET in the United States. Id. ¶ 5; Opp’n at 9. The parties memorialized the
    terms of the representation in a contract. The contract includes several provisions at issue here.
    First, it defines both “fixed fees” and “success bonus.” “Fixed fees” include “all
    attorney’s fees . . . and certain expenses incurred by the firm” and excludes certain fees not
    disputed here. See Largan Ex. 1 at 4 (Contract), ECF No. 1-2. The “success bonus” for Fisch
    Sigler is either 25% of “case profit” if the case concludes before a so-called “claim construction
    order” (a type of order specific to patent disputes) or 50% of case profit if the case concludes
    after that order. Id. at 4–5.
    Second, the contract contains both a mediation and an arbitration provision. If the parties
    dispute the amount of the success bonus, the contract directs the parties to “mediate in
    California.” Id. at 5. If the parties have a dispute over “fees”—an undefined term—the parties
    1
    All page numbers refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF electronic filing
    system.
    2
    “agree to mandatory arbitration before the Washington, D.C. Bar Attorney/Client Arbitration
    Board” (ACAB). Id. at 6.
    In early 2021, Largan won a judgment against AOET in the Taiwanese litigation. Mot.
    ¶ 9; Opp’n at 11. Largan and AOET then negotiated a settlement that resolved both the
    Taiwanese and U.S. lawsuits. Mot. ¶ 9. Largan and Fisch Sigler began to discuss the success
    bonus, but the parties could not agree on the amount. Id. ¶¶ 10–11; Opp’n at 14. Fisch Sigler
    says it asked Largan six times to mediate, and Largan refused each time. Opp’n at 14. Largan
    responds that the contract only requires it to mediate after good-faith discussions, and that Fisch
    Sigler never engaged in good-faith discussions. Largan Reply to Fisch Sigler’s Opp’n at 18
    (Reply), ECF No. 11. As proof, it submits a declaration from in-house counsel at Largan who
    says that Fisch Sigler at first asked for a $1.9 million success bonus. Decl. of Wei-Ju Chen Ex. E
    ¶¶ 3, ECF No. 11-1. But after a new attorney took over Fisch Sigler’s negotiations, it increased
    its demand to $5.65 million. Id. ¶ 4. To Largan, a request for triple the previous amount did not
    constitute good faith, so it refused to mediate. See id. ¶ 5; Reply at 18.
    Fisch Sigler filed a complaint with ACAB seeking to arbitrate the success bonus plus
    attorneys’ fees and expenses. Mot. ¶ 10; Opp’n at 14. Largan then filed this motion to stay
    arbitration. Fisch Sigler opposed the motion, and Largan replied. The motion is now ripe.
    II.
    The parties disagree on three issues. First, they dispute whether ACAB or the Court is
    the proper forum for this dispute. Second, they disagree about whether Largan provided
    informed consent to arbitrate the success bonus as required by ACAB rules. And third, they
    disagree about whether the arbitration clause covers the success bonus.
    3
    The Court need only address the first and third arguments. Under District law and
    Supreme Court precedent, a court decides whether parties agreed to arbitrate a particular issue. 2
    So the Court is the proper forum for this dispute. Because the Court finds that the arbitration
    clause does not cover disputes over a success bonus, it need not decide whether Largan provided
    its informed consent.
    A.
    Consider first the parties’ threshold dispute about whether this matter is properly before
    the Court. The answer to that question depends on how one frames the issue. Largan says the
    dispute is about whether the parties agreed to arbitrate disagreements about the success bonus.
    See Mot. ¶¶ 16–21. Framed this way, the dispute is over “the existence or formation of a valid
    agreement to arbitrate—i.e., arbitrability.” Id. ¶ 16.
    If Largan’s framing is correct, the Court should adjudicate because courts resolve
    disagreements about arbitrability. See 
    D.C. Code § 16-4406
    (b) (“The court shall decide whether
    an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.”); First
    Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 
    514 U.S. 938
    , 947 (1995) (holding that because a party did
    not “clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration,” the dispute over
    arbitrability “was subject to independent review by the courts”). To adjudicate a disagreement
    about arbitrability, courts decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists and the scope of that
    agreement. See 
    D.C. Code § 16-4406
    (b); see also Masurovsky v. Green, 
    687 A.2d 198
    , 204
    (D.C. 1996) (“[C]ourts, not arbitrators, are to determine whether the parties have agreed to
    2
    Whether the Court is the proper forum for this dispute is separate from the issue of whether the
    Court has subject matter jurisdiction. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
     because Fisch Sigler has its principal place of business in the District, Largan is a
    Taiwanese corporation, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Mot. ¶ 3.
    4
    arbitrate a particular matter, unless the parties themselves have agreed to submit the
    arbitrability question itself to arbitration.”) (emphasis added).
    Fisch Sigler responds that “the [Contract] itself shows that an agreement to arbitrate
    exists—indeed, it contains the arbitration provision.” Opp’n at 15. Thus, there can be no
    disagreement about the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Instead, Fisch Sigler contends,
    the only thing at issue is whether it “complied with” ACAB’s internal rules. 
    Id.
     Recall that the
    parties dispute whether Fisch Sigler obtained Largan’s informed consent. ACAB Rule 8(b)(iii)
    requires a client to “have been adequately informed of the scope and effect of a mandatory
    arbitration provision, consistent with D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee Opinion 376.” That
    rules dispute, according to Fisch Sigler, is not about the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. It
    is a dispute about an arbitral body’s rules. And under Supreme Court precedent, the arbitrator
    adjudicates these disputes. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynods, Inc. 
    537 U.S. 79
    , 84 (2002).
    Accepting Fisch Sigler’s framing, then, means ACAB is the proper forum.
    The Court agrees with Largan. Fisch Sigler assumes that because the contract includes
    an arbitration provision, the parties have agreed to arbitrate. But the existence of an arbitration
    contract says nothing about its scope. And the scope is what Largan disputes. 3 In other words,
    Largan challenges the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the success bonus. That
    disagreement goes to the Court unless “clear[]” and “unmistakable[]” evidence suggests the
    parties’ arbitration clause covers the disputed issue. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns
    Workers of Am., 
    475 U.S. 643
    , 649 (1986) (“[T]he question of arbitrability . . . is undeniably an
    issue for judicial determination. Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise,
    3
    Largan also disputes the validity of the entire arbitration provision because it says it never
    gave its informed consent to arbitrate. But that turns on the issue of informed consent, which the
    Court need not address to resolve this motion. See supra Section II.
    5
    the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the
    arbitrator.”).
    The contract does not “clearly and unmistakably” provide that the parties agreed to
    arbitrate disagreements about the success bonus. The arbitration clause applies to “fees,” an
    undefined term. See Contract at 6. A separate mediation provision covers disputes about the
    success bonus. Id. at 5. The contract does not say whether these provisions are mutually
    exclusive. Submitting that question to ACAB would improperly allow it to determine its own
    jurisdiction. See Grad v. Wetherholt Galleries, 
    660 A.2d 903
    , 908 (D.C. 1995) (“To require any
    degree of judicial deference to an arbitrator’s decision regarding arbitrability where a proper
    objection to the arbitrator’s authority has been lodged would vitiate the consent basis of statutory
    arbitration by permitting an arbitrator to clothe herself with actual authority, based on the
    agreement of the one party asserting the claim.”).
    Thus, the Court is the proper forum to resolve the dispute.
    B.
    Consider next whether the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes about the success bonus.
    When interpreting a contract, the Court bears in mind several principles. “This jurisdiction
    follows the ‘objective’ law of contracts.” DSP Venture Group, Inc. v. Allen, 
    830 A.2d 850
    , 852
    (D.C. 2003). So “the written language embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the
    rights and liabilities of the parties regardless of the intent of the parties at the time they entered
    into the contract, unless the written language is not susceptible of a clear and definite
    undertaking[.]” 
    Id.
     (cleaned up). Courts give “the language used its plain meaning,” Tillery v.
    Dist. of Colum. Contract Appeals Bd., 
    912 A.2d 1169
    , 1176 (D.C. 2006), and “will not torture
    words to import ambiguity where” there is none. Bragdon v. Twenty–Five Twelve Assocs. Ltd.
    6
    P’ship, 
    856 A.2d 1165
    , 1170 (D.C. 2004) (cleaned up). More, “contracts are not rendered
    ambiguous by the mere fact that the parties do not agree upon their proper construction.” Steele
    Founds., Inc. v. Clark Constr. Grp., 
    937 A.2d 148
    , 153 (D.C. 2007) (cleaned up).
    The crux of Fisch Sigler’s argument is that the parties wrote the arbitration provision
    broadly. Recall that the contract defines two sets of fees: “fixed fees” and the “success bonus.”
    Contract at 3–5. In contrast, the term “fees” is undefined. Fisch Sigler argues that though the
    term “fixed fees” is narrow, the parties wanted the arbitration provision to apply to fees
    “generally”—including the success bonus. Opp’n at 22–23. As evidence, the contract uses the
    term “fixed fees” 23 times. Id. at 23. But it uses the term “fees” sparingly. And where it does
    use that term, says Fisch Sigler, the contract uses it to cover “fixed fees” and the “success
    bonus.” See id.
    The problem with this argument is that several times the contract uses the term “fees” in a
    way that precludes it from covering the success bonus. First, the contract uses “fees” and “fixed
    fees” interchangeably. On its first page, the contract says that “the fees outlined below shall
    increase by 25%” if another defendant is added. Contract at 2 (emphasis added). The contract
    then gives a list of fixed fees. Id. at 2–3. A page later, the contract says that for “fixed fees, the
    firm will issue an invoice for each such fee at the beginning of the month (e.g., the $87,000 fixed
    fee invoice for September 2019 would be issued on September 1, 2019).” Id. at 4 (emphasis
    added). True, just because the contract refers to “fixed fees” as “fees” does not mean “fees”
    excludes the success bonus. But it is instructive that the contract uses the term “fees” to refer to
    “fixed fees” but never refers to the “success bonus” as a “fee.”
    Second, page three of the contract says that payment terms “apply to all amounts due
    including fees, non-covered expenses, and success bonuses.” Contract at 4 (emphasis added).
    7
    And page five of the contract reads: “Notwithstanding any such termination [of the firm’s
    representation], the Client remains liable to pay all fees, disbursements, success bonuses, and
    related charges incurred or earned under the agreement.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added). If “fees”
    included a “success bonus,” there would be no need to include them both in the same sentence.
    Put differently, Fisch Sigler’s approach would render the phrase “success bonuses” in these
    instances meaningless. The Court is loath to accept this interpretation because it contradicts the
    District’s rules for interpreting contracts. See Dist. of Colum. v. Young, 
    39 A.3d 36
    , 40 (D.C.
    2012) (“[W]e must strive to give reasonable effect to all [a contract’s] parts and eschew
    an interpretation that would render part of it meaningless or incompatible[.]”) (cleaned up); see
    also Antonin Scalia & Bryan J. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176
    (2012) (“Because legal drafters should not include words that have no effect, courts avoid a
    reading that renders some words altogether redundant.”).
    Third, the contract provides for a separate dispute resolution mechanism for the success
    bonus and only the success bonus. The parties agreed to mediate disputes about the success
    bonus in California. Contract at 5. This is different from how the parties agreed to resolve
    disputes about fees both in form—mediation versus arbitration—and in location—California
    versus the District. Fisch Sigler counters that mediation and arbitration are not mutually
    exclusive. See Opp’n at 24. The way to harmonize these two dispute resolution mechanisms, it
    says, is to understand that the contract “contemplates that the parties will mediate [a dispute over
    the success bonus] first and if it’s unsuccessful, initiate arbitration at the ACAB.” 
    Id.
     But
    nowhere does the contract set forth mediation and arbitration as successive dispute resolution
    mechanisms.
    8
    Fisch Sigler has one more argument. It says that if the Court finds the contract
    ambiguous, it should presume in favor of applying arbitration. Id. at 23; see also Woodroof v.
    Cunningham, 
    147 A.3d 777
    , 788 (D.C. 2016) (“If [a contractual] clause possesses a certain
    amount of ambiguity, a presumption . . . applies to construe any ambiguity in favor of
    arbitration.”) (cleaned up).
    There are two reasons not to apply the presumption in favor of arbitrability here. For
    starters, Fisch Sigler overemphasizes the force of the presumption. The Supreme Court recently
    highlighted the presumption’s limited reach when it clarified that the “policy favoring
    arbitration . . . is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering
    arbitration.” Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 
    142 S. Ct. 1708
    , 1713 (2022) (emphasis added). This
    “policy” exists not to “favor arbitration over litigation,” 
    id.,
     but to counter “the judiciary’s
    longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the
    same footing as other contracts,” Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 
    561 U.S. 287
    ,
    302 (2010) (cleaned up). And the Supreme Court has “never held that this policy overrides the
    principle that a court may submit to arbitration only those disputes that the parties have agreed to
    submit.” 
    Id.
     (cleaned up). See also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 
    514 U.S. 52
    ,
    57 (1995) (stating that the federal “proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the
    wishes of the contracting parties”).
    Consistent with these statements, the Supreme Court has laid out a two-pronged approach
    to determine whether to apply the presumption:
    [Courts] discharge [their] duty [to determine whether parties agreed
    to arbitrate an issue] by: (1) applying the presumption of arbitrability
    only where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement
    is ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at hand; and (2)
    adhering to the presumption and ordering arbitration only where the
    presumption is not rebutted.
    9
    Granite Rock Co., 
    561 U.S. at 301
     (emphasis added).
    Fisch Sigler fails to satisfy this test. As we have seen, the contract is not ambiguous
    about whether the arbitration clause covers a “success bonus”: (1) The contract uses the term
    “fees” and “success bonus” in the same sentence; (2) the contract uses the term “fees”
    interchangeably with “fixed fees”; and (3) the contract provides a separate dispute resolution
    mechanism in a separate forum for the success bonus. Thus, the presumption does not apply. In
    any event, if the contract was ambiguous, the ambiguity should be construed against the
    contract’s author—Fisch Sigler—not in its favor. See Dyer v. Bilaal, 
    983 A.2d 349
    , 355 (D.C.
    2009) (“[A]ny ambiguity as to the contract’s meaning will be construed strongly against the
    drafter.”); Aziken v. Dist. of Colum., 
    70 A.3d 213
    , 223 n.13 (D.C. 2013) (same).
    Fisch Sigler contends that if it cannot bring its claim before ACAB, it is without a forum
    to seek relief. Opp’n at 21. Not so. As even Largan acknowledges, Fisch Sigler is free to file a
    breach of contract claim in California contending that Largan has failed to mediate as required
    by the contract. See Reply at 17–19. But what Fisch Sigler may not do is force Largan to
    arbitrate a dispute that it did not agree to arbitrate.
    III.
    For all these reasons, the Court will grant Largan’s motion to stay the arbitration. A
    separate order will issue.
    2022.06.30
    17:08:33 -04'00'
    Dated: June 30, 2022                                      TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.
    10