Emrit v. Milley ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
RONALD SATISH EMRIT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-03726 (UNA)
)
MARK MILLEY, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Currently before the court is plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No. 1, and application for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained herein, the court
will grant plaintiff’s IFP application and dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiff’s complaint is rife with inconsistencies and confusing allegations. He names Mark
Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” as the defendant in the complaint’s caption, but
it is unclear how any of the claims that follow relate to General Milley. In the body of the
complaint, plaintiff identifies a different individual as the defendant, “the Special Agent in Charge
of the New York field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at Rockefeller Plaza in
Times Square in New York City,” which plaintiff alleges is “connected to [the] U.S. attorney’s
office in [the] Southern District of New York (SDNY).” Plaintiff lives in Sarasota, Florida, and
he has brought the action in this court, but he states that that venue and jurisdiction for this matter
are proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, “the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City or First Circuit Court of Appeals at John Joseph
Moakley Courthouse in Boston, Massachusetts[,]” or possibly, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
From there, the complaint becomes even more difficult to follow. Plaintiff discusses, at
length, his disagreement with the outcomes of litigation in various other federal and state courts,
including filing restrictions entered against him as a vexatious litigant, and refusals by those courts
to entertain his interlocutory appeals or transfer his matters to other jurisdictions. He then
intermittently alleges that “SDNY” “racially profiles people as Arabic of or Muslim,” while also
discussing his attempts to gain entry to Cuba, individuals falsely identified as Russian spies, and
his difficulties contacting foreign embassies in the United States. He demands damages and
injunctive relief. This complaint will be dismissed.
First, pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement
of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-
79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures
that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive
answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown
v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment
of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold
conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of
Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No.
17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and rambling narrative of
charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort
Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The instant complaint falls within this category. As presented, neither the court nor
defendant can reasonably be expected to identify plaintiff’s claims. In fact, it is unclear who
plaintiff has even intended to sue. And per plaintiff’s own assertions, this District appears to be
an improper venue for his claims, and it is unknown how, if at all, this court may exercise subject-
matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit.
Second, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of other federal
courts. See In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Panko v. Rodak, 606 F. 2d 168, 171 n.6
(7th Cir. 1979) (finding it “axiomatic” that a federal court may order judges or officers of another
federal court “to take an action.”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Choi, 818
F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that federal district courts “generally lack[] appellate
jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other
courts”), citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986); Fleming v. United States,
847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923)), aff’d,
No. 94-5079, 1994 WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995).
For all of these reasons, this case will be dismissed without prejudice. A separate order
accompanies this memorandum opinion.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
Date: December 21, 2022 United States District Judge