Pizarro v. Mead ( 2022 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
VICTOR MANUEL-JR PIZARRO,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. Action No. 21-194
KENNETH MEAD, et al., (EGS)
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Victor Manuel-Jr Pizarro (“Mr. Pizarro”) brings
this lawsuit against Defendants Judge Roland Saul (“Judge
Saul”); Don R. Allred, Ronald Kent Birdsong, and Darla
Lookingbill (collectively “Oldham County Defendants”); Kenneth
Mead, Andrea Edlana Mitre, Scott Neilson, and Harley Sutton
(collectively “Las Vegas Metropolitan Police (“LVMPD”)
Defendants”); Conrad Dominguez (“State Trooper Dominguez”), and
John Does 1-10 alleging: (1) negligence; (2) concealment of
documents; (3) privacy breach; (4) slander and defamation of
character; (5) wrongful trespass; (6) false arrest; (7) false
confinement; and (8) tortious interference. See Second Am.
Compl., ECF No. 9 ¶ 7. 1
1
When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
1
Pending before the Court and ripe for adjudication are: (1)
Judge Saul’s Motion to Dismiss, see ECF No. 13; (2) the Oldham
County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, see ECF No. 17; (3) the
LVMPD Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, see ECF No. 18; (4) State
Trooper Dominguez’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 23; (5) Mr.
Pizarro’s Motion to Strike, see ECF No. 29; and (6) Mr.
Pizarro’s Motion to Recuse Attorneys, see ECF No. 30. Upon
careful consideration of the motions, responses, any replies
thereto, the applicable law, and for the reasons explained
below: (1) Judge Saul’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; (2) the
Oldham County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; (3) the
LVMPD Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; (4) State
Trooper Dominguez’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; (5) Mr.
Pizarro’s Motion to Strike is DENIED; and (6) Mr. Pizarro’s
Motion to Recuse Attorneys is DENIED. The John Doe Defendants
are sua sponte DISMISSED from this action.
I. Background
A. Factual
The Court assumes the following facts alleged in the
complaint to be true for the purposes of deciding this motion
and construes them in Mr. Pizarro’s favor. See Baird v. Gotbaum,
792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Mr. Pizarro’s Complaint,
as amended, contains a number of allegations regarding events
that transpired in Las Vegas, Nevada in late November 2020,
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culminating in his confinement by law enforcement. Mr. Pizarro
alleges that the “[d]efendants live or work in Nevada and
Texas.” Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 9 ¶ 8.
II. Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss an
action when the court lacks personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(2). On such a motion, the plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over each defendant. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological
Soc’y., 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To meet this
burden, the plaintiff must allege specific facts that connect
each defendant with the forum. Second Amendment Found. v. U.S.
Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The
plaintiff cannot rely merely on conclusory allegations.
Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42
(D.D.C. 2003). The court may consider, receive, and weigh
affidavits and other relevant materials outside of the pleadings
to assist it in determining the pertinent jurisdictional facts.
U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 n.4 (D.D.C.
2000).
A “court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents must satisfy both the Due Process Clause and
D.C.’s long-arm statute.” Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 158, 173 (D.D.C. 2018)
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(citation omitted). To satisfy due process requirements, “a
plaintiff must demonstrate that there are ‘minimum contacts
between the defendant and the forum establishing that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’” Swecker v. Midland Power
Coop., 253 F. Supp. 3d 274, 278 (D.D.C. 2017) (citation
omitted). D.C.’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of
specific jurisdiction under certain enumerated circumstances,
including when an entity transacts any business in the
District; contracts to supply services in the District; causes
tortious injury in the District; or has an interest in, uses,
or possesses real property in the District. D.C. Code § 13-
423(a)(1)-(5).
The court may exercise either general or specific personal
jurisdiction. The Urban Institute v. Fincon Services, 681 F.
Supp. 2d 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2010). “A court with general
jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant.”
Brystol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San
Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). For an
individual, the “paradigm forum” for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation,
it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is
fairly regarded as at home. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
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In contrast, “[s]pecific jurisdiction is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the
very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Molock v. Whole
Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 122 (D.D.C. 2018)
(quoting Goodyear, 562 U.S. at 919). “[S]pecific jurisdiction
exists if a claim is related to or arises out of the non-
resident defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Molock, 297 F.
Supp. 3d at 122. A plaintiff must demonstrate “that specific
jurisdiction comports with the forums long-arm statute, D.C.
Code § 13-423(a), and does not violate due process.” Id.(citing FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Markets Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087,
1094-65 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
III. Analysis
A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Judge Saul
Judge Saul argues that Mr. Pizarro does not allege that
any claims arise from Judge Saul’s contacts with the District
of Columbia. Judge Saul Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 14 at 5. He
notes that attached as an Exhibit to Mr. Pizarro’s Second
Amended Complaint is a copy of an envelope with a return
address for Judge Saul at a Hereford, Texas address to a person
at a Dallas, Texas address. Id. (citing Second Am. Compl., ECF
No. 9 at 43). In response, Mr. Pizarro argues that
“[d]efendants have voluntarily responded to the complaint
therefor submitting to court having personal jurisdiction over
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defendants.” Opp’n, ECF No. 24 at 2. Mr. Pizarro is mistaken.
Mr. Pizarro does not allege that Judge Saul is domiciled
in the District of Columbia. Rather, he has alleged that the
“[d]efendants live or work in Nevada and Texas.” Second Am.
Compl., ECF No. 9 ¶ 8. Furthermore, Mr. Pizarro’s Second
Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that his
claims against Judge Saul arise from Judge Saul’s contacts with
the District of Columbia. See generally id. Accordingly, Mr.
Pizarro has not alleged that he suffered an injury within the
District of Columbia and that would comport with long-arm
jurisdiction. See D.C. Code Ann. § 13-423(a). The Court
concludes that it has neither general nor specific personal
jurisdiction over Judge Saul for the purposes of this action
and GRANTS Judge Saul’s Motion to Dismiss. 2
B. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Oldham
County Defendants
The Oldham County defendants argue that “[t]he Second
Amended Complaint fails to establish that the [they] transact
business in the District of Columbia, contract to supply
services in the District of Columbia, caused an injury in the
District of Columbia, regularly engage in conduct in the
2 Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Judge Saul,
the Court need not reach Judge Saul’s additional arguments in
support of dismissal. See Judge Saul Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13
at 6-10.
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District of Columbia, or have any interest in real property
within the District of Columbia.” Oldham County Defendant’s Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 17-1 at 10. The Oldham County defendants
point out that “there is no mention whatsoever of the District
of Columbia within the Second Amended Complaint.” Id.Mr. Pizarro did not file an opposition to three of the
motions to dismiss, including the Oldham County Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, within the timeframe provided by the Local
Civil Rules of the Court. See generally Docket for Civil Action
No. 21-194. Accordingly, the Court directed him to respond, and
informed him that if he did not respond by a certain date, the
Court may treat the motion as conceded. See Minute Order (Feb.
2, 2022). On February 22, 2022, Mr. Pizarro responded to one of
the motions to dismiss, but not to that of the Oldham County
Defendants. See generally Docket for Civil Action No. 21-194.
Analogous to the liberal construction to which a pro se
complaint is entitled, see Washington v. Geren, 675 F. Supp. 2d
26, 31 (D.D.C. 2009); the Court will consider Mr. Pizarro’s
opposition in response to the LVMPD Defendants as also
responding to the Oldham County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
rather than considering the Oldham County Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss to have been conceded by Mr. Pizarro. In that opposition
briefing, Mr. Pizarro responded to the same personal
jurisdiction argument as follows: “[d]efendants have voluntarily
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responded to the complaint therefor submitting to court having
personal jurisdiction over defendants.” Opp’n, ECF No. 24 at 2.
Mr. Pizarro is mistaken.
Mr. Pizarro does not allege that the Oldham County
Defendants are domiciled in Washington, DC. Rather, he has
alleged that the “[d]efendants live or work in Nevada and
Texas.” Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 9 ¶ 8. Furthermore, Mr.
Pizarro’s Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual
allegations that his claims against the Oldham County
Defendants arise from their contacts with Washington, D.C. See
generally id. As the Oldham County Defendants aptly point out,
the Second Amended Complaint fails to explain how this case has
any relationship to D.C. at all. Accordingly, Mr. Pizarro has
not alleged that he suffered an injury within the District of
Columbia and that would comport with long-arm jurisdiction. See
D.C. Code Ann. § 13-423(a). The Court concludes that it has
neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction over the
Oldham County Defendants for the purposes of this action and
GRANTS the Oldham Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 3
3 Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Oldham
County Defendants, the Court need not reach their additional
arguments in support of dismissal. See Oldham County Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 17-1 at 11-22.
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C. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the LVMPD
Defendants
The LVMPD defendants argue that neither general nor
specific person jurisdiction exists over them in the District
of Columbia forum because no LVMPD defendant is domiciled in
the District of Columbia and because the Second Amended
Complaint “fails to allege any fact showing that LVMPD
Defendants purposefully directed an at-issue action toward or
within the District of Columbia. In fact, the [operative]
Complaint fails to mention how the District of Columbia has
any relationship to this case.” LVMPD Defendants’ Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 18 at 5. In response, Mr. Pizarro argues that
the “[d]efendants have voluntarily responded to the complaint
therefor submitting to court having personal jurisdiction over
defendants.” Opp’n, ECF No. 29 at 2. 4 Again, Mr. Pizarro is
mistaken.
4 Mr. Pizarro has styled his response as “[M]otion to Strike:
[O]pposition to Kenneth Mead’s, Scott Neilson’s, Harley James
Sutton’s, and Andra Edlana Mitre’s motion to dismiss.” ECF No.
29. “[C]ourts . . . consistently den[y] as procedurally improper
motions to strike directed at other motions.” Law Offices of
Arman Dabiri & Assoc. v. Agricultural Bank of Sudan, Civil
Action No. 17-2497, 2018 WL 8262152, at * 1 (D.D.C. Aug. 5,
2018). Accordingly, the Court treats ECF No. 29 as Mr. Pizarro’s
Opposition to the LVMPD Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and
DENIES ECF No. 29 insofar as it purports to be a Motion to
Strike.
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Mr. Pizarro does not allege that the LVMPD defendants are
domiciled in the District of Columbia. Rather, he has alleged
that the “[d]efendants live or work in Nevada and Texas.”
Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 9 ¶ 8. Furthermore, Mr. Pizarro’s
Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations
that his claims against the LVMPD defendants arise from their
contacts with the District of Columbia. See generally id. As
the LVMPD Defendants aptly point out, the Second Amended
Complaint fails to explain how this case has any relationship
to the District of Columbia at all. Accordingly, Mr. Pizarro
has not alleged that he suffered an injury within the District
of Columbia and that would comport with long-arm jurisdiction.
See D.C. Code Ann. § 13-423(a). The Court concludes that it has
neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction over the
LVMPD Defendants for the purposes of this action and GRANTS the
LVMPD Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 5
D. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over State Trooper
Dominguez
State Trooper Dominguez argues that neither general nor
specific person jurisdiction exists over him because Mr. Pizarro
has made no attempt to demonstrate that State Trooper Dominguez
5 Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the LVMPD
Defendants, the Court need not reach their additional arguments
in support of dismissal. See LVMPD Defendants’ Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 18 at 6-13.
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has a forum connection with the District of Columbia, nor has
Mr. Pizarro demonstrated an “affiliation between the forum and
the underlying controversy.” State Trooper Dominguez’ Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 23 at 3.
Mr. Pizarro did not file an opposition to three of the
motions to dismiss, including State Trooper Dominguez’ Motion to
Dismiss, within the timeframe provided by the Local Civil Rules
of the Court. See generally Docket for Civil Action No. 21-194.
Accordingly, the Court directed him to respond, and informed him
that if he did not respond by that date, the Court may treat the
motion as conceded. See Minute Order (Feb. 2, 2022). On February
22, 2022, Mr. Pizarro responded to one of the motions to
dismiss, but not to that of State Trooper Dominguez. See
generally Docket for Civil Action No. 21-194. Analogous to the
liberal construction to which a pro se complaint is entitled,
see Washington v. Geren, 675 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2009);
the Court will consider Mr. Pizarro’s opposition in response to
the LVMPD Defendants as also responding to State Trooper
Dominguez’ Motion to Dismiss rather than considering State
Trooper Dominguez’ Motion to Dismiss to have been conceded by
Mr. Pizarro. In that opposition briefing, Mr. Pizarro responded
to the same personal jurisdiction argument as follows:
“[d]efendants have voluntarily responded to the complaint
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therefor submitting to court having personal jurisdiction over
defendants.” Opp’n, ECF No. 24 at 2. Mr. Pizarro is mistaken.
Mr. Pizarro does not allege that State Trooper Dominguez
is domiciled in the District of Columbia. Rather, he has
alleged that the “[d]efendants live or work in Nevada and
Texas.” Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 9 ¶ 8. Furthermore, Mr.
Pizarro’s Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual
allegations that his claims against State Trooper Dominguez
arises from the latter’s contacts with the District of
Columbia. See generally id. Accordingly, he has not alleged
that he suffered an injury within the District of Columbia and
that would comport with long-arm jurisdiction. See D.C. Code
Ann. § 13-423(a). The Court concludes that it has neither
general nor specific personal jurisdiction over State Trooper
Dominguez for the purposes of this action and GRANTS State
Trooper Dominguez’ Motion to Dismiss. 6
E. The Court Sua Sponte Dismisses the Claims Against John
Does 1-10
The Court also lacks personal jurisdiction over the ten
John Doe defendants, none of whom have been identified, served,
or have appeared in this litigation. Even though they have not
6 Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over State
Trooper Dominguez, the Court need not reach his additional
argument in support of dismissal. See State Trooper Dominguez’
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 23 at 3-4.
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filed a motion to dismiss, the foregoing analysis applies to
the John Doe defendants. First, Mr. Pizarro has alleged that
the “[d]efendants live or work in Nevada and Texas.” Second Am.
Compl., ECF No. 9 ¶ 8. Second, the Second Amended Complaint
does not explain what relation this case has to the District of
Columbia, nor is the District of Columbia even mentioned in the
Second Amended Complaint. See generally id. Accordingly, there
is no basis upon which to suppose that the Court has personal
jurisdiction over the John Doe Defendants. Accordingly, the
Court sua sponte DISMISSES them from this action. Cf. Gutierrez
v. U. S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Civil Action No. 18-1958,
2019 WL 6219936, at * 7 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2019) (concluding sua
sponte that the claims are moot as to the John Doe Defendants,
none of whom had been served or entered an appearance, for the
same reason as the claims were moot as to other defendants).
F. The Court DENIES Mr. Pizarro’s Motion to Recuse
Attorneys
Mr. Pizarro moves to recuse Lyssa Anderson and Kristopher
Kalkowski, attorneys for the LVMPD Defendants, because he
contends that they were not physically present when the
incidents that gave rise to his alleged injury occurred and
because they are preventing him from speaking directly with the
defendant who injured him. See Mot. to Recuse, ECF No. 33 at 1-
2. Counsel respond that Mr. Pizarro’s motion has no basis in
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procedural rules or case law. See Opp’n, ECF No. 33 at 3. Local
Civil Rule 7(a) requires each motion to “include or be
accompanied by a statement of the specific points of law and
authority that support the motion.” LCvR 7(a). Mr. Pizarro has
provided no legal basis pursuant to which recusal could be
considered for the attorneys. See generally Mot. to Recuse, ECF
No. 33. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion to Recuse, ECF
No. 33.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, (1) Judge Saul’s Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 13, is GRANTED; (2) the Oldham County
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 17, is GRANTED; (3) the
LVMPD Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED; (4)
State Trooper Dominguez’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 23, is
GRANTED; (5) Mr. Pizarro’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 29, is
DENIED; and (6) Mr. Pizarro’s Motion to Recuse Attorneys, ECF
No. 30, is DENIED. The John Doe Defendants are sua sponte
DISMISSED from this action. The Second Amended Complaint is
DISMISSED and the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
August 25, 2022
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