Irving v. D.C. Public Schools , 815 F. Supp. 2d 119 ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
VIRGINIA HAYES, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 09-1798 (RMU)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 23
:
D.C. PUBLIC SCHOOLS et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES & COSTS
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.
The plaintiff is the grandmother and legal guardian of a minor child who is entitled to the
protections of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et
seq. She commenced this action seeking $4,101.15 in attorney’s fees that she incurred while
prosecuting an administrative claim pursuant to the IDEA. The defendants, the District of
Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) and the District of Columbia, concede that the plaintiff
prevailed in the underlying merits hearing, but dispute the reasonableness of the requested fees.
Because the plaintiff is the prevailing party and because some of the requested fees are
reasonable, the court grants in part the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Because
certain fee requests by the plaintiff are inappropriate and deficient, however, the court denies in
part the plaintiff’s motion. Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiff an award of reduced fees.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff’s minor grandchild is enrolled in the District of Columbia Public Schools
(“DCPS”) and is entitled to the protections afforded by the IDEA. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. In
December 2008, the plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint against the DCPS and
the District of Columbia alleging that the defendants had failed to provide a Free and
Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) to her grandchild as required under the IDEA. Id. at ¶
4. After a hearing on the merits in January 2009 (“January 2009 merits hearing”), the hearing
officer issued a Hearing Officer Determination (“HOD”) granting the plaintiff the relief that she
had been seeking. Id. at ¶ 2. During the course of such administrative proceedings, the plaintiff
had been represented by the Law Offices of Christopher N. Anwah. Id. at 4.
The plaintiff then submitted an IDEA fee petition for attorney’s fees and costs to the
defendants, for a total amount of $5,323.25. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. The defendants only reimbursed the
plaintiff in the amount of $923.75, however, creating a difference of $4,101.15 between what the
plaintiff believed she was owed and what the defendants had paid. 1 Id. at 2.
In August 2009, the plaintiff filed an action in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, seeking to recover the $4,101.15 outstanding balance on her IDEA fee petition. Am.
Compl. ¶ 4. The following month, the defendants removed the action to this court. See Notice
of Removal. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint in July 2010. See generally Am.
Compl. Subsequently, after attempts at mediation proved unsuccessful, the plaintiff filed the
instant motion for attorney’s fees and costs. See generally Pl.’s Mot. In her amended complaint,
the plaintiff continues to seek the $4,101.15 that she contends is still due. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. With
1
The plaintiff conceded that certain charges, which total $298.35, are not owed. Pl.’s Mot. at 7.
The final attorney’s fee award will therefore be reduced accordingly.
2
this motion ripe for consideration, the court turns to the parties’ arguments and to the applicable
legal standards.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Attorney’s Fees Under the IDEA
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) requires that a party seeking “attorney’s fees and
related non-taxable expenses” must file a motion with the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(A).
The motion “must specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the
movant to the award.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(ii). It must also state the amount sought in
attorney’s fees, or provide a fair estimate of such amount. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(iii); see
also Herbin v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 890673, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2006).
The IDEA allows the parents of a disabled child to recover “reasonable attorney[’s] fees”
if they are the “prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Thus, when the court determines
an appropriate amount of attorney’s fees, it must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the court
must determine whether the party seeking attorney’s fees is the prevailing party. Id. A
prevailing party “is one who has been awarded some relief by a court.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001); Alegria v.
District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262, 264-65 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (applying Buckhannon in the IDEA
context).
Second, the court should determine whether the attorney’s fees sought are reasonable. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
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reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see also Blackman v.
District of Columbia, 397 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying Hensley in the IDEA
context). An attorney’s hourly rate for IDEA actions in the District of Columbia is typically
considered reasonable if it conforms to the Laffey Matrix, a chart of hourly rates based upon
attorneys’ respective years of experience. Lopez v. District of Columbia, 383 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24
(D.D.C. 2005) (citing Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 329 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2004));
see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C) (stating that attorney’s fees awards “shall be based on rates
prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of
services furnished”).
The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the number of hours that its counsel
has spent on a particular task is reasonable. Holbrook v. District of Columbia, 305 F. Supp. 2d
41, 45 (D.D.C. 2004). The plaintiff may satisfy this burden “by submitting an invoice that is
sufficiently detailed [in order] to ‘permit the District Court to make an independent
determination [of] whether or not the hours claimed are justified.’” Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of
Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Once the plaintiff
has provided the court with such information, a “presumption arises [in the plaintiff’s favor] that
the number of hours billed is reasonable[,] and the burden shifts to the defendants to rebut the
plaintiff’s showing of reasonable hours.” Herbin, 2006 WL 890673, at *5.
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B. The Court Grants in Part and Denies in Part the Plaintiff’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees
1. The Reasonableness of the Number of Hours Billed by the Plaintiff’s Counsel 2
a. Itemizing Each Attorney’s Respective Tasks
The plaintiff has submitted to the court an invoice for $4,101.15 that outlines her
attorney’s fees and costs. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A, Invoice of Billable Hours. The defendants allege
that the plaintiff’s fee petition is unacceptably vague because it does not identify the individual
attorney who performed each respective task. Defs.’ Opp’n at 6-7. The defendants argue that by
neglecting to delineate the work that each attorney performed, the plaintiff has failed to adhere to
the DCPS Guidelines for the Payment of Attorney Fees in IDEA Matters (“DCPS Guidelines”),
which provide specific instructions as to how to submit a fee petition. Id. As a result, the
defendants assert, the court lacks “sufficient information to determine whether the claimed rates
are appropriate for the work that was performed.” Id. at 6.
The plaintiff counters that she complied with the DCPS Guidelines by including a “user
summary” at the end of her invoice. Pl.’s Reply at 3. The summary lists the names of all staff
members who worked on the case, the total number of hours that each expended on the case,
each staff member’s respective hourly rate and the total dollar amount that each billed. Id. The
plaintiff further contends that the DCPS Guidelines do not require identification of each
individual attorney who performed specific legal activities, and that the defendants have offered
no legal authority to establish this purported requirement. Id. at 7.
2
As a threshold matter, the court notes that the defendants do not dispute that the plaintiff is the
prevailing party in the underlying IDEA suit. See generally Defs.’ Opp’n at 1. Indeed, because
the plaintiff succeeded on her claim in the merits hearing, she is the prevailing party and is
therefore entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.
5
A fee application must provide sufficient detail so as to allow the court to make an
independent determination of whether the charges are reasonable. See Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned
Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327. The plaintiff’s invoice “need not present the exact number of
minutes spent[,] nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted[,] nor the specific
attainments of each attorney.” Holbrook, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of
Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327); see also Smith v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d
151, 158 (D.D.C. 2006). Yet a fee petition that does not identify the specific attorneys who
performed each respective activity is considered insufficiently detailed. Gray v. District of
Columbia, 2011 WL 1561553, at *2 n.5 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2011). Without such information, the
court is unable to evaluate whether an attorney’s hourly billable rate and billed hours are
reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see also Blackman v. District of
Columbia, 397 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying Hensley in the IDEA context).
Here, the plaintiff’s failure to match the tasks with the respective attorneys who
undertook them creates ambiguity as to whether the task was performed by an attorney or a
paralegal. Moreover, if the task was indeed carried out by an attorney, the plaintiff’s failure to
identify that person by name leaves uncertainty as to his or her level of experience. Because the
fee petition fails to provide sufficient detail as to who undertook each individual activity, the
court cannot ascertain whether the hourly billing rate for each respective task is reasonable, and
therefore cannot determine whether the plaintiff’s overall request for attorney’s fees is
reasonable.
Even if the plaintiff’s fee petition is somewhat deficient, however, complete denial of
fees is inappropriate. See Jordan v. Dep’t of Justice, 691 F.2d 514, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
6
(holding that complete denial of fees should be reserved for only extreme situations, such as
when the petitioner offers no affidavits or timesheets, or when the application is filed in bad
faith). The court may, instead, reduce the overall fee award to account for such deficiencies. See
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (noting that “[w]here the documentation of hours is inadequate, the
district court may reduce the award accordingly”); Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d
962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reducing overall fee award by fifty percent where documentation of
time records was deficient); In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying an
overall reduction where time entries were inadequate). The court accordingly reduces the overall
fee award by twenty-five percent to account for these and, as indicated below, other deficiencies
in the plaintiff’s fee petition.
b. Whether Charges for Activities Are Too Remote in Time
From the Merits Hearing
The plaintiff requests attorney’s fees for activities that occurred between April 2, 2008
and November 17, 2008. Pl.’s Mot. at 7. The defendants contend that fees for these activities
should not be allowed because such activities occurred eight months prior to the January 2009
merits hearing in which the plaintiff received a favorable HOD. Defs.’ Opp’n at 22. The
defendants therefore assert that 16.77 hours should be disallowed from the plaintiff’s fee
petition, thereby reducing the total accordingly. Id. The plaintiff responds that these legal
activities for which she was charged are directly related and in close proximity to the January
2009 merits hearing. Pl.’s Mot. at 7-8, 11; Pl.’s Reply at 10-11. According to the plaintiff, she
retained her attorneys on April 2, 2008, who subsequently began monitoring whether the
defendant was providing a “free and appropriate education” to the minor child, pursuant to the
IDEA. Pl.’s Mot. at 7-8. The plaintiff notes that if her attorneys had not been observing whether
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her granddaughter was receiving a FAPE, they would not have discovered the violation that
resulted in the merits hearing. Id. Furthermore, the elderly plaintiff asserts that her age,
education and economic status required the attorneys to spend extra time assisting her with the
case, as “she was in no position to understand” on her own the student’s rights under the IDEA.
Id. at 8. The plaintiff attaches the HOD as evidence of the complexity of the administrative
proceeding, in order to justify her attorney’s charges. Id. at 8; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. C, Hearing
Officer’s Determination.
Charges incurred a few months prior to an IDEA merits hearing are not excessively
remote as to be excluded from an attorney’s fee award. See Cox v. District of Columbia, 754 F.
Supp. 2d 66, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that charges for work done less than five months
before an IDEA due process hearing were reasonable); Lax v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL
1980264, at *4 (D.D.C. July 11, 2006) (holding that “time spent over the course of a year for a
particular client” is reasonable, because the plaintiffs tied each charge to a subsequent hearing
and it often takes up to a year for an administrative IDEA case to be resolved). The plaintiff here
demonstrates the relevance of the disputed charges to the underlying administrative proceeding,
and that these charges were incurred only eight months before the merits hearing. Accordingly,
the court concludes that the hours expended prior to the merits hearing are reasonable.
2. The Reasonableness of the Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Respective Hourly Rates
a. The Court Properly Applies the Laffey Matrix to Determine Fee Awards
The plaintiff urges the court to adopt an “adjusted” version of the Laffey Matrix when
calculating the proper attorney hourly rate because it is a better representation of prevailing
market rates than the standard version. See Pl.’s Mot. at 6-7; Pl.’s Reply at 4. The defendants,
8
however, assert that the plaintiff is not entitled to Laffey rates, adjusted or otherwise, because
IDEA proceedings are “not the type of complex federal litigation for which Laffey rates were
adopted.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9. Instead, the defendants insist, the DCPS Guidelines contain the
appropriate fee schedule that should be applied (“DCPS fee schedule”). Id. at 9. The plaintiff
counters that the DCPS fee schedule is “grossly antiquated,” and that it does not allow for any
upward adjustment to account for standard of living increases or inflation. Pl.’s Mot. at 6.
This court has previously held that attorney’s fees in IDEA actions are presumptively
reasonable if they conform to the Laffey Matrix. See Jackson v. District of Columbia, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the Laffey Matrix is the proper formula to
determine the prevailing market rate for legal services rendered in connection with IDEA
administrative proceedings). Other members of this court have reached similar conclusions.
See, e.g., Brown v. Jordan P.C.S., 539 F. Supp. 2d 436, 438 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that the
plaintiffs’ hourly rates were reasonable because they conformed to the updated Laffey Matrix and
were customary for similar cases); Kaseman, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 25-26 (holding that the
plaintiffs’ counsel’s rate was reasonable because it was below the applicable Laffey Matrix rate);
Nesbit v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 01–2429 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2003) (Order at 1) (holding
that an hourly billing rate in accordance with the Laffey Matrix was reasonable).
Furthermore, this court has already rejected the suggestion that IDEA administrative
litigation is categorically less complex than other forms of litigation, and reaffirms that IDEA
cases are sufficiently complex to allow the application of the Laffey Matrix. See Jackson, 696 F.
Supp. 2d at 102 (holding that IDEA administrative proceedings, which require expert testimony
regarding whether a student has been denied a FAPE, are sufficiently complex to warrant
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application of the Laffey Matrix); Nesbit, Civ. No. 01–2429, (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2003) (Order at 1)
(refusing to create an exception to the application of the Laffey Matrix for IDEA litigation); see
also Cox, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (holding that counsel must have specialized knowledge of the
bureaucracy and practices of DCPS to handle IDEA cases). Similarly, this court has rejected the
application of the DCPS fee schedule to determine prevailing attorney rates for IDEA cases. See
Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (declining to apply the DCPS fee schedule because the
defendant provided no evidence to show how it represented prevailing market rates and because
precedent supported application of the Laffey Matrix). The defendants here have not offered any
evidence to indicate the methodology by which the DCPS fee schedule was calculated, nor why
it should be applied in this case. See Cox, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (holding that the Laffey Matrix
should apply because the defendant offered “no reasoned defense for its own Guidelines”). The
court therefore declines to apply the DCPS fee schedule to this case.
With respect to the plaintiff’s request to apply an adjusted Laffey Matrix, the court notes
that two versions of the Laffey Matrix exist in the District of Columbia: the “U.S. Attorney’s
Office Laffey Matrix” and the “Adjusted Laffey Matrix.” See Smith v. District of Columbia, 466
F. Supp. 2d 151, 156 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101,
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that “plaintiffs may point to such evidence as an updated version
of the Laffey Matrix or the U.S. Attorney’s Office Matrix, or their own survey of prevailing
market rates in the community”). The U.S. Attorney’s Office Matrix “calculates the matrix rate
for each year by adding the change in the overall cost of living, as reflected in the Consumer
Price Index (“CPI”) for the Washington, D.C. area for the prior year.” Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at
156; see also U.S. Atty’s Office for D.C. Laffey Matrix 2003-2010, available at
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http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/civil_laffey_matrix_8.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
By contrast, the Adjusted Laffey Matrix, offered by the plaintiff, “calculates the matrix rates for
each year by using the legal services component of the CPI rather than the general CPI on which
the U.S. Attorney’s Office Matrix is based.” See Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (quoting Salazar
v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2000)).
Although both matrices have been approved for use as evidence of prevailing market
rates, this court has consistently applied the U.S. Attorney’s Office Laffey Matrix. See, e.g.,
Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 104. Accordingly, the court adopts the U.S. Attorney’s Office
version of the Laffey Matrix in order to determine the prevailing market rate for attorney’s fees in
this case.
b. Applicable Hourly Rates for the Plaintiff’s Attorneys
The defendants offer some additional objections to the plaintiff’s requested hourly billing
rates. First, they contend that because the plaintiff’s fee petition is impermissibly vague, they are
unable to determine the reasonableness of the rates that were used to calculate the amount of
requested attorney’s fees. Defs.’ Opp’n at 6-7. Second, the defendants insist that the plaintiff
has failed to meet her burden of establishing her counsel’s qualifications and experience,
asserting that the only pieces of evidence that she has provided are “conclusory allegations,
insufficient to support an award” of attorney’s fees. Id. at 7-8. The defendants further argue that
the sworn declaration from one of the plaintiff’s attorneys does not include information about
whether the plaintiff’s attorneys have been admitted to the District of Columbia Bar (“D.C.
Bar”), nor any indication of the prevailing market rates that are enjoyed by special education
attorneys. Id. at 8.
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The plaintiff responds that the “user summary” at the end of her invoice provides
sufficient detail by listing the name of each staff member who worked on the case, the total
number of hours that each expended, their respective hourly rates and the total dollar amount that
each billed. Pl.’s Reply at 3. Furthermore, she contends that her attorney’s sworn declaration
contains sufficient proof of her counsel’s qualifications, and that she has satisfied her burden of
establishing the reasonableness of her requested rates. Id.
A party that requests attorney’s fees must submit evidence showing “the attorneys’
billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates
in the relevant community.” See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 896 n.11 (1984)). The prevailing market rate in the Laffey Matrix is “but one of the
elements needed to establish the reasonableness of a billing rate sought in a fee application.”
Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 104; see also Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109 (holding that plaintiffs may
provide evidence to supplement the Laffey Matrix, including fees awarded to attorneys with
similar qualifications in comparable cases). The prevailing market rate “provide[s] merely a
starting point” for determining the reasonableness of a billing rate. Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at
104. The fee applicant should also submit evidence, including affidavits, regarding her counsel’s
general billing practices and such counsel’s skill, experience and reputation. See Nat’l Ass’n of
Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1326. Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the defendant
may then rebut the presumption of reasonableness by offering “specific contrary evidence.”
Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109.
In this case, the plaintiff submitted a sworn declaration from her attorney in support of
her requested rates. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. B, Decl. of Qualifications and Experience of Individual
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Special Educ. Legal Providers Employed by the Chris Anwah Law Firm (“Adewusi Decl.”).
The declaration attests to the attorneys’ respective educational background, bar admission status
and special education experience and training. See generally id. The plaintiff also notes that her
attorneys’ law firm has been “practicing special education law exclusively since 1997.” Pl.’s
Mot. at 4. Although the plaintiff did not submit evidence that described her attorneys’ standard
billing practices, the information that she did submit regarding their qualifications and
experience in litigating IDEA cases sufficiently satisfies her burden of proving that her requested
rates are reasonable. See, e.g., Alfonso, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 6-7 (holding that the plaintiffs met
their burden by “highlighting the experience and qualifications of plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm and
the firm’s long history of practice in this area of law”); Kaseman, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (holding
that the plaintiff established the reasonableness of her requested rate even though she did not
attest to the “actual rates charged by lawyers who do similar work” nor to the “the reputations of
plaintiffs’ counsel”).
By contrast, the defendants have not provided specific evidence to rebut this presumption
of reasonableness, such as documentation of rates that are awarded in similar cases. See
Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109-10 (stating that “in the normal case the [defendant] must either
accede to the applicant’s requested rate or provide specific contrary evidence tending to show
that a lower rate would be appropriate” (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at
1326)); Brown, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (noting that the “defendant’s vague allegations that the
plaintiff’s amounts are ‘excessive’ are insufficient to bar recovery”); Abraham v. District of
Columbia, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (applying the Laffey Matrix where the defendant submitted no
evidence to support its request to reduce rates). Because the plaintiff has met her burden of
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providing evidence that shows her attorneys’ skill, experience and reputation, the court
concludes that she has established a presumption of the reasonableness of the billing rates sought
in her fee application.
Accordingly, the court will evaluate each of her attorneys’ respective hourly rates
according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office Laffey Matrix. 3 In doing so, the court addresses specific
objections raised by the defendants.
i. Fatmata Barrie
The plaintiff seeks an hourly billing rate of $300.00 for Fatmata Barrie, who was
admitted to the D.C. Bar in February 2004. Adewusi Decl. ¶ 1. The defendants argue that the
plaintiff fails to establish that Barrie possesses a level of skill and experience that justifies a
$300.00 billing rate. Defs.’ Opp’n at 11.
Attorney’s fees are presumptively reasonable if they conform to the Laffey Matrix. See,
e.g., Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 102. Barrie performed work in November and December 2008,
when she had been a member of the D.C. Bar for three years. 4 See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A. The Laffey
Matrix hourly rate for an attorney with Barrie’s experience in the fall of 2008 is $225.00. “When
the requested hourly rates are higher than those set forth in the Laffey Matrix, courts generally
reduce the attorneys’ hourly rates to the rates provided by the Laffey Matrix.” Alfonso, 464 F.
Supp. 2d at 7. The court accordingly reduces Barrie’s hourly rate to $225.00.
3
The plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $350.00 for Christopher N. Anwah. Adewusi Decl. ¶ 5.
Because the plaintiff’s fee request does not include any charges relating to Anwah, it is not
necessary to determine his proper hourly rate.
4
The Laffey Matrix calculates hourly rates based on the number of years that one has been out of
law school. See generally U.S. Atty’s Office for D.C. Laffey Matrix 2003-2010,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/civil_laffey_matrix_8.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).
Because the plaintiff does not indicate when Barrie graduated from law school, the court has
calculated her appropriate hourly rate based on her bar admission date.
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ii. Annie Pressley
The plaintiff seeks hourly rates of $200.00 and $165.00 for Annie Pressley. Pl’s Mot.,
Ex. A. Pressley is a “special education advocate” who graduated from the University of the
District of Columbia School of Law in “2004[-]2005.” Adewusi Decl. ¶ 2. She is not a licensed
attorney nor a member of the D.C. Bar. Defs.’ Opp’n at 12. The defendants contend that the
IDEA does not require the DCPS to pay for the services of educational advocates. Id. The
plaintiff asserts, however, that section (h) of the DCPS Guidelines permits payment of fees to
educational advocates. Pl.’s Reply at 6. The plaintiff further argues that attorneys require the
services of paralegals and advocates in order to adequately represent their clients. Id. at 6-7.
The court in Bowman v. District of Columbia held that court-appointed educational
advocates may not recover attorney’s fees under the IDEA. 496 F. Supp. 2d 160, 167 (D.D.C.
2007). The educational advocates in Bowman, however, were appointed by the court to make
educational decisions for children who were wards of the district, so that the advocates
effectively acted as “parents” under the IDEA. See id. Accordingly, even though they were
licensed attorneys, they could not recover fees as educational advocates because they were not
acting in an attorney-client capacity. See id.Unlike the attorneys in Bowman, Pressley was employed by the Chris Anwah Law Firm,
instead of being appointed by the court as an educational advocate. See Adewusi Decl. ¶ 2.
Furthermore, Pressley’s work on this matter was similar to that performed by the billing
attorneys. See Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A. Because she is not a member of the D.C. Bar, however,
Pressley is not entitled to attorney rates. See Dickens, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (holding that
attorneys not admitted to the D.C. Bar are not entitled to reimbursement, but awarding fees at
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paralegal rates as equitable relief); Agapito v. District of Columbia, 477 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112-13
(D.D.C. 2007). Pressley is described as a “paralegal” in the plaintiff’s declaration, and the court
accordingly reduces her hourly rate to $85.00, consistent with the rate charged by paralegals at
the Chris Anwah Law Firm. See Adewusi Decl. ¶ 2, 7; Dickens, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 120
(awarding fees below Laffey rates because “[a]ctual billing practices factor into a court’s
discretionary assessment of the reasonableness of rates”). Because this hourly rate is already
lower than the paralegal rate set forth in the Laffey Matrix, the court need not reduce the rate any
further.
iii. Samar Malik
The plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $200.00 for Samar Malik. Adewusi Decl. ¶ 3. It
appears that Malik was also not admitted to the D.C. Bar during the period for which attorney’s
fees are sought. See id. The defendants thus contend that Malik’s practice was not authorized.
Defs.’ Opp’n at 12-13. Furthermore, even if her practice was authorized, they argue, the plaintiff
has not provided sufficient evidence to suggest that Malik possesses “a level of experience and
skill, or an adequate reputation” to support a $200.00 billing rate. Id. at 13. The defendants
contend, therefore, that the hours claimed for Malik should be reduced to reflect a rate applicable
to paralegals. Id.
Attorneys who are not admitted to the D.C. Bar are not entitled to reimbursement at
attorney rates in IDEA proceedings. See Dickens, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 120; Agapito, 477 F. Supp.
2d at 112-13. Accordingly, the court reduces Malik’s hourly rate to $85.00, the rate charged by
paralegals at the Chris Anwah Law Firm. Because this hourly rate is already lower than the
paralegal rate set forth in the Laffey Matrix, the court need not reduce the rate any further.
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iv. Mireya Amaya
The plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $85.00 for Mireya Amaya, who is a paralegal.
Adewusi Decl. ¶ 3. The defendants do not object to this rate. Defs.’ Opp’n at 13. Therefore, the
court’s award reflects this hourly rate for Amaya.
v. LaDonna Rogers
The plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $250.00 for LaDonna Rogers, who was admitted to
the D.C. Bar in July 2000. Adewusi Decl. ¶ 5. The defendants contend that the plaintiff fails to
establish that Rogers possesses the background and experience necessary to support a $250.00
billing rate. Defs.’ Opp’n at 14-15. As previously noted, attorney’s fees are presumptively
reasonable if they conform to the Laffey Matrix. See, e.g., Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 102.
Rogers performed work for this case in 2008, at which point she had been a member of the D.C.
Bar for eight years. See Adewusi Decl. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A. The Laffey Matrix rate for an
attorney with Rogers’ experience in 2008 is $330.00 per hour. Because the plaintiff’s requested
hourly rate of $250.00 is below the rate set forth in the Laffey Matrix, the court deems it
reasonable.
vi. Georgina Oladokun
The plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $250.00 for Georgina Oladokun, who was admitted
to the D.C. Bar in January 2007. Adewusi Decl. ¶ 4. The defendants assert that Oladokun lacks
the skill and reputation required to support a $250.00 billing rate. Defs.’ Opp’n at 15-17. Again,
attorney’s fees are presumptively reasonable if they conform to the Laffey Matrix. See, e.g.,
Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 102. Oladokun performed work in 2008, when she had been a
member of the D.C. Bar for one year. See Adewusi Decl. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A. The Laffey
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Matrix rate for an attorney with Oladokun’s experience in 2008 is $225.00 per hour. The court
accordingly reduces Oladokun’s hourly rate to $225.00. See Alfonso, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 7.
vii. Matt Mixon
The plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $250.00 for Matt Mixon. Adewusi Decl. ¶ 6. Mixon
was admitted to the D.C. Bar in October 2006. Id. The defendants argue that Mixon lacks the
experience and skill required to support a $250.00 billing rate. Defs.’ Opp’n at 17-19.
Attorney’s fees are presumptively reasonable if they conform to the Laffey Matrix. See,
e.g., Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 102. Mixon performed work in 2008, when he had been a
member of the D.C. Bar for two years. See Adewusi Decl. ¶ 6; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. A. The Laffey
Matrix rate for an attorney with Mixon’s experience in 2008 is $225.00 per hour. The court
accordingly reduces Mixon’s hourly rate to $225.00. See Alfonso, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 7.
3. Summary of Fees Allowed
In sum, the court awards to the plaintiff a total of $2,757.00 in attorney’s fees and costs,
after the adjustments summarized in the chart below. 5 According to the parties, the defendants
have already paid the plaintiff $923.75, leaving a total unpaid balance of $1,833.25.
5 The plaintiff argues that her fee award should not be affected by the $4,000.00 fee cap imposed
by the District of Columbia Appropriations Act. Pl.’s Reply at 7. The defendants, on the other
hand, contend that the plaintiff’s fee award is subject to the statutory fee cap. Defs.’ Opp’n at 2.
The court notes that in some instances, the District of Columbia is statutorily limited to a
$4,000.00 fee cap in reimbursing attorney’s fees in IDEA cases. See Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121
Stat. 1844 (2007). In this case, because the court’s award of attorney’s fees is less than the
$4,000.00 fee cap, the court need not reach this issue.
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Name Hours Requested Adjusted Hourly Rate Amount
Hourly Rate Allowed
Annie Pressley 5.68 $200.00 and $85.00 $482.80
$165.00
Fatmata Barrie 5.58 $300.00 $225.00 $1,255.50
Georgina 6.42 $250.00 $225.00 $1,444.50
Oladokun
LaDonna Rogers 0.25 $250.00 $250.00 $62.50
Matt Mixon 1.00 $250.00 $225.00 $225.00
Mireya Amaya 4.18 $85.00 $85.00 $355.30
Samar Malik 1.75 $200.00 $85.00 $148.75
Fees Owed Before Any $3,974.35
Reductions
Fees Owed After Deducting $3,676.00
$298.35 Conceded by
Plaintiff
Total Awarded Fees After $2,757.00
25% Overall Reduction
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiff’s motion
for attorney’s fees and costs. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately
and contemporaneously issued this 30th day of September, 2011.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
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