Heintzman v. Amalgamated Transit Union International , 825 F. Supp. 2d 161 ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
RONALD HEINTZMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 11-1456 (EGS)
)
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION )
INTERNATIONAL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 22, 2011, plaintiff Ronald Heintzman, proceeding pro
se, filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia against defendants Amalgamated Transit Union
International (“ATU”), a labor organization, and Lawrence Hanley,
in his official capacity as International President of ATU
(“President”). Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a breach of
contract claim against defendants for violation of the ATU
Constitution and General Laws (“ATU Constitution”). Plaintiff,
who served as International Executive Vice President and then
President of ATU from August 2009 through September 2010, alleges
that defendants have unlawfully withheld vacation pay to which he
is entitled under Sections 8 and 10 of the ATU Constitution,
which specify the duties and benefits of the organization’s
executive officers. Defendants timely removed plaintiff’s action
to this Court, on grounds that plaintiff’s vacation pay claim
arises under federal law. Pending before the Court is
plaintiff’s motion to remand the action to Superior Court. Upon
consideration of plaintiff’s motion, the defendants’ response
thereto,1 the applicable law, the entire record, and for the
reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that it must DENY
plaintiff’s motion to remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant ATU is an international labor organization with
its principal place of business in Washington, DC. Notice of
Removal (“Not. Rem.”) ¶ 3. ATU is an unincorporated membership
association which exists for the purpose of representing
employees in the transit industry concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and/or
conditions of work. Not. Rem. ¶ 3. ATU oversees and directs the
activities of approximately 270 local labor unions throughout the
United States and Canada. Not. Rem. ¶ 4; Compl. ¶ 3. Defendant
Lawrence Hanley currently serves as President of ATU and is being
sued in his official capacity. Not. Rem. ¶ 1.
Plaintiff was employed as International Executive Vice
President of ATU from August 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010. Compl.
¶ 2. He was appointed to the position of President of ATU by the
ATU Executive Board on July 1, 2010. Compl. ¶ 2. Plaintiff was
subsequently unseated as President by election of the ATU
1
Plaintiff did not file any reply in support of his
motion to remand.
2
membership in late September 2010. Compl. ¶ 5. The successful
candidate, Lawrence Hanley, took office on September 30, 2010.
Compl. ¶ 5.
Section 8 of the ATU Constitution provides that the
President of ATU “shall be allowed thirty (30) calendar days
leave of absence to be taken wholly or in part as the [President]
may elect.” ATU Const. § 8; Compl. ¶ 7. Similarly, Section 10
of the Constitution provides that the International Executive
Vice President “shall be allowed thirty (30) calendar days’
vacation annually with full pay.” ATU Const. § 10; Compl. ¶ 7.
Plaintiff alleges that he did not take any of the vacation days
he accrued pursuant to these provisions during the year prior to
his removal from office. Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff further alleges
that, according to ATU custom, unused vacation leave has
typically been paid upon termination of employment. Compl. ¶ 7.
Accordingly, immediately following his removal from office,
plaintiff sought recovery of his full allocation of vacation pay.
Compl. ¶ 8. Despite repeated requests, plaintiff alleges,
defendants have refused to authorize payment. Compl. ¶ 9.
Plaintiff initiated this action for breach of contract in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on or about July
22, 2011. Not. Rem. Ex. C, Initial Order and Addendum, Doc. No.
1. Plaintiff seeks relief in the amount of $28,271.43 with
interest and costs. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff also asks this Court
3
to order defendant ATU to re-calculate plaintiff’s pension to
include the additional six weeks of compensation. Compl. ¶ 12.
Defendants removed plaintiff’s action to this Court on August 11,
2011. Plaintiff objects to removal and filed a motion to remand
the action to Superior Court on August 31, 2011. See generally
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (“Pl. Mot.”), Doc. No. 8.
Plaintiff’s motion to remand is now ripe for consideration by the
Court.
II. ANALYSIS
Under 28 U.S.C. section 1441, a defendant may remove a case
filed in state court to federal court only when the action could
originally have been filed in federal court.2 See Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Specifically, 28
U.S.C. section 1441(b) provides:
Any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right
arising under the . . . laws of the United States shall
be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties.
The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party
seeking removal. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S.
92, 97 (1921).
Defendant contends that removal of plaintiff’s action to
this Court is proper pursuant to Section 301(a) of the Labor
2
For removal purposes, the term “state court” includes
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1451.
4
Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), which gives the
district courts of the United States jurisdiction over all
“[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce . . . or between any such labor
organizations.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“Section 301(a)”). The
Supreme Court has expressly held that the constitutions of
international labor organizations, such as ATU, are “contracts”
within the meaning of Section 301(a) because they are contracts
“between labor organizations.” See Defendants’ Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (“Def. Opp’n”), Doc. No. 10, at 3
(citing United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipefitting Indus. v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 627 (1981)).3
Accordingly, defendants conclude, because plaintiff’s alleged
right to vacation pay is created by the ATU Constitution itself
and plaintiff is suing to enforce that right, this action falls
squarely within the scope of Section 301(a) and, therefore, is
subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.4
Plaintiff contends, by contrast, that this action does not
3
Defendants further note that, under Supreme Court
precedent, the subject-matter jurisdiction conferred on the
federal courts by Section 301(a) extends to suits on union
constitutions brought by individual union members. Def. Opp’n at
3 (citing Woodell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 502 U.S. 93,
98-103 (1991)).
4
Defendants do not contend that this action is also
removable on other grounds, such as diversity.
5
fall within the scope of Section 301(a). First, plaintiff
argues, this action is not the type of action envisioned by
Section 301(a) because plaintiff does not seek to vindicate his
union membership rights but only seeks to vindicate his rights as
an employee of the union. As plaintiff points out, courts have
held that Section 301(a) does not give the federal courts
subject-matter jurisdiction over individual employment contracts.
See Pl. Mot. ¶ 4 (citing Padilla-Gonzalez v. Local 1575, Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 635 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110-11 (D.P.R. 2009)).
See also Kunz v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 876, 5
F.3d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a simple employment
contract between an individual and a labor organization is not a
contract within the meaning of Section 301(a)).
Second, plaintiff argues that this action does not fall
within the scope of Section 301(a) because it does not require
“interpretation” of the ATU Constitution but is purely a factual
inquiry. According to plaintiff, “[t]he factual question at
issue is not what the language says but whether [plaintiff] did
or did not take vacation.” Pl. Mot. ¶ 5. Indeed, plaintiff
contends, the language of the ATU Constitution that creates the
purported right he seeks to enforce is “clear, unambiguous, and
does not require interpretation.” Pl. Mot. ¶ 5.
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the
Court finds that it must agree with defendants. The Court notes
6
that, in general, “[t]he presence or absence of federal question
jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’
which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s
properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. The
well-pleaded complaint rule recognizes that the plaintiff is
“master of the claim” and may rely exclusively on state law to
avoid federal question jurisdiction. See id. Here, on its face,
plaintiff’s complaint does not assert a right to relief based on
any question of federal law; rather, plaintiff asserts only a
state common-law breach of contract claim.
However, a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule
provides for removal where there is complete federal preemption
of potential state-law claims. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
Under this principle, the preemptive force of a statute can be so
“extraordinary” that it “converts an ordinary state common-law
complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987). When the federal statute completely
preempts the state-law cause of action, any civil complaint
raising that claim is therefore “necessarily federal in
character.” Id. at 63-64. Section 301 of the LMRA is one of the
few federal statutes that the Supreme Court has found to
completely preempt state law. See id. at 64 (citing Avco Corp.
7
v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)). Indeed, the Supreme Court
has described Section 301(a) as “a congressional mandate to the
federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law to be used
to address disputes arising out of labor contracts.” Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985). Accordingly,
“when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent
upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the
parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as
a § 301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-
contract law.” Id. at 220 (internal citation omitted).
In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff seeks to
vindicate a right created by two specific provisions of an
international union constitution. The Supreme Court has held
that international union constitutions fall within the scope of
Section 301(a). See Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 622. The Supreme
Court has also held that individual union members may bring suit
to enforce the terms of a union constitution. See Wooddell, 502
U.S. at 98; see also Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195,
200 (1962) (rejecting argument that the scope of Section 301(a)
is limited only to suits between unions and employers). Although
plaintiff may be correct that he is seeking to vindicate his
rights as an employee of the union, the Court finds plaintiff’s
argument for remand on these grounds unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s
situation is a unique one. The benefits that accrued to him as
8
an executive officer of ATU are established by the ATU
Constitution itself. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff is
suing to enforce the terms of an international union
constitution, this action clearly falls within the bounds of
Section 301(a). As the Supreme Court observed in Journeymen,
“[n]othing in the language or legislative history of § 301(a)
suggests any special qualification or limitation on its reach,
and we decline to interpose one ourselves.” 452 U.S. at 624-25.
See also, e.g., Kitzmann v. Local 619-M Graphic Commc’ns
Conference of the Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 Fed. Appx. 714,
719 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court denial of a motion
to remand insofar as plaintiff, a former union president, alleged
violations of an international labor union constitution); Vazquez
v. Central States Joint Bd., Int’l Union of Allied Novelty &
Prod. Workers, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7083, at *32-33 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 25, 2005) (finding that the court had subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301(a) over certain counts of
plaintiff’s complaint that raised claims of breach of an
international labor union constitution).
The cases cited by plaintiff do not mandate a different
conclusion. In Padilla-Gonzalez, for example, the District Court
of Puerto Rico held that it did not have jurisdiction over a
local union president’s breach of contract claims primarily
because the plaintiff sought to enforce the terms of a local
9
union constitution, which the court found was not a contract
within the meaning of Section 301(a). 635 F. Supp. 2d at 110(“[A] purely local constitution is not a contract between labor
organizations under section 301(a) . . . [because] local
constitutions concern the relationship between individual members
and the local, not between two unions.”).5 Other courts that
have remanded similar actions have done so primarily on grounds
that the plaintiffs sought to enforce rights created by
agreements or other policies outside the scope of Section 301(a).
See, e.g., Marion v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 52 F.2d 86, 88-89
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that district court erred in denying
motion to remand because plaintiff’s suit was based on breach of
an individual employment agreement and plaintiff was not covered
by collective bargaining agreement at the time of termination);
Int’l Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of
the West, 366 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. 2005) (remanding action
to Superior Court because plaintiff sought to enforce and collect
on a bond that was not a contract within the meaning of Section
5
Moreover, the local constitution at issue in that case
did not specifically create a right to the monetary relief the
plaintiff sought to recover (i.e., a Christmas bonus, pension
plan contributions, and medical plan payments) but instead merely
provided that “[s]yndical work performed for the Union and/or in
representation of the same will be paid based on the maximum
salaries and fringe benefits that the Union may have obtained
during the negotiations and collective bargaining agreements for
the members of the Union.” Id. at 108. Here, by contrast, the
ATU Constitution expressly grants the ATU President and
International Executive Vice President certain vacation benefits.
10
301(a)); Comm’r of Labor of the State of North Carolina v.
Teamsters Local No. 71, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3701, at *3
(E.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 1999) (remanding action to state court because
“[plaintiffs’] entitlement to vacation pay . . . arises, if at
all, from local union policies as stated in the minutes of the
local union’s executive committee” and local policies are outside
the scope of Section 301(a)). Here, by contrast, plaintiff has
identified no employment contract with ATU or other agreement
that establishes his purported right to vacation pay, apart from
the ATU Constitution itself.
The Court similarly rejects plaintiff’s argument that this
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 301(a)
because the resolution of this case requires only “reference” to
the ATU Constitution rather than “interpretation” of its
provisions. As defendants note, the legal dispute between the
parties in this case turns on the question of whether, under a
reasonable reading of the ATU Constitution, plaintiff is required
to provide documentation to show that he used a specified number
of vacation days before he is entitled to receive pay for any
unused days. Def. Opp’n at 9. However, “[w]hat the constitution
means in relation to [plaintiff’s] claim is a question about the
merits of that claim.” See Korzen v. Local Union 705, Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
The Court need not reach the merits of plaintiff’s claim at this
11
stage; the fact that plaintiff has asserted a claim arising under
the ATU Constitution is sufficient to confer subject-matter
jurisdiction on this Court under Section 301(a). See Bush v.
Clark Constr. & Concrete Corp., 267 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C.
2003) (finding that Section 301(a) preempts plaintiff’s state-law
claim for recovery of wages under a collective bargaining
agreement because “the claim is substantially dependent on terms
of the [agreement]” governing the timing of plaintiff’s final
paycheck and “the Court must construe the [agreement] to resolve
the plaintiff’s claim”).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it must DENY
plaintiff’s motion to remand this action to Superior Court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is
hereby DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: EMMET G. SULLIVAN
United States District Judge
November 18, 2011
Notice to:
Ronald Heintzman
P.O. Box 1194
Silverton, OR 97381
12