Reeves v. MV Transportation, Inc. , 845 F. Supp. 2d 104 ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________
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LEAVON Z. REEVES, )
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Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Civil Action No. 11-0755 (EGS)
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MV TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., )
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Defendants. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motions to dismiss [Dkt. # 3, 12]. 1 For the
reasons discussed below, the motions will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On Thursdays, plaintiff has traveled from his home in Southeast, Washington, D.C. to
Washington Hospital Center Behavioral Health Services at 216 Michigan Avenue, N.E.
Defendant MV Transportation, Inc. (“MV Transportation”) has provided transportation for
plaintiff at the District of Columbia government’s expense, and apparently in conjunction with
MetroAccess, a paratransit service of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
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Defendant Alex Lodde relies on the arguments set forth in the motion to dismiss filed on
behalf of MV Transportation, Inc., Feyson Lodde, and the defendant identified as “Julius,
Dispatch Supervisor” in the complaint. The Court presumes that the defendants identified as
“Feysan Lodde” and “Fay San Lodde” are references to the same individual whose name
properly is spelled Feyson Lodde.
It is unclear whether service of process has been effected on the remaining defendants,
and no answer other response to the complaint has been filed on their behalf. The Court will
dismiss these defendants without prejudice as parties to this action.
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Notwithstanding this arrangement, when plaintiff boarded the van on March 17, 2011, the
operator directed plaintiff to “pay [a fare of] five dollars and some change.” Compl. at 2. Police
were called “to have [plaintiff] removed from the van,” but without a crime having been
committed, the police took no action. Id. Apparently plaintiff “departed the . . . [v]an” on his
own. Id. A second incident occurred on March 24, 2011, when an MV Transportation operator
“refused to use the money in the MetroAccess Easy Pay Account once again.” Id. at 3.
According to plaintiff, MV Transportation and the individuals to whom he made
complaints “are purposely and intentionally inflicting . . . undue inhuman treatment” on him and
otherwise are mistreating people such as plaintiff with disabilities. Id. Plaintiff demands an
“award [of] Fifty Thousand Dollars because of the inhuman treatment and stress that has been
inflicted” on him. Id. at 4. He also demands injunctive relief. Id.
II. DISCUSSION
The Court concurs with defendants’ assessment that, although “[p]laintiff’s pro se
complaint is, quite frankly, difficult to interpret at times,” it properly is construed “to generally
allege disability discrimination with respect to access to transportation . . . under the public
accommodations provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 3. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the pleading fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. at 3-5. Plaintiff’s opposition is devoted entirely
to defendants’ alleged failure to serve him a copy of their motion in accordance with Local Civil
Rule 5.3(e), see Opp’n Mot. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. at 2 (page number designated
by the Court), and ignores completely the arguments set forth in defendants’ motion.
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A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A complaint need only provide a “short and plain statement of [plaintiff’s] claim showing
that [he] is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a “complaint is construed
liberally in the plaintiff[’s] favor, and [the Court] grant[s] plaintiff[] the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Comm’cns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not allege all the elements of his prima
facie case. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002).
A complaint survives a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it “contain[s] sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.,129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“A complaint alleging facts which are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability . . . stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A pro se complaint “must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but it, too, “must plead ‘factual matter’ that
permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. District of
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Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
at 1950).
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under Title III of the ADA
With respect to public transportation, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) provides:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of specified public
transportation services provided by a private entity that is primarily
engaged in the business of transporting people and whose
operations affect commerce.
42 U.S.C. § 12184(a). Title III supplements this general prohibition with “various, more
specific requirements.” Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 128 (2005). For
example, an entity providing public transportation may not “impose[] . . . eligibility criteria that
screen out . . . an individual with a disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12184(b)(1), must make “reasonable
modifications,” id. § 12184(b)(2)(A), must provide auxiliary aids and services to disabled
riders, id. § 12184(b)(2)(B), and must “remove barriers,” id. § 12184(b)(2)(C), as necessary, see
id. ¶ 12182(a)(2)(A).
A plaintiff alleges a violation of Title III of the ADA by asserting that he is an individual
with a disability, that the defendant is subject to Title III, and that he was denied an opportunity
to benefit from the defendant’s services or otherwise was discriminated against because of his
disability. See Poldberg v. 5 Star Flash, Inc., No. 11 CV 3194, 2011 WL 6097990, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 1, 2011). The Court reads the complaint to allege that plaintiff is a disabled individual
for purposes of the ADA, and MV Transportation concedes that it is “a private transportation
service subject to the public accommodations provisions” of the Title III of the ADA. Defs.’
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Mem. at 3. Left for the Court’s consideration, then, is whether the complaint adequately alleges
that plaintiff has been denied the benefit of MV Transportation’s services because of his
disability.
It appears that the alleged denial of services occurred because of funding – although
plaintiff’s fares were to be paid from government funds, for reasons unknown, the fares were
unavailable. These events caused plaintiff inconvenience and he may have incurred expenses to
in obtain alternative means of transportation to and from the two appointments mentioned in the
complaint. It is not a foregone conclusion that these events occurred because of plaintiff’s
disability. As drafted, plaintiff alleges that defendants may have violated Title III of the ADA,
but these facts “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Where, as here, plaintiff’s factual allegations are “merely consistent
with” defendants’ liability, his complaint “stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). Absent allegations to link defendants’ conduct with plaintiff’s disability, the
type or nature of which is unclear, the ADA claim fails. See Poldberg, 2011 WL 6097990 at *2
(blind plaintiffs with service dog who pled that a dispatched cab “failed to show up” did not
allege that “the failure of [the] cab to arrive . . . was in any way caused by reason of [their]
disabilities”).
Even if plaintiff had adequately alleged an ADA claim, he cannot recover monetary
damages under Title III because “only injunctive relief is available for violations of Title III.”
Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002); Daubert v. A-1 Tours & Travel, No. 1:06-
cv-00612, 2006 WL 1628234, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2006) (“To the extent that Plaintiff seeks
damages for a violation under Title III of the ADA, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
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because damages are not recoverable under Title III of the ADA; rather, only injunctive relief is
available for violations of Title III.”); Woods v. Wills, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1163 (E.D. Mo.
2005) (“To the extent Ms. Woods’ claim is based on other aspects of denial of public
accommodation, she cannot state a claim because the only relief she seeks, monetary damages, is
unavailable under Title III.”).
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege a claim under Title III of
the ADA. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted. An Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
Signed: EMMET G. SULLIVAN
United States District Judge
Dated: February 24, 2012
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