Lardner v. Federal Bureau of Investigation , 875 F. Supp. 2d 49 ( 2012 )


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  •                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________________
    GEORGE LARDNER,                      )
    )
    Plaintiff,                    )
    )
    v.                            )   Civil Action No. 03-0874 (RCL)
    )
    FEDERAL BUREAU OF                   )
    INVESTIGATION, et al.,              )
    )
    Defendants.                   )
    ____________________________________)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Pending before the Court is plaintiff George Lardner’s (“Lardner”) Motion For Partial
    Reconsideration of this Court’s April 4, 2012, Judgment and Memorandum Opinion [99].
    Lardner’s quest for responsive documents began in 1993, when he filed his first Freedom of
    Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq., request. Notwithstanding the fact that many
    years passed before Lardner received a response from the government, Lardner persevered in his
    battle for responsive records. The Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’
    Motion for Summary Judgment on April 4, 2012, determining that the defendants adequately
    searched for responsive records. After receiving notice of the Court’s decision, plaintiff now
    requests that the Court partially reconsider its judgment. Specifically, plaintiff asks this Court to
    re-evaluate its decision because he believes that the Court committed a “clear error” in its
    Memorandum Opinion. Upon consideration of the Motion, the Opposition, the Reply thereto,
    the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court denies the plaintiff’s Motion for the
    reasons set forth below.
    1
    II.      BACKGROUND 1          P   P
    Lardner is a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist who filed FOIA requests on September 14,
    1993 and January 21, 2003. Supp. Hardy Decl. [50-2] ¶ 24. Lardner seeks access to an array of
    records pertaining to Aniello Dellacroce (“Dellacroce”), the Underboss of the Gambino Crime
    Family who died in 1985; Sam “Moomoo” Giancana (“Giancana”), the deceased underboss of
    the Chicago Crime Family; and all records concerning the FBI’s Top Hoodlum Program
    (“THP”). Vaughn Index, Hardy Second Supp. Decl. 9–10; Pl.’s Reply [108] at 1. Shortly after
    filing his second FOIA request, Lardner filed suit in the United States District Court for the
    District of Columbia, requesting the release of all records from the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (“FBI”), Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) and five other Jon Doe Federal
    Agencies pertaining to his FOIA requests. Mem. Op. [99] at 3. Before the Court ruled on the
    cross-motions for summary judgment, the FBI agreed to the following: (1) to process
    approximately 34,000 pages of investigative records concerning the THP prior to and after 1960;
    (2) to provide Lardner with a Status Report; and (3) to search the Electronic Surveillance Indices
    (“ELSUR”) in nineteen field offices.2 
    Id. In addition,
    the FBI filed a Vaughn Index on August
    27, 2010, created from 150 sample documents that the plaintiff aided in choosing.3 
    Id. at 4.
    After a thorough review of the motions before the Court and the plethora of evidence that
    both parties submitted in support of their respective positions, this Court granted in part the
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Mem. Op. at 1. The Court ruled in favor of the
    1
    As this is the second Memorandum Opinion addressing the merits of this case, the Court will merely
    provide a brief overview of the pertinent facts relevant to plaintiff’s most recent claims. A more detailed description
    of the factual and procedural background can be found in this Court’s April 4, 2012 Memorandum Opinion. See
    Lardner v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 03-CV-0874, 
    2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47063
    (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012).
    2
    ELSUR Indices are used to maintain information on subjects whose electronic and/or voice
    communications have been intercepted as the result of a warrantless and/or consensual ELSUR or a court-ordered
    ELSUR conducted by the FBI. Hardy Decl. 2 at 19.
    3
    The Court notes that Vaughn Index focuses on records regarding Dellacroce and THP because “none of
    the documents in Plaintiff’s Sample of Documents are from the documents released to plaintiff pursuant to his
    Giancana FOIA request.” Supp. Hardy Decl. at 4 n. 7.
    2
    defendants with respect to the reasonableness of the FBI’s search for responsive records. 
    Id. This Court,
    however, ruled in favor of the plaintiff with regard to this request ordering the
    defendants to reprocess all responsive records. 
    Id. Within twenty-eight
    days of the Court’s
    ruling, plaintiff presented the Court with this Motion for Partial Reconsideration, asking the
    Court to reconsider its opinion regarding the adequacy of the defendants’ search. Pl.’s Mot.
    [102] Partial Recons. at 2. Plaintiff argues that the Court committed a “clear error” when it
    determined that the FBI’s search was adequate, particularly with regard to Giancana and
    Dellacroce. 
    Id. Plaintiff makes
    the following arguments in support of his motion for
    reconsideration with regard to Giancana: that (1) the FBI failed to search for or locate additional
    responsive records and that (2) the FBI conducted inadequate searches of the Automated
    Databases (“ADB”) and the Inactive Indices. Pl.’s Mot. at 1–9. With regard to Dellacroce,
    plaintiff makes the following arguments in support of his motion for reconsideration: that (1) the
    FBI failed to search the Confidential Source Indices for documents; (2) the FBI is invoking the
    “Glomar defense”4 without acknowledging that it is doing so regarding “new evidence” that
    Dellacroce was an FBI informant; (3) the FBI failed to search for and produce copies of
    audio/videotapes and photographic records requested by the plaintiff; (4) the FBI failed to search
    for and disclose entire sections of FBI files; and (5) the FBI failed to search other field offices,
    notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff failed to submit a FOIA request to each individual
    office. 
    Id. at 10–17.
    Finally, plaintiff disputes the Court’s determination that summary judgment
    was appropriate, arguing that there are disputed issues of material fact, thus making summary
    judgment inappropriate. Instead, plaintiff asks the Court to allow discovery on the disputed
    4
    A “Glomar response may be issued in place of a statement acknowledging the existence of the responsive
    records by withholding them, if confirming or denying the existence would associate the individual named in the
    request with criminal activity.” Nation Magazine, Washington Bureau v. United States, 
    71 F.3d 885
    , 893 (D.C. Cir.
    1995).
    3
    search issue pursuant to Rule 56(f). 
    Id. at 17–18.
    For the reasons explained below, this Court
    denies the plaintiff’s motion.
    III.     LEGAL STANDARD
    Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order pursuant
    to Rules 52(b) and 59(b).5 While these rules are certainly applicable to the current motion, these
    rules fail to establish the standard that a Court must use in assessing such motions. Instead, this
    Court will look to Rule 59(e), which permits a party to file a motion to alter or amend a
    judgment, for guidance in evaluating a plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Fed. R. Civ. P.
    59(e). Rule 59(e) motions are “disfavored” and are reserved for “extraordinary circumstances.”
    Liberty Prop. Trust v. Republic Props. Corp., 
    570 F. Supp. 2d 95
    , 97 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting
    Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 
    153 F. Supp. 2d 23
    , 28 (D.D.C. 2001)). “Extraordinary
    circumstance[s]” include (1) an intervening change of controlling law, (2) the availability of new
    evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Anyanwutaku v.
    Moore, 
    151 F.3d 1053
    , 1057–58 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Re-litigating arguments or legal theories that
    could have been raised earlier do not qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance” under Rule
    59(e). See Taylor v. DOJ, 
    268 F. Supp. 2d 34
    , 35 (D.D.C. 2003). “New evidence” under Rule
    59(e) applies to evidence that “was not previously available,” as opposed to newly asserted facts.
    See Messina v. Fontana, 
    439 F.3d 755
    , 759 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Additionally, Rule 59(e) motions
    are not vehicles that disgruntled plaintiffs may use to litigate novel claims or assert innovative
    legal theories for the first time. See Lurie v. Mid-Atlantic Permanente Medical Group, P.C., 
    787 F. Supp. 2d 54
    , 63 (D.D.C. 2011). With regard to “clear error,” Courts have not generally
    5
    A Rule 52(b) motion, which may “accompany a motion for a new trial under Rule 59,” permits a court to
    “amend its finding—or make additional findings—and . . . amend the judgment accordingly” if the motion is “filed
    no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). Rule 59(b) establishes that “[a] motion for
    a new trial must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b).
    4
    defined what constitutes “clear error” under Rule 59(e). Lightfoot v. Dist. of Columbia, 355 F.
    Supp. 2d 414, 422 (D.D.C. 2005). What can be learned from the scarce case law on the subject,
    however, is that clear error should conform to a “very exacting standard.” 
    Id. (quoting Hopwood
    v. Texas, 
    236 F.3d 256
    , 272 (5th Cir. 2000)). District Courts should have “a clear
    conviction of error” before finding a final judgment was predicated on clear error. 
    Id. The Seventh
    Circuit declared that a final judgment must be “dead wrong” to constitute clear error.
    Parts & Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc., 
    866 F.2d 228
    , 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
    IV.    ANALYSIS
    A.      Sam Giancana Records
    Plaintiff argues that the FBI failed to adequately search for records regarding Giancana.
    Specifically, plaintiff rebuts the Court’s determination that the FBI (1) searched for or located
    additional responsive records and (2) that the FBI conducted adequate searches of the ADB and
    the Inactive Indices. Plaintiff offers the following arguments in support of his argument that the
    FBI failed to search for or locate additional responsive records. Prior to the Court’s issuance of
    its Memorandum Opinion, plaintiff informed the Court that the National Archives and Records
    Administration (“NARA”) contacted him, explaining “that it had 21 boxes of records on
    Giancana in its President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection.” Pl.’s Mot.
    Recons. at 3. Plaintiff argues that his inference—that “the FBI may very well also have retained
    copies of the 21 boxes of Giancana records transferred to NARA” —indicates that the FBI did
    not do an adequate search. 
    Id. at 4.
    The basis for plaintiff’s inference rests on a statement in
    David Hardy’s (“Hardy”) declaration. 
    Id. Although the
    Court dismissed plaintiff’s inferences in
    its Memorandum Opinion as merely speculative and lacking evidentiary support, plaintiff
    5
    persists in believing that a justifiable inference follows from NARA’s allegation. Mem. Op. at
    7–8.
    In response to plaintiff’s argument, defendant argues that plaintiff misrepresented a
    particular section of Hardy’s declaration, a misrepresentation that would allow him to draw these
    inferences. Defendant explains that the plaintiff’s statement—“the FBI agreed to process
    approximately 1,790 pages of the JFK Act records on Giancana which it had retained in its
    possession”—is false. Pl.’s Mot. at 4. Defendant argues that these copies did not specifically
    pertain to Giancana as the relevant portion of Hardy’s declaration merely stated that “[a]s a result
    of the search for documents accessioned to NARA, the FBI located approximately 1,790 pages
    of material.” Status Decl. of David M. Hardy [57-1] ¶ 10. Defendant argues that nowhere in the
    declaration does it state that the 1,790 pages specifically referred to Giancana. 
    Id. It is
    established law that an agency “‘need not respond to a FOIA request for copies of
    documents where the agency itself has provided an alternative form of access,’ i.e., making
    records available in a reading room.” Oglesby v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 
    920 F.2d 57
    ,
    70 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Tax Analysts v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
    845 F.2d 1060
    , 1065
    (D.C. Cir. 1988)). In the present case, the record reflects that the documents that Lardner seeks
    “are open to the public and researchers may access the original documents in NARA’s Textual
    Research Room at the National Archives Building in College Park, Maryland.” Status Decl. of
    David M. Hardy ¶ 10. Although the FBI should have released these documents to Lardner in a
    timely fashion, since they are now publicly accessible, plaintiff has the ability to review the
    records. Notwithstanding this point, plaintiff’s argument fails because he is merely re-litigating
    a stale legal theory, which will not be entertained under a Rule 59(e) motion. See Taylor, 268 F.
    Supp. 2d at 35.
    6
    Plaintiff’s second argument alleges that the FBI failed to search its Inactive Indices and
    ADB for responsive records. In support of this argument, plaintiff explains that “no description
    is given to indicate how this data was compiled, [or] how the subjects of the index were selected
    for inclusion.” Pl.’s Mot. at 7. Plaintiff also argues that the FBI’s failure to search more than
    one of the nine CRS databases failed to take into account recent case law. Id.; see Negley v.
    F.B.I., 
    658 F. Supp. 2d 50
    , 57 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that a “[d]efendant cannot limit its
    search to only one record system, which in this case was the UNI,6 if there are others that were
    likely “to turn up the information requested.”). Finally, plaintiff argues that even if the FBI
    failed to search the “ZY” database, it is plausible that the FBI created another major case file,
    named “La Cosa Nostra” or “organized crime,” that could be responsive to Lardner’s search.
    Pl.’s Reply at 7. Plaintiff argues that the FBI should have disclosed, at minimum, whether such a
    file existed or whether it searched for such a file. 
    Id. In response,
    the FBI counters plaintiff’s argument that it failed to search the Inactive
    Indices of the Central Records System (“CRS”) by describing the CRS and by explaining that it
    conducted a hand search for responsive records.7 Def.’s Opp. at 5; Supp. Hardy Decl. ¶ 91. The
    FBI asserts that it conducted a “reasonable” search, arguing that it “searched the most likely
    places to contain records regarding the subject matter (Sam Giancana).” Def.’s Opp. at 5.
    Contrary to plaintiff’s argument that the FBI failed to describe its search methods, the
    Court determines that the FBI adequately searched for responsive documents. Indeed, the FBI
    detailed the process that it utilized when it manually searched through index cards for responsive
    6
    The “UNI” is “an index of approximately 99.7 million records, [that] functions to index names to cases,
    and to search names and cases for use in FBI investigations. Names of individuals or organizations are recorded
    with identifying applicable information such as date or place of birth, race, sex, locality, Social Security number,
    address, and/or date of event.” Supp. Hardy Decl. ¶ 85(c).
    7
    The CRS records consist of administrative, applicant, criminal, personnel, and other files compiled for
    law enforcement purposes. Second Hardy Decl. at 16.
    7
    files. Supp. Hardy Decl. ¶ 87–92. The standard for determining whether a search was adequate
    depends on the adequacy of the search for documents, not whether additional potentially
    responsive documents exist. Steinberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    23 F.3d 548
    , 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
    An adequate search consists of a good faith, reasonable search of those systems of records likely
    to possess the requested information. Oglesby v. Dep’t of Army, 
    920 F.2d 57
    , 68 (D.C. Cir.
    1990). In fact, within the CRS, the FBI searched the ADB and the Inactive Indices for
    responsive files, ultimately finding “several FBIHQ main files [that] were identified as
    responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA requests concerning these subjects.” Supp. Hardy Decl. ¶ 91;
    Def.’s Opp. at 4. Although plaintiff continues to assert that the FBI created a major case file
    with regard to Giancana, this Court has already explained that mere speculation as to the
    existence of records not located as a result of the agency’s search does not undermine the
    adequacy of the search. Mem. Op. at 7; Weisberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    745 F.2d 1476
    , 1485 (D.C.
    Cir. 1984).
    Although plaintiff cites Negley for support, Negley is not applicable in the current
    
    situation. 658 F. Supp. 2d at 58
    . In Negley, the Court reasoned that the FBI failed to adequately
    search for responsive records because the FBI only searched a single database, the “UNI”, for
    responsive records although eight other databases existed. 
    Id. The distinction
    between Negley
    and the present case is that in Negley, the plaintiff was somehow involved in the UNABOMB
    investigation, thus making it reasonable for the agency to search the “ZY” database for
    responsive records, which the FBI failed to do. 
    Id. Here, the
    FBI explained that the ADB and
    the Inactive Indices were the databases most likely to contain responsive records—the FBI had
    no reason to search the “ZY” database for files related to Lardner’s FOIA request because his
    8
    subjects did not remotely relate to the UNABOMB investigation.8 The FBI adequately searched
    for responsive documents since an agency is only required to search in the places “likely” to
    possess responsive records. See 
    Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68
    .
    B.      Aniello Dellacroce Records
    Plaintiff raises five issues regarding the FBI’s search for records concerning Dellacroce.
    First, plaintiff alleges that the FBI failed to search its Confidential Source Indices for records.
    Pl.’s Mot. at 10. Essentially, plaintiff argues that since the FBI has not denied that a Confidential
    Source Index exists regarding Dellacroce, an index must exist and he is entitled to those records.
    
    Id. In response,
    FBI argues that plaintiff merely “speculates” regarding the existence of a
    “‘separate, independent index’ other than the CRS.” Def.’s Opp. at 6. The FBI asserts that if
    these confidential files existed, they would have been “located through a search of the FBI’s
    automated CRS.” 
    Id. In accordance
    with the requirements for an adequate search, the FBI searched several
    databases within the CRS for responsive documents regarding Dellacroce. 
    Id. Plaintiff does
    not
    proffer any proof that such responsive documents would exist in the Confidential Source Indices,
    other than asserting that the FBI, on “an official form,” searches the Confidential Source Indices
    for responsive records. Pl.’s Mot. at 10. Hardy, however, explained that the FBI “does not
    maintain any separate ‘confidential source’ and ‘confidential informant’ indices . . . [because the]
    files of confidential sources of the FBI can be located through a search of the CRS.” Supp.
    Hardy Decl. Since confidential sources are included in a search of the CRS—which included the
    ADB and the Inactive Indices in this case—the FBI conducted an adequate search. Def.’s Opp.
    at 6. Finally, as this Court has already noted, mere speculation as to the existence of records not
    8
    The “ZY” database “was created for the UNABOMB file in relation to the UNABOMB case.” Fifth
    Hardy Decl. ¶ 5(b).
    9
    located as a result of the agency’s search does not undermine the adequacy of the search. See
    
    Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485
    .
    Second, plaintiff asserts that he is now in possession of “new evidence” regarding the
    FBI’s search of the Confidential Source Indices. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he has “new
    evidence,” proving that Dellacroce was an FBI informant. Pl.’s Mot. at 11. Plaintiff proffers a
    list of informants, speculating that “T-3” is Dellacroce, and he asks “the court (sic) to determine
    whether that is true or not.” Pl.’s Mot. at 10. Relying on Memphis Commercial Publishing
    Company v. FBI, No. 10-1878, 
    2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11616
    (D.D.C. Jan. 31 2012), Lardner
    alleges that the FBI, by not releasing Dellacroce’s information to him, is invoking the “Glomar
    defense” without acknowledging that it is doing so. Pl.’s Mot. at 10. The FBI counters
    Lardner’s allegations by denying that it ever identified Dellacroce as an FBI informant. Def.’s
    Opp. at 6.
    Plaintiff’s reliance on Memphis Commercial Publishing is misplaced. In Memphis, the
    FBI disclosed information—when it publicly released information pertinent to the plaintiff’s
    FOIA request—that “clearly showed” that the person in question was an FBI informant.
    Memphis Publ’g Co., LEXIS 11616 *11. Here, however, the FBI did not release any
    information regarding Dellacroce’s status as an informant, nor can plaintiff cite to any evidence
    in the record that would support his argument. Pl.’s Mot. at 11. Indeed, plaintiff asks this Court
    to “determine whether” T-3, is in fact Dellacroce and would thereby qualify as an FBI informant.
    
    Id. at 10.
    Lardner fails to appreciate that, mere speculation, or deduction on his part, does not
    constitute official acknowledgement on the part of an agency. Valfells v. CIA, 
    717 F. Supp. 2d 110
    , 118 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Since the plaintiff cannot point to evidence that would constitute
    “acknowledgement” on the part of the FBI, and since the Court cannot find any corresponding
    10
    support in the Record, plaintiff cannot rely on Memphis Publishing to support his argument with
    regard to Lardner’s FOIA request.
    Third, plaintiff argues that since the FBI failed to provide Lardner with photographic
    copies of photographs and photographic albums (they were provided in Xerox form), the FBI
    failed to adequately search for responsive records. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. In response, defendant
    argues that it complied with plaintiff’s request, providing photocopies of available photographs
    in its records. Def.’s Opp. at 6.
    Plaintiff’s argument fails—an agency satisfies its obligations under FOIA if it provides
    records in any format. Sample v. Bureau of Prisons, 
    466 F.3d 1086
    , 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
    Here, the FBI provided photocopies of the records plaintiff requested, thus fulfilling plaintiff’s
    FOIA request. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. If plaintiff wanted the negatives of the photographs, he should
    have specified that in his original FOIA request—he cannot use this Motion for Partial
    Reconsideration to re-litigate a tired argument. See 
    Taylor, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 35
    .
    Fourth, plaintiff argues that the FBI failed to disclose entire sections of FBI files, alleging
    that Hardy’s declarations do not provide any details regarding the FBI’s search methodology.
    Pl.’s Mot. at 14. Without this search methodology, plaintiff asserts that it would be impossible
    for the Court to determine whether the FBI conducted a good faith search. 
    Id. In response,
    the
    FBI argues that plaintiff merely rehashes an old argument—plaintiff seems to believe that if
    there are missing files, it must follow that the FBI failed to adequately search for them. Def.’s
    Opp. at 6. Defendant offers various declarations of Hardy, which provide information regarding
    the procedure that the FBI utilized to search for missing files, to prove that the FBI adequately
    searched for the files that Lardner requested. 
    Id. at 6,
    7.
    11
    The Court again notes that “the adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined not
    by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the
    search.” Steinberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    23 F.3d 548
    , 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Nation
    
    Magazine, 71 F.3d at 892
    n. 7 (explaining that “there is no requirement that an agency [locate]
    all responsive documents”). Whether an agency utilized “appropriate” methods in its search is
    governed by the reasonability of its search methods. Ramstack v. Dep’t of the Army, 607 F.
    Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2009). A search for responsive documents will not be considered
    “unreasonable” merely because “it fails to produce all relevant material; [as] no search of this
    [large] size will be free from error.” Meeropol v. Meese, 
    790 F.2d 942
    , 952–53 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
    see also Snyder v. CIA, 
    230 F. Supp. 2d 17
    , 21 (D.D.C. 2002) (stipulating that FOIA does not
    require a search of “every conceivable area where responsive records might be found”).
    Plaintiff’s argument lacks support. Plaintiff merely speculates regarding the existence of
    these missing files, failing to cite any new evidence that would support his contentions. Pl.’s
    Mot. at 14. This Court has explained, ad nauseam, that mere speculation regarding the existence
    of records is not a sufficient basis for challenging the adequacy of an agency’s search. 
    Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485
    . Although the plaintiff argues that the FBI failed to provide details of its search
    procedures, the FBI provided sufficient information for this Court to determine that its search
    was reasonable. Supp. Hardy Decl. ¶ 69. Furthermore, plaintiff alleges that the FBI failed to
    adequately search for records regarding Dellacroce, yet he admits that the “missing records” that
    he seeks are mainly pertinent to his THP request. Pl.’s Mot. at 14. Plaintiff cannot question the
    adequacy of the FBI’s search when the basis for his argument pertained to a different portion of
    Lardner’s FOIA request that is not at issue in the current Motion. See 
    Lurie, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 63
    .
    12
    Finally, in its Memorandum Opinion, this Court observed that Larder failed to comply
    with the applicable FOIA regulations and thus did not “effectively initiate a FOIA request.”
    Mem. Op. at 10. Plaintiff argues that the Court’s reliance on 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(a) is misplaced,
    since “the FBI agreed to search a large number of field office files for ELSUR materials even
    though he submitted no requests to those field offices.” Pl.’s Mot. at 17. Plaintiff thus infers that
    since the FBI searched a large number of field office files for ELSUR materials (without
    receiving individual requests), the FBI could do the same for the records in this portion of
    plaintiff’s FOIA request. 
    Id. In response,
    defendant merely points to 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(a), which
    requires a party seeking records from the FBI to file requests with separate field offices.
    A FOIA request must be made in accordance with an agency’s “published rules stating
    the time, place, fees (if any) and procedures to be followed” in making such a request. 5 U.S.C.
    § 552(a)(3)(A). A request for records maintained by a particular FBI field office must be
    submitted directly to that field office. 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(a). The FBI is not obligated to undertake
    a search of its field offices’ records when a requester submits his request only to its headquarters.
    See 
    Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68
    (“There is no requirement that an agency search every record
    system.”); Church of Scientology of California v. Internal Revenue Service, 
    792 F.2d 146
    , 150
    (D.C. Cir. 1986) (when agency regulations require that FOIA request be submitted to specific
    office and requester does not follow regulations, agency not obligated to search additional
    offices); Marrera v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
    622 F. Supp. 51
    , 54 (D.D.C. 1985) (noting
    that an agency is not required to “search every division or field office in response to a FOIA
    request.”).
    Plaintiff’s argument lacks support. The FBI and Lardner stipulated and agreed that the
    FBI would search nineteen field offices in the interest of “narrowing disputed issues.”
    13
    Stipulation & Order Concerning Other Proceedings [15-1] 2–4, Feb. 23, 2004. Of note,
    however, is the fact that the FBI only agreed to search for the records specified in the September
    14, 1993, FOIA request.9 
    Id. at 4.
    The law is clear on this issue: parties seeking FBI records
    must send FOIA requests to individual FBI field offices. 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(a). Since plaintiff
    failed to submit individual FOIA requests to various field offices for responsive documents, as is
    required by law, he cannot challenge the adequacy of the FBI’s search.
    C.       Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery
    Plaintiff argues that based on the above arguments, a “disputed issue of material fact
    genuinely exists as to the adequacy of the search conducted by the FBI.” Pl.’s Mot. at 17. Thus,
    plaintiff believes that the only way to resolve this issue is to conduct discovery regarding the
    disputed search issue pursuant to Rule 56(f). 
    Id. In response,
    the FBI argues that this Court did
    not commit a “legal error” when it affirmed that the FBI’s search was adequate. Def.’s Opp. at
    2. Since this Court is denying plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend its judgment pursuant to Rule
    59(e), plaintiff’s request for further discovery is similarly denied.
    V.      CONCLUSION
    For the aforementioned reasons, this Court will deny plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider its
    judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
    Opinion.
    Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on July 13, 2012.
    9
    The Order expressly stated that both parties “have been unable to agree regarding plaintiff’s demand that
    the FBI search non-ELSUR records in its field offices in the absence of any FOIA requests by plaintiffs addressed to
    those field offices.” Stipulation & Order Concerning Other Proceedings at 4.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2003-0874

Citation Numbers: 875 F. Supp. 2d 49, 2012 WL 2870177, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96801

Judges: Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth

Filed Date: 7/13/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (17)

Taylor v. U.S. Department of Justice , 268 F. Supp. 2d 34 ( 2003 )

Lurie v. Mid-Atlantic Permanente Medical Group, P.C. , 787 F. Supp. 2d 54 ( 2011 )

Negley v. Federal Bureau of Investigation , 658 F. Supp. 2d 50 ( 2009 )

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Snyder v. Central Intelligence Agency , 230 F. Supp. 2d 17 ( 2002 )

Michael Meeropol, A/K/A Rosenberg v. Edwin Meese Iii, ... , 790 F.2d 942 ( 1986 )

The Nation Magazine, Washington Bureau, and Max Holland v. ... , 71 F.3d 885 ( 1995 )

Tax Analysts v. United States Department of Justice , 845 F.2d 1060 ( 1988 )

Michele Steinberg v. United States Department of Justice , 23 F.3d 548 ( 1994 )

Marrera v. United States Department of Justice , 622 F. Supp. 51 ( 1985 )

Anyanwutaku, K. v. Moore, Margaret , 151 F.3d 1053 ( 1998 )

Hopwood v. State of Texas , 236 F.3d 256 ( 2000 )

Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus , 153 F. Supp. 2d 23 ( 2001 )

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