Williams v. Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for Dc ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
LINWOOD A. WILLIAMS, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 08-1538 (RWR)
)
COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER )
SUPERVISION AGENCY FOR D.C., )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Linwood A. Williams, Jr. sues the Court
Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of
Columbia (“CSOSA”) and three agency officials alleging sex
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Williams
renews his motion for appointment of counsel and moves for
sanctions against CSOSA. Williams’ motions will be denied
because Williams has not demonstrated that appointing counsel or
imposing sanctions are warranted.
BACKGROUND
The background of this case is set out fully in Williams v.
Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for D.C., 772 F.
Supp. 2d 186 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated on reconsideration, 840 F.
Supp. 2d 192 (D.D.C. 2012). Briefly, Williams served as a
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Supervisory Community Supervision Officer at CSOSA and alleges
that the agency retaliated against him and ultimately terminated
him in response to complaints that Williams filed against the
agency. Williams appealed his termination to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (“MSPB”), and an MSPB administrative judge
affirmed the agency action and denied Williams’ petition to
reconsider. Williams filed this action and moved for in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) status and for appointment of counsel. A
July 23, 2012 memorandum opinion and order granted Williams’
motion for IFP status, but denied Williams’ motion for
appointment of counsel. Williams renews his motion for
appointment of counsel and moves for sanctions against CSOSA.
DISCUSSION
I. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Courts have discretion to appoint counsel to represent an
indigent pro se party. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (providing that “[u]pon application by the
complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just,
the court may appoint an attorney”). The following factors guide
the exercise of courts’ discretion:
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(i) the nature and complexity of the action;
(ii) the potential merit of the pro se party’s claims;
(iii) the demonstrated inability of the pro se party to
retain counsel by other means; and
(iv) the degree to which the interests of justice will
be served by appointment of counsel, including the
benefit the Court may derive from the assistance of the
appointed counsel.
LCvR 83.11(b)(3).
Williams’ first motion for appointment of counsel was denied
because the action “appears fairly straightforward,” the MSPB’s
decision “casts some doubt on the strength of Williams’ present
claims[,]” Williams had approached only one firm to attempt to
obtain counsel, “no novel legal issues” loomed then about which
the court could benefit from appointing counsel for Williams, and
Williams “appear[ed] prepared to be an effective advocate on his
own behalf[.]” Williams v. Court Servs. and Offender Supervision
Agency for D.C., 878 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267-68 (D.D.C. 2012).
Williams’ renewed motion for appointment of counsel asserts only
that one of the four factors has changed since that decision:
Williams’ inability to retain counsel by other means. Williams
has not shown that any of the other factors have changed. It
appears now as it appeared before that “Williams’ pro se status
has not placed him at a gravely unfair disadvantage,” id. at 268,
and his new efforts to retain counsel do not tip the balance in
favor of appointment of counsel. Because the interests of
justice still do not warrant granting the motion, the motion will
be denied.
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II. SANCTIONS
Williams also moves for sanctions against CSOSA for delaying
the litigation, failing to respond to discovery requests and
failing to preserve documents regarding Williams’ complaint of
unlawful employment practices. However, Williams’ complaints
about delay and CSOSA’s failure to respond to discovery requests
are not substantiated by the record. Williams alleges without
support that the defendants stonewall and defy the court’s
directions regarding discovery. Actually, it appeared during the
February 20, 2013 status conference that Williams’ own delay in
producing documents has been a serious hindrance to concluding
discovery in this matter. Williams has not shown that sanctions
are warranted by any delays or failures to respond by the
defendants.1
Williams argues that CSOSA failed to preserve documents in
Williams’ former supervisors’ files and in the records of
Williams’ grievances filed at the agency, violating CSOSA’s duty
to preserve documents that arose during the MSPB proceedings.
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Protective Order and Mot. for Fin.
Sanctions at 4-6. Williams states that he has been “prejudiced
1
All of Williams’ pending discovery requests have been
resolved by Magistrate Judge Kay’s March 25, 2013 memorandum
opinion and order which denied the majority of Williams’ requests
because CSOSA had adequately responded to his requests and
Williams’ requests were overly burdensome and lacked relevance to
his claims.
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by [CSOSA’S] failure to preserve responsive documents and is
entitled to an adverse inference.” Id. at 2. Williams asks that
CSOSA be sanctioned $50,000.00 in addition to $500.00 each week
until the defendants have satisfied discovery. Id. at 7.
“A party has a duty to preserve potentially relevant
evidence . . . once [that party] anticipates litigation.” Zhi
Chen v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “A sanction for failure to
preserve evidence is appropriate only when a party has
consciously disregarded its obligation to do so.” Shepherd v.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
There are two types of sanctions: punitive or penal sanctions,
such as fines, and issue-related sanctions, such as an adverse
inference instruction. Clarke v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., Civil Action No. 10-1083 (RC), 2012 WL 5505242, at *7
(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1478).
The party seeking sanctions bears an evidentiary burden
that is calibrated to ensure that the gravity of the
sanction corresponds to the conduct. . . . [A] party
seeking an issue-related sanction need only put forth a
preponderance of the evidence, but a party seeking a
penal sanction must put forth clear and convincing
evidence before sanctions are warranted.
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (citing
Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1477-79).
Here, Williams’ unsupported claim that CSOSA failed to
preserve documents is insufficient to carry any burden to show
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that punitive or issue-related sanctions are appropriate.
Williams has not put forward any evidence that CSOSA destroyed or
failed to preserve any records. Thus, sanctions will not be
imposed on CSOSA and Williams’ motion will be denied.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Williams has not demonstrated that appointing counsel or
imposing sanctions on CSOSA is warranted. Accordingly, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s renewed motion [71] to appoint
counsel be, and hereby is, DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion [73] for sanctions be,
and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 8th day of April, 2013.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge