United States v. Speight ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Criminal Action No. 12-270-7 (JEB)
RONALD CRAIG SPEIGHT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Indicted with six others for conspiracy to distribute heroin, Defendant Ronald Craig
Speight alone presses for a trial as soon as possible. Speight and his lawyers have forcefully
asserted his speedy-trial rights at every opportunity. Unfortunately for Speight, however, his
Speedy Trial Act clock mirrors that of his slowest moving co-Defendant. And because
severance is unwarranted at this juncture, Speight’s clock will remain at zero days until at least
May 15. Before considering Speight’s efforts to move the proceedings along, this Opinion will
lay out the Speedy Trial Act framework and calculate Speight’s current speedy-trial clock.
Although the Sixth Amendment also requires “a speedy and public trial,” Speight rightly
bases his challenge only on the Speedy Trial Act, which reads, “In any case in which a plea of
not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the
commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making
public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a
judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18
U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). In counting those seventy days, certain periods of delay “shall be
excluded.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). Two exclusions are in play here. First, the Act excludes “[a]
reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom
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the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(6). Under this co-defendant exclusion, “[a]ll defendants who are joined for trial
generally fall within the speedy trial computation of the latest codefendant.” Henderson v.
United States, 476 U.S. 321, 323 n.2 (1986). That means “an exclusion applicable to one
defendant applies to all codefendants.” United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted). “[U]pon the addition of a new co-defendant,” moreover, “all defendants’
speedy trial clocks are reset to day zero.” United States v. Van Smith, 530 F.3d 967, 970 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); see also id. at 971-72. Second, the Act excludes delay “if the judge granted [a]
continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(7)(A).
As the path of Speight’s prosecution has been somewhat circuitous, some detail here
proves helpful. The prosecution began in criminal case number 12-276, which charged Speight
and Raymond Proctor with conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846. Proctor was arrested and arraigned immediately, and Speight was arrested and
arraigned on January 7, 2013. Thirty-four days elapsed between his arraignment and when the
Court began excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act in the interests of justice, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(7), for the reasons given at the February 11th and February 26th status hearings. The
last order excluded time until April 22.
Simultaneously, the Government pursued a separate case with similar facts. Criminal
case number 12-270 also charged a conspiracy to distribute heroin – this time one kilogram or
more. The first Superseding Indictment alleged that six people participated in the conspiracy,
including Proctor (but not yet Speight). For the entire case, the speedy-trial clock for all
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defendants in 12-270 has stood at zero: One defendant, Alvin Banks, first appeared in court on
the charge on March 8. As “[a]ll defendants who are joined for trial generally fall within the
speedy trial computation of the latest codefendant,” Henderson, 476 U.S. at 323 n.2, the clock in
12-270 could not run for anyone until Banks appeared. For reasons stated during hearings on
January 16 (for everyone except Banks) and March 8 (for Banks), the Court then excluded time
in 12-270 in the interests of justice until March 19.
On March 13, the Court granted the Government’s unopposed motion to join the
indictments in 12-270 and 12-276 for purposes of trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
13. That March 13 joinder reset Speight’s speedy-trial clock to zero. To explain, when
defendants with ticking clocks are joined together, each defendant’s speedy-trial clock is
“synchronized with the clock of the defendant with the most time remaining.” United States v.
Lightfoot, 483 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir. 2007); see also 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal
Procedure § 18.3(b), at 144 n.36 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2012-2013). In this case, the speedy-trial
clock for all defendants in 12-270 sat at zero on March 13. When Speight’s case joined that
case, therefore, his clock correspondingly dropped to zero. See Lightfoot, 483 F.3d at 886-87(“[I]n those cases where a defendant whose speedy trial clock has not yet commenced is joined
with a defendant whose speedy trial clock had already started running . . . [t]he other defendant’s
clock, for all practical purposes, may be considered reset to zero because it will be synchronized
to the speedy trial clock of the codefendant.”).
On March 19, 2013, a superseding indictment in 12-270 combined the two cases, alleging
that all Defendants (including Speight) participated in a single conspiracy to distribute a
kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The same day, the Court held
another status hearing. For the reasons stated on the record, the Court again tolled the Speedy
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Trial Act for all Defendants in the interests of justice until May 15. (The Court had already
excluded, in various status hearings, the time between March 13 and March 19 for all Defendants
in the interests of justice.) Because Speight was the lone Defendant who would not consent to
the exclusion of time at the March 19 hearing, the Court made its ruling without prejudice to
Speight, allowing him to file objections. 1
The Court interprets this Motion to raise such an objection. It concludes, however, that
time was properly excluded as to Speight until May 15 in the interests of justice. This is a
complex case, an allegedly lengthy and far-reaching conspiracy involving a great deal of
discoverable evidence, including wiretaps. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii) (listing factors to
be considered in excluding time in the interests of justice, including whether “the case is so
unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the
existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation
for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section”).
During the excluded time, Defendants can review the materials being produced by the
Government, and both sides can engage in meaningful plea discussions. Indeed, this is why all
of his co-Defendants were amenable to the time exclusion. In any event, the dispute about
Speight’s exclusion is academic. As long as he is joined to his co-Defendants, reasonable
exclusions of time for the others – like the exclusion until May 15 – will likewise delay Speight’s
speedy-trial clock, and his clock will stay at zero. See Saro, 24 F.3d at 292.
Recognizing that he is stuck as long as his trial is joined to his co-Defendants’ trials,
Speight alternatively moves to sever. Joinder rules permit an indictment to charge defendants
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In their filings, the Government and Speight disagree about whether the Court excluded time for him on
March 19. To resolve the dispute, the Court reviewed the recordings from the hearing and determined that it had
excluded time for Speight without prejudice for him to revisit the issue in a motion. The Minute Entry from that day
will be revised to correctly reflect what transpired.
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together “if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same
series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Yet,
“[i]f the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for
trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of
counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 14(a). The Supreme Court has recognized “a preference in the federal system for joint
trials of defendants who are indicted together.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537
(1993). “[T]his preference is especially strong when the respective charges require presentation
of much the same evidence, testimony of the same witnesses, and involve two defendants who
are charged, inter alia, with participating in the same illegal acts.” United States v. Wilson, 605
F.3d 985, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). For defendants properly
joined under Rule 8(b), “a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a
serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or
prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at
539. Severance may be warranted, for example, when “many defendants are tried together in a
complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability,” when evidence will be
introduced “that is probative of a defendant’s guilt but technically admissible only against a
codefendant,” or when “essential exculpatory evidence that would be available to a defendant
tried alone were unavailable in a joint trial.” Id. Merely gaining a better chance at acquittal from
a separate trial, however, is not enough. See id. at 540.
In this case, Speight has registered no specific prejudice he expects from a joint trial. Nor
could he at this early stage, when the evidence to be used at trial – and even the co-Defendants
he would be jointly tried with – remain unknown. Severance is particularly disfavored in
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conspiracy cases such as this, moreover. All conspirators can be held responsible for acts
committed by one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, see Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640 (1946), meaning that evidence will likely overlap. See, e.g., United States v.
Wilson, 481 F.3d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is a strong preference that co-conspirators
be jointly tried, particularly when they were indicted together.”); United States v. Soto-Beniquez,
356 F.3d 1, 29 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Because conspiracy cases often involve evidence that is
admissible against all members of the conspiracy, in the context of conspiracy, severance will
rarely, if ever, be required.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Spinelli, 352
F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Joint trials are often particularly appropriate in circumstances where
the defendants are charged with participating in the same criminal conspiracy, as is the case
here.”). The short delay in Speight’s trial here falls far short of what would be needed to justify
severance.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny Defendant Speight’s Motion in a
separate Order to be issued this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: April 25, 2013
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