Clark v. Computer Science Corporation , 958 F. Supp. 2d 208 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANTHONY CLARK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Case No. 12-01310 (RJL)
)
COMPUTER SCIENCE CORP., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
5-I-
MEMORANDUM OPINION
August -J-'
2013 [## 4, 6, 11, 22, 23, 26]
Plaintiff Anthony Clark initiated this action in D.C. Superior Court against his
former employer, Insight Global, Inc., and technology companies Kforce, Inc. and
Computer Science Corporation ("CSC"). Plaintiff alleged that defendants erroneously
accused him of stealing a laptop, thereby triggering his arrest, detention, and criminal
prosecution. Defendants removed this action and filed three motions to dismiss and two
motions for summary judgment. 1 Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in such a way
as to eliminate federal jurisdiction and to permit the Court to remand the case. Mot. to
1 Mot. to Dismiss, Aug. 14, 2013 [Dkt. # 4] ("Insight Global's Mot. to Dismiss"); Def.
Computer Science Corp.'s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl., Aug. 14, 2013 [Dkt. # 6]
("CSC's Mot. to Dismiss"); Def. Kforce Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. for Failure to
State a Claim for Which Relief May Be Granted, Aug. 21, 2013 [Dkt. # 11] ("Kforce' s
Mot. to Dismiss"); Def. Insight Global, Inc.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Feb. 28, 2013 [Dkt. #
22] ("Insight Global's Mot. for Summ. J."); Def. Kforce Inc.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Mar.
27, 2013 [Dkt. # 26] ("Kforce's Mot. for Summ. J.").
1
Amend Compl. and Remand, Feb. 27, 2013 [Dkt. # 23] (Pl.'s Mot. to Amend/Remand").
Because plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court
GRANTS defendants' Motions to Dismiss, DENIES as moot defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment, and DENIES plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Complaint and
Remand.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began working for Insight Global as a Senior Systems Analyst in
December 2009. Compl., June 27, 2012 [Dkt. # 1], ~ 16. Both Insight Global and
Kforce were subcontractors for CSC, which provided information technology ("IT")
services to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). !d.~ 13. In resolving IT
inquiries at EPA, plaintiff occasionally took inoperable laptops to his home to conduct
diagnostic testing. !d. ~ 18. esc also issued plaintiff a work laptop, which plaintiff
occasionally used for work at home. !d. ~ 19. Plaintiff alleges that Insight Global,
Kforce, and CSC were aware that employees took home both their work laptops and
other, inoperable laptops. !d. ~ 22. Plaintiff also alleges that CSC issued him a
"Property Pass" that permitted plaintiff to remove his laptops and other laptops from the
job site. !d. ~ 20.
On February 24, 2011, plaintiff took home his work laptop and one inoperable
laptop after work. !d. ~ 22. The following day, plaintiff came to work without either
laptop. !d. ~ 23. That same day, he learned that his employment with Insight Global
2
was terminated. Jd. ~ 24. He informed Insight Global Account Manager Olivia Wheeler
that he had the two laptops, his badge, and a work telephone at his home that he needed to
return to Insight Global. !d. ~ 26. In the weeks following his termination, plaintiff
called Wheeler and other employees at Insight Global, CSC, and Kforce several times to
arrange the return of the work property, but he was unable to return the property. !d.``
27-30.
Over a month after plaintiffs termination, Kforce contacted the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") to report the inoperable laptop as stolen. Id. ~ 32. Because
the laptop contained software that traced its location when connected to the internet, DHS
detected that the laptop was in plaintiffs possession. !d.`` 35-37. After a DHS agent
contacted plaintiff about the laptop, plaintiff returned his work laptop on June 15, 2011
and returned the inoperable laptop on June 20, 2011. !d.~ 40.
Three days later, a DHS agent informed plaintiff that he was the subject of an
outstanding arrest warrant for receiving the "stolen" laptop. !d. ~ 41. Plaintiff
voluntarily surrendered to the police six days later, at which time he was handcuffed,
subjected to a search, and detained for approximately 15 hours. In September 2011, he
went to trial in D.C. Superior Court, for which defendants provided witnesses and
testimony in an effort to prove that plaintiff committed the crime. !d.~ 52. After the
short trial, plaintiff was found not guilty. !d. ~ 51, 53.
3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. In evaluating defendants' motions, the Court must "treat the
complaint's factual allegations as true" and "grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged." Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d
1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitle[ ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Rather, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (factual allegations must "be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level"). "[T]he court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[ ] if such inferences
are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint." Kowal v. MCI Commc 'ns Corp.,
16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Indeed, "where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
4
alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Defendants also move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, stipulations, affidavits,
and admissions in a case show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court must
accept as true the evidence of, and draw "all justifiable inferences" in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986)
(citation omitted). A genuine issue exists only where "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." !d. at 248.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs complaint against defendants alleges five claims of torts: false arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention. Compl. ``
31-79. Unfortunately, for plaintiff, he fails to plead the facts necessary to establish the
elements of any of his claims. Because the complaint lacks allegations to support
plausible claims, defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED as moot. Further, because plaintiff cannot
be permitted to amend his complaint for the purpose of eliminating federal jurisdiction,
plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint and Remand is DENIED.
5
I. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Defendants' motions to dismiss must be granted because plaintiff has not put forth
"sufficient factual matter" to create any plausible claims for relief against any of the
defendants. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs first claim, false arrest, requires facts
sufficient to conclude that he was unlawfully detained. Dewitt v. District of Columbia,
43 A.3d 291,295 (D.C. 2012); see also Magwoodv. Giddings, 672 A.2d 1083, 1086
(D.C. 1996) (probable cause for an arrest and detention constitutes a valid defense to false
arrest claim). False arrest does not occur when a person simply "giv[es] facts to an
officer showing that an offense has been committed," Smith v. District of Columbia, 399
A.2d 213, 218 (D.C. 1979), unless that person "knowingly and maliciously" makes a false
report to the police, Vessels v. District ofColumbia, 531 A.2d 1016, 1020 (D.C. 1987).
Plaintiff simply alleges that the defendants "knew or should have known" that the
property was not stolen when they "instigated, directed, participated in, and effected the
[plaintiffs] arrest." Compl. ~ 44-46. But plaintiffs facts, even if assumed true, do not
support such an allegation. Plaintiff never alleges that CSC or Insight Global made any
report to law enforcement that led to his arrest. Regarding the only defendant that
allegedly contacted law enforcement-Kforce-plaintiff fails to show that Kforce
knowingly or maliciously made a false report. Plaintiff simply states that he made
"several calls to staff of [defendants]" to arrange to return of the laptops, but "Defendants
filed [sic] to assist or cooperate in the return of said property." !d.~ 30. Taken together,
6
these facts, at best, demonstrate negligence by Kforce, but they cannot produce the
conclusion that Kforce knowingly and maliciously made a false report regarding the
laptop.
Similarly, plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support a claim of malicious
prosecution. For a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must allege "(a) a criminal
proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff, (b) termination
of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (c) absence of probable cause for the
proceeding, and (d) 'Malice,' or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than
that of bringing an offender to justice." DeWitt, 43 A.3d at 296 (quoting Jarrett v.
Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C. 1964)). As with the false arrest claim, plaintiff
identifies no facts to support an allegation that defendants acted with malice toward
plaintiff. The conclusory allegation that"[ d]efendants, jointly and severally, acted with
malice in instigating and prosecuting said criminal action," Compl. ~ 60, is inadequate to
support a malicious prosecution claim.
Plaintiff also fails to state facts sufficient to support his claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof
of the following elements: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the
defendant which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional
distress." Baltimore v. District of Columbia, 10 A.3d 1141, 1155 (D.C. 2011) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). To qualifY as "extreme and outrageous," the
7
conduct "must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all plausible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community." Larijani v. Georgetown Univ., 791 A.2d 41, 44 (D.C. 2002)
(citations omitted). By no stretch of the imagination could any of defendants' actions, as
stated in the complaint, be considered extreme and outrageous under this exacting
standard.
Like his claim of intentional infliction of his emotional distress, his claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress also must be dismissed. To support a claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff may show that defendants caused him
direct physical injury or placed him in a "zone of physical danger" that caused him
serious emotional distress. District of Columbia v. McNeill, 613 A.2d 940, 943 (D.C.
1992); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1067 (D.C. 1990). While plaintiff alleges that
he was "handcuffed, subjected to a search of his body, [and] placed in a holding cell" by
police, Compl. ~ 43, he does not allege that the arrest caused him direct physical injury or
was placed in a zone of physical danger. Indeed, he states that he "voluntarily
surrendered" to police, absent any physical altercation. !d. ~ 42. His allegations of
"headaches and sleeplessness," id. ~ 64, are psychological symptoms-not a direct
"physical injury" actionable under this claim.
Absent physical harm or a "zone of physical danger," plaintiff may claim negligent
infliction of emotional distress if he shows that "(1) the defendant has a relationship with
8
the plaintiff ... of a nature that necessarily implicates the plaintiffs emotional
well-being, (2) there is an especially likely risk that the defendant's negligence would
cause serious emotional distress to the plaintiff, and (3) negligent actions or omissions of
the defendant in breach of that obligation have, in fact, caused serious emotional distress
to the plaintiff." Hedgepath v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 810-11 (D.C.
2011 ). Plaintiff claims that defendants "owed a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiff to
investigate any claim regarding stolen property to determine if in fact the allegations have
a basis in fact," Compl. ~ 66, but plaintiff does not identify the "relationship [with
defendants] that necessarily implicates [his] well-being" that the claim requires. Even if
his employer-employee relationship with Insight Global were sufficient, 2 the conduct at
issue occurred after plaintiff was no longer employed. Further, it is, to say the least, a
stretch to suggest that, by failing to investigate a stolen property claim, defendants were
"especially likely" to cause "serious emotional distress" to plaintiff.
Finally, plaintiffs claim of negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention
cannot stand. 3 Negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention require a showing of
2 See Hedgepath, 22 A.3d at 812-13 (to create negligent infliction of emotional distress,
the relationship "must 'implicate' the plaintiffs emotional well-being," such as that of a
psychiatrist/therapist or doctor/patient).
3 This Court assesses this claim under both Virginia law and District of Columbia law, as
defendant Insight Global states that its hiring, training, supervision, and retention occur in
its Virginia office. See Insight Global's Mot. to Dismiss at 17. For the Court's purpose,
the two states' laws are quite similar with respect to negligent hiring and negligent
retention. See J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Va. 1988)
(negligent hiring occurs when an employer places "an unfit person in an employment
9
common law negligence: that an employer failed to use reasonable care in selecting,
training, supervising, or retaining an employee, thereby proximately causing harm to
plaintiff. See Beyene v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 815 F. Supp. 2d 235, 251 (D.D.C. 2011)
(quoting Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. 1951)); Dormu v. District of
Columbia, 795 F. Supp. 2d 7, 31 (D.D.C. 2011); Phelan v. City of Mount Rainier, 805
A.2d 930, 940 (D.C. 2002). Yet nowhere in his complaint does plaintiff state facts to
explain how defendants were purportedly negligent in how they hired, trained, or
supervised their employees. The only employee mentioned by name is Insight Global's
Olivia Wheeler, who allegedly failed to respond to plaintiffs requests to return his
laptops. Compl. ,-r 25-29. Assuming these facts to be true, these facts certainly do not
show that Insight Global failed to properly train or supervise Wheeler, that Insight Global
knew or should have known that Wheeler was likely to harm plaintiff, or that Wheeler's
actions were a proximate cause of plaintiffs harm. Absent such facts, plaintiff has not
established the elements of his final negligence claims against defendants.
situation involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others"); Southeast Apartments
Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va. 1999) (negligent retention "based on
the principle that an employer ... is subject to liability for harm resulting from the
employer's negligence in retaining a dangerous employee who the employer knew or
should have known was dangerous and likely to harm"). The Supreme Court of Virginia
has not yet recognized a cause of action for negligent supervision or negligent training.
See Hernandez v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 83 Va. Cir. 210 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2011). Even
if these causes of actions exist under Virginia law, plaintiff has failed to state facts that
support these claims under any conception of common law negligence.
10
II. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint and Remand
In lieu of opposing defendants' motions to dismiss, plaintiff moves to amend his
complaint and remand the case to D.C. Superior Court. Pl.'s Mot. to Amend/Remand at
1. Specifically, plaintiff seeks to remove defendant CSC and reduce his compensatory
and special damages from $800,000 to $70,000, thereby removing this Court's subject
matter jurisdiction over his complaint. !d. The remainder of plaintiffs claim would
remain substantively identical.
A plaintiff cannot amend his pleading solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. See
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293-94 (1938) ("events
occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount recoverable, whether beyond
the plaintiffs control or the result of volition, do not oust the district court's
jurisdiction"); Kopffv. World Research Group, LLC, 298 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (D.D.C.
2003) ("the time for assessing jurisdictional amount is at the time of removal"). Even if
plaintiffs amendment were permissible, a court may deny leave to amend if the
amendment would be futile. Since plaintiffs proposed complaint does not change or
enhance the factual allegations from his original complaint, his amended complaint would
fail to state a claim for the same reasons discussed above. For both of these reasons, his
motion to amend his complaint and remand is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' motions to dismiss,
11
DENIES as moot defendants' motions for summary judgment, and DENIES plaintiffs
motion to amend the complaint and remand. An order consistent with this decision
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
12