United States v. Floyd ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
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v. ) Criminal No. 13-305-1 (ESH)
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JUAN R. FLOYD, )
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Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Juan R. Floyd, along with twenty-two others, has been charged with
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin,
five hundred grams or more of cocaine, and twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, crimes punishable by a minimum of ten years imprisonment. See
21 U.S.C. § 841. Floyd is also charged with conspiracy to launder monetary instruments in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), for which the government seeks forfeiture pursuant to 21
U.S.C. §§ 853(a), (p) and 18 U.S.C. § 982.
The government requested a detention hearing which was held by Magistrate Judge Kay
on November 26, 2013. (See Detention Memorandum (“Det. Mem.”) at 1, Dec. 3, 2013 [ECF
No. 64].) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Magistrate Judge ruled that Floyd should be held
pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. (See id. at 7.) Floyd thereafter filed a motion to
appeal Magistrate Judge Kay’s detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), which the
government opposed. (Def. Floyd’s Mot. for Review of Pretrial Det. Order (“Mot.”), Dec. 11,
2013 [ECF No. 81]; Gov’t’s Omnibus Opp. to the Defs.’ Mot. for Review and Revocation of
Det. Orders (“Opp.”), Dec. 13, 2013 [ECF No. 86].) This Court held a hearing on the motion on
December 17, 2013. For the reasons stated in open court, as well as the reasons set forth herein,
the Court will deny this motion.
DISCUSSION
Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., a judicial officer “shall order” a
defendant’s detention before trial if, after a hearing, “the judicial officer finds that no condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and
the safety of any other person and the community.” Id. § 3142(e). The judicial officer
considering the propriety of pretrial detention must consider four factors:
(1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
including whether the offense . . . involves . . . a controlled
substance, [or] firearm;
(2) the weight of evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including . . . the
person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug
or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings; . . . and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release.
Id. § 3142(g). The government is required to demonstrate the appropriateness of pretrial
detention by clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 3142(f). However, when “there is
probable cause to believe that the [defendant] committed an offense for which a maximum term
of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §
801 et seq.),” there is a rebuttable presumption that “no condition or combination of conditions
will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of the
community.” Id. § 3142(e). Considering each factor below, the Court agrees with the
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Magistrate Judge that the government has met its burden and that defendant Floyd has failed to
rebut the presumption against pretrial detention.
First, the nature and circumstances of the offense favor continued detention. The
indictment demonstrates probable cause that Floyd participated in a large-scale narcotics and
money-laundering conspiracy. Moreover, Magistrate Judge Kay concluded that Floyd was not
just a member, but “appears to be the head of [this] significant narcotics enterprise . . . .” (Det.
Mem. at 6.) Based on the government’s proffer and the evidence presented at the December 17
hearing, the Court agrees with this conclusion.
Pursuant to warrant, the government recorded more than twenty thousand of Floyd’s
phone calls made on seven different cell phones during the period between April 2013 and
August 2013. 1 (See Det. Mem. at 3; Gov’t’s Second Mem. in Support of Pretrial Det. (“Gov’t’s
Mem.”), Nov. 26, 2013 [ECF No. 15], at 7-8.) These calls strongly support the conclusion that
Floyd played a central role in the alleged narcotics conspiracy. Significantly, he frequently
spoke with Mr. Armando Gamez—a Texas-based narcotics supplier indicted in a related case.
These conversations, conducted in code, concerned the purchase and transfer of large amounts of
narcotics from Texas. (Det. Mem. at 3-4, 6.) There are also a significant number of calls (also in
code) in which Floyd and his co-defendants discuss the purchase and sale of narcotics. (Id. at 6.)
In addition to the evidence derived from the wiretaps, Floyd was the subject of significant
law enforcement surveillance. (Det. Mem. at 2; Opp. at 8.) This surveillance showed Floyd
picking up couriers from Texas late at night from the Greyhound bus station, dropping them off
at a hotel, and then driving to homes of family members (including his daughter and the mother
of his daughter) where drugs were subsequently found. Floyd also deposited money in
1
A total of fourteen cellphones were recovered from Floyd’s home. Obviously, the government has no
knowledge of the contents of the calls made on these additional phone lines not subject to wiretaps.
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increments just below $10,000 into bank accounts corresponding to bank account numbers sent
by text message from Gamez. 2 (Det. Mem. at 4.) Though no drugs were found when law
enforcement searched Floyd’s home, they recovered more than $470,000 cash and fourteen cell
phones. This is an exceptional amount of cash and a large number of cell phones for an
individual who, by his own admission, is unemployed and on SSI. (Id.) There were also drugs
found in the homes and vehicles of Floyd’s family members (who are also co-defendants and
alleged co-conspirators), including his nineteen year-old daughter, Brittany Floyd’s residence,
his then-pregnant daughter, Juanita Culbreth’s car, and the mother of his daughter, Mia
Culbreth’s D.C. home. There is also evidence that he used Juanita Culbreth’s Nissan Maxima to
transport narcotics and money, as well as to complete narcotics transactions. (Opp. at 8.) When
law enforcement searched this vehicle they found five plastic bags containing a brown powder
substance, a portion of which field tested positive for heroin. (Det Mem. at 4.) Ultimately, the
nature and circumstances of the alleged offenses therefore strongly favor Floyd’s continued
detention.
Second, the weight of the evidence supports the inference that Floyd was the leader of
this large-scale narcotics conspiracy. Floyd’s attorney argues that the telephone intercepts which
constitute a large part of the government’s evidence against him have been “self-servingly
interpreted by government agents as [a] suggestion [of] Mr. Floyd’s involvement in the charged
conspiracy. . . “[and b]elief does not amount to clear and convincing evidence.” (Mot. at 2). The
Court agrees instead with Magistrate Judge Kay’s conclusion that “there is a wealth of evidence
indicating drug trafficking on those calls.” (Det. Mem. at 6.) For example, Floyd’s conversations
with Mr. Gamez about purchasing and transporting cars (specifically “Civics” and
2
Under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 5311, et seq., financial institutions are required to file
reports on deposits of more than $10,000 in order to help deter money laundering efforts. Regular
deposits just under this statutory threshold indicate attempts to avoid government detection.
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“Expeditions”), “African wood,” and “fruits and vegetables” make no sense in light of the fact
that Floyd is unemployed and there is no evidence that he ever came into possession of any such
items. The far more likely explanation is that Floyd and Gamez were speaking in coded
language regarding the purchase and transfer of specific narcotics.
The additional evidence against Floyd is significant: the large amount of cash and the
cellphones found in his home, the heroin-laced substances found in Floyd’s daughter’s Nissan
Maxima (which he was seen driving on many occasions), the regular deposits of amounts just
below $10,000 into various bank accounts provided by Gamez, and regular trips to pick up
individuals who were likely drug couriers. In addition, there is evidence that Floyd was texted
the postal tracking number for a package mailed from Texas which was found to contain five
pounds of a substance that field-tested positive for marijuana. (See Det. Mem. at 3.) Ultimately,
the Court finds that the weight of evidence more than adequately implicates Floyd in this
conspiracy.
Third, the history and characteristics of the defendant support his continued detention.
Floyd has a considerable history of narcotics trafficking and is currently under court supervision
for distribution of cocaine (set to expire in December 2014). (See Det. Mem. at 4.) Moreover,
the evidence suggests that Floyd implicated his own children and other family members in the
narcotics-conspiracy, including a nineteen-year old daughter. While the Court recognizes that
Floyd has significant ties to the community as well as medical needs, these facts do not outweigh
the factors that compel the Court to order his continued detention pending trial.
Fourth, defendant’s potential danger to the community favors his continued detention.
Floyd has been indicted as the leader of a large-scale narcotics conspiracy, which constitutes
“serious and pervasive damage to the community.” (Det. Mem. at 7.) Floyd’s significant
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contacts in both Washington D.C. and Texas, as well as his extensive history in the narcotics
trade, represent a significant danger that he will continue to traffic narcotics if not detained
pending trial.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for reversal of the Magistrate Judge’s
order of detention is hereby DENIED, and in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), the Court
ORDERS that defendant remain in the custody of the Attorney General for confinement pending
trial.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge
DATE: December 18, 2013
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