Hawkins v. Potomac Lighthouse Public Charter School , 19 F. Supp. 3d 330 ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANDREA HAWKINS,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 12-264 (GK-DAR)
POTOMAC LIGHTHOUSE PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Andrea Hawkins seeks to collect attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in bringing an administrative action under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20
U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Defendant is Potomac Lighthouse Public
Charter School ("Potomac") .
On January 17, 2014, Magistrate Judge Robinson issued a
Report and Recommendation recommending that both Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 26] and Defendant's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 27] be granted in part and
denied in part. On January 30, 2014, Defendant filed Objections
to the Report and Recommendation [Dkt. No. 33], and on February
14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Objections
[ D kt . No . 3 4 ] .
Upon consideration of the Objections, Response, the Report
I
and Recommendation, and the entire record herein, and for the
reasons stated below, the Report and Recommendation is adopted
in part, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in
part and denied in part, and Defendant's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND 1
On September 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed a due process
complaint on behalf of her minor daughter, A.H., against
Defendant and the Office of the State Superintendent of
Education ( "OSSE") . The complaint raised five issues, two of
which concerned the provision of free appropriate public
education ("FAPE") during the 2008-2009 school year.
On October 12, 2010, Plaintiff and Potomac reached a
settlement on the claims related to the 2008-2009 school year.
The settlement agreement specified that Plaintiff would withdraw
all claims against Potomac and Potomac would provide
compensatory education, including independent tutoring, a
semester of dance class, and summer camp. In addition, Potomac
agreed to pay "reasonable and documented attorneys' fees related
1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth herein are drawn
from the Parties' Statement of Material Facts as to Which There
Is No Genuine Issue submitted pursuant to Local Civil Rule
7(h)(1).
-2-
to the issues surrounding the provision of FAPE for the 2008-
2009 school year and incurred as of August 27, 2010." Pls.' Mot.
at Ex. 2, at 2 [Dkt. No. 26-2, at 26]. Potomac proceeded with a
due process hearing against OSSE on its other claims. 2
On November 24, 2010, Plaintiff's attorney submitted an
invoice to Defendant requesting $7,191.54 in fees and costs.
Defendant reimbursed Plaintiff's attorney $1,377.33, but
disputed the remaining balance of $5,814.21. Plaintiff then
filed a claim in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking $5,000 in
additional fees. Statement of Claim [Dkt. No. 1, at 6].
On February 16, 2012, Potomac removed the action to this,
Court [Dkt. No. 1]. On March 2, 2012, this case was referred to
Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson for full case management
[Dkt. No. 6]. On April 16, 2012, Magistrate Judge Robinson
denied Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Dkt. No. 12].
On February 22, 2013, Magistrate Judge Robinson issued a
Report and Recommendation [Dkt. No. 21] recommending that
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 14] be granted
in part and denied in part and Defendant's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment [ Dkt. No. 16] be denied in part. On March 8,
2
The record does not reflect the results of that hearing or what
fees, if any, Plaintiff recovered from OSSE.
-3-
2013, Defendant filed Objections [Dkt. No. 22] to that Report
and Recommendation and Plaintiff did not file a Response to
those Objections.
Before the Court resolved the Objections, it came to the
Court's attention that Plaintiff had sought fees arising from
the same administrative proceeding in another case, before a
different Judge on this bench, Moore v. Dist. of Columbia, Case
No. 12-1704. On March 29, 2013, the Court denied without
prejudice both Plaintiff's Motion and Defendant's Cross-Motion
and ordered counsel for Plaintiff to file a declaration
clarifying the nature of the fees sought in the two cases [Dkt.
No. 24].
On April 8, 2013, Plaintiff's counsel filed a Response
indicating that this action sought fees under the settlement
agreement between these parties, whereas the fees at issue in
Moore arose from the hearing that occurred on Plaintiff's claims
against OSSE subsequent to that agreement [Dkt. No. 25].
On May 6, 2013, the parties filed renewed Motions for
Summary Judgment [Dkt. Nos. 26, 27]. On January 17, 2014,
Magistrate Judge Robinson issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending that both Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
[Dkt. No. 26] and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
[Dkt. No. 27] be granted in part and denied in part. Defendant's
-4-.
Objections to that Report and Recommendation are now ripe for
review.
I I . STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and Local
Civil Rule 7 2. 3, this Court reviews objections to the factual
findings and legal conclusions of a Magistrate Judge's Report
and Recommendation de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (b) (3) ("The
district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge's disposition that has been properly objected to."); Local
Civ. R. 72.3(c) ("A district judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of a magistrate judge's findings
and recommendations to which objection is made[.]").
III. ANALYSIS
The Court will address each of the four objections raised
by Defendant in turn.
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff should be denied all
additional fees because Plaintiff failed to avail herself of a
substantial amount of the compensatory education obtained in the
settlement agreement.
It is undisputed that A.H. availed herself of a significant
portion of the compensatory relief obtained. See Def. 's St. of
Material Facts, at CJ[ 13 (acknowledging that Plaintiff used 60
hours of tutoring) [Dkt. No. 27-2]. Moreover, the fact that A.H.
-5-
did not avail herself of all the relief obtained does not affect
Plaintiff's counsel's success in obtaining that relief. There is
no precedent that supports denying Plaintiff's counsel fees for
its work on this basis. 3 Thus, Defendant's objection is
overruled.
Second, Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge's failure
to address its argument that Plaintiff should be denied
reimbursement of $17.00 for faxing a due process complaint to
OSSE on August 2, 2010. Plaintiff did not address this argument
in her summary judgment papers, nor in her response to
Defendant's Objections.
Significantly, the Court finds that Plaintiff counsel's
filings indicate they are also seeking this fee in its entirety
from OSSE in the Moore case. See Pls.' Response to Ct.'s Order
of March 29, 2013, Ex. 1, at 27 (seeking $17.00 for "Facsimile
compaint [sic] to Carmela Edmunds/OSSE" on August 2, 2010, the
identical entry sought in this case) . [ Dkt. No. 2 5-1] . Thus,
Plaintiff's request is duplicative and should be denied. See
Report and Recommendation, at 16 (denying a time entry as
3
The Court concurs with Judge Robinson's conclusion that the
analysis in E. M. v. Marriott Hospitality Pub. Chartered High
Sch., 541 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D.D.C. 2008), is inapplicable to the
very different facts and procedural history of this case.
-6-
duplicative). Defendant's objection regarding the $17.00 fax fee
is sustained.
Third, Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge
inappropriately permitted fees for three time entries that
reflect work done on issues unrelated to the provision of FAPE
for the 2008-2009 school year. Those entries are: 1) a May 11,
2010 entry for . 42 hours, described as "Discussion with Kevin
Cater, educational advocate, RE the status of the case and the•
result of the last meeting and what the team decided;" 2) a June
8, 2010 entry for .17 hours, described as "Phone call to parent
to check status of student and whether there were any issues of
concern with the student or school that needed to be addressed;"
and 3) a July 14, 2010 entry for .5 hours, described as
"Conference and discussion with the parent regarding the
withdrawal of the complaint due to newly discovered issues that
were not brought in the initial complaint." Def.'s Cross-Motion,
Ex. 4, at 5, 7 [Dkt. No. 27-3, at 28, 30].
The Court finds that the entries demonstrate a "sufficient
temporal proximity" to the underlying proceeding, particularly
because these entries predate the settlement agreement in this
case. Jones v. Dist. of Columbia, 859 F. Supp. 2d 149, 156
(D.D.C. 2012). It was perfectly appropriate for counsel to
consult with Plaintiff and others about the status of the claim
-7-
while it was pending. Thus, Defendant's objection to these three
time entries is overruled.
Fourth, Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge
inappropriately permitted fees for two time entries that reflect
clerical work. Those entries are: 1) a portion of the December
8, 2009, entry for . 58 hours, described as "Drafted letter to
parent, prepared file jacket, and disseminated file information
to various member [sic] of the legal team;" and 2) an April 23,
2010, entry for .58 hours, described as "At the request of the
attorney, drafted letter to parent re New Attorney Introduction
and status update." Def.' s Cross-Motion, Ex. 4, at 1, 3 [ Dkt.
No. 27-3, at 24, 26].
The Court finds that billing for time spent communicating
with clients is not clerical and is appropriate. See Parks v.
Dist. of Columbia, 895 F. Supp. 2d 124, 134 (D.D.C. 2012)
(finding that fees related to client communications were
reasonable and allowable); Rapu v. Dist. of Columbia Public
Schools, 793 F. Supp. 2d 419 (D.D.C. 2011) (same). In addition,
the Court finds the amount of time billed for these tasks was
reasonable.
Defendant argues that Magistrate Judge Robinson lacked a
basis for concluding that fees for the December 8, 2009, entry
were reasonable, because the entry does not specify how much
-8-
time was spent on client correspondence and how much was spent
on two clerical tasks. The Court notes that the total amount
Plaintiff will recover for that entry is less than a third of
the amount it initially sought -- only $22.62. 4 The Court finds
this amount reasonable. See Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2216
( 2 011) ("The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party)
is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So
trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a
suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an
attorney's time.") . Thus, Defendant's objections to these time
entries are overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Report and
Recommendation of January 17, 2014 [Dkt. No. 32] is adopted in
part, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 26] is
granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant's Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 27] is granted in part and denied
in part.
4
· Plaintiff originally sought $75.40 for this entry. The billed
rate, $130, was reduced,to 75% of the Laffey matrix, and then an
additional 20% reduction was applied because Plaintiff failed to
provide any information about the time-biller in question.
Report and Recommendation, at 15. In addition, the entry was
reduced by half because Plaintiff failed to refute the argument
that the entry reflected work done on the general complaint,
only half of which applied to Potomac. Id. at 18-19. Defendant
did not object to either of those findings.
-9-
An Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
February 25, 2014
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
-10-