Sanchez-Alaniz v. Federal Bureau of Prisons , 85 F. Supp. 3d 208 ( 2015 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ___________________________________
    )
    MARTIN SANCHEZ-ALANIZ,              )
    )
    Plaintiff,        )
    )
    v.                            )                      Civil Action No. 13-1812 (EGS)
    )
    FEDERAL BUREAU OF                   )
    PRISONS, et al.,                    )
    )
    Defendants.       )
    ___________________________________ )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP” or
    “defendant”), brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), see 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    . Now before the Court is defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for
    Summary Judgment [ECF No. 15]. Because defendant has submitted and the Court has
    considered matters outside of the pleadings, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment.
    For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be denied without prejudice.
    I. The BOP’s Search for Records Responsive to FOIA Request No. 2013-10877
    Upon receipt of a request under the FOIA, an agency generally must search its records for
    responsive documents. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(3)(A). An agency “fulfills its obligations under
    FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to
    uncover all relevant documents.” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
    641 F.3d 504
    , 514 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To meet its burden,
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    the agency may submit affidavits or declarations that explain in reasonable detail the scope and
    method of its search. Perry v. Block, 
    684 F.2d 121
    , 126 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In the absence of
    contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an agency’s
    compliance with the FOIA. 
    Id. at 127
    . On the other hand, if the record “leaves substantial doubt
    as to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Truitt v.
    Dep’t of State, 
    897 F.2d 540
    , 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast
    Guard, 
    180 F.3d 321
    , 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
    Plaintiff seeks a “report issued by the Special Investigative Service on or about May
    2013[,] June 2013 or July 2013 . . . at Atwater United States Penitentiary” regarding plaintiff.
    Compl., Ex. D (Letter to Office of the General Counsel, BOP, from plaintiff dated August 6,
    2013). The BOP’s declarant explains that “SIS records remain at the originating institution,”
    Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summ. J.
    (“Defs.’ Mem.”), Vickers Decl. ¶ 11, and that the BOP’s Central Office assigned plaintiff’s
    FOIA request to the Western Regional Counsel’s Office (“WXRO”), 
    id.,
     Vickers Decl. ¶ 21.
    This declarant further states that “FOIA Request No. 2013-10877 was processed by the FOIA
    technician at the WXRO,” that the technician “acknowledged receipt of five responsive pages
    from USP Atwater SIS,” and that the technician “immediately released five pages to Inmate
    Sanchez-Alaniz free of charge.” Id. ¶ 22. Missing from the declaration is any description of the
    search itself. The declarant neither identifies which files were searched, nor explains why
    particular files were searched, nor describes how the files were searched. The declaration is
    vague and conclusory, and it does not explain adequately the scope and method of the BOP’s
    search.
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    II. Exemption 7(F)
    Exemption 7(F) protects from disclosure information contained in law enforcement
    records that “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any
    individual.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (b)(7)(F). “While [C]ourts generally have applied Exemption 7(F) to
    protect law enforcement personnel or other specified third parties, by its terms, the exemption is
    not so limited; it may be invoked to protect ‘any individual’ reasonably at risk of harm.” Long v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    450 F. Supp. 2d 42
    , 79 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (b)(7)(F)).
    The agency need not “specifically identify the individuals who would be endangered.” Elec.
    Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    777 F.3d 518
    , 520 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “In
    reviewing claims under [E]xemption 7(F), courts have inquired whether there is some nexus
    between disclosure and possible harm and whether the deletions were narrowly made to avert the
    possibility of such harm.” Antonelli v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
    623 F. Supp. 2d 55
    , 58 (D.D.C.
    2009) (citing Albuquerque Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 
    726 F. Supp. 851
    , 858 (D.D.C.
    1989)).
    According to a second declarant, the BOP applies Exemption 7(F) to withhold “portions
    of the [Inmate Investigation Report] in this case in conjunction with [Exemption 7(C)] because
    of strong indications that there was a reasonable likelihood that a threat of harm could be posed
    to certain individuals should the withheld material be released.” Defs.’ Mem., Ochoa Decl. ¶ 21.
    She further states that “[a] reasonable likelihood that there was a threat of harm to BOP SIS
    employees and inmates could be inferred from the facts and circumstances evident in the
    document[] in question.” 
    Id.
     This description is vague and conclusory. Based on the BOP’s
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    declaration and review of the redacted Inmate Investigation Report, there is no apparent
    connection between disclosure and possible harm to SIS employees or to inmates.
    The BOP has not demonstrated that its search for records responsive to FOIA Request
    No. 2013-10877 was reasonable or that its reliance on Exemption 7(F) is proper. Accordingly, it
    is hereby
    ORDERED that defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for
    Summary Judgment [ECF No. 15] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is further
    ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion to Rule [26] is DENIED, and that his Motion for
    Leave to File [28] is GRANTED.
    SO ORDERED.
    DATE: March 28, 2015                            /s/
    EMMETT G. SULLIVAN
    United States District Judge
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