Flanagan v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 87 F. Supp. 3d 93 ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SAUNDRA FLANAGAN, et al., :
:
Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 10-1643 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 29
:
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
This case arises out of the October 12, 2000, terrorist bombing of the U.S.S. Cole (“the
Cole”) in Yemen, which resulted in the death of seventeen American sailors, including
Electronic Warfare Technician First Class Kevin Shawn Rux (“Kevin”). First Amended
Complaint [#18] at 1. The plaintiffs are Kevin’s mother (“Doe Victim A”) and his four brothers
(“Doe Victim B,” “Doe Victim C,” “Doe Victim D,” and “Doe Victim E”). Id. ¶¶ 4-8. The
defendants are: 1) the state of Iran and its agencies and instrumentalities, to include a) the
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, b) the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
and c) the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Division (“the Iranian defendants”);
2) the state of Sudan and its agencies and instrumentalities, to include a) the Sudanese Ministry
of the Interior, b) the Sudanese Ministry of Defense, c) the Security of the Revolution, d) the
Sudanese Military Intelligence, e) the Sudanese State Security, f) the Sudanese Popular Defense
Force, and g) the Revolutionary Security Services (“the Sudanese defendants”); and 3) the state
of Syria and its agencies and instrumentalities, to include a) the Syrian National Security
Directorate, b) the Syrian Republic Guard, 3) the Syrian Ministry of Interior, 4) the Syrian
Military Intelligence Service, 5) the Syrian Air Force Intelligence, and 6) the Syrian Special
Forces (“the Syrian defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 9-15. The plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”) and solatium are brought under section 1605A of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. 1Id. ¶¶ 2, 138-144.
On October 31, 2012, defaults were entered against the Iranian and Sudanese defendants.
See Default [#26] at 1; Default [#27] at 1. According to the plaintiffs, as of March 28, 2013,
they were unable to effectuate service of process against the Syrian defendants. See Plaintiffs’
Status Report [#28] at 1. The plaintiffs decided, therefore, to proceed against the Iranian and
Sudanese defendants. Id. at 2. Thus, currently pending and ready for resolution is Plaintiffs’
Motion for Default Judgment Upon Evidentiary Hearing Against Iranian and Sudanese
Defendants [#29].
An evidentiary hearing on liability and damages was held on August 12, 2014. 2 At that
hearing, the Court took judicial notice of the evidence presented in Rux v. Republic of Sudan,
495 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2007), another case arising out of the same incident. 3 See
Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Before the Honorable John Facciola United States
1
All references to the United States Code or the Code of Federal Regulations are to electronic versions that appear
in Westlaw or Lexis.
2
Although now-retired Magistrate Judge Facciola presided over the evidentiary hearing, the current opinion is being
issued by the undersigned, following the Rule 63 Certification, which was issued on February 19, 2015. See Rule
63 Certification [#46].
3
“[W]hen a court has found facts relevant to a FSIA case involving material support to terrorist groups, courts in
subsequent, related cases may ‘rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation . . . without necessitating the
formality of having that evidence reproduced.’” Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D.D.C.
2012) (citation omitted) (taking judicial notice of facts in Rux, which also arose out of the bombing of the Cole).
But taking judicial notice of facts in these “one-sided” FSIA default judgment proceedings accords the noticed facts
no “preclusive effect,” and courts must “endeavor to make . . . additional findings in each case” as needed to render
judgment. Id. (citations omitted). Here, this Court takes judicial notice only of facts in Rux related to the attack
itself and elsewhere makes its “own independent findings of fact,” based on evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing, to support its judgment against the defendants. Id.; see also Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F.
Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining that factual findings in case “decided without the full benefits of
adversarial litigation . . . lack the absolute certainty with which they might otherwise be afforded”).
[Magistrate] Judge [#40] at 11. In addition, the Court accepted evidence in the form of live
testimony, affidavits, and documentary evidence.
Finally, the Court also accepted testimony from five qualified experts. As to the
Sudanese defendants’ relationship with and support for Al-Qaeda, the Court accepted the
testimony of: 1) Lorenzo Vidino, PhD, a senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies in
Zurich, Switzerland; 4 and 2) Dale L. Watson, former Assistant Director of Counterterrorism for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 5 As to the Iranian defendants’ relationship with and support
for Al-Qaeda, the Court accepted the testimony of: 1) Patrick Clawson, PhD, Director of
Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; 6 2) Daniel Byman, PhD, Professor at
Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service; Research Director,
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; 7 and 3) Dale L. Watson, again.
Finally, plaintiffs offered the expert testimony of Larry H. Pastor, MD, FAPA, DABAM, a
psychiatrist who works in the Office of Medical Services at the Central Intelligence Agency, in
support of their claims for damages. 8
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 9
1. During the Afghanistan war against the Soviet Union, from 1979 to 1989, Osama Bin
Laden, the son of a Saudi construction magnate, organized and financed the recruitment and
4
See generally Plaintiffs’ Exhibit (“PEX”) 1: Vidino Affidavit and Exhibits.
5
See generally [#40] at 81:23-130:11.
6
See generally PEX 2: Clawson Affidavit.
7
See generally PEX 3: Byman Affidavit.
8
See generally PEX 4: Pastor Affidavit.
9
The Court will use the spellings “Osama Bin Laden” and “Al-Qaeda” throughout this opinion. Where the spellings
are different, they reflect the spellings used in the source documents, from which the information was taken.
training of Arab nationals to join the Afghan national resistance movement in what was known
as the anti-Soviet “jihad” or holy war. PEX 9 10 at 55. 11
2. In approximately 1988, Bin Laden founded Al-Qaeda to serve as a base “for future
jihad.” Id. at 56. Al-Qaeda’s “structure included as its operating arms an intelligence
component, a military committee, a financial committee, a political committee, and a committee
in charge of media affairs and propaganda. It also had an Advisory Council (Shura) made up of
Bin Ladin’s inner circle.” Id.
3. Since its inception, Al-Qaeda has executed or inspired acts of terrorism around the world,
including the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States, which have killed or injured
thousands of innocent people. Id. at 47-63.
4. Specifically, “Bin Ladin saw himself as called ‘to follow in the footsteps of the
Messenger and to communicate his message to all nations,’ and to serve as the rallying point and
organizer of a new kind of war to destroy America and bring the world to Islam.” Id. at 48
(internal citations omitted). Accord PEX 1 at ¶ 11.
II. The Bombing of the U.S.S. Cole
5. “At approximately 8:30 a.m. on October 12, 2000, the Cole entered the Port of Aden,
Yemen, to temporarily stop for refueling.” Rux, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 544-45.
6. “The Republic of Yemen is a country of 203,850 square miles located on the southern
coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Aden is a city of approximately 440,000 located on Yemen’s
10
PEX 9: Excerpt from The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (2004) (available at http://www.9–11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf).
11
Plaintiffs have not numbered, using a Bates stamp, the pages within individual exhibits. Therefore, except for
PEX 9, the Court’s reference to a page number within an exhibit is to the order in which the page appears in the
exhibit. In other words, even if a page has the number 10 printed on it, if it is the second page of an exhibit, the
Court will identify it as page 2. With respect to PEX 9, because of the length of the exhibit, the Court will identify
the page by the page number printed on the top right or left corner of the document.
south coast. The Port of Aden is a natural harbor with a deep draft in most areas and natural land
protection on all sides.” Id. at 545.
7. “In February 1999, the Navy began using Aden instead of Djibouti as the primary
refueling stop for American ships during their 3,000-mile journey to the Arabian Gulf from the
Mediterranean Sea. Under a contract entered into between the United States and Yemen, U.S.
Navy vessels could obtain fuel at one of two fueling ‘dolphins’ located near the mouth of the
harbor without going to the pier.” Id.
8. “The Cole, an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, was the twenty-fifth Navy ship to stop in
Aden Harbor for refueling over the previous nineteen months. As of October 2000, the ship had
a crew of twenty-six officers and 270 enlisted personnel. The Cole departed from its home port
of Norfolk, Virginia, on August 8, 2000, before patrolling the Mediterranean Sea. On October 9,
2000, the ship transited the Suez Canal and headed for Yemen. At the time that the ship entered
the Port of Aden on October 12, 2000, the U.S. Department of Defense terrorist threat level in
Aden was ‘Threat Condition (THREATCON) BRAVO,’ which indicated an ‘increased and more
predictable threat of terrorist activity.’” Id.
9. “At approximately 8:49 a.m., the Cole moored starboard side to Refueling Dolphin
Seven, near the mouth of the harbor. The ship began refueling at approximately 10:31 a.m. At
approximately 11:10 a.m., one of the sailors standing watch over the refueling noticed a small
boat heading ‘fast and hard’ toward the Cole from the direction of the city. The boat, painted
white with fire red trim, was about thirty-five feet long and six to seven feet wide and had a
shallow V-hull. It looked ‘brand new.’ The boat was similar in size and shape to many other
small vessels in the harbor, including the service craft that had been alongside the Cole. The
boat was manned by two males, both of whom appeared to be in their early thirties. The two
men slowed the boat as they approached the Cole, maneuvered it parallel to the ship and came
down the port side headed aft. As they did so, the two men in the boat were smiling, and waved
to the crew. Some crew members returned the greeting. Seconds later, the boat exploded.” Id.
10. “The explosion occurred between approximately 11:15 and 11:18 a.m., just as some of
the crew was sitting down for lunch. The blast ripped a thirty-two- by thirty-six-foot hole in the
port side. . . . Smoke, dust, and fuel vapors filled the air. The main engine room, auxiliary
machine room, and the dry provisions storeroom were flooded. Several chambers, including the
Crew and Chief Petty Officer's Galley, were structurally destroyed. The blast and its after-
effects killed seventeen Navy sailors, all of them American citizens. Forty-two others were
injured, some of them sustaining serious burns to their faces, hands and arms, as well as
lacerations and fractures.” Id.
III. The Sudanese Defendants
A. Background
11. In 1989, General Omar Bashir assumed the presidency of Sudan in a military coup that
overthrew the elected government and converted Sudan into an Islamic Arab state. PEX 7 12;
PEX 8 13. The coup was orchestrated by Hassan al Turabi, head of the Sudanese political party,
the National Islamic Front (“NIF”). PEX 6 at 57. Accord PEX 10 14 at 6. Turabi was in power
from 1989 until his fall in late 1999. PEX 10 at 6.
12. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Bin Laden briefly returned to
his home country of Saudi Arabia but had his passport seized by the government due to his
12
PEX 7: Profile: Sudan’s President Bashir, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2003) (available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3273569.stm).
13
PEX 8: Military Coup in Sudan Ousts Civilian Regime, NEW YORK TIMES (Jul. 1, 1989) (available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/01/world/military-coup-in-sudan-ousts-civilian-regime.html).
14
PEX 10: CIA Report: Al Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths (Mar. 10,
2003).
relationship with extremists in Afghanistan. PEX 1-A 15 at 2. At a time when Al-Qaeda found
itself without a territory from which it could base its terrorist operations, Turabi offered the
organization refuge in Sudan. PEX 9 at 57; PEX 1 at ¶ 15; PEX 1-A at 2.
13. Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991, and lived there until 1996, when he was expelled
from the country under international pressure. PEX 11 16 at 11.
14. Turabi and Bin Laden shared a common extremist ideological and religious outlook. PEX
9 at 61; PEX 1 at ¶ 43. Turabi envisioned a pan-Islamic force consisting of both Shiites and
Sunnis to counterbalance Western powers militarily, economically, and politically. PEX 1 at ¶
45. Bin Laden agreed to help Turabi in the regime’s ongoing war against African Christian
separatists in southern Sudan, and also to invest his wealth in the country’s infrastructure. PEX 9
at 57. In exchange, Sudan provided Bin Laden’s group with a sanctuary within which it could
freely meet, organize, and train militants for future operations. Id.; PEX 1 at ¶¶ 12-13, 36, 45.
15. Starting in the early 1990s, Turabi and the Sudanese regime convened annual conferences
in Sudan under the label “the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference.” PEX 10 at 6; PEX 1 at ¶
44. At these conferences, Bin Laden and other top leaders and operatives from the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, Hamas, and Hezbollah, congregated to exchange information and plan
terrorist activities. Id.
16. Since 1993, the United States has designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism. See
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
B. General Support for Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
1. Overview
15
PEX 1-A: State Department Fact Sheet: Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier (Aug. 14, 1996)
(available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB343/osama_bin_laden_file01_transcription.pdf).
16
PEX 11: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997 (Apr. 1998) (available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/1997index.html).
17. Each year from 1997 through 2000, Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, safe
haven, and training hub for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Abu Nidal Organization, and Hamas. PEX 11 at 12; PEX 12 17 at 10;
PEX 14 18 at 11; PEX 15 19 at 10.
18. Sudan’s material support of Al-Qaeda, such as “(1) its provision of sanctuary and safe
haven from 1991-1996; and (2) [the] technical training and support Sudanese military and
intelligence forces provided al Qaeda throughout the 1990s; was indispensable for al Qaeda not
just to survive but also to then develop the expertise, technical knowledge and wide network of
contacts that allowed it to flourish as a terrorist organization and carry out the USS Cole
bombing.” PEX 1 at ¶ 83.
19. Al-Qaeda’s time in Sudan from 1991 through 1996 was invaluable to the development of
the terrorist organization:
Q So, Mr. Watson, as you can tell by the text, the 9/11
Commission has described how al-Qaeda flourished in
Sudan. It says, “Bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991 and
set up a large and complex set of intertwined business and
terrorist enterprises. In time, the former would encompass
numerous companies and a global network of bank
accounts and nongovernmental institutions.” Later on in
the text it says, “Meanwhile, al-Qaeda finance officers and
top operatives used their position in bin Laden's businesses
to acquire weapons, explosives and technical equipment for
terrorist purposes.” And then at 58 it says, “The
groundwork for a true global terrorist network was being
laid.” Mr. Watson, do you agree with this assessment laid
out in the 9/11’s Commission's report?
A I do.
17
PEX 12: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (Apr. 1999) (available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/1998index.html).
18
PEX 14: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999 (Apr. 2000) (available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.html).
19
PEX 15: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000 (Apr. 2001) (available at
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2000).
Q And the type of support that is described in the 9/11
Commission’s report, what’s the significance of having
intertwined business and terrorist enterprises, allowing, you
know, training for weapons, also acquiring weapons and
explosives technical equipment, et cetera?
A It allowed him to expand the organization, make it better.
It allowed them to have funds available through legitimate
businesses. It gave them some credibility. It also allowed
for the organization to be a safe place, because, at that point
in time, he had been removed from Saudi Arabia. He had
no country. And so he was allowed to operate with
impunity there in Sudan for a number of years . . . .
Q And one of the things you mentioned is that you said it
gave the organization credibility. What do you mean by
that?
A The ability to issue statements; the ability to recruit people;
the ability to set up training camps; the ability to travel in
and out of places to identify potential targets, in my
opinion.
Q And would having a safe place to meet, the ability to travel
safely and freely, would this have allowed Al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden -- would this have given them a way of
shielding their activities from other law enforcement or
intelligence agencies?
A Yeah. It’s not like setting up shop in Leesburg, Virginia,
where, you know, you would come under scrutiny of the
Bureau or some federal agency. It’s a foreign country, and
a foreign country that was not the most favored, you know,
looking toward the United States. So it was very difficult
to operate in that environment as a U.S. Government
representative.
Q So bin Laden is in a place where it’s difficult for the U.S.
Government to keep tabs on him. And in terms of the
Sudanese government, is it accurate to say that bin Laden
and al-Qaeda are also in a place where they don’t have to
worry about the interference of Sudanese authorities with
their terrorist activities?
A That is correct.
[#40] at 108:6-110:11.
20. Even after Al-Qaeda was expelled from Sudan in 1996, Sudan continued to be a safe
harbor for the organization, allowing the organization to “plan more freely.” Id. at 112:5-113:12.
2. Financial Support
21. Bin Laden established several joint business ventures with the Sudanese regime that
flourished upon his arrival in Khartoum in 1991. PEX 1 at ¶ 19; PEX 1-A at 2-3. He “also
formed symbiotic business relationships with wealthy NIF members by undertaking civil
infrastructure development projects on the regime’s behalf.” PEX 1 at ¶ 19. These projects
included:
* Al-Hijrah for Construction and Development, Ltd., which
built the Tahaddi [ ] road linking Khartoum with Port
Sudan, as well as a modern international airport near Port
Sudan.
* Taba Investment Company Ltd, an investment company.
* Wadi al-Aqiq Company, Ltd., an import-export firm that, in
conjunction with Bin Laden’s Taba Investment Company,
Ltd., secured a near monopoly over Sudan’s agricultural
exports of gum, corn, sunflower, and sesame products in
cooperation with prominent NIF members.
* Al-Themar al-Mubarak-ah Agriculture Company, Ltd.,
which grew to encompass large tracts of land near
Khartoum and in eastern Sudan.
* Khartoum Tannery, a leather company, which was still
operating as of May 4, 2004.
* Al Themar, a Sudanese agricultural company in which Bin
Laden had a financial interest.
* The Blessed Fruits Company and al-Ikhlas, two companies
that were involved in the production of honey, fruits and
vegetables, and in which Bin Ladin also had a financial
interest.
* Al Qudurat Transportation.
PEX 1 at ¶ 19; PEX 1-A at 2-3.
22. These businesses “allowed al-Qaeda to funnel money for terrorist activities through
Sudanese banks and Sudanese-based legitimate businesses, therefore overcoming the difficulties
in transferring funds the group would have otherwise faced.” PEX 1 at ¶ 35. Accord PEX 1 at ¶¶
21-35. Bin Laden maintained those interests even after his expulsion from Sudan. PEX 6 20 at
19-20.
23. In addition, “Bin Ladin and wealthy NIF members [directly] capitalized Al-Shamal
Islamic Bank in Khartoum” with Bin Laden personally investing $50 million in the bank. PEX 1
at ¶¶ 22-23, 25; PEX 1-A at 3.
3. Support for Training
24. “[B]y January 1994, Bin Laden had begun financing at least three terrorist training camps
in northern Sudan—camp residents included Egyptian, Algerian, Tunisian, and Palestinian
extremists—in cooperation with the NIF.” PEX 1-A at 3. See also PEX 13 21 at 34.
25. Bin Laden’s main training camp in Sudan was “a 20-acre site near Soba, 10 kilometers
south of Khartoum.” PEX 1 at ¶ 36.
26. In addition, “Bin Laden’s Al-Hijrah for Construction and Development Company
work[ed] directly with Sudanese military officials to transport and provision terrorists training in
such camps.” PEX 1-A at 3.
27. While Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were in Sudan, they “were allowed to operate freely.”
PEX 1 ¶ 36.
20
PEX 6: Sudan and Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 105th Cong. (1997).
21
PEX 13: State Department Publication: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995 (Apr. 1996).
4. Facilitation of Travel
28. In 1998, “Al-Zawaheri 22 and leaders of Sudanese, Eritrien, Ugandan, Yemeni and
Egyptian Islamic groups . . . agreed to open Sudan’s doors to international Islamic fundraising
organizations and to facilitate the movement of extremists by providing them with Sudanese
diplomatic passports.” PEX 17 at ¶ 26.
29. An individual carrying a diplomatic passport was “immune from [most] laws and
criminal process.” [#40] at 116:5-6. Furthermore, “diplomatic passports have diplomatic
pouches which are not authorized to be examined by the host country . . . [allowing its holder to
transport] materials without government scrutiny or scrutiny at the borders.” Id. at 116:19-21,
24-25.
30. When Bin Laden moved to Sudan, the Sudanese government provided Al-Qaeda
members with Sudanese travel documentation, including 200 passports, which facilitated the
movement of Al-Qaeda operatives in and out of Sudan. PEX 1 at ¶¶ 36, 41-42; PEX 11 at 17;
PEX 12 at 11.
31. “In addition to providing some al-Qaeda operatives with new passports, Sudanese
officials also made sure that al-Qaeda members traveling to Sudan with different passports could
enter and leave the country without having their passports stamped.” PEX 1 at ¶ 42.
32. “These officials would have been acting with the full knowledge and consent of the
highest levels of the Sudanese government . . . because a stamp from Sudan (a country known
for its support of terrorism) would have raised the attention of immigration officials in other
countries.” Id.
22
Ayman Al-Zawaheri was the one-time leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad / Al Jihad (“AJ”) a “group [that]
employs terrorism as a part of a wider campaign to root out Western secular influences and create an Islamic state in
Egypt by overthrowing the current government.” PEX 17: Canadian Security Intelligence Services Statement:
Summary of Information Related to Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, a high-ranking member of the Vanguards of
Conquest, a radical wing of AJ (Federal Court of Canada - June 27, 2000) at ¶¶ 4, 9.
33. Significantly, Sudan also exempted Al-Qaeda and its members from paying any taxes or
import duties, thus permitting it to bring containers into the country without inspection by
customs officials. PEX 1 at ¶ 20.
C. Specific Involvement in the Attack
34. Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda would not have been able to carry out the attack on the Cole
without the support of the Sudanese defendants:
[T]he Sudan’s material support of al Qaeda including, (1) its
provision of sanctuary and safe haven from 1991-1996; and (2)
technical training and support Sudanese military and intelligence
forces provided al Qaeda throughout the 1990s; was indispensable
for al Qaeda not just to survive but also to then develop the
expertise, technical knowledge and wide network of contacts that
allowed it to flourish as a terrorist organization and carry out the
USS Cole bombing.
PEX 1 at ¶ 81.
IV. The Iranian Defendants
A. Background
35. In approximately 1991, Iran and Sudan wanted to foster coordination between Sunni and
Shia Islamists, by forming a “tripartite front” against their common enemies, the United States
and Israel. PEX 16 23 at 6-7. “The front would consist of the NIF, Iran, and Usama (Bin Laden)’s
Islamic Army.” Id. at 6. See also PEX 2 at ¶ 76 (describing the relationship between Iran,
Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda in the 1990s as one of “quite active cooperation”).
36. “Eventually an agreement was reached to collaborate politically and militarily.” PEX 16
at 7. Specifically, the parties agreed that “experience from Hizballah and Iran should be
transferred to new nations/extremist groups who lack this expertise . . . [in order to] allow
Islamic Army members to gain the necessary experience in terrorist operations.” Id. at 8.
23
PEX 16: CIA Report: Terrorism: Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Laden, Iran, and
the NIF (Jan. 31, 1997).
37. “At that [same] time, the Iranian government was providing very active assistance to the
Sudanese government for its fighting in the civil war in the south of the country.” PEX 2 at ¶ 41.
In addition, “in 1991, the Sudanese government [ ] supported a conference of those resisting the
Madrid conference launching Israeli-Arab peace talks, and both Iranian representatives and Bin
Laden were active at this event.” Id.
38. Ultimately, the relationship between Sudan and Iran in the 1990s offered Al-Qaeda the
opportunity to build ties with Iranian officials, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations
dedicated to attacking United States personnel, military targets, and citizens in the Middle East.
See PEX 27 24 at 2-7; PEX 19 25 at 17-21; PEX 9 at 61.
39. Since 1984, the United States has designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. See
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
B. General Support for Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
1. Overview
40. Iran’s material support of the Al-Qaeda/Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1990s was
described by a high level Al-Qaeda operative as follows:
I was aware of certain contacts between al-Qaeda and al Jihad
organization, on one side, and Iran and Hezbollah on the other
side. I arranged security for a meeting in the Sudan between
Mughaniyah, Hezbollah’s chief, and Bin Laden. Hezbollah
provided explosives training for al-Qaeda and al Jihad. Iran
supplied Egyptian Jihad with weapons. Iran also used Hezbollah
to supply explosives that were disguised to look like rocks.
PEX 19 at 19. Accord PEX 3 at ¶ 68 (noting that Iran often used “both its own people and
facilities” as well as those of “its close ally Hizballah” to support terrorist operations).
24
PEX 27: Trial Transcript: Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, an Al-Qaeda operative, in U.S. v. Usama bin Laden, No.
98-CR-1023 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2001).
25
PEX 19: Trial Transcript: Guilty Plea of Mohammed Ali, an Al-Qaeda operative, in U.S. v. Usama bin Laden,
No. 98-CR-1023 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2000).
41. Although Iranians are Shias, they nevertheless supported the terrorist activities of Bin
Laden, a Suni, because of their mutual hatred of “the infidels in the United States.” [#40] at
121:10-17. See also PEX 2 at ¶ 73 (stating that Iran often support the terrorist activities of
organizations “with which it ha[d] some profound differences”).
42. Iranian “[s]upport for militant and terrorist groups [was] almost always done via Iran’s
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
a parallel military force that [was] tasked with protecting Iran’s revolution at home and spreading
it abroad, among other duties.” PEX 3 at ¶ 71.
43. With respect to the MOIS, “‘Iran has used its intelligence services extensively to
facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks . . . [and] Intelligence officers have used the diplomatic
pouch for conveyance of weapons and finances for terrorist groups.’” PEX 2 at ¶ 40 (internal
citation omitted).
44. In addition, “‘MOIS [ ] facilitated the movement of al Qa’ida operatives in Iran and
provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports’” and “‘also negotiated
prisoner releases of AQI operatives.’” PEX 3 at ¶ 75 (internal citations omitted).
45. With respect to the IRGC and the IRGC Qods, they sponsored terrorism in the following
fashion:
The IRCG was established in the immediate wake of the 1979
revolution. Its role is built into Iran's constitution as defenders of
the revolution-- not just defenders of Iran as a country, but
defenders of the 1979 revolution. The IRGC is one of the major
organizations through which Iran has historically carried out its
support for terrorism.
Among its other tasks, the IRGC is dedicated to the spread of
fundamentalist Islamist principles throughout the world, and the
establishments of fundamentalist Islamist governments in nations
other than Iran. The Qods Force is the branch of the IRGC
generally charged with “foreign operations.”
The foreign operations it supports include foreign insurgents and
terrorists such as those fighting U.S. forces and U.S.-backed
governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is the principal Iranian
organization working with the Lebanese Hizbollah organization’s
armed elements, which carry out terrorist operations worldwide,
engage in military operations in Syria in support of the Assad
regime’s battle against insurgents, and prepare for battle against
Israel.
While in theory the Qods Force is a component element of the
IRGC, in practice it operates largely autonomously. It reports
directly to the Supreme Leader, rather than being subordinate to
the IRGC command structure. The IRGC defines itself as an agent
and instrumentality of the Supreme Leader, to which it pledges its
unflinching loyalty. The IRGC and the Supreme Leader both
frequently speak about the IRGC as the guardian of the principles
of the Iranian revolution of 1979.
***
It [ ] has been well-documented for over twenty years that the
IRGC has historically provided funding and/or training for
terrorism operations that targeted United States and Israeli citizens.
Such activities have included support for Hizbollah of Lebanon,
HAMAS, as well as al-Qaeda, with the character of that support
being quite different in each case. Hizbollah of Lebanon (or
Hizbollah for short, though not to be confused with similarly
named organizations in other countries which have varying degrees
of ties with Hizbollah of Lebanon) is a Shiite terrorist organization
established in 1982 by Iran as an extension of the Iranian
Revolution in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. The
IRGC’s relationship with Hizbollah is extremely close. . .
Although they have a long history of cooperating in a common
anti-American agenda, Iran and al-Qaeda have always had serious
ideological differences. In providing support to al-Qaeda and
Hizbollah, the IRGC, including the IRGC Qods division, is acting
as an official agency whose activities are tightly and carefully
controlled by the Iranian government through the Supreme Leader
and his representatives. Iran’s relationship with Al-Qaeda
continues even in situations where Iran is also supporting those
fighting Al-Qaeda. For instance, the U.S. Treasury Department's
February 5, 2014 designation of senior al-Qaeda member Jafar al-
Uzbeki described him as part of an al-Qaeda network which
"operates there [in Iran] with the knowledge of Iranian authorities."
The Treasury statement added that this network "uses Iran as a
transit point for moving funding and foreign fighters through
Turkey to support al Qaeda-affiliated elements inside Syria." This
despite the fact that Iran has made a major commitment of men and
arms to fight Al-Qaeda in Syria.
In sum, the terrorism training provided to Hizbollah, HAMAS, and
al-Qaeda by the IRGC is an official policy of the Iranian
government.
PEX 2 at ¶¶ 26-37.
2. Financial Support
46. Iran supported Al-Qaeda financially:
There is compelling evidence that radical Islamists are receiving
considerable foreign support and assistance. . . . In Afghanistan, AJ
[Al Jihad, an Islamist terrorist group controlled by Bin Laden]
members are trained at the Al-Khalifah or Caliphate camp by
Iranians and equipped with powerful explosives. AJ leaders Al-
Zawaheri and Muhammad Shauqi Al-Islambouli have received
large sums of money from Iran and intense secret contacts have
taken place between top Iranian intelligence officers, Bin Laden
and Al-Zawaheri. . . .
***
Both Iran and Osama Bin Laden have played a role in efforts to
once again merge the AJ with the AGAI [Al Gama’a al-Islamiya,
an Egyptian Islamist terrorist group that had once merged with AJ
but then the two fell out]. At a September-October 1996 meeting
with the former Iranian intelligence minister, Ali Fallahian, the AJ
and the AGAI reportedly endorsed a plan to carry out terrorist
operations to be financed by Iran and Osama Bin Laden. At
another meeting in early 1998, the possibility of providing funds
and improving training and operation activities was offered by Iran
to the two groups if they agreed to cooperate. The groups agreed
to focus on efforts to launch attacks on United States and Israeli
targets outside Egypt, to retain separate leadership, organizational
and military capacities, and to use a new coalition under the
leadership of Osama Bin Laden as their base to achieve these aims.
PEX 17 at ¶¶ 25, 30.
3. Support for Training
47. Iran directly trained Al-Qaeda operatives:
In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al-Qaeda and
Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in
providing support – even if only training – for action carried out
primarily against Israel and the United States. Not long
afterwards, senior al-Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran
to receive training in explosives.
In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa
Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in
intelligence and security. Bin Laden reportedly showed particular
interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that
had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship
between al-Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions
did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation
in terrorist operations. . . . al-Qaeda contacts with Iran continued in
ensuing years.
PEX 9 at 61. Accord PEX 27 at 2-4.
48. Iran also supported Hezbollah, which in turn provided training for Al-Qaeda:
In many of its operations involving terrorist groups, Iran uses
Hizballah as a facilitator. Hizballah plays this role for several
reasons. First, Iran’s involvement in Hizballah’s creation, large-
scale funding, constant provision of training, and role in
Hizballah’s leadership councils has given Iran an important role in
the Lebanese organization. Iran trusts Hizballah and Hizballah
trusts Iran – one of the closest relationships in history between a
terrorist group and its sponsor. Hizballah has a particularly close
relationship with the IRGC, with which it has worked since the
group’s founding in the early 1980s. . . . In the past, however,
according to some polls, Hizballah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was
the single most popular individual in the Arab world because of his
organization’s repeated and successful defiance of Israel. Third,
Hizballah is highly capable and has a high degree of independence
in Lebanon. Thus the training offered at Hizballah camps is
superb, and it can be done without having to hide it from the
Lebanese government. Finally, working through Hizballah offers
Iran some degree of deniability if it chooses, as it places one more
degree of separation between the group in question and Iran.
PEX 3 at ¶ 49. Accord [#40] 122:5-9; 121:21-24 (describing the closeness of the relationship
between Hezbollah and Iran and thereby affirming Iran’s intent to directly support the activities
of Al-Qaeda); PEX 3 at ¶ 68 (same).
49. Ultimately, the training Al-Qaeda received in Iran “was particularly important in the
organization’s early years, when its operatives had less battle experience and expertise in
general.” PEX 3 at ¶ 69. Accord [#40] at 122:25-123:11 (explosives training Al-Qaeda received
from Hezbollah in Iran would have enabled Al-Qaeda to build a bomb like that used in the Cole
attack).
4. Facilitation of Travel
50. Finally, Iran has long provided material support to Al-Qaeda in the form of safe passage
and facilitation of travel:
Importantly, Iran also provided important services to al-Qaeda as a
transit location through Iran to the outside world once bin Laden
and his outfit moved to Afghanistan. And this happened before the
U.S.S. Cole attack. . . . Iran permitted at least some Al-Qaeda
members and leaders to cross Iranian territory, without stamping
their passports.
It was very useful for al-Qaeda to pass through Iran in order to get
to the outside world, because if they showed up with Pakistani
visas on their passports, then the Saudis or United Arab Emirate
authorities were suspicious. However, if they came through
without any stamps on their passport, they had a much easier time.
. . . the transit through Iran begins not long after bin Laden shows
up in Afghanistan. . . .
PEX 2 at ¶¶ 78-79.
51. “In the mid-1990s, Mustafa Hamid[, a senior Al-Qaeda operative,] reportedly negotiated
a secret relationship between Usama Bin Laden and Iran, allowing many al Qaida members safe
transit through Iran to Afghanistan.” PEX 20 26 at 1. Accord PEX 3 at ¶ 52 (“Iran had become an
26
PEX 20: U.S. Treasury Department Press Release: Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operative in Iran (Jan. 16, 2009).
important route [for Al-Qaeda members] into Afghanistan and al-Qa’ida’s training camps
there.”).
52. In order to facilitate the travel of Al-Qaeda members through Iran, Iran let the
organization set up guest houses:
Iran let Al-Qaeda establish a series of guest houses for its fighters
making the long journey through its territory. After Pakistan
began to tighten up transit routes in the years before 9/11, one of
al-Qa’ida’s key military commanders, Seif al-Adl, told an
interviewer that al-Qa’ida began “building good relations with
some virtuous people in Iran to pave the way [for travel] and
coordinate issues of mutual interest.” The al-Qa’ida-linked Saudi
dissident al-Faqih noted that “before 9/11 many Saudis used Iran to
access Afghanistan” because “the Iranians kept a blind eye to this.”
PEX 3 at ¶ 53 (internal citations omitted).
53. “Al-Qaeda also deliberately established training camps on the western border of
Afghanistan to make it easier for recruits to travel through Iran.” Id. at ¶ 53.
54. Ultimately, Iran’s facilitation of travel had a significant impact on Al-Qaeda’s efforts:
Such travel assistance is invaluable for groups like al-Qa’ida. If
visas had an Iranian stamp or showed a link to Afghanistan, they
would be far more likely to attract the attention of border security
officials in Saudi Arabia, the United States, or other countries that
are hostile to al-Qa’ida. In addition, established lines of transit
make recruitment and training easier, as individuals can travel to
and from training camps without fear of interference. This is
particularly important for facilitating the flow of new recruits, who
lack training in clandestine travel. Finally, travel facilitation
enables better communication and coordination among the far-
flung strands of the global jihad of which al-Qa’ida is a part. Even
before 9/11, al-Qa’ida and its affiliate groups were aware that the
United States and other hostile powers monitored phones and other
forms of communication and recognized that many sensitive
deliberations are best done face-to-face. Doing so, however,
requires individuals who can travel freely from one area to another.
PEX 3 at ¶ 58. Accord [#40] at 124:9-127:3.
C. Specific Involvement in the Attack
55. At the time of the bombing of the Cole, the links between the Iranian defendants and Bin
Laden and Al-Qaeda were firmly established:
Iran was actively tied to al-Qa’ida in the years when the attack on
USS Cole was being planned and when it was executed. The 1999
State Department report on terrorism that year noted Iran’s support
in training and logistics for extremist groups like al-Qa’ida in the
Gulf, among other activities. Iran reportedly contributed to
helping al-Qa’ida set up a network in Yemen: Zawahiri wrote to
thank the Iranians for their assistance. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali,
identified as one of the USS Cole bombing masterminds, was
radicalized in Iran after hearing Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, speak about jihad there
(the exact date is unclear). Al-Qa’ida facilitator and financier
Muhsin al-Fadhli is Iran-based and he helped finance the 2002
attack on MV Limburg off Yemen—many of those involved in Al
Qaeda’s [sic] operations in Yemen were also involved in the
Limburg attack. In addition, initial reports indicated the bomb
used for the USS Cole attack bears similarities to shaped bombs
designed by Hizballah, and it is possible that al-Qa’ida learned
such techniques when training in Lebanon in the early 1990s.
***
. . . Iran supported al-Qa’ida as an organization and made it
stronger overall, and this made al-Qa’ida better able to carry out
terrorist attacks such as the USS Cole bombing. This support is not
consistent or unqualified, but over the years it has helped make al-
Qa’ida a formidable organization. . . .
PEX 3 at ¶¶ 70, 81 (internal citations omitted).
56. As a result of Iran’s complicity, it is likely that Abd Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al
Nashiri, one of the masterminds of the attack on the Cole, travelled through Iran when moving
between Yemen and Afghanistan both before and after the bombing. PEX 2 at ¶¶ 80, 81
(“Certainly, during the late 1990s and through 2000, Iran was the common route that al-Qaeda
members used when traveling from gulf countries such as Yemen to Afghanistan. Iran was also
the common route used by al-Qaeda members when returning from Afghanistan to gulf countries
such as Yemen.”).
V. The Plaintiffs
A. Doe Victim A
57. Doe Victim A is Kevin’s mother. [#40] at 15:5-6.
58. Doe Victim A had a troubled childhood and an abusive father, who was an alcoholic.
PEX 4 at ¶ 4. Her husband, the father of her children, was also an alcoholic. Id. They were
married in 1964 and divorced in 1990 or 1992. Id.
59. Doe Victim A enjoyed an especially close relationship with her son. [#40] at 19:2-6. He
also helped financially support his mother. Id. at 19:7-8.
60. After Kevin died, Doe Victim A stated: “I couldn’t function. . . . I just wanted to sleep,
and I mostly laid in my bed in a fetal position.” Id. at 26:4-7. It took her months to return to her
job. Id. at 26:11-18.
61. Describing the impact of Kevin’s death, Doe Victim A stated:
It’s had an intense effect on my life, on me. I’ve been on Prozac
and they’ve had to raise it. Started out on 20, and they have it
raised to 40. Sometimes, I take two a day. October is just a
nightmare. So many times I’ve said I wish they could just take
October off the calendar because that’s the month he was born, it’s
the month he was married.
There’s so many times that I can’t . . . think straight. And this past
winter, I spent a lot of time in bed sleeping and just not caring
about anything.
Id. at 27:23-28:7. She also stated that she had seen a grief counselor on several occasions. Id. at
28:11-14.
62. Dr. Larry Pastor, a clinical psychiatrist, described Doe Victim A’s condition as follows:
[She] experienced a catastrophic loss upon the death of her son
Kevin Rux in October 2000. Due to the sudden, violent nature of
the incident, Doe Victim A experienced psychological trauma in
addition to massive psychological loss. The trauma involved
particular qualities that were additive to the loss itself, including
suddenness, violence, evil intent, gruesomeness and disfigurement,
and inability to anticipate the incident. . . . It is my medical
opinion that the examinee suffers from traumatic grief (a condition
that has been conceptualized under various names including
traumatic grief, complicated grief, unresolved grief, prolonged
grief, pathological grief, and in the current edition of the DSM,
“persistent complex bereavement-related disorder.”). Findings
elicited in examination included yearning for the deceased, intense
pangs of grief associated with triggering stimuli, prolonged and
intense grief, a dramatically altered view of one’s world and one’s
future, anhedonia, feeling worse when reminded of the deceased,
and doing things to please the deceased (examinee stated that she
wants to change her name back to Rux, because Kevin didn’t like
that his last name was different from hers, but at present she
doesn’t have the $200 in court fees that a name change would
cost). Doe Victim A continues to exist in a chronic, heightened
state of mourning, recurrently upset by horrific, intrusive images of
the bombing, pre-occupied with sorrow and other negative
emotions related to her son’s death (anger, bitterness, sense of
injustice), and trouble getting through her day and carrying out
normal life routines. Contemplation of the mangled and
dismembered remains of her son and 16 others is a trigger for
intense, raw feelings of horror and distress. In contrast to the
course of normal (“uncomplicated”, or non-traumatic) grief, the
passage of years does not diminish the pain of loss. Indeed, the
passage of time can serve to heighten the pain of loss, as the
sufferer cannot resolve the feeling of a loved one unjustly taken
away, and the ongoing inability to restore a sense of fairness or
justice to the world. . . . There is also marked social withdrawal
and diminished interest in social interaction and meeting new
people, which cannot definitively be attributed to the traumatic loss
of her son but I believe is most likely due to this trauma, because
diminished social interaction is routinely associated with
prolonged grief, sadness, and negative emotions associated with
traumatic grief (and seen in this examinee) such as anger and
survivor’s guilt. Social withdrawal, or avoidance, a form of
emotional self-protection, is a feature of PTSD, 27 traumatic grief,
and other trauma-related disorders. It is a defense mechanism used
by individuals with these syndromes, including the examinee, in an
effort to avoid triggering painful emotional states and it results in
an impoverishment of interpersonal relationships. Examinee also
meets the diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder related to stress
and trauma in the DSM-V, 309.89. As the most successful, highly
functioning of the five children and in the absence of a father,
Kevin served as a crucial support person for Doe Victim A and the
27
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. PEX 4 at ¶ 9 n.2.
other four sons (I am reminded of, but hesitate to use, the cliché
“father figure”). It is my opinion that the death of Kevin Rux is
the direct cause of the pain, suffering, and functional impairment
evidenced in the examination of Doe Victim A.
PEX 4 at ¶ 9.
B. Doe Victim B
63. Doe Victim B is Kevin’s youngest brother. [#40] at 68:15-18.
64. Doe Victim B stated that Kevin was his “best friend” and also “like a father figure” to
him. Id. at 68:21-24. He further stated that when their parents separated, when Doe Victim B
was eleven, Kevin “took [him] under his wing and took care of [him].” Id. at 68:25-69:5. Doe
Victim B also stated that Kevin disciplined him on several occasions. Id. at 72:4-8.
65. After his parents got divorced, Doe Victim B “got into trouble” and “spent 19 months in
prison for arson.” PEX 4 at ¶ 14.
66. Doe Victim B described his brother Kevin as “the glue that held [the family] together.”
[#40] at 70:7-10. He stated that the moment he learned that Kevin had been killed was “the
worst moment in [his] entire life.” Id. at 75:1-4.
67. Since Kevin’s death, Doe Victim B has become withdrawn, has suffered from debilitating
depression, and has had difficulty holding down a job. Id. at 76:18-77:13.
68. Doe Victim B’s wife stated:
[Doe Victim B is] backward, he don’t want to speak to anybody,
he won't go into the store now, he won’t -- I have to beg him to go
anywhere with me. And so I’m pretty much have to do everything
myself, pretty much raised the kids myself, because he won't do
anything. I feel that my kids have lost their father of what he could
have been, you know.”
Id. at 139:1-6.
69. Dr. Pastor described Doe Victim B’s condition as follows:
[F]indings from the examination of [Doe Victim B] meet the
criteria for traumatic grief and Persistent Complex Bereavement
Disorder, coded as the DSM-5 diagnosis 309.89, Other Specified
Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder (Persistent Complex
Bereavement Disorder). Findings include yearning or longing for
the deceased, difficulty accepting the loss, bitterness or anger,
prolonged sadness, feelings of horror and pain from contemplating
the manner of death, and difficulty trusting others. Doe Victim B
continues an internal, mental relationship with Kevin in his mind
that is evidence of a close relationship with Kevin, whom he
looked up to as a significant support person and role model.
Finding a co-worker who looks “exactly like” and reminds him of
his deceased brother is considered a result of yearning or longing
for the deceased. To date Doe Victim B continues to experience
intense sadness and emotional pain related to the death of his
brother.
PEX 4 at ¶ 17.
C. Doe Victim C
70. Doe Victim C is Kevin’s second youngest brother. [#40] at 56:4-13.
71. Doe Victim C was close with Kevin growing up. Id. at 57:10-11. As adults, the brothers
spoke once a week, even though they lived in different states. Id. at 58:1-6; 60:24-25. Kevin was
a figure of stability and a role model for Doe Victim C. Id. at 58:21-25.
72. Doe Victim C testified that he was in prison when Kevin was killed. Id. at 58:6-7.
73. After Kevin was killed, Doe Victim C began to experience nightmares of Kevin’s death
and became severely depressed. Id. at 64:11-65:3. As a result, Doe Victim C has not been able
to work and is on disability for his depression. Id. at 65:4-14.
74. Dr. Pastor described Doe Victim C’s condition as follows:
It is my medical opinion that Doe Victim C is severely impaired
and merits the diagnosis of PTSD, with nightmares,
hypervigilance, re-experiencing, avoidance, chronic insomnia,
stress-intolerance and reduced role functioning. The PTSD-
inducing stressor was the sudden loss of his brother Kevin. There
is an implication of cognitive distortion as a defense mechanism in
order to block out what would be an even more painful reality; i.e.,
despite evidence for an overwhelmingly lethal blast that mangled
bodies and encased sailors in between massively twisted metal
hulls, examinee finds solace in the improbable case that his brother
was able to remain conscious and experience a peaceful, thoughtful
last few moments before death.
PEX 4 at ¶ 25.
D. Doe Victim D
75. Doe Victim D is one of Kevin’s older brothers. [#40] at 47:7-9.
76. Doe Victim D has struggled with depression his entire life and attempted suicide prior to
Kevin’s death. PEX 4 at ¶ 18. While he was in high school, his father kicked him out of the
house. Id. He later “spent three years in prison on a charge of probation violation/drug
possession.” Id.
77. Doe Victim D and Kevin were very close. [#40] at 47:18-22. Doe Victim D thought of
Kevin as his “best friend.” Id. at 48:16.
78. Doe Victim D also joined the Navy and they were both stationed in Charleston, South
Carolina. Id. at 47:23-48:4.
79. After Kevin died, Doe Victim D began experiencing nightmares on a daily basis, and
began using recreational drugs to cope with his depression. PEX 4 at ¶ 20. Doe Victim D has
struggled with depression both before and after Kevin’s death and has been prescribed a variety
of psychotropic medications. Id. at ¶ 18.
80. Dr. Pastor described Doe Victim D’s condition as follows:
[Doe Victim D suffers from] chronic, debilitating emotional pain
related to the sudden death of Kevin Rux. Symptoms include
feelings of sadness, loss, helplessness, avoidance behaviors,
sudden grief intruding into otherwise enjoyable moments, and
impaired self-care. Doe Victim D meets the DSM criteria for
Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder with significant
personal distress and functional impairment in ability to work and
health-related behavior: according to the DSM-5, “Persistent
complex bereavement disorder is associated with deficits in work
and social functioning and with harmful health behaviors, such as
increased tobacco . . . use.” (p.792) Examinee also reports a
history of prior depression. Recovery from depression is
negatively impacted by stressful life events and it is my opinion
that Doe Victim D also merits a psychiatric diagnosis of residual
depression (depressive disorder, in partial remission, DSM code
296.25) with lack of full remission resulting from the stressor of
Kevin’s sudden and violent death.
Id. at ¶ 21.
E. Doe Victim E
81. Doe Victim E is Kevin’s oldest brother. [#40] at 33:3-14.
82. Doe Victim E and Kevin had a very close relationship. Id. at 33:15-22.
83. Doe Victim E testified that they moved around a lot as a family because their father was
in the Navy. Id. at 34:21.
84. After Kevin died, Doe Victim E fell into a deep depression and cried regularly in the five
years following his brother’s death. PEX 4 at ¶ 21. He is constantly preoccupied by images of
his brother’s death, and imagines him suffering. Id. His pain is just as intense today as it was the
day he learned that Kevin was killed. Id.
85. Dr. Pastor described Doe Victim E’s condition as follows:
It is my medical opinion that Doe Victim E had a close and loving
relationship with his brother Kevin Rux and suffered severe
sadness, anger, and grief following Kevin’s death, including years
of significant emotional distress and depression. Ken meets the
criteria for the diagnosis of DSM 309.89, Other Trauma and
Stress-Related Disorder (persistent complex bereavement
disorder). Doe Victim E’s feelings of loss and emotional pain
continue to the present day. He may be at risk of using alcohol
from time to time to deaden the emotional pain.
PEX 4 at ¶ 28.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Standing
In order to have standing in an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, either “the claimant or
the victim [must be] a national of the United States” at the time of the terrorist act. 28 U.S.C. §
1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Pursuant to the United States Code, a “national of the United States” is
defined as “(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22). In this
case, each of the five plaintiffs is a United States citizen, and therefore each has standing to bring
suit under the FSIA. See [#18] ¶¶ 4-8.
II. Jurisdiction
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Legal Standard
The FSIA provides generally as follows:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to
1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604. See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
434-35 (1989) (holding that the FSIA provides the sole basis for a district court to assert
jurisdiction over a foreign state).
Under section 1605A, no foreign sovereign immunity exists where:
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources for such an act if such act or
provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an
official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).
Under the FSIA, the term “extrajudicial killing” is defined as “a deliberated killing not
authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992); § 1605A(h)(7).
The term “material support or resources” is defined as “any property, tangible or intangible, or
service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(3) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1)). See also Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67-68
(D.D.C. 2008) (providing examples of material support).
2. Analysis
In this case, the Court may assert jurisdiction over the subject matter because money
damages are sought for an extrajudicial killing that was caused by the provision of material
support or resources (financial support, support for training, and facilitation of travel) to Bin
Laden and Al-Qaeda by the Sudanese and Iranian defendants, acting within the scope of their
official employment. See generally [#18].
B. Personal Jurisdiction
1. Legal Standard
Under the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists if the defendants have been properly served
pursuant to section 1608. Subsection (a) governs service upon a foreign state or political
subdivision of a foreign state, while subsection (b) provides for service upon an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) and (b); I.T. Consultants Inc. v.
Republic of Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
In determining whether a foreign entity is to be treated as the state itself or as an agency
or instrumentality, courts employ the “core functions” test articulated in Roeder v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Pursuant to this “categorical approach,” if the
core functions of the entity are governmental, it is considered to be a foreign state but if its core
functions are commercial, it is considered to be an agency or instrumentality of that state. Id. at
234.
2. Analysis
Sudan and Iran are clearly foreign states. With respect to the seven remaining Sudanese
defendants, because they are each subdivisions of the Sudanese government and perform
governmental functions, they will be treated as the foreign state of Sudan. See [#18] ¶¶ 12, 15;
Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2005) (treating Sudan’s Ministry
of the Interior as a foreign state). With respect to the three remaining Iranian defendants,
because they too are each subdivisions of the Iranian government, they will be treated as the
foreign state of Iran. See [#18] ¶¶ 9, 10; Nikbin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 471 F. Supp. 2d 53,
59 (D.D.C. 2007) (treating Iran’s MOIS and the Revolutionary Guards as foreign states). Having
determined that each of the Sudanese and Iranian defendants is, under the FSIA, a foreign state,
the next issue is whether service of process was perfected.
With respect to the Sudanese defendants, service was perfected on January 30, 2011,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3), through courier delivery of the summonses, complaints and
attachments to Ahmed Ali Karti, the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Khartoum, Sudan.
See Return of Service [#15]. With respect to the Iranian defendants, because the United States
does not maintain diplomatic relations with Iran, service was perfected on February 15, 2010,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4), through delivery of the summonses, complaints and notices of suit
to the Foreign Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran, for conveyance to the
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See April 19, 2011 and April 20, 2011 letters from William
Fritzlen, Attorney Advisor at the State Department’s Office of Policy Review and Interagency
Liaison, to Angela Caesar, Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
[#16]. Because plaintiffs properly served the Sudanese and Iranian defendants, this Court may
assert subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b); TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property
Fund, 411 F.3d 296, 327 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
III. Default Judgment
A. Legal Standard
Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure
is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a). After the party’s default is entered, plaintiffs must move the court for the entry of a
default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
Before plaintiffs can be awarded any relief, however, plaintiffs must establish their
claims by “evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). See also Taylor v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2011); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195
F. Supp. 2d 140, 159 (D.D.C. 2002). This requirement “imposes a duty on FSIA courts to not
simply accept a complaint’s unsupported allegations as true, and obligates courts to ‘inquire
further before entering judgment’ against parties in default.” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
In evaluating plaintiffs’ proofs, a court may “accept as true plaintiffs’ uncontroverted
evidence, which may take the form of sworn affidavits or prior transcripts.” Estate of Botvin v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 510 F. Supp. 2d 101, 103 (D.D.C. 2007). Such evidence may also
include judicial notice of the evidence presented in related proceedings. Id.
B. Analysis
There are five elements of liability under the FSIA’s state-sponsored terrorism exception:
“(1) ‘an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or provision of
material support or resources for such an act’ where (2) the act was committed, or the provision
provided, by the foreign state or agent of the foreign state, and the act (3) ‘caused’ (4) ‘personal
injury or death’ (5) ‘for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under
this section for money damages.’” Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 907 F. Supp. 2d 93, 101
(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1605A(1), (c)). In order to satisfy the third and fourth
elements, plaintiffs must “prove a theory of liability under which defendants cause the requisite
injury or death.” Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 73 (D.D.C. 2010). “In
other words, plaintiffs in § 1605A actions—whether seeking solely punitive damages or pursuing
compensatory relief as well—must articulate the justification for such recovery, generally
through the lens of civil tort liability.” Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76.
In this case, it has been established, with evidence satisfactory to the Court, that the
defendants, through the provision of material support and resources (the financial support,
support for training, and facilitation of travel) to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, facilitated the
planning and execution of the attack on the Cole, which resulted in the extrajudicial killing of
Kevin Rux. See Findings of Fact supra ¶¶ 17-34 (Sudanese defendants); ¶¶ 40-55 (Iranian
defendants). The next issue, therefore, is whether plaintiffs have proven an appropriate theory of
liability.
Plaintiffs claim that the defendants are liable upon a theory of IIED and solatium. See
[#18] ¶¶ 138-144. Under the Restatement of Torts, a defendant shall be liable for IIED to family
members of an injured person if the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct which
1) was directed at persons other than plaintiffs and 2) intentionally or recklessly caused severe
emotional distress, but not necessarily bodily harm, to such persons’ immediate family members,
who were present at the time such conduct occurred. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1)-
(2)(a) (1965). “Acts of terrorism are by their very definition extreme and outrageous and
intended to cause the highest degree of emotional distress.” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d
78, 89 (D.D.C. 2002)). Notably, in terrorism actions brought pursuant to section 1605A of the
FSIA, the requirement of presence at the time of the incident is waived. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d
at 80 (“One [ ] need not be present at the time of a terrorist attack upon a third person to recover
for severe emotional injuries suffered as a result.”).
Under the FSIA, a claim for solatium is nearly indistinguishable from a claim for IIED.
Spencer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 12-CIV-42, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2014 WL 5141429,
at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2014) (citing Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85). “A claim of solatium is a
claim for the mental anguish, bereavement and grief that those with a close personal relationship
to a decedent experience as the result of the decedent’s death, as well as the harm caused by the
loss of the decedent, society and comfort.” Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (citing Dammarell v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 196–97 (D.D.C. 2003); Elahi v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2000)). However, because plaintiffs can only recover
once for their claims of IIED and solatium and “[b]ecause section 1605A explicitly makes
damages for solatium available, the Court will proceed [solely] under this theory of recovery.”
Belkin, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
In this case, it has been established, with evidence satisfactory to the Court, that the
defendants enabled Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to perpetrate the attack on the Cole, thereby
causing Kevin’s death and the resulting mental anguish, bereavement, and grief of his immediate
family members, the plaintiffs. See Findings of Fact supra ¶¶ 57-85 (detailing injury caused to
Kevin’s mother and brothers as a result of his death).
IV. Damages
In any action brought under section 1605A of the FSIA, “damages may include economic
damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). In this
case, plaintiffs seek both compensatory and punitive damages, and the Court will consider each
in turn after a preliminary discussion of joint and several liability.
A. Joint and Several Liability
1. Legal Standard
In section 1605A actions against foreign states or their instrumentalities, the court may
assess damages jointly and severally against defendants that conspired to provide material
support for terrorist activity. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30, 34
(D.D.C. 2012) (making Iranian and Syrian defendants jointly and severally liable for all
damages, where Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”) received “substantial logistical, financial, and
technical support” from and “act[ed] as agents for” the defendants); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 59 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
Iranian Ministry of Information and Security jointly and severally liable for all damages). 28
2. Analysis
Because the record supports a finding that the Iranian and Sudanese defendants conspired
to support Al-Qaeda, which in turn carried out the bombing of the Cole, the Court concludes that
all defendants shall be jointly and severally liable for all damages. This conspiracy can be traced
back at least to 1991, when Iran and Sudan decided to form a “tripartite front” against the United
States and Israel, agreeing to collaborate both “politically and militarily.” PEX 16 at 6–7.
Iran took primary responsibility for transferring, via Lebanese Hizballah, extensive
technical expertise to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. See id. at 8; PEX 27 at 2–7;
PEX 9 at 61. In the 1990s, Al-Qaeda was able to deepen relationships with Iranian officials and
Hizballah. See PEX 27 at 2–7; PEX 9 at 61. Al-Qaeda also used Iran as a “transit point” for
moving money and fighters. PEX 2 at ¶ 36; cf. Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (“[T]he Iranian
Defendants funneled money through the Syrian Defendants to the PIJ in order for the PIJ to carry
out terrorist attacks.”). In the years leading up to the Cole bombing, Iran was directly involved
in establishing Al-Qaeda’s Yemen network and supported training and logistics for Al-Qaeda in
the Gulf region. See PEX 3 at ¶ 70. Throughout, Iran used Lebanese Hizballah, long-trusted yet
easily distanced in public, as its primary “facilitator” for providing training and communications
support. PEX 3 at ¶ 49.
28
Cf. Blue v. Rose, 786 F.2d 349, 352–53 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[W]here an award of punitive damages is based upon
actions by one or more partners acting within the scope of authority and in further[a]nce of the partnership business,
. . . under the general principles of agency and partnership law, all the partners could be held jointly liable for the
punitive damages, and a single sum verdict is warranted.”). As an alternative to joint and several liability, the
majority of U.S. jurisdictions allow courts to apportion punitive damages according to the culpability of individual
defendants. See 2 John J. Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, Punitive Damages: Law and Practice §§ 16:8–16:9
(2014) (reviewing cases). Here, however, the record provides no clear rationale for apportionment, and the plaintiffs
do not request such a remedy. See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Redacted [#44] at
55 (seeking final judgment against defendants “jointly and severally”).
For its part, Sudan served as a meeting place, safe haven, and training ground for Al-
Qaeda and others, including Lebanese Hizballah in the 1990s and into 2000. See PEX 12 at 10;
PEX 15 at 10; cf. Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 35(“[T]he safe haven, advice, encouragement,
assistance, and facilities provided by Syrian Defendants substantially contributed to the PIJ’s
ability to train suicide bombers.”). In exchange, Bin Laden agreed to support Turabi, head of
Sudan’s NIF, in his war against Christian separatists in southern Sudan. See PEX 9 at 57.
Additionally, Bin Laden established business ventures with the NIF elite that facilitated the
transfer of funds for terrorist activities. See PEX 1 at ¶¶ 19, 35. In sum, Sudan’s support was
“indispensable” in enabling Al-Qaeda to acquire expertise and contacts for carrying out the Cole
bombing. PEX 1 at ¶ 81.
Lastly, there is ample evidence that Al-Qaeda carried out the final act of bombing the
Cole and proximately causing the injury suffered by the plaintiffs. See PEX 3 at ¶¶ 70, 81. In
light of the evidence of the Iranian and Sudanese defendants’ conspiracy to support the terrorist
activities of Al-Qaeda, which ultimately executed the Cole bombing, joint and several liability
for all damages is appropriate.
B. Compensatory Damages
1. Legal Standard
In determining the appropriate amount of compensatory damages, courts may look to
prior decisions awarding damages for pain and suffering, and to those awarding damages for
solatium. See Acosta v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citing Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 71 (D.D.C. 2006)). In Estate of
Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2006), the court, following an
extensive survey of other decisions of the District Court for the District of Columbia, noted that
“courts typically award between $8 million and $12 million for pain and suffering resulting from
the death of a spouse[,] approximately $5 million to a parent whose child was killed[,] and
approximately $2.5 million to a plaintiff whose sibling was killed.” Id. at 269. It is also true,
however, that courts “award greater amounts in cases with ‘with aggravating circumstances,’ . . .
indicated by such things as ‘[t]estimony which describes a general feeling of permanent loss or
change caused by decedent's absence’ or ‘[m]edical treatment for depression and related
affective disorders,’” Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85-86 (internal citations omitted). With respect
to such enhancements, the court in Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F. Supp. 2d 16
(D.D.C. 2011), noted the following:
Factors pertinent to the determination of damage enhancements are
largely derived from common sense, and generally fall into one of
three categories: evidence establishing an especially close
relationship between the plaintiff and decedent, particularly in
comparison to the normal interactions to be expected given the
familial relationship; medical proof of severe pain, grief or
suffering on behalf of the claimant; and circumstances surrounding
the terrorist attack which made the suffering particularly more
acute or agonizing.
Id. at 26-27. Accord Spencer, 2014 WL 5141429, at *3.
2. Analysis
In this case, the evidence demonstrates that Kevin was the center of his family. See
Findings of Fact supra ¶¶ 57-85. His unexpected death was devastating to his mother and
brothers. Id. Furthermore, the violent nature in which he died further exacerbated their grief and
mental suffering, with several of his family members tortured by the fact that he may have
suffered before he died. See generally PEX 4. Finally, the medical evidence shows that each
plaintiff experienced extraordinarily severe pain and suffering following Kevin’s death. Id. at ¶¶
9-12 (concluding that Plaintiff A suffers from “traumatic grief” or “persistent complex
bereavement-related disorder”); Id. at ¶ 17 (concluding that Plaintiff B suffers from “traumatic
grief” or “persistent complex bereavement-related disorder”); Id. at ¶ 25 (concluding that
Plaintiff C suffers from PTSD); Id. at ¶ 21 (concluding that Plaintiff D suffers from “traumatic
grief” or “persistent complex bereavement-related disorder”); Id. at ¶ 28 (concluding that
Plaintiff E suffers from “traumatic grief” or “persistent complex bereavement-related disorder”).
Under these circumstances an upward departure of 25% 29 of the baseline is warranted.
Accordingly, each plaintiff shall be awarded the following damages for solatium:
Plaintiff Relationship Baseline 25% Total Solatium
to Kevin Award Enhancement Damages
1. Plaintiff A Mother $5,000,000 $1,250,000 $6,250,000
2. Plaintiff B Brother $2,500,000 $625,000 $3,125,000
3. Plaintiff C Brother $2,500,000 $625,000 $3,125,000
4. Plaintiff D Brother $2,500,000 $625,000 $3,125,000
5. Plaintiff E Brother $2,500,000 $625,000 $3,125,000
C. Punitive Damages
1. Legal Standard
“[T]he purpose of punitive damages is ‘to punish’ a defendant for ‘outrageous conduct,’
and ‘to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.’” Baker, 775 F. Supp.
2d at 84 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977)). In calculating an award of
punitive damages under section 1605A of the FSIA, 30 courts evaluate four factors: “‘(1) the
character of the defendant’s act, (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that defendants
29
Although plaintiffs seek an upward departure of 50%, the Court finds this to be excessive. In this case, although
each family member appears to have had an extremely close relationship with Kevin, the Court notes that not all of
the emotional harm and dysfunction currently being experienced by the plaintiffs is necessarily attributable to the
attack. As noted above, Kevin’s mother’s father was an alcoholic and she married an alcoholic. See Findings of
Fact supra ¶¶ 57-85. After her divorce from him, she raised five boys on her own. Id. Of those five boys, two of
them served time in prison prior to the attack and one of them was in prison at the time of the attack. Id. Thus,
without diminishing the pain and anguish felt by the plaintiffs, the Court simply notes that an enhancement of 25%
is more appropriate in this instance. See Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48,
83 (D.D.C. 2011) (approving an upward departure of 25% from the baseline for solatium damages); Valore, 700 F.
Supp. 2d at 86 (same).
30
Punitive damages against state sponsors of terrorism first became available in 2008. See Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d
at 87.
caused or intended to cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants.’”
Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (internal citations omitted). Courts have found these factors to be
satisfied when a defendant has provided material support to a terrorist organization in carrying
out an act of terrorism. See, e.g., Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (finding that an award of punitive
damages was warranted where “defendants supported, protected, harbored, aided, abetted,
enabled, sponsored, conspired with, and subsidized a known terrorist organization whose modus
operandi included the targeting, brutalization, and murder of American citizens and others”);
Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 235 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that an
award of punitive damages was warranted where “[t]he defendant organized, trained, and funded
[terrorist organizations] so that [they] could torture and take individuals like the plaintiff
hostage”).
2. Analysis
In this case, punitive damages are clearly warranted. First, when the Cole was bombed, it
was manned by 26 officers and 270 enlisted personnel. See Findings of Fact supra ¶ 8. The
result of the bombing was the death of 17 American sailors and the injury of 42 others. Id. ¶ 10.
This was, without a doubt, a heinous act. The defendants’ provision of material support to the
perpetrators of that bombing was no less heinous. See Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (finding
that “[w]hile Sudan’s support of Al Qaeda [in the bombing of the Cole] does not rise to level of
direct involvement in the attacks, it was nonetheless intentional, material and, as a result,
reprehensible”).
Second, in supporting Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, the defendants’ intention was clearly to
further their own Anti-Western, Anti-American agenda. See Findings of Fact supra ¶¶ 11-16
(Sudanese defendants); ¶¶ 35-39 (Iranian defendants).
Third, numerous courts have acknowledged that the need to deter these defendants from
committing future terrorist acts is great. See, e.g., Onsongo v. Republic of Sudan, No. 08-CIV-
1380, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, ---, 2014 WL 3702875, at *5 (D.D.C. July 25, 2014) (awarding punitive
damages against Sudan following the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya,
upon a finding that the need for deterrence was great); Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42
(awarding punitive damages against Iran following the suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv restaurant,
upon an implicit finding that the need for deterrence was great); Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 50-
51 (awarding punitive damages against Sudan following the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, upon a
finding that the need for deterrence was great); Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 784 F. Supp.
2d 1, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2011) (awarding punitive damages against Iran following the suicide
bombing of an Israeli bus, upon an implicit finding that the need for deterrence was great).
Furthermore, it appears as though Iran is acutely aware of these U.S. lawsuits:
Iranian leaders pay close attention to civil suits about terrorism. In
2000/01, the issue was a major controversy in Iran. . . . Former
Iranian President, now chairman of the powerful Expediency
Council (charged with resolving disputes among the various organs
of government), Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani complained at
length about the suits, as did numerous members of Iran’s
Parliament. Of particular concern was the large punitive damage
awards assessed against Iran, which they acknowledged exceeded
a billion dollars. . . .
***
While Iranian leaders do pay close attention to the court judgments
against Iran for its material support of terrorism, the effort to
dissuade Iran from providing financial support for terrorism
against Americans encountered several significant obstacles until
recently. First, from 2005-2013, the president of Iran was
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, [ ] a right-wing extremist who enjoyed
attacking the United States and mocking its power. Second, Iran’s
much higher oil income after 2005 because of higher oil prices
made it easier for Iran to allocate more funds for the support of
terrorism during the years until the additional U.S. and European
Union sanctions of 2013 sharply reduced Iran’s oil [income].
Third, the perceived success of major terrorist groups that receive
material support from Iran, namely, Hizbollah’s performance in its
2006 confrontation with Israel, followed up by its 2009-2010
success in keeping a role in the Lebanese government despite
doing poorly in the elections, and HAMAS’ 2006 takeover of Gaza
(though that has been tarnished by its poor showing in the 2008-
2009 confrontation with Israel). Fourth, the perception in recent
years has been that the United States has been unable to exercise
power in the Middle East: it was tied down by Iraqi and Afghan
insurgents until it decided to scale back or end its military role, it
announced that it would pivot to Asia with an implicit reduced role
in the Middle East, and it was unable to put into effect President
Barak Obama’s 2012 call for Syrian President Assad to leave
office. Iranian leaders have often proclaimed these developments
as evidence that Islamist resistance movements and their terrorist
activities can defeat the United States. In consideration of these
factors, the financial pressure to abandon terrorism against U.S.
citizens and entities as a result of past court judgments was not
sufficient[ ] to induce Iran to change course.
But that pressure, in my opinion, certainly remains, and should not
be underestimated as an element in Iran’s calculation about
whether and how to support terrorism against Americans. For one
thing, Iran is less confident in 2014 than it was some years ago, in
no small part because of the U.S. success since 2012 in persuading
other countries to join in tougher sanctions against Iran. A factor
which could make court judgments more effective at leading Iran
to reconsider its policy of terrorism against Americans is Iran’s
active pursuit of a nuclear accord with the United States. In the
2013 Iranian presidential elections, all of the candidates except the
one most associated with hardliners argued that Iran must
compromise with the international community in order to secure
relief from international sanctions. Indeed, the heart of winning
candidate Hussein Rouhani’s campaign was that the only way to
improve Iran’s dreadful economic situation was to obtain sanctions
relief and that required compromising with the United States about
the nuclear program. To the extent that the Iranian government is
focused on how to obtain sanctions relief, that government will be
more sensitive to pressure related to Iran’s support for terrorism
against Americans. To be sure, Supreme Leader Khamenei is
skeptical about the nuclear negotiations and counsels adopting an
“economy of resistance” which does not rely on sanctions relief.
Yet the issue of how to improve the economy and how much to
compromise with the West is in my expert opinion a matter being
vigorously debated in Iran, and court judgments which highlight
the cost for terrorism support could be an important element in that
debate.
That is especially the case since recent legal actions suggest that
substantial Iranian assets could be at risk. While I am not at liberty
to discuss a number of actions in which I am an expert witness and
where the proceedings are under seal, I can note that the Wall
Street Journal has reported that in one case, more than one billion
dollars is at stake. In 2013, a federal court ordered the surrender of
the assets of the Alavi Foundation of New York – worth in excess
of $600 million -- on the grounds that the Foundation was
controlled by the Iranian government. Furthermore, Canada
revised its laws in [ ] to allow seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy
court judgments against Iran. In March 2014, a Canadian court
ordered the seizure of more than $7 million in Iranian assets under
the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act to satisfy court judgments
in the United States. Iranian media have extensively reported on
this case. The prospect that Iran must contemplate is that
additional countries may permit seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy
the U.S. court judgments, which could considerably complicate
Iranian trade and put at risk substantial Iranian assets abroad.
Iran has recently been taking a more active stance on terrorism-
related lawsuits brought against it. Although Iran has had a long
history of failing to appear in these lawsuits, Iran has entered
several recent suits. For instance, as I mentioned earlier, in 2004,
plaintiffs holding judgments against Iran filed a property claim for
ancient Iranian tablets held by the University of Chicago’s Oriental
Institute. The suit was initially ignored by Iran. However, in 2009,
after the district court finally ruled that the case could proceed, Iran
intervened in the case. Indeed, Iran has vigorously defended a
Canadian wrongful death suit against it, Estate of the Late Zahra
(Ziba) Kazemi, and Stephan (Salman) Hashemi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, et al., Case No. 500-17-031760-062 (Sup. Ct.
Montreal), since suit was filed in 2009. And since 2011, the Alavi
Foundation of New York has vigorously but so far unsuccessfully
contested in federal court the U.S. seizure of its assets.
. . . Here, Iran has not decreased its support for terrorism, but
instead has dramatically increased and widened its support for
terrorists, terrorist organizations, and terrorist activities throughout
the world. Punishment can be measured, in large part, by assessing
significant financial damages for Iran’s continued and wide-
ranging worldwide support for terrorism, both directly and through
its governmental arms (MOIS, IRGC, and IRGC Qods) and
through Hizbollah. Iran is blatant in its support of terrorism. As
to deterrence, there [are] two factors to consider: deterring similar
conduct by others and making further efforts to deter Iran in its
bold and increasing support for terrorism, which Iran uses to
expand its influence, its reach, and its force by terrorist means.
It is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that Iranian
officials pay extremely close attention to what the outside world
has to say about the Iranian government and its policies, and they
generally assume that whatever is written about Iran – whether by
judges, by independent newspapers, by non-governmental
organizations, or by foreign ministries – is a direct product of a
unified policy by the government of the country from which the
comment originates. Further, as I noted earlier, the Iranians have
shown themselves to be sensitive to punitive damages levied
against them, and they are well aware that such damages have been
a common feature in actions against Iran for its support of
terrorism against Americans. Were this Court not to impose
punitive damages for what was a spectacular terrorist act, this
would be read by Iranian government officials as indicating a
significant weakening of U.S. pressure on Iran to end its support
for terrorism against Americans. On the other hand, were this
Court to impose substantial punitive damages, this would be read
by Iranian officials as indicating that U.S. policy remains firmly
opposed to Iranian support for terrorism against Americans.
PEX 2 at ¶¶ 92-99.
The degree to which Sudan is concerned about these U.S. lawsuits is unclear, as none of
plaintiffs’ experts addressed this issue. However, the state has, on occasion, participated in
litigation brought in U.S. courts. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (full participation); Kumar v. Republic of Sudan, No. 2:10-CIV-171, 2011 WL 4369122
(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2011) (limited participation); Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 672 F. Supp. 2d 726
(E.D. Va. 2009) (limited participation).
Finally, the wealth of Sudan and Iran supports an award of punitive damages. In 2014,
Sudan’s GDP was estimated at $85.3 billion. See http://www.heritage.org/index/country/sudan
(last visited Jan.26, 2015). Iran’s GDP in 2014 was estimated at $999.2 billion. See
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/iran (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). In light of the foregoing
analysis, the Court concludes that an award of punitive damages is warranted.
The next step, then, is to quantify punitive damages. Courts have adopted two primary
approaches to calculating punitive damages against foreign states under section 1605A of the
FSIA, but both approaches seem ill-suited to this case.
Many courts apply the Flatow method, multiplying the defendant state’s annual
expenditures on terrorism (the multiplicand) by a factor usually ranging from three to five (the
multiplier). See, e.g., Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 789 F. Supp. 2d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2011)
(using multiplier of three); Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (using multiplier of five); Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 32–34 (D.D.C. 1998) (articulating punitive damages’
dual purposes of retribution and deterrence, and applying multiplier of three). Applying the
Flatow method here could send a strong message of deterrence, but strikes this Court as
potentially excessive. Iran’s support for terrorism was estimated in 2008 to amount to $200
million. See PEX 2 at ¶ 91 (citing 2008 Patterns of Global Terrorism report). 31 Plaintiffs ask
this Court to multiply this sum by a multiplier of five (5), render a total punitive award of $1
billion, and allocate this amount to each plaintiff according to his or her share of compensatory
damages. 32 See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Redacted [#44] at
31
In applying the Flatow method, courts disagree on whether terrorism spending should reflect, on the one hand,
spending at the time of the attack at issue (or at least in years immediately prior to the attack) or, on the other, annual
spending at the time of litigation. Compare Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 11-cv-1377 (RCL), 2015 WL
349208, at *18 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2015) (using Iran’s “annual material support to Hamas during the 1990s” as Flatow
multiplicand for damages in case arising from 2001 terror attack), with Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151
F. Supp. 2d 27, 44, 53 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding that Iran “currently spends approximately $100 million per year or
more on terrorist activities,” in calculating damages in connection with captivity spanning from 1985 to 1991).
Additionally, some courts focus on spending directed at the terrorist organization that perpetrated the attack at issue,
rather than total support of terrorism. Compare Roth, 2015 WL 349208, at *18 (isolating support to Hamas);
Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (isolating support to Hizballah), with Haim, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (using “annual
support for international terrorism” as Flatow multiplicand).
32
Tellingly, in asking the Court to apply a $200 million multiplicand, the plaintiffs decline to adopt their own
expert’s “highly conservative estimate” of Iran’s annual terrorism support as ranging from $300 to $500 million.
See PEX 2 at ¶ 91. Additionally, the plaintiffs justify the use of the higher multiplier of five with cursory references
55. But under this approach, each of the five plaintiffs in this case would receive punitive
damages amounting to approximately fifty-three (53) times his or her compensatory damages. 33
Under the second approach, some courts impose a fixed $300 million punitive award.
This approach is based on courts’ perception that punitive awards are converging toward this
figure, and on the theory that consistent, foreseeable punishment serves as a better deterrent for
the rational bad actor. See, e.g., Bodoff, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (awarding $300 million in
punitive damages and explaining that a punitive damage award should be “reasonably
predictable in its severity” so that a “bad man can look ahead with some ability to know what the
stakes are in choosing one course of action or another” (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008))); Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (same). But this approach, even more
so than the Flatow method, limits courts’ discretion to tailor a punitive award appropriate for the
magnitude of the underlying injury. Compare Bodoff, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 106 (awarding $300
million in punitive damages to five plaintiffs whose compensatory damages totaled
approximately $17 million), with Oveissi, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (awarding $300 million in
punitive damages to one plaintiff whose compensatory damages totaled $7.5 million); see also
Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (considering “the character of the defendant’s act” and “the nature
to “new terrorist threats such as Bokom Haram [sic] and ISIS,” without explaining any purported linkages between
these groups and the Iranian or Sudanese defendants. See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Redacted [#44] at 55.
33
By way of further illustration, plugging into the Flatow formula (with a multiplier of 3) an annual terrorism
spending figure of $400 million would yield a total punitive award of $1.2 billion and a per-plaintiff punitive-
compensatory ratio of sixty-four (64), and spending of $500 million would correspond with a total punitive award of
$1.5 billion and a punitive-compensatory ratio of eighty (80). If the Due Process Clause governed these proceedings
(which it does not, see infra note 37), ratios of 53, 64, and 80, might all be unconstitutional. See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due
process, while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500
to 1 or, in this case, of 145 to 1.” (internal citation omitted)).
and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that defendants caused or intended to cause,” among other
factors, in calculating punitive damages (internal quotation marks omitted)). 34
Most crucially, both approaches fail to account for a relatively unique feature of this case:
This Court has already rendered a punitive award against the Republic of Sudan in connection
with the very same bombing of the Cole. See Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23
(D.D.C. 2012). The Harrison court applied the Flatow method, but explained that in light of the
absence of “evidence relating to Sudan’s actual expenditures on terrorist activities,” it would
“use the compensatory damages value as the multiplicand.” Id. at 50. The court then used a
multiplier of three, in the absence of any “exceptional circumstances” justifying an upward
adjustment. Id. 35 The eighteen plaintiffs, who are not in this case, were awarded punitive
damages in the amount of $236,029,422. Id. at 51.
34
See also 2 John J. Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, Punitive Damages: Law and Practice § 18:8 (2014)
(reviewing cases and explaining that courts calculating punitive damages consider the “‘nature and enormity of the
wrong,’ the ‘magnitude and flagrancy’ of the offense, [and] the ‘blameworthiness and harmfulness’ of the
misconduct” (internal citations omitted)); Robert J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111
Mich. L. Rev. 33, 36–37 (2012) (“[P]unitive damages should equal the harm multiplied by the reciprocal of the
injurer’s chance of being found liable for wrongful activities.” (emphasis added)).
Other courts prefer a fixed punitive award for each immediate victim harmed directly by the terrorist act
(i.e., those whom the terrorists killed, tortured, kidnapped, etc.). See, e.g., Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (awarding
$150,000,000 in punitive damages against Syria for each of three Americans shot in execution-style by terrorist
hijackers, for a total punitive award of $450,000,000); Gates, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (awarding $150,000,000 in
punitive damages against Syria for each of two civilian contractors beheaded by Al-Qaeda in Iraq operatives, for a
total punitive award of $300,000,000). But this immediate-victim approach cannot fully account for the foreseeable
effects of terrorism on secondary victims such as family members or other potential claimants. The more numerous
these secondary victims, the greater the likelihood that the immediate-victim methodology could under-punish and
under-deter the perpetrator, relative to the actual magnitude of resultant harm. A further complication is that, insofar
as duplicative punishment is to be avoided, courts instating immediate-victim punitive awards assume that all
potential plaintiffs are before the court and that no other secondary victims have brought or will bring claims related
to the same immediate victim. See Baker, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (awarding punitive damages to “each of the victims
of the hijacking and their families”); Gates, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (awarding punitive damages to estates of two
victims). But this case illustrates the limits of such an assumption: Kevin’s wife is not in this case and, in fact, was
unable to obtain punitive damages in the earlier Rux case. See infra note 35.
35
As already discussed, see supra note 2, Rux arose out of the same attack on the Cole (and even involves the same
decedent, though not the same plaintiffs as this case). But because the Rux court awarded only compensatory and
not punitive damages, that case does not present the problem of duplicative punitive damages. The newly enacted
section 1605A authorizing punitive damages had no retroactive application to the Rux plaintiffs’ suit, and the district
court denied their motion to amend their complaint to request punitive and other damages under that section. See
Rux, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 566–67 (describing compensatory damages); Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 672 F. Supp. 2d
This Court’s prior assessment in Harrison of punitive damages against Sudan for the
same attack on the Cole presents two additional challenges. First, the Court should avoid
imposing a duplicative punishment against the Sudanese defendants for the same conduct, given
that they are jointly and severally liable for all damages in this case. See supra Part IV.A. 36
Second, the Court is concerned for consistency on an individual plaintiff level; a punitive award
should minimize any disparities between the Harrison plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in this case,
whose injuries are similar in “nature and extent” and thus warrant comparable levels of
punishment and deterrence. See Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
Fortunately, the shortcomings of the Flatow and fixed-award approaches and the
duplication and consistency challenges presented by Harrison’s prior punitive award all find a
reasonably elegant solution in Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C.
2010). In Murphy, the plaintiffs’ injuries arose from the 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marine Corps
barracks in Lebanon. Id. at 55. In calculating the punitive award, the court acknowledged a
“quandary”: It had already awarded punitive damages against Iran in Valore for precisely the
same bombing. See id. at 81. “Recurrent awards in case after case arising out of the same
facts,” the Court reasoned, “can financially cripple a defendant, over-punishing the same conduct
through repeated awards with little additional deterrent effect, and awards . . . can differ, creating
anomalous results.” Id.
726, 730–34, 738 (E.D. Va. 2009) (explaining section 1605A’s lack of automatic retroactive effect and denying
motion for leave to supplement complaint).
36
Here, various Sudanese ministries and agencies are defendants alongside the Republic of Sudan, whereas in
Harrison, the Republic of Sudan was the sole defendant. But this formal distinction does not alleviate the Court’s
concerns about duplicative punishment: Because both Harrison and this case arise out of the bombing of the Cole,
any Sudanese government officials or entities that must be punished and deterred are ultimately identical.
Following the Supreme Court’s teaching that punitive damages are “personal” to injured
plaintiffs in a specific case, 37 the Murphy Court concluded that “[w]here there is more than one
case arising out of the same facts, an analysis of the amount of punitive damages awarded
compared with the amount of compensatory damages awarded [in the prior case] can be used to
gauge the amount of punishment and deterrence the Court considered necessary based on the
injuries plaintiffs to that case suffered.” Id. at 81–82. Because Valore’s punitive-to-
compensatory-damages ratio was 3.44-to-1, the Murphy court applied this same ratio to calculate
punitive damages with respect to each individual plaintiff. Id. at 82–83; see also Estate of Brown
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 872 F. Supp. 2d 37, 44–45 (D.D.C. 2012) (following Murphy and
applying 3.44-to-1 ratio from Valore in case arising out of same bombing); Davis v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) (same); Estate of Bland v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 831 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); Goldberg-Botvin v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 938 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11–12 (D.D.C. 2013) (following Murphy and applying
punitive damages-compensatory damages ratio from Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003), which arose out of same bombing).
Here, following Murphy, this Court finds guidance in the ratio between the punitive and
compensatory awards rendered in Harrison, which arose out of the same bombing of the Cole.
The Harrison court awarded $236,029,422 in punitive damages and $78,676,474 in
compensatory damages. See Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 51. Accordingly, Harrison’s ratio of
37
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007), the Supreme Court held that a jury instruction not
expressly limiting a punitive award to the plaintiffs in the case, thereby permitting jurors to consider harm done to
other individuals not before the court, constituted an unconstitutional taking without due process, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 349. Here, this Court, like the Murphy court, is mindful that the Due Process
Clause (of the Fifth Amendment) does not apply to foreign states and their instrumentalities. See Price v. Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord Murphy, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68; see
also Haim, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (“Due Process principles play no role in limiting punitive damages in terrorism-
related FSIA suits . . . .”). Nonetheless, like the Murphy court, this Court finds the due process principles articulated
in Philip Morris instructive, insofar as they embody general concerns for fairness and consistency.
punitive damages to compensatory damages is 3-to-1, and in this case, the Court shall apply the
same ratio to derive punitive damages.
Plaintiffs contend that “Harrison’s calculation of punitive damages is not appropriate
here” because “plaintiffs there did not provide evidence relating to Sudan’s actual expenditures
on terrorist activities . . . [whereas] here, plaintiffs have established evidence regarding Iran’s
actual expenditures on terrorism, and that much of the terrorism sponsored was done in
conjunction with the Sudan.” Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Redacted [#44] at 53 n.16 (internal citations and quotations omitted). But this argument misses
the mark. At issue is not whether Harrison is correct, but rather, whether Murphy provides a
sound methodology for calculating punitive damages. In opting to follow Murphy, this Court
relies on Harrison only insofar as that case arises from the same incident and similar injuries (the
bombing of the Cole), and supplies a ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. As a
doctrinal matter, therefore, this case is governed not by Harrison, but by Murphy. 38
Accordingly, the Court will award punitive damages to each plaintiff in this case in an
amount three times greater than his or her respective compensatory damages:
Plaintiff Relationship Total Punitive-to- Total Punitive
to Kevin Solatium Compensatory- Damages
Damages Damages Ratio
1. Plaintiff A Mother $6,250,000 3:1 $18,750,000
2. Plaintiff B Brother $3,125,000 3:1 $9,375,000
3. Plaintiff C Brother $3,125,000 3:1 $9,375,000
4. Plaintiff D Brother $3,125,000 3:1 $9,375,000
38
Here, directly adopting Harrison’s calculation would yield the same punitive award as following Murphy’s
extrapolation of ratios, because it just so happens that the Harrison court, lacking data on Sudan’s terrorism
spending, opted simply to multiply compensatory damages by a factor of three (3) in calculating punitive damages.
See Harrison, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 50–51. But this is mere happenstance: Even if the Harrison court had applied the
Flatow method by multiplying Sudan’s terrorism spending by a multiplier, Murphy would still instruct this Court to
extrapolate the punitive-compensatory ratio from the resulting figures. In fact, the Murphy court did precisely this
vis-à-vis Valore. The Valore court had multiplied Iran’s terrorism spending ($200 million) by a multiplier of five
(5) to calculate a total punitive award of $1 billion, which the Murphy court then divided by total compensatory
damages to obtain the average punitive-compensatory ratio of 3.44. See Murphy, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 82–83; Valore,
700 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
5. Plaintiff E Brother $3,125,000 3:1 $9,375,000
V. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment Upon Evidentiary
Hearing Against Iranian and Sudanese Defendants [#29] will be granted. Furthermore, final
judgment will be entered against the defendants, jointly and severally, in the amounts set forth
above, along with post-judgment interest at the statutory rate, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). 39
Dated: March 31, 2015 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
39
See Lanny J. Davis & Associates LLC v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2013)
(allowing post-judgment interest against a foreign sovereign under the FSIA).