Okolie v. Future Services General Trading & Contracting Company, W.L.L. , 102 F. Supp. 3d 172 ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________
)
CHINYE OKOLIE and TYRONE DUCKETT, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civ. Action No. 13-1874 (EGS)
)
FUTURE SERVICES GENERAL TRADING )
& CONTRACTING COMPANY, W.L.L., )
)
Defendant. )
__________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chinye Okolie and Tyrone Duckett bring this lawsuit alleging
that Future Services General Trading and Contracting Company
(“Future Services”) injured them by negligently causing a car
accident in Kuwait on December 4, 2010. Pending before the Court
is Future Services’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the motion, the response and
reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, the
Court GRANTS Future Services’s motion.
I. Background
Chinye Okolie and Tyrone Duckett are residents of Texas. First
Am. Compl., ECF No. 16 ¶ 4. In 2010, they appear to have been
working with the United States in some capacity in Kuwait. See
id. ¶¶ 5–6, 9, 13–15. Future Services is a company based in
Kuwait that contracted to provide vehicles to the United States
Government for use in Kuwait. See id. ¶¶ 5–6. The contract
between Future Services and the United States contained a clause
selecting the Court of Federal Claims as the appropriate forum
for the resolution of contract-related disputes. See id. ¶ 5.
Future Services previously contracted to provide trucks to the
United States Government for use in Iraq. See Ex. A to Def.’s
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18-1. In 2009, Future Services filed a
lawsuit against the United States in the Court of Federal
Claims—as required by the contract between the two parties—
alleging that the United States had failed to return those
trucks at the end of the lease term. See First Am. Compl., ECF
No. 16 ¶ 5; Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18 at 3.
On December 4, 2010, the plaintiffs were riding in a Future
Services vehicle and driving alongside another Future Services
vehicle. See id. ¶¶ 9, 11. The drivers of both vehicles “were
operating them as the agents, servants, employees and/or
representatives of the Defendant.” Id. ¶ 12. The drivers began
to race each other “at a high speed,” and then the vehicle in
which the plaintiffs were traveling “slammed into a vehicle
stopped in front of it.” Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on November 26, 2013, alleging
that Future Services negligently caused the accident. See
Compl., ECF No. 1. After some delay in effecting service of
process due to difficulties conducting service in Kuwait,
plaintiffs filed in July 2014 proof that the defendant had been
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served. See Service Aff., ECF No. 9. Plaintiffs subsequently
filed an amended complaint. See First Am. Compl., ECF No. 16. On
October 3, 2014, Future Services moved to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint, arguing that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Mem.”), ECF
No. 18. The plaintiffs oppose the motion. See Opp. to Mot. to
Dismiss (“Opp.”), ECF No. 20. Future Services filed its reply
brief on October 23, 2014. See Reply in Supp. of Mot. (“Reply”),
ECF No. 21. The motion is now ripe for adjudication.
II. Analysis
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing a factual basis for personal
jurisdiction. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454,
456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To meet that burden, the plaintiff “must
allege specific acts connecting [the] defendant with the forum.”
Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521,
524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (alteration in original). The Court need
not treat all of a plaintiff’s allegations as true; rather, it
“may receive and weigh affidavits and other relevant matter to
assist it in determining the jurisdictional facts.” Buesgens v.
Brown, 567 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2008) (quotation marks
omitted).
The Court may exercise one of two types of personal
jurisdiction: “general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific
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or case-linked jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). The existence of
general jurisdiction permits the Court to hear “any and all
claims” brought against the defendant. See id. By contrast,
“specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
establishes jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Assessing whether the Court may exercise either type of
jurisdiction “typically implicates a state’s jurisdictional
statute or rule.” Alkanani v. Aegis Defense Servs., 976 F. Supp.
2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2014) (quotation marks and alteration
omitted); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753
(2014) (“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in
determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”).
The D.C. Code provides a statute that speaks to general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, D.C. Code § 13-334, and
another that speaks to specific jurisdiction, D.C. Code § 13-
423. See Gonzalez v. Internacional de Elevadores, S.A., 891 A.2d
227, 232 (D.C. 2006).1
1
Plaintiffs appear to be under the erroneous belief that a third
method of establishing personal jurisdiction exists: When
exercising jurisdiction “will not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice” by virtue of the forum being
an efficient location for resolving the dispute. See Opp. at 6–
7. This is an inaccurate statement of the law, which
contemplates the exercise of personal jurisdiction only when the
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A. The Court May Not Exercise General Jurisdiction.
The District of Columbia general-jurisdiction statute permits
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over “a foreign
corporation doing business in the District.” Id. § 13-334(a).
This jurisdiction is contingent upon that corporation having
been served through “the agent of the corporation or person
conducting its business, or, when he is absent and can not be
found, by leaving a copy at the principal place of business in
the District, or, where there is no such place of business, by
leaving a copy at the place of business or residence of the
agent in the District.” Id. If a plaintiff fails to serve the
foreign corporation in the District in this manner, she is
“foreclosed from benefiting from [the statute’s] jurisdictional
protection.” Gonzalez, 891 A.2d at 233 (quotation marks
omitted); see also Gowens v. Dyncorp, 132 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42
(D.D.C. 2001) (where plaintiff served foreign-corporation
defendant “at its headquarters in Virginia,” service did “not
meet the requirements of D.C. Code § 13-334” and personal
jurisdiction was therefore lacking). It is undisputed that
plaintiffs served the defendant in Kuwait, not the District of
Columbia, so the Court may not exercise general jurisdiction.
See Mem. at 14–15; Service Aff., ECF No. 9.
requirements of specific or general jurisdiction have been met.
See, e.g., Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
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In any event, plaintiffs’ allegations would not establish
general jurisdiction. The scope of the phrase “doing business”
as used in the D.C. Code has been found to be “co-extensive with
the reach of” general jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.
Day v. Corner Bank, 789 F. Supp. 2d 150, 155–56 (D.D.C. 2011).
The Due Process Clause permits “[a] court [to] assert general
jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations . . . when their
affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. It is undisputed that Future
Services is not incorporated in the District of Columbia and
does not have its principal place of business here. See Mem. at
16; Opp. at 7–10. Indeed, the only contacts with the District
that the plaintiffs allege are: (1) a lawsuit filed by Future
Services in the Court of Federal Claims regarding an unrelated
contract; and (2) the existence of contracts with the United
States that contain a clause selecting the Court of Federal
Claims as the appropriate forum for the resolution of disputes
regarding those contracts. See First Am. Compl., ECF No. 16 ¶ 5;
Opp. at 7–12. These minimal contacts are nowhere near sufficient
to show that Future Services is “essentially at home” in the
District of Columbia. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.2
2
To the extent that plaintiffs’ mention of Marshall v. I-Flow,
LLC, 856 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2012) is intended to support a
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B. The Court May Not Exercise Specific Jurisdiction.
The District of Columbia specific-jurisdiction statute
authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction under certain
enumerated circumstances, including when the defendant has
“transact[ed] any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C.
Code § 13-423(a)(1). The D.C. Court of Appeals has indicated
that the “transacting business” test is “coextensive with the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Gonzalez, 891 A.2d
at 234. Accordingly “the defendant must have minimum contacts
with the forum so that exercising personal jurisdiction over it
would not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “When
jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section,
only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this
section may be asserted against him.” Id. § 13-423(b).
Plaintiffs raise two actions—the existence of contracts with the
finding that general jurisdiction exists in this case, Opp. at
5, plaintiffs are mistaken. Marshall found general jurisdiction
on the basis of allegations, not present here, that:
Defendant has established and benefits from a
partnership with the George Washington University
Hospital, devotes an entire sales region to sales in
Washington, D.C., profits from sales . . . to every
major Washington, D.C. Hospital, and has obtained
expert medical consulting services of prominent
Washington, D.C. medical facilities and physicians.
Marshall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (quotation marks and alteration
omitted).
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United States that include forum-selection clauses designating
the Court of Federal Claims as the appropriate forum for the
resolution of contract disputes and Future Services’s lawsuit
against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims—as
bases for specific jurisdiction. See First Am. Compl., ECF No.
16 ¶ 5; Opp. at 7–12.
The contract-related contacts may not be considered due to the
“‘government contacts’ exception” to the specific-jurisdiction
rule, which provides that “a nonresident’s entry into the
District of Columbia for ‘the purpose of contacting federal
governmental agencies cannot serve as a basis for personal
jurisdiction.’” Alkanani, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting Savage
v. Bioport, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2006)). Such
contacts are “excluded from ‘the jurisdictional calculus.’” Id.
(quoting Savage, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 62); see also United States
v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (contacts with
federal agencies within the District of Columbia “will not give
rise to personal jurisdiction”).3
3
Plaintiffs appear to argue that the Court may exercise personal
jurisdiction because the contract between Future Services and
the United States regarding the vehicles in which plaintiffs
were riding is covered by 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-8, which makes a
federal-government contractor “liable for . . . all actions or
claims for loss of or damage to property or the injury or death
of persons, resulting from the fault, negligence, or wrongful
act or omission of the Contractor.” Plaintiffs’ argument is far
from clear, but to the extent they intend to argue that this
provision constitutes a waiver of personal jurisdiction or
8
Even if both sets of contacts could be considered, they fail
to satisfy the requirement that the facts giving rise to the
cause of action “aris[e] from” the minimum contacts that form
the basis for personal jurisdiction. See D.C. Code § 13-423(b);
see also Novak-Canzeri v. Saud, 864 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D.D.C.
1994) (“The claim itself must have arisen from the business
transacted in the District or there is no jurisdiction.”).
The alleged negligent operation of vehicles by Future Services
in Kuwait and resulting injuries to the plaintiffs are extremely
attenuated from Future Services’s negotiation of contracts with
the United States. Indeed, “an injury sounding in tort does not
‘arise from’ a contract for services for the purpose of specific
jurisdiction.” Alkanani, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 27. Plaintiffs’
argument to the contrary borders on the absurd:
It can be said “but for” [sic] the agreement by Future
Services to consent to the jurisdiction of Courts in
the District of Columbia, it would not have received
the contract with the U.S. Government, and the
Plaintiffs would not have been injured by Defendant’s
automobiles in which they were riding in [sic] at the
time of their injures [sic].
Opp. at 11. “The critical test is whether the nonresident’s
conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he or
she should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”
consent thereto, the Court agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that
“[t]his section . . . makes no mention of a waiver of personal
jurisdiction and does not alter the required constitutional
analysis that the court must consider.” Baragona v. Kuwait Gulf
Link Transport Co., 594 F.3d 852, 855 (11th Cir. 2010).
9
Trerotola v. Cotter, 601 A.2d 60, 64 (D.C. 1991) (quotation
marks and alteration omitted). Future Services could not have
anticipated being haled into a District of Columbia court in
connection with an accident that occurred in Kuwait, based
solely upon Future Services’s consent to the Court of Federal
Claims adjudicating potential contract disputes with a third
party.
Nor is there any reasonable connection between a lawsuit by
Future Services against the United States seeking recovery for
the alleged breach of an unrelated contract (involving the
provision of different vehicles at a different time for use in a
different country) and the tort claims the plaintiffs bring.
Accordingly, none of the potential minimum contacts raised by
the plaintiffs are sufficiently related to the actions
underlying this lawsuit, leaving no support for the exercise of
specific jurisdiction.
C. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Jurisdictional Discovery.
In the alternative, plaintiffs request that they be permitted
to conduct jurisdictional discovery to “include at [a] minimum
obtaining all contracts between Defendant and the United States
Government.” Opp. at 12. Plaintiffs’ goal appears to be to learn
“of all the relationships and transactions taken by Future
Services in relation to the District of Columbia, the
Plaintiffs, [and] the automobiles that they were riding in on
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the date of their injury.” Id. at 12–13. The defendant opposes
this request. See Reply at 10–12.
“Whether to permit jurisdictional discovery rests in the
discretion of the district court.” In re Papst Licensing GMBH &
Co. KG Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 94, 101 (D.D.C. 2008); see also
FC Inv. Grp. v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 2008). Discovery is not warranted “where a plaintiff
‘simply wants to conduct a fishing expedition in the hopes of
discovering some basis of jurisdiction.’” In re Papst, 590 F.
Supp. 2d at 101 (quoting Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC
Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 215 n.3 (4th Cir.
2002)). “In order to engage in jurisdictional discovery, the
plaintiff ‘must have at least a good faith belief that such
discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.’” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at
1093–94 (quoting Caribbean Broad. Sys. v. Cable & Wireless PLC,
148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
For that reason, plaintiffs’ desire to learn “of all the
relationships and transactions taken by Future Services in
relation to the District of Columbia” cannot support
jurisdictional discovery without a clear articulation of the
jurisdictional basis plaintiffs intend to prove. Plaintiffs
failed to provide such a justification. Their existing
jurisdictional allegations fall far short of the standards for
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specific and general jurisdiction, and they have not described
any fact that could be obtained in discovery to alter this
conclusion. Indeed, plaintiffs seek merely to double down on
their theory that the existence of contracts with the United
States that contain a clause selecting the Court of Federal
Claims as the forum for the resolution of any contract disputes
somehow provides personal jurisdiction over this tort action.
Jurisdictional discovery would not render this argument any more
successful. See supra Part II.A–B.
D. The Case Will Be Dismissed Without Prejudice.
Future Services asks the Court to dismiss this case with
prejudice. See Mem. at 18. Plaintiffs oppose this request,
citing Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2005),
Opp. at 13, and defendant did not address this citation. See
Reply at 12. The Court follows the general rule described in the
decision cited by the plaintiffs that “dismissals for lack of
personal jurisdiction should be made without prejudice,” because
a lack of jurisdiction in one court does not preclude a court of
the appropriate forum from exercising jurisdiction. See Intera
Corp., 428 F.3d at 620–21.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Future Services’s
motion to dismiss this case. An appropriate Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
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SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
April 21, 2015
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