Stevenson v. Delta Airlines, Inc. , 251 F. Supp. 3d 265 ( 2017 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
JALEANA STEVENSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 16-cv-01398 (APM)
v. )
)
DELTA AIRLINES, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc., seeks to dismiss certain of Plaintiff Jaleana Stevenson’s
claims alleging unlawful employment action and to transfer others to the Eastern District of
Louisiana. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss & Transfer Venue, ECF No. 8. Because the court writes
primarily for the parties, it presumes their familiarity with the Complaint’s allegations and refers
to those allegations only as necessary to resolve Defendant’s Motions.
FMLA Claims
To begin, Plaintiff’s claims under the Federal Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) are time-
barred. The FMLA requires a plaintiff to file a civil action within two years “after the date of the
last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought,” or within three years
if the action is brought for a “willful violation” of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1), (2). Here,
Plaintiff admits that the “last event constituting the alleged violation” was her alleged constructive
discharge on June 19, 2013. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 11 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n], at 5; Compl.,
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Compl.], ¶ 13. Accordingly, for Plaintiff’s FMLA claims to be considered
timely even under the longer three-year limitations period, Plaintiff would have had to bring them
no later than June 19, 2016. She filed this action on July 1, 2016. See Compl. (filed July 1, 2016).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FMLA claims are time-barred, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss those
claims is granted.
Title VII Claims
Plaintiff advances three different claims under Title VII: (1) disparate treatment on the
basis of her race; (2) retaliation for engaging in protected activity; and (3) a hostile work
environment, leading to her constructive discharge. The court grants Defendant’s Motion in part
by dismissing the second and third of those claims.
To state a plausible claim of disparate treatment, Plaintiff had to allege facts reflecting that
(1) she suffered an adverse action (2) because of her race. See Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d
1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A plaintiff need not plead specific facts establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination, but rather, need only allege facts that “give[] the [defendant] fair notice of
the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claims.” Swierkeweicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2012). In
Swierkeweicz, the Court held that a complaint alleging age discrimination satisfied the notice
pleading requirement where it “detailed the events leading to [the plaintiff’s] termination, provided
relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons
involved with his termination.” Id. In light of Swierkeweicz, “courts in this Circuit have
consistently recognized the ease with which a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination can
survive . . . a motion to dismiss.” Fennell v. AARP, 770 F. Supp. 2d 118, 127 (D.D.C. 2011)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim of race-based discrimination, albeit barely,
because she identifies the adverse employment actions purportedly taken against her—demotion
and constructive discharge—and when they occurred. Although Defendant correctly points out
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that the text of the Complaint itself does not allege that the adverse actions occurred because of
her race, Plaintiff’s pleading includes an exhibit, which the court may consider in determining
whether she has stated a claim. See Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir.
2006). Plaintiff attached to her Complaint the administrative complaint that she filed with the
Louisiana Commission on Human Rights, which does allege that she suffered the adverse actions
based on her “race.” Compl., Ex., ECF No. 1-3. The Complaint’s allegations, when combined
with the allegations made in the administrative complaint, are sufficient to provide Defendant fair
notice of the basis for Plaintiff’s discrimination claim. See Swierkeweicz, 534 U.S. at 514.
Therefore, the request to dismiss Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim is denied.
On the other hand, Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support either her retaliation
or hostile work environment claims. Title VII makes unlawful only those discriminatory
employment actions taken against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
The Complaint alleges only that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for complaining to her
manager about “the disclosure of her personal medical information to her co-workers without
Plaintiff’s knowledge or approval”—which is not activity protected by Title VII. See Compl. ¶¶ 5,
10. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a viable retaliation claim. Additionally, the allegations
comprising Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim come up short. Plaintiff needed to allege
facts establishing that “[her] workplace [wa]s permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that [wa]s sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her]
employment and create an abusive working environment.” See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Her allegations, however, are
largely conclusory, see Compl. ¶ 24 (claiming that she “was forced to endure an atmosphere filled
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with constant threats of termination and demeaning conduct”), and, at most, allege only ordinary
workplace indignities, see, e.g., id. ¶ 11 (alleging unaddressed physical threats from another
employee on a single occasion), such as “petty insults, vindictive behavior, and angry
recriminations that are not actionable under Title VII,” Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273,
1277–78 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the court dismisses
Plaintiff’s retaliation and hostile work environment claims under Title VII. 1
Transfer to the Eastern District of Louisiana
What remains of Plaintiff’s Complaint is a claim for disparate treatment on the basis of her
race under Title VII and a claim for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
latter of which Defendant did not seek to dismiss. Defendant urges the court, over Plaintiff’s
objection, to transfer these remaining claims to the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana. The court will do so.
Under Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code, a court may transfer a case to
another judicial district “where it might have been brought” “for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, [and] in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). That analysis involves a two-step
process. The court first must determine whether the transferee district is one where the action
“might have been brought,” and then balance the private and public interests involved in the
proposed transfer to determine “whether the defendant has demonstrated that considerations of
convenience and the interest of justice support a transfer.” Barham v. UBS Fin. Servs., 496
F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2007). In this case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff could have
brought this case in the Eastern District of Louisiana because the acts about which she complains
occurred there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The parties’ dispute lies in the balancing of interests.
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In light of this ruling, the court denies Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement.
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Although a plaintiff’s choice of forum ordinarily is accorded deference in the balancing of
interests, that deference is diminished when the plaintiff has not selected her home forum and
“there is an insubstantial factual nexus between the case and the plaintiff’s chose forum.”
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 856 F. Supp. 2d 186, 192 (D.D.C. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff claims that her choice of forum is entitled to deference
because the District of Columbia “is where [she] is currently.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. But she offers
no evidence to support that contention. This court’s Local Civil Rules require that “[t]he first
filing by or on behalf of a party shall have in the caption the name and full residence address of
the party.” LCvR 5.1(c)(1). Plaintiff complied with that requirement when, upon filing her
Complaint, she identified her address as “238 S. Salcedo Street, New Orleans, LA 70119.” Compl.
at 1. The Local Civil Rules further provide that, “[u]nless changed by notice filed with the Clerk,
the address . . . of a party . . . noted on the first filing shall be conclusively taken as the last known
address . . . of the party . . . .” LCvR 5.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not notified the
court of any change in address. Her home address, therefore, is presumed to be in New Orleans.
See id. Because the District of Columbia is not Plaintiff’s home forum—and the events at issue
have no apparent connection to this district—the court affords her choice of forum diminished
deference.
Given that conclusion, the court’s decision to transfer this matter to the Eastern District of
Louisiana is an easy one. The court need not address each individual private and public interest
factor. It suffices to say that Plaintiff lives in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the events at issue
all occurred in that district, the witnesses and other evidence are found there, and there is a strong
local interest in resolving this case where the operative events occurred. Simply put, because this
case has no apparent connection to the District of Columbia, not a single factor favors litigating
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this matter here. Accordingly, the court grants Defendant’s request to transfer Plaintiff’s
remaining claims to the Eastern District of Louisiana.
A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: May 5, 2017 Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge
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