Russell v. Corrections Corporation of America ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MAXINE RUSSELL
Plaintiff,
v. Civ. Action No. 17-313
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Maxine Russell allegedly suffered injuries when
she was a pretrial inmate at the Correctional Treatment Facility
(“CTF”) after she tripped and fell in her dark cell. She had
complained about the inadequacy of the lighting in her cell in
the weeks prior to her fall. She alleges that she did not
receive proper medical attention which caused her condition to
further deteriorate. She has since been released, and now sues
the Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) and the District
of Columbia (“the District”) bringing several claims based on
her alleged injuries.
Pending before the Court is the District’s motion to
dismiss Count Seven of Ms. Russell’s complaint. Upon
consideration of the motion, the response and reply thereto, the
applicable law, the entire record, and for the reasons stated in
this Memorandum Opinion, the District’s motion to dismiss Count
Seven of the complaint is GRANTED.
I. Background
At all relevant times Plaintiff Maxine Russell was a pre-
trial inmate at CTF, a correctional facility operated by CCA
pursuant to a contract with the District. Compl., ECF No. 1-1
¶¶ 2, 3, 9. She was held at CTF for approximately six weeks,
from January 21, 2014 until March 4, 2014. Id. ¶ 10. During her
time at CTF, she was held in a “tiny cell without light.” Id.
She alleges that these conditions led to her “experiencing
serious traumatic and mental health injuries.” Id.
Ms. Russell alleges that she made “many pleas” to CTF
management and staff that the lack of light in her cell was
causing her traumatic injuries, but CTF refused to transfer her
to another cell or fix the lighting in her cell. Id. ¶ 11. About
a month into her detention, Ms. Russell tripped and fell as she
was trying to get to her bunk bed. Id. ¶ 12. The fall resulted
in physical injuries, which she alleges were exacerbated because
she did not receive “adequate physical and psychological medical
care” after she fell. Id ¶ 13.
Ms. Russell subsequently filed this suit alleging
violations of state and federal law. See generally id. Relevant
to this motion to dismiss, Ms. Russell brings a claim for
“Municipal Liability” (Count Seven) alleging that the District
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was deliberately indifferent to her constitutional rights and
the rights of other inmates. Id. ¶ 37–45.
The District has moved to dismiss Count Seven, the
municipal liability claim. Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 14 Ms. Russell has filed an opposition to the motion, Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 18, and the District has filed a reply, Def.’s
Reply, ECF No. 29. The motion is ripe for adjudication.
II. Legal Standard
A dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is proper if the plaintiff’s complaint fails
“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss filed under
Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient facts,
accepted as true, to state a claim “that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citation
omitted). When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint. Id. However, the Court is not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation. Id. In addition, “only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. A
claim is facially plausible when the factual content “allows the
[C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 663. While
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plausibility does not equate to the “probability requirement, [a
plaintiff must show] more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant acted unlawfully. Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
III. Analysis
The District moves to dismiss the municipal liability count
for failure to state a claim. Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 14. To succeed against a municipality, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a “municipal policy was the ‘moving force’
behind the constitutional violation.” Baker v. Dist. of
Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003). To determine
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a court must conduct
a two-step inquiry. Id. First, a court must determine whether
the plaintiff establishes a predicate constitutional or
statutory violation. Id. If so, a court then determines whether
the complaint alleges that a custom or policy of the
municipality caused the violation. Id.; see also Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Proof
of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not
sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the
incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing,
unconstitutional municipal policy[.]” Parker v. Dist. of
Columbia, 850 F.2d 708, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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In her opposition, Ms. Russell references the
“constitutional protection against cruel and unusual
punishment,” under “the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause or, if not yet convicted, under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at
4. 1 Ms. Russell argues two bases for a violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments: “the indifference of the defendants
as a result of her conditions of incarceration” and “the failure
by the defendants to provide her with necessary and adequate
medical care.” Id. The Court discusses each in turn.
A. Confinement Conditions
The Eighth Amendment 2 protects an inmate’s right to “humane
conditions of confinement,” which includes “adequate . . .
medical care” and “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety
of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33,
(1994). “[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the
original page number of the filed document.
2 “[A]n individual not yet convicted of a crime must challenge
his or her treatment or the conditions of confinement under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments rather
than the Eighth Amendment.” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 770 n.
10 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment
standard for cruel and unusual punishment may be applied to
custody of a pretrial detainee—even though such detainees have
not been convicted of a crime and may not be subjected to
punishment in any manner—since the conditions of confinement are
comparable.” Young v. Dist. of Columbia, 107 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77
(D.D.C. 2015).
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holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon
it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his
safety and general well-being.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty.
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989)(citation
omitted). Generally, “‘deprivations’ that trigger Eighth
Amendment scrutiny are deprivations of essential human needs.”
Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
Ms. Russell alleges that she was held in a “tiny cell
without light,” that her cell was “dark and dingy,” and that CTF
refused to transfer her to another cell or ”fit her cell with
proper lighting.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 10–11. Her complaint
simply alleges that these conditions were “cruel and unusual”
without any factual support. Id. ¶ 10. This threadbare
allegation does not satisfy the objective threshold for alleging
a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)(“conditions posing
a substantial risk of serious harm”); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)(describing conditions that “deprive inmates
of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities”); Women
Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93
F.3d 910, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(describing “conditions that are
‘soul-chilling’” and ‘grossly wanting’”).
Even if the complaint could be construed to allege a
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constitutional violation, the complaint is devoid of facts
sufficient to allege a policy or custom that amounts to the
District’s deliberate indifference of such a violation. Although
it is true that the failure to train, supervise, or discipline
city employees can constitute such a policy or custom if it
amounts to deliberate indifference towards the constitutional
rights of a plaintiff, see Daskalea v. Dist. of Columbia, 227
F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000), Ms. Russell alleges in a
conclusory manner that “[t]he need for training was so obvious
that failure to address it was likely to result in a
constitutional violation.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 38. She has not
alleged any deficiencies with respect to the training provided
to employees at CTF, or connected any such deficiencies in
training with any violation of her constitutional rights. See
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)(“Only
where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a
relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the
rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly
thought of as a city ‘policy or custom” that is actionable under
§ 1983.”). Ms. Russell only alleges legal conclusions such as
that the District failed to investigate unnamed claims by other
inmates regarding constitutional or “other” violations and
failed to reprimand employees for unspecified violations of
those unspecified inmates’ rights. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 41.
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Such “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
B. Medical Treatment
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation for failure to
provide adequate medical treatment, a plaintiff must allege
that: (1) his or her medical need is serious; and (2) that
defendant officials acted with a “deliberate indifference to
[his or her] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976). A medical need is “serious if it is one that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.” Cox v. Dist. of Columbia,
834 F. Supp. 439, 441 (D.D.C. 1992). A complaint that alleges
negligence in treating the plaintiff does not suffice to state a
constitutional claim for inadequate medical treatment. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106. Rather, the plaintiff must establish that
“officials had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need
and recklessly disregarded the excessive risk to [his or her]
health or safety from that risk.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306.
Here, Ms. Russell has not alleged any facts that support an
inference that she had a serious medical need after her fall.
Ms. Russell alleges that she was not afforded adequate physical
or psychological care between the days of her accident on
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February 21, 2014 and her release on March 4, 2014. See id.¶¶ 10–13. She has failed to allege that her injuries were so
obvious that a layperson would understand her need for medical
treatment. See generally id. Nor has she alleged any facts that
show that the defendant had a subjective knowledge of and
“recklessly disregarded the excessive risk to [her] health and
safety.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Ms. Russell’s complaint simply
alleges that she tripped, was physically injured and that she
suffered serious traumatic and mental health injuries. See
Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 10. 3 These allegations are insufficient to
support an inference that the District is liable for a
constitutional violation based on its conduct.
Ms. Russell’s complaint fails to identify any facts that
would permit the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the
District is liable for a violation of the Eighth Amendment in
this case. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. If Ms. Russell obtains
discovery that supports her legal conclusions, she can seek to
amend at that time. However, because she has failed to support
her legal conclusions with factual allegations, the District’s
motion to dismiss Count Seven of her complaint is GRANTED.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons the District’s motion to dismiss
3 Ms. Russell also fails to allege a custom or policy related to
her inadequate medical treatment claim. See supra at 7–8.
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Count Seven is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
June 17, 2019
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