Mittakarin v. Infotran Systems, Inc. , 81 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 942 ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
DENIS MITTAKARIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 11-0017(EGS)
v. )
)
INFOTRAN SYSTEMS, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPNION
Pending before the Court is plaintiff Denis Mittakarin’s
motion to voluntarily dismiss all claims against defendants
InfoTran Systems, Inc. and Tien H. Tran, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). In response, defendants state
that they do not oppose dismissal; however, defendants urge the
Court to condition any dismissal upon the reimbursement of their
attorneys’ fees and costs. Upon consideration of the motion,
the response, the reply and surreply1 thereto, the applicable
law, and the entire record, and for the reasons stated below,
the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion and declines to
1
The Court notes that defendants filed a surreply without
leave of Court. See United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes
Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276 (D.D.C.
2002) (“A surreply may be filed only by leave of Court, and only
to address new matters raised in a reply, to which a party would
otherwise be unable to respond.”). The Court has, however,
reviewed defendants’ improperly filed surreply brief and found
it no more persuasive than defendants’ opposition brief, for the
reasons set forth in more detail below.
condition dismissal upon an award of attorneys’ fees and costs
to defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mittakarin is an information technology (“IT”)
service provider who specializes in performing IT work for the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).
Compl. ¶ 8. Defendant InfoTran had a subcontracting
relationship with an entity or entities who contracted to
perform IT work on behalf of USCIS. See id. ¶ 13. On April 20,
2009, plaintiff entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement
(“Agreement”) with InfoTran. Id. ¶ 20. The Agreement contained
a non-compete provision, which barred plaintiff from (a)
soliciting or accepting any employment with, or (b) performing
any services similar to those performed by plaintiff for
InfoTran for its customers or competitors. See id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiff alleges that, as of November 16, 2010, one of the
contracting entities, Computer Sciences Corporation (“CSC”),
terminated InfoTran from its subcontracting relationship to
perform work on behalf of USCIS. Id. ¶ 26. Between November 9,
2010 and the filing of his complaint in this action on January
4, 2011, plaintiff sent defendant Tran numerous emails
requesting that InfoTran release plaintiff from the non-compete
provision of the Agreement, but Tran refused. See id. ¶¶ 29-30.
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Because CSC terminated InfoTran’s contract, plaintiff has not
been able to perform work on the USCIS project since November
16, 2010. Id. ¶ 33.
Plaintiff commenced this action on January 4, 2011, seeking
a declaratory judgment that the non-compete provision is invalid
(Count I), and alleging intentional interference with a business
expectancy (Count II), fraudulent misrepresentation (Count III),
and negligent misrepresentation (Count IV). The next day,
plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Count
I, arguing that because CSC had terminated defendant, the non-
compete provision was not necessary to protect InfoTran’s
business or goodwill and was therefore invalid as a matter of
law. See generally Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Docket No.
4. Defendants filed a counterclaim on January 19, 2011, seeking
a declaratory judgment that the non-compete provision is, in
fact, valid and enforceable. Plaintiff then filed a motion for
summary judgment on defendants’ counterclaim on February 18,
2011. By minute order dated August 25, 2011, the Court denied
both of plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment. See Minute
Order (Aug. 25, 2011). On September 30, 2011, plaintiff filed a
motion to voluntarily dismiss all claims against defendants
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), arguing that because the non-compete
provision will expire before the end of the discovery period,
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the dispute over the validity of the non-compete provision will
be rendered moot. That motion is now ripe for determination by
the Court.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides:
[A]n action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s
request only by court order, on terms that the court
considers proper. If a defendant has pleaded a
counterclaim before being served with the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over
the defendant’s objection only if the counterclaim can
remain pending for independent adjudication. Unless
the order states otherwise, a dismissal under this
paragraph (2) is without prejudice.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). A court applying Rule 41(a)(2) must
consider (1) whether the plaintiff seeks the motion for
voluntary dismissal in good faith, and (2) whether the dismissal
would cause the defendant “legal prejudice.” In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litig., 198 F.R.D. 296, 304 (D.D.C. 2000). In
determining whether a defendant would suffer legal prejudice by
a voluntary dismissal, the Court must consider four factors:
(1) the defendants’ effort and expense in preparation
for trial; (2) excessive delay or lack of diligence on
the plaintiffs’ part in prosecuting the action; (3)
the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ explanation for
voluntary dismissal; and (4) the stage of the
litigation at the time the motion to dismiss is made.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Raines (In re Fannie Mae Secs.,
Derivative Litig.), 725 F. Supp. 2d 169, 176 (D.D.C. 2010).
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Courts generally grant dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2) “unless
the defendant would suffer prejudice other than the prospect of
a second lawsuit or some tactical disadvantage.” Conafay v.
Wyeth Labs., 793 F.2d 350, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
One of the “terms” upon which the Court may condition
dismissal is the payment of the defendant’s attorneys’ fees and
costs. See Taragan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 838 F.2d 1337, 1340
(D.C. Cir. 1988). The purpose of the provision authorizing the
Court to dismiss a case “on terms that the court considers
proper” is to protect a defendant from any prejudice or
inconvenience that may result from a plaintiff’s premature
dismissal. GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364,
369 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Attorneys’ fees may be awarded where
“costs were undertaken unnecessarily.” Id. at 367.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s motions for summary
judgment were premature, and that the legal work defense counsel
performed in defending against the premature motions will be
rendered useless by dismissal of this action. See Defs.’
Response to Pl.’s Mot. to Voluntarily Dismiss Claims, Docket No.
22, at 3-4. Defendants therefore ask the Court to award them
attorneys’ fees and costs related to the filing of their
oppositions to plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment.
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Plaintiff argues that this case falls outside the mainstream of
cases in which attorneys’ fees and costs were awarded upon
voluntary dismissal, that plaintiff’s motion to dismiss is
timely, and that defendants will not suffer legal prejudice by
dismissal of this action. See Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to
Voluntarily Dismiss Claims, Docket No. 24, at 3-5.
As discussed in more detail below, the Court concludes that
voluntary dismissal here is appropriate, and the Court declines
to condition that dismissal on an award of attorneys’ fees.
A. Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(2)
Neither party disputes that plaintiff seeks voluntary
dismissal in good faith. In addition, considering the four
factors set forth above, the Court concludes that voluntary
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is proper. As to the first and
fourth factors, this case is in the early stages of litigation.
No discovery has been completed, and defendants have not likely
made any effort or expense in preparing for trial. Therefore,
the Court finds that the resources defendants have expended thus
far do not amount to legal prejudice. As to the second factor,
the Court finds that there has been no delay or lack of
diligence on the part of plaintiff in prosecuting this action.
Finally, plaintiff has provided an adequate explanation for
dismissal: the issue at the heart of this action is, or will
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shortly become, moot. Defendants do not challenge that
rationale. The Court therefore concludes that voluntary
dismissal is appropriate under Rule 41(a)(2).
B. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Under Rule 41(a)(2)
The Court next determines whether attorneys’ fees and costs
should be imposed as a condition of dismissal under Rule
41(a)(2). As noted above, attorneys’ fees and costs are
commonly awarded where costs are undertaken “unnecessarily.”
GAF, 665 F.2d at 367. The purpose of such an award is to
protect defendants from undue prejudice or inconvenience caused
by voluntary dismissal. See id. at 367, 369.
Like in SBM Wageneder Gesellschaft, M.B.H. v. American
Arbitration Association, the Court finds that the instant case
is fundamentally different from cases in which courts have
awarded attorneys’ fees as a condition of dismissal. See 113
F.R.D. 659, 662 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Conafay, 793 F.2d at 351;
McLaughlin v. Cheshire, 676 F.2d 855 (1982); GAF, 665 F.2d at
366). As the court stated in SBM Wageneder Gesellschaft, in
cases in which fees were awarded, “the scenario [was] the same:
the plaintiff, having filed in federal court, discovered that
federal jurisdiction could not be maintained and consequently
sought a voluntary dismissal in order to pursue its claims in
another forum.” 113 F.R.D. at 662. In those cases, “the root
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of the court’s decision to award compensation was that
defendant’s expenses were ‘undertaken unnecessarily.’” Id.
Here, by contrast, the Court is not convinced that
plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment forced the defendants
to undertake expenses unnecessarily. Plaintiff’s motions sought
a declaratory judgment regarding the legality of a non-compete
provision that was allegedly precluding him from obtaining
employment in his field of expertise.2 The Court’s Order denying
the motions—based on the Court’s determination that genuine
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment—did not
render the plaintiff’s motions unnecessary. See id. at 663 (“To
condition a voluntary dismissal on an award of fees, the case
law requires that defendant’s efforts must have been
unnecessary, not that the plaintiff must prevail.”). Moreover,
there is no evidence that plaintiff intends to re-file his suit
in another forum, or that he is seeking dismissal for a tactical
advantage. Instead, and as defendants do not contest, the
purpose for dismissal is that the central issue in this case has
2
Plaintiff’s two motions—a motion for partial summary judgment
and a motion for summary judgment on defendants’ counterclaim—
both sought identical relief: a declaratory judgment that the
non-compete provision at issue was unenforceable. Consequently,
the two motions were virtually identical, as were defendants’
two opposition briefs. Compare Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for
Partial Summ. J., Docket No. 8 with Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot.
for Summ. J. on Defs.’ Countercl., Docket No. 17.
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become moot. However, the mere fact that plaintiff’s central
claim has become moot does not render his earlier efforts, or
defendants’ responses, unnecessary, and therefore does not
entitle defendants to attorneys’ fees. See id. at 663 (holding
that where plaintiffs brought a motion for a temporary
restraining order, which was denied, “[t]he fact that the
defendant was forced to respond to the plaintiffs’ motions [did]
not constitute prejudice warranting an award of fees”); see also
Independence Fed. Sav. Bank v. Bender, 230 F.R.D. 11, 15 (D.D.C.
2005) (finding that defendant’s attorneys’ expenses were not
undertaken unnecessarily where a proposed merger was terminated
beyond the eve of trial, thus mooting the principle goal of
plaintiff’s action).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS
plaintiff Mittakarin’s motion to voluntarily dismiss this action
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), and the Court, in its
discretion, declines to award attorneys’ fees and costs to
defendants. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
Signed: EMMET G. SULLIVAN
United States District Judge
January 17, 2012
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