Green v. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (Afl-Cio) , 287 F.R.D. 107 ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
KELLY A. GREEN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 06-366 (RWR)
)
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, )
AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL )
ORGANIZATIONS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Kelly Green sued the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) and
Mark Zobrisky, his supervisor at the AFL-CIO, alleging
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq., breach
of Green’s employment contract, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination.
Judge Ricardo M. Urbina granted summary judgment to the
defendants because the plaintiff’s claims were foreclosed by a
settlement agreement, and denied Green’s motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) for relief from the judgment.
Green now moves under Rule 60(b)(6) for relief from the judgment
arguing that the defendants made false representations which
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perpetrated a fraud on the court and challenging the validity of
the settlement agreement. Because the plaintiff has not shown
that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is warranted, the motion will be
denied.
BACKGROUND
The background of this case is set forth fully in Green v.
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, 811 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252-53 (D.D.C. 2011).
Briefly, the plaintiff filed against the defendants an
administrative complaint and a grievance under his union’s
collective bargaining agreement. The parties reached a
settlement agreement releasing the defendants from “all claims of
any nature . . . that relate to or arise out of [Green’s]
employment” and awarding Green a monetary settlement of $10,365.
Id. at 252. Nevertheless, Green later filed a complaint in this
court which was resolved by an order granting summary judgment to
the defendants because the settlement agreement precluded the
civil suit. Id. at 253. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment
because Green ”entered into a binding settlement agreement” and
he “failed to meet the burden of showing the invalidity of the
agreement.” Green v. Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus.
Orgs., No. 09-7130, 2010 WL 2160003, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 10,
2010).
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Green then moved under Rule 60(b)(3) for relief from the
judgment arguing that “the defendants falsely represented to the
court that the plaintiff was discharged for just cause” and
alleging “fraudulent misrepresentation” by the defendant. Green,
811 F. Supp. 2d at 254. Judge Urbina denied the motion because
Green did not offer sufficient proof to support the fraud
allegations and failed to establish how the fraud “would have
prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case before
the court.” Id. at 254-55. Green now moves for relief from the
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) alleging that the defendants have
caused a “fraud on the court” through “fraudulent
misrepresentations[,]” and challenging the validity of the
settlement agreement.
DISCUSSION
A court has discretion to grant relief from a final judgment
for five enumerated reasons under Rule 60(b)(1)-(5), and for “any
other reason that justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). “‘[T]he decision to grant or deny a rule 60(b)
motion is committed to the discretion of the District Court.’”
Kareem v. FDIC, 811 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting
United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d
469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “‘should
be only sparingly used’” and only in “‘extraordinary
circumstances.’” Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia,
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633 F.3d 1110, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Ackermann v.
United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950) and Good Luck Nursing
Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
Examples of the limited circumstances where relief under Rule
60(b)(6) is appropriate include an adversary’s failure to comply
with a settlement agreement which was incorporated in a court’s
order, fraud by “the party’s own counsel, by a codefendant, or by
a third-party witness[,]” or “when the losing party fails to
receive notice of the entry of judgment in time to file an
appeal.” 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2864 (2d ed. 1995). Claims under Rule 60(b)(6) must
not be “premised on one of the grounds for relief enumerated in
clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5).” Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988); see also Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 811 F.
Supp. 2d 216, 231 (D.D.C. 2011). Rule 60(b)(6) does not provide
an opportunity to relitigate a motion brought unsuccessfully
under one of the other provisions of Rule 60(b). See Kramer v.
Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The party seeking
relief under Rule 60 bears the burden of showing that he is
entitled to the relief. U.S. v. 8 Gilcrease Lane, 668 F. Supp.
2d 128, 131 (D.D.C. 2009). In addition, “‘[o]ne who attacks a
settlement must bear the burden of showing that the contract he
has made is tainted with invalidity[.]’” Gains v. Cont’l Mortg.
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and Inv. Corp., 865 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting
Callen v. Pa. R.R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 630 (1948)). However, a
party is precluded from attacking the validity of a settlement
agreement where the party “has sought to keep the benefits of the
[a]greement without also accepting its obligations.” Schmidt v.
Shah, 696 F. Supp. 2d 44, 64 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Duma v. Unum
Provident, 770 F. Supp. 2d 308, 314 (D.D.C. 2011).
Green’s current motion for relief from the judgment asserts
three principal grounds for relief: 1) the defendants’ false
representations, Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Relief
(“Pl.’s Mem”) at 69-83; 2) invalidity of the settlement agreement
because Green did not knowingly and voluntarily sign it, id. at
84-101, 137-145; and 3) the alleged “fraud on the court”
perpetrated by the defendants, id. at 122-136, 147-149. Green’s
allegations of false representations and fraud were raised in his
first motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(3)
covering all claims of fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct by
opposing parties, and they were properly rejected. Because the
six enumerated grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) are mutually
exclusive, Rule 60(b)(6) cannot now provide relief for Green’s
claims of fraud and misrepresentations by the defendants. See
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863 & n.11.
Green’s remaining claim challenging the validity of the
settlement agreement fails. Green now argues that the agreement
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is invalid because he reached no meeting of the minds with the
defendants and did not indicate an intention to be bound. Pl.’s
Mem. at 96-101. The settlement agreement suggests otherwise.
Green signed it, just below his acknowledgment that he “discussed
this Settlement Agreement with the representative of his choice
and that he is entering into it knowingly and voluntarily.”
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 5 at 3. Judge Urbina found that
undisputed, and noted early in the litigation that “[t]he
plaintiff [made] no claim that he acquiesced to the terms of the
Settlement Agreement based on fraudulent representations or under
duress or that he did not knowingly and voluntarily sign the
agreement.” Green v. Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus.
Orgs., 657 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166 (D.D.C. 2009). Green may not use
Rule 60(b)(6) now as a second opportunity to re-argue his first
unsuccessful Rule 60 motion. See Kramer, 481 F.3d at 792. Nor
does Green’s allegation that he did not have the opportunity to
meet with the AFL-CIO about the agreement carry his burden under
Rule 60(b)(6). Green has not shown, for example, that the
defendants violated the settlement agreement, that fraud was
committed by any party (including the defendants), or that he was
not informed of the court’s judgment in time to appeal. Where
Green has accepted the monetary benefits of the agreement, he is
not free to attack the agreement’s validity and circumvent the
bar on pursuing his claims here. The plaintiff provides no
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authority that his allegation supports a finding of
“extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief under Rule
60(b)(6).
CONCLUSION
Because Green has not shown that relief from the judgment
under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate, his motion will be denied.
An appropriate final Order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
SIGNED this 19th day of December, 2012.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge