United States v. Queen ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Crim. Action No. 17-58 (EGS)
DOMINIC RANDY QUEEN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Defendant Dominic Randy Queen (“Mr. Queen”), proceeding pro
se, is serving a sixty-month concurrent term of imprisonment at
the Rivers Correctional Institution in Winton, North Carolina,
after pleading guilty to two counts in the five-count
indictment: (1) unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and (2) unlawful
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841 (b)(1)(D). See J., ECF No. 47 at 1-
3. 1 Mr. Queen claims that the Court’s written judgment conflicts
with the Court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence—
specifically, the written judgment fails to state that he will
receive credit for the time he served in custody before
sentencing. Def.’s Mot. for Amend. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 49
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
at 2-3. Id.
Mr. Queen understands, based on the oral pronouncement,
that he is entitled to receive credit for all of the time that
he served in custody from his initial arrest on February 25,
2017 until his sentencing hearing on September 25, 2018. Id. at
3. Mr. Queen contends that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
is subjecting him to an eighty-four month prison term rather
than a sixty-month prison term because BOP calculated his
sentence from the sentencing hearing instead of the initial
arrest. Id. Mr. Queen urges this Court to amend the written
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Id.
at 1, 5.
The government opposes Mr. Queen’s motion, arguing that
there is no clerical error in the written judgment. Gov’t’s Mot.
to Transfer (“Gov’t’s Mot.”), ECF No. 53 at 1. According to the
government, BOP correctly calculated Mr. Queen’s jail-time
credit in this case as required by federal law, and BOP
attributed most of Mr. Queen’s jail-time credit to his parole
revocation proceedings in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia (“D.C. Superior Court”). Id. The government moves to
transfer Mr. Queen’s motion, construed as a habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, the district
where Mr. Queen is presently incarcerated. Id.
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Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendant’s Motion for
Amendment of the Written Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36; and (2) United States’ Motion to Transfer
Defendant’s Rule 36 Motion, Construed as a Habeas Petition Under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, to the Eastern District of North Carolina.
Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the
applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court
construes Mr. Queen’s motion as a petition for habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and such a petition must be brought in
the district in which Mr. Queen is presently incarcerated.
Therefore, the government’s motion is GRANTED. Mr. Queen’s
motion shall be TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
II. Background
On February 25, 2017, officers from the District of
Columbia’s Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) arrested
Mr. Queen after conducting a traffic stop and recovering a
loaded firearm and drugs from his vehicle. Statement of Offense,
ECF No. 33 at 2-3. Eleven days later, on March 7, 2017, the
United States Parole Commission issued a warrant based on
Mr. Queen’s violation of the conditions of release in his D.C.
Superior Court case. Warrant, ECF No. 36 at 1-2. On March 22,
2017, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Queen on five related
drug and firearm charges in this case. Indictment, ECF No. 1 at
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1-3.
On May 31, 2018, Mr. Queen pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(“Count One”); and possessing with the intent to distribute
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841 (b)(1)(D)
(“Count Four”). Plea Agreement, ECF No. 32 at 1 ¶ 1. Pursuant to
the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the parties agreed that a
total sentence of sixty months of imprisonment, to be followed
by four years of supervised release, was an appropriate
sentence. Id. at 2 ¶ 4. Later, the parties agreed that three
years of supervised release was the appropriate period. Gov’t’s
Mot., ECF No. 53 at 4. To address the parole warrant detainer
from the D.C. Superior Court case, the Court released Mr. Queen
to the custody of the United States Marshals Service on June 22,
2018. Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 53 at 3.
The United States Parole Commission revoked Mr. Queen’s
parole in the D.C. Superior Court case and imposed a revocation
sentence of twenty-one months. Id. (citing Gov’t’s Ex. 1, ECF
No. 53-1 at 11). Mr. Queen completed his parole revocation
sentence on September 14, 2018, after receiving jail-time credit
from the date of the issuance of the parole warrant (March 7,
2017) through June 21, 2018, in addition to good time credit.
Id. On the same day, BOP erroneously released Mr. Queen from
federal custody despite the pending charges in this case. Id. On
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September 19, 2018, this Court scheduled a status hearing for
September 21, 2018, and the Court ordered Mr. Queen to self-
surrender at the status hearing. See Min. Order of Sept. 19,
2018; see also Def.’s Mot. to Continue Hearing/Defendant
Released by Error, ECF No. 40 at 1. Mr. Queen complied with the
Court’s Order. Min. Entry of Sept. 21, 2018.
On September 25, 2018, the Court sentenced Mr. Queen. At
sentencing, the Court accepted the parties’ proposed sentence
under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Sentencing Hr’g Tr. (Sept. 25, 2018),
ECF No. 52 at 14. Before the oral pronouncement of the sentence,
the Court asked the government for its position on whether the
Court should run the sentence concurrently with or consecutively
to any other sentence. Id. at 6. “[W]ith respect to the parole
sentence,” the government stated that it did not take the
position that the sixty-month prison term should be consecutive
to the parole sentence. Id. Neither party, however, informed the
Court that Mr. Queen had already completed his parole revocation
sentence on September 14, 2018. See id. at 6-12. The Court
decided that the sentence in the instant case would run
concurrently with Mr. Queen’s parole revocation sentence. Id. at
12.
The Court sentenced Mr. Queen to a sixty-month concurrent
term of imprisonment as to Counts One and Four. Id. at 18. The
Court imposed a three-year concurrent term of supervised
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release. Id. The Court ordered the prison term to run
concurrently with the parole revocation sentence. Id.
Following the oral pronouncement, the Court informed
Mr. Queen that he would receive credit for the time that he had
served in custody. Id. at 14. The Court engaged in a discussion
with the United States Probation Officer regarding the estimated
jail-time credit:
THE COURT: But I’m going to run the sentence
-- I’m going to accept the sentence. It’s 60
months. You’ll get credit for the time served.
I’m not sure how much time remains. I don’t
know, maybe -- I don’t know. I hate to guess
because I’m always wrong, but it’s about three
years or so. Ms. Kraemer-Soares, I don’t know.
THE PROBATION OFFICER: That sounds about
right.
THE COURT: That’s about right. It could be
less than, I just don’t know because you’re
getting credit for -- you’ve been incarcerated
for 19 months, right, so 15 percent every year
will be reduced, so it’s going to be reduced,
so it’s somewhere around 36 months or so. I
don’t know. You have a better calculation. And
that’s with credit, so it’s not quite 36
months. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Id. at 14-15.
The Court reiterated the sentence to Mr. Queen: “I’ll run
the sentences -- It’s Count 1 and Count 4, so I’ll run the
sentence of 60 months concurrent, impose a period of supervision
of three years on each count concurrent, and that’s concurrent
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with the parole sentence that you are serving, all right.” Id.
at 18.
Consistent with the oral pronouncement, the Court entered
the written judgment on October 4, 2018. J., ECF No. 47 at 1-8.
The written judgment states that Mr. Queen shall serve a sixty-
month concurrent term of imprisonment as to Counts One and Four.
Id. at 3. And the sixty-month concurrent term of imprisonment
would run concurrently with the term of imprisonment imposed by
the United States Parole Commission. Id. Mr. Queen did not
appeal the sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”). See generally
Docket for Crim. Action No. 17-58.
Less than a year after the entry of the written judgment,
the Clerk of Court filed Mr. Queen’s pro se Rule 36 motion on
July 28, 2019. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 49 at 1. On September 3,
2019, the government filed its motion to transfer Mr. Queen’s
Rule 36 motion, construed as a Section 2241 petition, to the
Eastern District of North Carolina. See Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 53
at 1. Mr. Queen filed his response, styled as “Defendant’s Reply
to the Government’s Motion for Order to Transfer His Rule 36
Motion, Construed as a Habeas Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
to the Eastern District of North Carolina.” See Def.’s Resp.,
ECF No. 55 at 1. The government then filed its reply brief. See
Gov’t’s Reply, ECF No. 57 at 1. On April 21, 2020, Mr. Queen
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submitted a letter to the Court. See Def.’s Letter, ECF No. 58
at 1. The motions are ripe for the Court’s adjudication.
III. Analysis
Under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
“the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a
judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an
error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 36 (emphasis added). Mr. Queen seeks an amendment to
the written judgment to: (1) reflect “the Court’s intent to
credit the nineteen (19) months he had already served prior to
his sentencing”; and (2) “conform the sentence [to] the Court’s
intentions pronounced orally on September 25, 2018.” Def.’s
Mot., ECF No. 49 at 7. In Mr. Queen’s view, the written judgment
should include an explicit statement that he will receive credit
for time served. See id. at 3; see also Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 55
at 7-8. Mr. Queen, however, is not entitled to relief under Rule
36.
Having carefully reviewed the transcript from the
sentencing hearing, the Court cannot find that the written
judgment contains a clerical error within the meaning of Rule
36. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 52 at 14-15; see also J.,
ECF No. 47 at 3. During the sentencing hearing, the Court did
not state that an express term of the sentence would include
credit for the time that Mr. Queen had already served in
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custody. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 52 at 14-15. Although
the Court stated that Mr. Queen would receive “credit for the
time served,” the Court made clear that its prediction could be
“wrong” with respect to the specific amount of Mr. Queen’s jail-
time credit. Id. at 14 (“I’m not sure”; “I hate to guess”; “I
don’t know”; “I just don’t know”). The Court’s statement—that
Mr. Queen would receive credit for the time served in custody—is
consistent with the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
By its terms, Mr. Queen “shall be given credit toward the
service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in
official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . .
. that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]fter a
district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney
General, through the BOP, has the responsibility for
administering the sentence,” which includes calculating jail-
time credit. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992).
“Because the offender has a right to certain jail-time credit
under § 3585(b), and because the district court cannot determine
the amount of the credit at sentencing, the Attorney General has
no choice but to make the determination as an administrative
matter when imprisoning the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added).
Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2011) is
illustrative. There, a sentencing judge stated during the
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sentencing hearing that “the time [the defendant] served to date
will be credited to this conviction.” Blood, 648 F.3d at 206.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third
Circuit”) held that the sentencing judge’s statement, “when read
in context, merely reflect[ed] the [sentencing judge’s]
prediction that the BOP would credit the disputed time toward
the [state] sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).” Id. The Third
Circuit explained that “district courts have no authority to
credit time toward a sentence under § 3585(b)—that function
rests in the sole authority of the BOP.” Id. 2
2 Mr. Queen’s argument—that the Court has the authority to award
him credit for time served under Section 5G1.3 of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines—is unavailing. See Def.’s Resp.,
ECF No. 55 at 3-10. Section 5G1.3 did not apply to Mr. Queen’s
sentence because he was not subjected to an “undischarged” term
of imprisonment or an “anticipated” state term of imprisonment.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. In fact, Mr. Queen’s parole revocation
sentence was discharged as of September 14, 2018. Gov’t’s Reply,
ECF No. 57 at 4. Mr. Queen’s reliance on the Third Circuit’s
decision in Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2002) is
misplaced. In that case, the Third Circuit held that a federal
district court had authority under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) to adjust
a sentence for time served on a state conviction. Ruggiano, 307
F.3d at 131. As the government correctly notes, the “holding [in
Ruggiano] has been superseded by more recent amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines, which the Third Circuit expressly
acknowledged in Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir.
2011).” Gov’t’s Reply, ECF No. 57 at 5 n.1. Finally, the Court
rejects Mr. Queen’s contention that this Court “intended to
exercise [its] authority to adjust [his] sentence to account for
all the 19 months of time he had served prior to his sentencing
including the time served on his parole sentence.” Def.’s Resp.,
ECF No. 55 at 6. The Court expressly accepted the agreed-upon
sentence in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and imposed
sixty months of imprisonment without any adjustments. See
Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 52 at 14, 18.
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Here, the government argues—and the Court agrees—that a
district court lacks the authority to “assess its own
calculation of credit for time served in a particular case”
because “‘that authority rests exclusively with the BOP.’”
Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 53 at 6 (quoting United States v. Ross,
219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000)). That being said, the
government contends that the Court should construe Mr. Queen’s
motion as a challenge to: (1) BOP’s calculation of his jail-time
credit attributable to this case; and (2) BOP’s computation of
his release date. Id. at 7. Mr. Queen asserts that he “is NOT
challenging how the BOP calculated his sentence.” Def.’s Resp.,
ECF No. 55 at 9.
Nonetheless, the Court is not bound by the label that
Mr. Queen attaches to his pro se Rule 36 motion. See Castro v.
United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–82 (2003). The Court may
recharacterize Mr. Queen’s motion to, among other things,
“create a better correspondence between the substance of [his]
pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis.” Id. The
Court liberally construes Mr. Queen’s motion and filings given
his status as a pro se prisoner. See Davis v. U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n, 716 F.3d 660, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In doing so, it is
clear that Mr. Queen disagrees with the BOP’s calculation of his
jail-time credit attributable to the sixty-month term of
imprisonment in this case. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 49 at 1-7.
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The crux of Mr. Queen’s motion challenges BOP’s calculation
of the length of his confinement. See id. Based on his own
calculations, Mr. Queen claims that his projected release date
should be May 31, 2021 with good time credit and the nineteen
months that he served in custody prior to sentencing in this
case. See id. at 3. But the government explains that “[t]he
discrepancy between the BOP’s calculation and the proposed
release date in [Mr. Queen’s] motion is because [he] seeks to
attribute all of the time he spent in custody from his arrest
(February 25, 2017) until his sentencing hearing (September 25,
2018) as jail credit in this case.” Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 53 at
7.
The government confirms that “BOP did calculate
[Mr. Queen’s] jail credit in this case, as it does for every
inmate pursuant to federal law.” Id. at 6. According to BOP’s
calculation, Mr. Queen “had only 20 days of jail credit
attributable to this case: 10 days for the period from [his]
arrest (February 25, 2017), until the parole warrant was issued
for [his] [D.C.] Superior Court case (March 7, 2017), plus 10
days for the period after [his] completion of his parole
revocation sentence (September 15, 2018), until the day before
[he] was sentenced in this case (September 24, 2018).” Id. at 7.
The government asserts that BOP attributed most of Mr. Queen’s
jail-time credit to his parole revocation proceedings in the
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D.C. Superior Court case. Id. (stating that “[a] BOP
representative informed government counsel . . . that the BOP
believes it properly attributed most of that time to defendant’s
parole revocation proceedings in his [D.C.] Superior Court
case”). And the government correctly notes that “federal law
prohibits [Mr. Queen] from receiving dual credit.” Id.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 is the proper vehicle for challenges to the
execution of a defendant’s sentence, the administration of his
sentence, or the length of his confinement. See Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (explaining that challenges to
the fact or duration of confinement lie at the core of habeas
corpus). The government contends—and the Court agrees—that
“[Mr. Queen’s] motion should be construed as a challenge to the
BOP’s calculation of his jail credit attributable to this case,
and to the BOP’s determination of his release date.” Gov’t’s
Mot., ECF No. 53 at 7.
“A federal court can only issue a writ of habeas corpus if
(1) the petitioner is physically confined within the court’s
territorial jurisdiction, and (2) the court has personal
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s immediate custodian.” Jeong
Seon Han v. Lynch, 223 F. Supp. 3d 95, 109 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 444, 447 (2004)). “This means
that, as a general matter, courts may grant habeas relief only
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‘within their respective jurisdictions.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a)); see also Stokes v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 374 F.3d 1235,
1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]n habeas cases involving present
physical confinement, jurisdiction lies only in one district:
the district of confinement.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Here, Mr. Queen is serving his sentence at the Rivers
Correctional Institution in Winton, North Carolina, and the
warden is his immediate custodian. This Court does not have
personal jurisdiction over the warden because the warden is
located in the Eastern District of North Carolina. See Padilla,
542 U.S. at 447 (“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to
challenge his present physical custody within the United States,
he should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in
the district of confinement.”). Where, as here, the Court lacks
jurisdiction over a Section 2241 motion, the Court “has the
authority to dismiss the action or transfer it [to the
appropriate district] in the interest of justice.” Stern v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 601 F. Supp. 2d 303, 306 (D.D.C. 2009).
Having construed Mr. Queen’s motion as a habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court will exercise its authority, in the
interest of justice, to transfer Mr. Queen’s motion to the
appropriate forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
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IV. Conclusion and Order
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Queen is not entitled
to relief under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Mr. Queen’s Rule 36 motion, construed as a habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, shall be transferred to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, the district in which Mr. Queen is incarcerated.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the United States’ Motion to Transfer
Defendant’s Rule 36 Motion, Construed as a Habeas Petition Under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, to the Eastern District of North Carolina, ECF
No. 53, is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Amendment of the
Written Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
36, ECF No. 49, is TRANSFERRED to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina; it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate Mr. Queen’s
motion, ECF No. 49, and mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order to Mr. Queen’s address of record.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
May 27, 2020
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