Info Labs Inc. v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ( 2020 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    INFO LABS INC.,                                  :
    :
    Plaintiff,                                :      Civil Action No.:      19-684 (RC)
    :
    v.                                        :      Re Document No.:       11, 12
    :
    UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND                    :
    IMMIGRATION SERVICES, et al.,               :
    :
    Defendants.                               :
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’
    CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    Thanks to the H-1B program, non-citizens can temporarily work in the United States if
    they are sponsored by an employer in a “specialty occupation.” Immigration and Nationality
    Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). Plaintiff Info Labs Inc. (“Info Labs”) filed a H-1B petition
    on behalf of its intended beneficiary, Mr. Dinesh Kumar Tatavarthi, so that he could work for the
    company as a computer systems analyst. The petition was denied by the United States
    Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on grounds that Info Labs failed to establish
    that the position qualified as a “specialty occupation” under the INA and associated regulations.
    Info Labs then sued USCIS and various officials under the Administrative Procedure Act
    (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., arguing that the agency’s denial was arbitrary and/or
    capricious. Currently pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary
    judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion, denies
    Defendants’, and remands to the agency for further consideration.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Legal Framework
    Under the INA, employers can petition for H-1B nonimmigrant visas on behalf of alien
    beneficiaries. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1). To secure a H-1B visa, an employer first submits to the
    Department of Labor (DOL) a Labor Condition Application (“LCA”), which identifies the
    specialty occupation at issue and certifies that the company will comply with the requirements of
    the H-1B program. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1). Then, once the DOL has certified the LCA, the
    employer submits it (together with a Form I-129 petition) to USCIS. 8 C.F.R. §
    214.2(h)(4)(i)(B). USCIS ultimately determines whether a position counts as a specialty
    occupation, see 20 C.F.R. § 655.715, and the employer bears the burden of convincing the
    agency that the position so qualifies and the applicant is otherwise eligible for a visa, see 8
    U.S.C. § 1361 (“Whenever any person makes application for a visa or any other document
    required for entry, . . . the burden of proof shall be upon such person to establish that he is
    eligible to receive such visa.”).
    For the purposes of the H-1B program, the INA defines a “specialty occupation” as one
    that requires “(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized
    knowledge, and (B) attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its
    equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
    1184(i)(1). The applicable regulations provide more specific criteria (or prerequisites) as to what
    qualifies:
    To qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must meet one of the following
    criteria:
    (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum
    requirement for entry into the particular position;
    (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among
    similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its
    2
    particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an
    individual with a degree;
    (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
    (4) The nature of the specific duties are so specialized and complex that knowledge
    required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a
    baccalaureate or higher degree.
    8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) (“Criteria for H-1B petitions involving a specialty occupation”);
    see also Defensor v. Meissner, 
    201 F.3d 384
    , 387 (5th Cir. 2000) (“assum[ing] arguendo that §
    214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) creates [a] necessary and sufficient condition[] for the category of ‘specialty
    occupation’” but acknowledging that the provision could also “be read as merely an additional
    requirement that a position must meet, in addition to the statutory . . . definition”).
    B. Case Background
    Info Labs is a software development and technical services company. AR 189. 1 On
    November 11, 2017, 2 it filed a H-1B “specialty occupation” petition for Mr. Tatavarthi, AR 2,
    whom it sought to employ as a Computer Systems Analyst, AR 29. The petition included a
    variety of supporting materials, including a letter from Info Labs describing the duties of the
    position and explaining the educational background required for the role. AR 48–49.
    On May 18, 2020, USCIS sent a request for evidence (“RFE”), which informed Info Labs
    that the initial evidence did not establish that the contemplated job qualified as a specialty
    occupation and sought additional proof supporting that classification. AR 4. In response, Info
    Labs provided a variety of additional evidence, including: (a) a supporting letter from a vendor;
    (b) relevant excerpts from various DOL documents (including the Occupational Outlook
    1
    “AR” refers to the certified administrative record filed in this case. See Joint Appendix,
    ECF Nos. 21. The corresponding page numbers refer to the stamped Bates numbers.
    2
    As described in the Complaint, Mr. Tatavarthi’s H-1B history is “complex,” involving
    multiple petitions and amendments. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1. Mr. Tatavarthi has actually worked
    for Info Labs, in various roles, since October 2014.
    Id. ¶ 1.
    But this case concerns only the
    petition filed on November 7, 2017.
    Id. ¶ 3.
    3
    Handbook and O*Net Online database); (c) a list of companies offering similar job positions and
    the associated job postings; and (d) a “Specialty Occupation Evaluation” by a Professor Michael
    Braasch. AR 4. Despite the additional evidence, USCIS determined that Info Labs “ha[d] not
    established eligibility for the requested classification by a preponderance of the evidence” and
    denied the petition. AR 5. In its decision justifying the denial, USCIS discussed the §
    214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) criteria and explained why none of the four were met. AR 5–11.
    Here, Info Labs seeks review of USCIS’s denial. See Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Currently
    ripe and pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See
    Pl.’s Points & Authorities Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s MSJ”), ECF No. 11-1; Def.’s Mem.
    Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n (“Def.’s XMSJ”), ECF No. 12-1.
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    Normally, summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
    genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But a different standard governs cases involving review of agency
    action under the APA “because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative
    record.” Ctr. for Food Safety v. Salazar, 
    898 F. Supp. 2d 130
    , 138 (D.D.C. 2012). In these
    contexts, “[i]nstead of reviewing the record for disputed facts that would preclude summary
    judgment, the function of the district court is a more limited one: ‘to determine whether or not as
    a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the
    decision it did.’” Ardmore Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Contreras-Sweet, 
    118 F. Supp. 3d
    . 388, 393
    (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Sebelius, 
    828 F. Supp. 2d 193
    , 198 (D.D.C.
    2011)).
    4
    The ultimate standard is whether the agency action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Review under that
    standard is “highly deferential.” AT&T, Inc. v. FCC, 
    886 F.3d 1236
    , 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
    (quoting Nat’l Tel. Coop. Ass’n v. FCC, 
    563 F.3d 536
    , 541 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). For its decision to
    be upheld, the agency must have only “‘examine[ed]’ the relevant factors and data and
    articulate[d] a ‘rational connection’ between the record and [its] decision.”
    Id. (first quoting
    Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43
    (1983); then quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 
    371 U.S. 156
    , 168 (1962)). At the
    same time, though, judicial review is not a rubber stamp: a court will find an agency acted
    arbitrarily or capriciously “if it has relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider,
    entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation either
    contrary to the evidence before the agency or so implausible as to not reflect either a difference
    in view or agency expertise.” Defs. of Wildlife v. Jewell, 
    815 F.3d 1
    , 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. USCIS’s Analysis of the 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) Factors
    Plaintiff’s overarching argument is that USCIS erred in its analysis of the facts and law
    with respect to the criteria under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). See Pl.’s MSJ at 9. USCIS
    counters that its decision was reasonable, based on appropriate considerations, and consistent
    with the law. See Def.’s XMSJ at 2. The Court will discuss each of the factors in turn, keeping
    in mind that it must consider only “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
    relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” ExxonMobil Gas Mktg.
    Co. v. FERC, 
    297 F.3d 1071
    , 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
    Inc. v. Volpe, 
    401 U.S. 402
    , 416 (1971)). It is not enough that the Court “would have come to a
    5
    different conclusion” than the agency had it considered the matter de novo. Conservation Law
    Found. v. Ross, 
    374 F. Supp. 3d 77
    , 89 (D.D.C. 2019).
    1. Whether “[a] baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum
    requirement for entry into the particular position”
    In its decision, USCIS reported that it reviewed a variety of evidence relevant to this
    criterion, but found it all inadequate. AR 5. Specifically, it explained that, in the RFE, it already
    rejected as “insufficient” Info Labs’ own statement that a bachelor’s degree or the equivalent was
    required for the position.
    Id. It considered
    the entry for “computer systems analyst” in the
    DOL’s Occupational Outlook Handbook (“OOH” or “the Handbook”), 3 but determined it was
    inconclusive, as it “did not indicate that Computer Systems Analyst positions normally require a
    minimum of a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty.” AR 6. It discounted corresponding
    information from the DOL’s O*Net Online (O*Net) database for similar reasons.
    Id. And it
    declined to defer to the opinion of Professor Braasch, because he “provide[d] no substantiating
    evidence to support his opinion” and USCIS determined that “[s]imply going on record stating
    degrees, [sic] is insufficient.”
    Id. In its
    briefing here, Info Labs primarily challenges USCIS’s rejection of evidence from
    the Handbook. See Pl.’s MSJ at 10–11. As the company points out, the Handbook says that “[a]
    bachelor’s degree in a computer or information science field is common, although not always a
    requirement,” that “[m]ost computer systems analysts have a bachelor’s degree in a computer-
    3
    As USCIS explains, “petitioners and USCIS often rely on the Department of Labor’s
    Occupation Outlook Handbook . . . for information regarding the minimum requirements for
    positions falling into different occupational categories described by the DOL.” Def.’s XMSJ at
    9; see also Blacher v. Ridge, 
    436 F. Supp. 2d 602
    , 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Reliance on the
    Occupational Handbook is reasonable in determining whether a proposed position satisfies the
    requirements of a ‘specialty occupation.’”); Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 
    484 F.3d 139
    , 146 (1st
    Cir. 2007) (“In its review of petitions for nonimmigrant work visas, CIS frequently—and
    sensibly—consults the occupational descriptions collected in the Handbook.”).
    6
    related field,” and that “[a]though many computer systems analysts have technical degrees, such
    a degree is not always a requirement.” AR 346. It also reports that “for more technically
    complex jobs, a master’s degree in computer science may be more appropriate.”
    Id. According to
    Info Labs, all this indicates that “[a] baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is
    normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position.” 8 C.F.R. §
    214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1). USCIS, however, maintains that this language supports the opposite
    conclusion: namely, that “a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty is not normally a minimum
    requirement for entry in the occupation of Computer Systems Analysts.” Def.’s XMSJ at 10
    (emphasis added). It stresses other language in the Handbook indicating that “[m]any analysts
    have liberal arts degrees and have gained programming or technical expertise elsewhere.”
    Id. (quoting AR
    346).
    From the Court’s perspective, the Handbook’s statement that a bachelor’s degree in
    computer or information science is “common, although not always a requirement” supports,
    rather than disproves, the proposition that a specialized degree or its equivalent is normally the
    minimum requirement. The fact that such a degree is not “always” required—or that “some
    firms” hire analysts with general business or liberal arts degrees—does not suggest a specialty
    degree is not “normally” required. Also suggestive is the language that “most” computer
    systems analysts have a bachelor’s degree in a computer-related field. While this is not phrased
    in terms of an explicit requirement or condition of employment, it does provide additional
    support for Info Labs’ position when read in context. And finally, the further indication that a
    master’s degree in computer science may be more appropriate for “more technically complex
    positions” fairly implies that a specialized bachelor’s degree is the typical baseline requirement.
    7
    The court’s analysis in Next Generation Tech., Inc. v. Johnson, 
    328 F. Supp. 3d 252
    (S.D.N.Y. 2017) is relevant. There, the OOH entry for “computer programmer” explained that
    “some employers hire workers with an associate’s degree,” but went on to say that “[m]ost
    computer programmers have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related subject.”
    Id. at 267–68.
    Based on this language, the court concluded that “the Occupational Handbook arguably
    demonstrates that a bachelor’s degree or higher in a specific specialty is ‘normal[ly]’ the
    minimum requirement for entry into the position.”
    Id. at 268
    (quoting 8 C.F.R. §
    214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1)). 4 Also helpful is Xiaotong Liu v. Baran, No. 18-cv-376, 
    2018 WL 7348851
    (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018). In Liu, the court relied, in part, on “OOH language
    indicating that ‘most’ positions require a four-year bachelor’s degree” to conclude that “the
    record establishes that the position normally requires a bachelor’s degree or higher.”
    Id. at *5.
    Most recently, Judge Lamberth found that O*Net language indicating that “most” positions
    require a degree, but “some” do not, ultimately supported the petitioner. See 3Q Digital, Inc. v.
    USCIS, No. 19-cv-579, 
    2020 WL 1079068
    , at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2020) (“[The regulation] does
    not say that a degree must always be required, yet the agency appears to have substituted the
    word ‘always’ for the word ‘normally.’ This is a misinterpretation and misapplication of the
    law, and [one that] effectively hold[s] the plaintiff to a higher standard than that which is set by
    the regulation . . .”).
    4
    USCIS claims that “Next Generation is distinguishable from this case because it
    involved a different job position, different Handbook language, and was adjudicated based on a
    different record and based on different agency guidance.” Def.’s Reply at 6, ECF No. 19. That
    is all true, but it has no bearing on Next Generation’s analysis of Handbook language that is
    effectively identical to the language at issue here. 
    See 328 F. Supp. 3d at 267
    (“[T]his Court is at
    a loss to see a ‘rational connection’ between the evidence indicating that ‘most computer
    programmers have a bachelor’s degree’ and USCIS’s determination that ‘computer programmers
    are not normally required to have a bachelor’s degree.’”).
    8
    Some divergent authority comes from Ajit Healthcare Inc. v. DHS, No. 19-684, 
    2014 WL 11412671
    (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2014). There, the court found “at least a ‘rational connection’
    between the Handbook description of the job in question and the conclusion that a [position]
    would not normally require a baccalaureate degree or higher” when the relevant OOH entry
    provided that “[a]lthough bachelor’s and master’s degrees are the most common educational
    pathways to work in this field, some facilities may hire those with on-the-job experience instead
    of formal education.”
    Id. at *4
    (internal citation omitted). It was enough, Ajit concluded, that
    “the Handbook describes a pathway to the position that does not require any formal education.”
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Another district court decision, distinguishing Next Generation, found that
    an OOH entry indicating that “[m]ost computer programmers have a bachelor’s degree” did “not
    describe the normal minimum educational requirements of the occupation in a categorical
    fashion.” Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran, 
    399 F. Supp. 3d 1004
    , 1013, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 5
    Aware that the precise Handbook language at issue varies across these cases, the Court
    nonetheless finds the overall thrust of Liu, Next Generation, and 3Q Digital more relevant and
    5
    Innova Solutions also seems to suggest that, if the OOH description indicates that some
    jobs in the field do not require a degree in the specialty, the employer must provide additional
    evidence indicating that its job is different from those that do not require the specialty 
    degree. 399 F. Supp. 3d at 1015
    (finding that petitioner “could not simply rely on the OOH profile,” but
    “had the burden to show that the particular position offered . . . was among the Computer
    Programmer positions for which a bachelor’s degree was normally required.”). While this
    analytical approach has some appeal in principle, it is unclear whether the OOH description
    provides enough detailed information to enable this kind of comparative analysis. It also
    significantly raises the burden on a petitioner—if an OOH description acknowledges, in passing,
    that a particular position occasionally does not require a specialty degree, a petitioner must
    somehow define a new subfield and muster supporting evidence outside of the OOH. This
    drastically reduces the value of the OOH as an authoritative resource. More fundamentally, it
    seems to reframe the relevant question: whether a specialty degree is normally required. The fact
    that the OOH recognizes some exceptions should not be fatal or even particularly significant.
    9
    persuasive than Ajit and Innova Solutions. 6 If USCIS wants to discount OOH evidence
    indicating that a specialty degree requirement is “common” and that “most” people in the
    position have a degree in a computer-related field, it cannot simply rely on the OOH’s
    recognition that an unspecified number of contrary cases exist. That is not a “fair reading of the
    Occupational Handbook,” Next 
    Generation, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 267
    , or the regulation itself. And
    because this treatment of the OOH was crucial to USCIS’s conclusion that the position did not
    qualify under this criterion, USCIS’s decision under this criterion must be remanded for
    reconsideration and further explanation. 7
    2. Whether “[t]he degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among
    similar organizations” or the “particular position is so complex or unique that it can be
    performed only by an individual with a degree”
    As both parties recognize, this criterion has two subparts; in its decision, USCIS analyzed
    each separately.
    As to the first subpart: to determine whether the degree requirement is common in
    parallel positions, USCIS reviewed Info Labs’ letter of support; (b) copies of job postings for
    computer systems analyst positions (and the associated degree requirements) from various firms;
    and (c) the specialty occupation evaluation by Professor Raasch. AR 7. The decision
    acknowledged but did not appear to give weight to the letter itself.
    Id. It dismissed
    the job
    6
    Innova Solutions and Ajit are also distinguishable on their facts: the OOH language at
    issue in those cases did not include a statement that a relevant bachelor’s degree is “common,
    although not always a requirement.” See Innova 
    Solutions, 399 F. Supp. 3d at 1013
    ; 
    2014 WL 11412671
    , at *4. As discussed, that OOH language is particularly helpful to Info Labs.
    7
    When an agency action violates the APA, “the proper course, except in rare
    circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Fla.
    Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 
    470 U.S. 729
    , 744 (1985). After all, a reviewing court “is not
    generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach
    its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.”
    Id. However, the
    Court does take this
    opportunity to observe that the statute seems designed to apply to jobs like the one at issue and
    benefit talented, well-educated beneficiaries like Mr. Tatavarthi.
    10
    postings because “although a bachelor’s degree is required for most of these positions, a
    bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent is not.”
    Id. And even
    then, the
    postings were for “positions in different industries and dissimilar organizations” and the
    “generalized” description of the Info Labs position made it impossible to make meaningful
    comparisons.
    Id. Finally, USCIS
    declined to credit Professor Raasch’s opinion, as it doubted his
    qualifications and found his submission insufficiently supported by the evidence.
    Id. The Court
    harbors doubts about some of USCIS’s conclusions. For example, multiple
    job postings do suggest a relevant specialty degree is required. See, e.g., AR 371 (computer
    systems analyst position listing education requirements as “[a] Bachelor’s degree in Computer
    systems analysis, Computer science, . . . or a similar field of study.”); AR 373 (computer systems
    analyst position listing education requirements as “Bachelor’s Degree in a related Computer
    Technology field.”); AR 388 (“Computer Systems Analyst needed w/ Masters degree or Foreign
    Equivalent in Computer Engineering or Computer Science . . .”). In its briefing here, USCIS
    seems to hedge slightly, arguing that the agency “concluded that the job announcements did not
    all indicate that a bachelor’s degree or higher in a specific specialty was required.” Def.’s XMSJ
    at 12 (emphasis added). But that is not what the USCIS decision said. In any case, by
    introducing an apparent unanimity requirement, USCIS overstates petitioner’s burden, which is
    to establish that the specialty degree requirement is merely “common.”
    As discussed, USCIS’s fallback argument is that the postings were for jobs in different
    industries and dissimilar organizations, and Info Labs’ job description was too general. AR 8.
    But the decision does not go into any detail or explain the relevant differences among the
    postings, or explain why the generality of the posting frustrated a reasonable comparison. Of
    course, no two positions or companies are identical, and USCIS will always be able to point to
    11
    some differences. But the lack of reasoning and explanation makes it impossible for the Court to
    endorse the agency’s ultimate conclusion. See Susquehanna Int’l Grp., LLP v. SEC, 
    866 F.3d 442
    , 449 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (observing that a “lack of reasoned decisionmaking” is enough to
    make an agency decision arbitrary and capricious). USCIS offers some grounds for
    distinguishing the postings in its briefing here. See Def.’s Reply at 8–9. But it is well-
    established that an agency “cannot fill the holes of [its] decision by providing post hoc
    explanations in its briefs.” Mori v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
    917 F. Supp. 2d 60
    , 66 (D.D.C. 2013)
    (citing Camp v. Pitts, 
    411 U.S. 138
    , 143 (1973)). Accordingly, USCIS’s decision must be
    remanded for reconsideration and further explanation of its treatment of the comparator job
    postings.
    USCIS’s treatment of Dr. Braasch’s opinion is a different matter. USCIS concluded that
    he had not provided evidence that his prior opinions had been recognized as authoritative, and
    that there was no indication that he had conducted any relevant research or studies. AR 8. It
    also found that Dr. Braasch had not supported his opinion with sufficient evidence; for instance,
    he provided a brief, general description of Info Labs’ business activities, but did not demonstrate
    an in-depth knowledge of its operations.
    Id. While this
    Court does not necessarily share
    USCIS’s skepticism of Dr. Braasch’s opinion, the agency is entitled to its own evaluation of an
    expert opinion and can generally give it the weight it deems appropriate. In light of its narrow
    standard of review, the Court sees no basis for disturbing the agency’s discounting of Dr.
    Braasch’s opinion. See Sagarwala v. Cissna, 
    387 F. Supp. 3d 56
    , 66 (D.D.C. 2019) (“USCIS
    could have, in its discretion, accepted [a] professional opinion, but, absent more support, the
    agency certainly was not required to.”).
    12
    As to the second subpart: to determine whether the position is so complex or unique that
    it can be performed only by an individual with a degree, USCIS reviewed the petitioner’s
    description of the offered position, a letter of support from an Info Labs’ vendor, and Professor
    Braasch’s opinion. AR 9. It concluded that none of this indicated that the particular position
    was sufficiently complex.
    Id. Here, Plaintiff
    primarily argues that USCIS ignored an
    “expanded itinerary” which expounded on the position’s job duties, but, as USCIS explains, it
    did also consider the description of job duties provided with the RFE. Def.’s XMSJ at 22–23.
    Accordingly, the Court sees no basis for disturbing the agency’s conclusion as to the second
    prong.
    3. Whether “[t]he employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position”
    To evaluate this criterion, USCIS reviewed a variety of evidence, including a statement
    from Info Labs that “each employee assigned to this project with our company posses[es] at least
    a bachelor’s degree in an industry-recognized field” and an accompanying Organizational Chart.
    AR 10. It found this insufficient to demonstrate that Info Labs “historically hired individuals
    who hold at least a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for employment”
    in the position.
    Id. Info Labs
    has not challenged the USCIS conclusion as to this criterion, and
    the Court accordingly declines to disturb it.
    4. Whether “[t]he nature of the specific duties are so specialized and complex that knowledge
    required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or
    higher degree”
    Finally, as to this criterion, USCIS reviewed Info Labs’ letter of support and Dr.
    Braasch’s expert opinion letter. AR 10. Without much explanation, USCIS concluded that
    “[d]ue to the lack of detail in the description you have provided, it cannot be determined that
    these duties would require the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly
    specialized knowledge.”
    Id. 13 In
    challenging USCIS’s conclusion, Info Labs again argues that USCIS ignored the
    “expanded itinerary” that it submitted. Pl.’s MSJ at 14. But as discussed above, the record does
    indicate that USCIS reviewed all the evidence provided. Additionally, Info Labs takes issue with
    the decision’s statement that “[Info Labs has] not described with sufficient detail how [the
    duties] are more specialized and complex than those of other Computer Systems Analyst
    positions,” AR 10, which Info Labs claims is a misstatement of the governing regulatory test,
    Pl.’s MSJ at 14. But as USCIS explains, the decision “simply made the point that Plaintiff had
    not provided evidence that the position intended for Mr. Tatavarthi was any more specialized or
    complex than the standard Computer Systems Analyst position, which clearly does not require a
    bachelor’s degree.” Def.’s XMSJ at 23–24. The Court agrees with this reading of the decision
    and sees no basis for overturning the agency’s decision as to this criterion. Of course, however,
    for the reasons already discussed, see Section 
    III.A.1 supra
    , the premise underlying USCIS’s
    statement (i.e., that the standard position does not require a specialty degree) needs to be
    reconsidered.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Info Labs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and
    Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED, to the extent that this Court finds
    that, in denying Info Labs’ petition, USCIS disregarded or failed to explain why it discounted
    substantial evidence in the record that supported a determination that Info Labs had met the
    requirements for approval of an H-1B visa petition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) and
    (2), and that USCIS’s decision was therefore arbitrary and capricious. This matter is remanded
    to USCIS for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. A corresponding
    order is separately and contemporaneously issued.
    14
    Dated: March 31, 2020        RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
    United States District Judge
    15