United States v. Hughes ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Criminal Action No. 93-97 (BAH)
RONALD HUGHES,
Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant, Ronald Hughes, seeks early termination of his five-year term of supervised
release following 360 months’ incarceration, to which he was re-sentenced in 2002, see Order
(Aug. 6, 2002), ECF No. 536, on his 1994 conviction for conspiracy to distribute and for
distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii),
see Def.’s Mot. to Terminate Period of Supervised Release (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 724. The
government consents to this motion, see Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. (“Gov’t’s Resp.”), ECF
No. 726, and for the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
Having already described the facts of this case in detail, see United States v. White et al.,
413 F. Supp. 3d 15, 19–28 (D.D.C. 2019), only a brief review of the relevant procedural history
is provided here. In 1994, defendant was found guilty by a jury of one count of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and three counts of distribution of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and sentenced to life
imprisonment and three concurrent terms of 240 months. Gov’t’s Resp. at 1. In 2002,
defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), was granted
and he was resentenced to 360 months’ incarceration. Id. at 1–2. In 2019, defendant, who had
completed his 360-month term of imprisonment on May 13, 2019, and was serving his
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concurrent terms of supervised release, sought a reduction of his supervised release terms from 5
to 3 years, pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. White, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 28; id. at 19 n.1; see
also Def.’s Emergency Mot. to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, ECF No.
695. The Court denied this motion upon finding that defendant was not eligible for a reduction
under the First Step Act because his “supervised release term remain[ed] statutorily required for
his conviction on Count 1 … Thus no Section 404 relief is available to reduce his supervised
release term.” White, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 51 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)). The Court went
on to note that, even if available under Section 404, a reduction in defendant’s supervised release
term was not warranted due to his “Bureau of Prisons disciplinary history,” which “demonstrates
a continued pattern of violence while he was in prison,” including “a violation as recently as
2018, for failure to obey an order.” Id. at 53.
Defendant now moves to terminate his remaining period of supervised release, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), which authorizes termination of supervision “at any time after the
expiration of one year of supervised release,” so long as certain factors set out in § 3553(a) are
considered and the release “is warranted by the conduct of the defendant [on supervision] and the
interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Under this provision, the Court has discretion to
modify a term of supervised release even when such term is statutorily mandated. See United
States v. Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d 137, 142–43 (D.D.C. 2017) (BAH) (discussing this issue and
concluding that the “weight of authority confirms that § 3583(e)(1) authorizes termination of [a]
statutorily mandated term of supervised release . . .”) (collecting cases); see also United States v.
King, Crim. Case No. 03-cr-249 (BAH), 2019 WL 415818, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2019) (same);
United States v. Wesley, 311 F. Supp. 3d 77, 79 n.1 (D.D.C. 2018) (CKK) (same). No
“extraordinary or unusual conduct” during supervision is required to meet this standard. See
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Harris, 258 F. Supp. at 148–50; see also United States v. Borea, No. 03-cr-33-A, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 170268, *1–2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2018) (no new or changed circumstances are required)
(quoting United States v. Parisi, 821 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam)).
In evaluating a motion for early termination of supervised release, the Court must
consider the following seven factors from § 3553(a): (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the defendant’s history and characteristics; (2) deterrence of criminal conduct; (3)
protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant; (4) the need to provide the
defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment;
(5) the applicable sentencing guideline range for the offense and pertinent policy statements
issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e) (authorizing modification of supervised release “after considering the factors set forth
in” § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), and (a)(4)-(7)). Thus, among the §3553(a) factors not to be
considered in determining whether to modify the term of supervision, id., is “the need…to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL
OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE (July 2010) (“Supervised Release
Report”) at 9 (“The legislative history indicates that section 3553(a)(2)(A) was not included for
consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) because the primary purpose of supervised release is to
facilitate the integration of offenders back into the community rather than punish them.”).
In considering these factors, however, courts must recognize that supervised release
“serves an entirely different purpose than the sentence imposed under § 3553(a),” Pepper v.
United States, 562 U.S. 476, 502 n.15 (2011), since “[s]upervised release fulfills rehabilitative
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ends, distinct from those served by incarceration,” United States v. Johnson (“Johnson I”), 529
U.S. 53, 59 (2000); see also Johnson v. United States (“Johnson II”), 529 U.S. 694, 708–09
(2000) (recognizing the “congressional policy in providing for a term of supervised release . . . is
to improve the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty”). In addition, in the
context of a motion for early termination of supervised release, the sixth factor has limited
relevance because the “factor of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities . . . would generally
undermine the case specific inquiry required in evaluating a motion for early termination of
supervised release.” Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 145.
While acknowledging “the severity of the conviction in the instant matter,” Def.’s Mot. at
3, defendant argues, and the government agrees, that the second, third, and fourth of the §
3553(a) factors weigh in favor of early termination, as does the interest of justice, given the
rehabilitative rather than punitive ends served by supervised release, id. at 3–4; Gov’t’s Resp. at
3–4. Defendant has already served a 360-month prison sentence, which is sufficient to deter
similar criminal conduct in accordance with the second § 3553(a) factor. With regard to the third
and fourth factors, meanwhile, defendant’s positive behavior since being released supports a
finding both that defendant poses a minimal risk of danger to the community and that he is no
longer in need of rehabilitative training or other services. In particular, defendant has found
gainful employment and received praise from his employer both for his work performance and
for playing “a vital role [in] the company’s community outreach program.” Gov’t’s Mot. at 3.
Defendant has worked as a “community outreach specialist” and “serves as a mentor for [an]
Entrepreneurship Training program for formerly Incarcerated Persons.” Id. at 3–4; see also id.,
Ex. A, Ltr. from Councilmember Trayon White, Sr. (Feb. 25, 2020), ECF No. 724-1 (attesting to
defendant’s outreach work in Ward 8 and stating that “he is becoming an instrumental part of
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bolstering the local economy and community relations.”). Meanwhile, defendant has also
married and bolstered positive family relationships with his daughter and granddaughter, which
relationships provide “a stable foundation” for his ongoing reintegration in the community.
Def.’s Mot. at 4.
Given these admirable developments, the Court agrees with the government that
continuing supervised release “would have no real value as far as law enforcement or any other
community interest is concerned,” Gov’t’s Resp. at 4 (quoting Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 150
(internal citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court finds that early termination of defendant’s
supervised-release term is in the “interest of justice” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(1). Since defendant has served more than one year of his supervised-release term, which
began on May 13, 2019, he has also met the provision’s time requirement, which, as explained
above, allows for early termination “at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised
release.” 18 U.S.C. §3583(e)(1).
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant’s Motion to Terminate Period of Supervised Release, ECF
No. 724, to which the government consents, is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that defendant’s term of supervision shall be terminated early, effective June
26, 2020.
SO ORDERED.
Date: June 24, 2020
__________________________
BERYL A. HOWELL
Chief Judge
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