Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Mnuchin ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE )
CHEHALIS RESERVATION, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 20-cv-01002 (APM)
)
STEVEN MNUCHIN, in his official capacity )
as Secretary of the Treasury, )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE, et al. )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 20-cv-01059 (APM)
)
STEVEN MNUCHIN, in his official capacity )
as Secretary of the Treasury, )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
UTE TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND )
OURAY RESERVATION, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 20-cv-01070 (APM)
)
STEVEN MNUCHIN, in his official capacity )
as Secretary of the Treasury, )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
On June 26, 2020, the court ruled that Alaska Native regional and village corporations
(“ANCs”) are eligible to receive emergency relief funds appropriated by Congress under Title V
of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, or CARES Act. See Confederated
Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Mnuchin, No. 20-cv-01002 (APM), 2020 WL 3489479 (D.D.C.
June 26, 2020). The court accordingly entered judgment in favor of Defendant Secretary of the
U.S. Department of the Treasury and the ANC Defendant-Intervenors, and dissolved the
preliminary injunction that, until then, had prevented the Secretary from disbursing Title V funds
to ANCs. See Order, ECF No. 98. The Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation Plaintiffs
now ask the court to stay its judgment pending appeal. Pls.’ Mot. for Injunction Pending Appeal
and Mem. of P. & A., ECF No. 99 [hereinafter Pls.’ Mot.].1 Specifically, they seek an injunction
that prohibits the Secretary from “disbursing or otherwise paying Title V funds to any [ANC], until
further order of this Court or by order of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.”
Proposed Order, ECF No. 99-1, at 2. For the reasons that follow, the requested injunctive relief is
granted, subject to the condition that Plaintiffs file a notice of appeal and a motion for expedited
review by July 14, 2020.
II.
This court set forth the standard governing a motion for injunction pending appeal in
Cigar Association of America v. FDA, 317 F. Supp. 3d 555, 560–61 (D.D.C. 2018). The court
need not repeat that discussion here but incorporates it by reference, and proceeds directly to the
four injunction factors it must consider on a sliding scale.
1
Plaintiff Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation join in the Confederated Tribes Plaintiffs’ motion.
See Ute Indian Tribe’s Joinder in “Mot. for Leave to File Injunction Pending Appeal,” ECF No. 100.
2
First, Plaintiffs have presented “serious legal questions going to the merits, so serious,
substantial, difficult as to make them a fair ground of litigation and thus for more deliberative
investigation.” Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
Although the court ultimately ruled in Defendants’ favor, it observed that “this case does not
present easy, straightforward questions of statutory interpretation,” and it “wrestled” with the
decision it made. Confederated Tribes, 2020 WL 3489479, at *6. The proper application of the
competing canons of interpretation to Title V’s relevant statutory terms alone warrants additional
scrutiny, and the “impressive array of textual, historical, and practical evidence” amassed by the
parties, “all of which must be viewed against the unique treatment of Native Alaskans by Congress
and Executive Branch agencies,” only counsels in favor of further review. Id. Because the
question of statutory interpretation presented in this case is as complicated as it is consequential,
it deserves an audience before a higher court while maintaining the status quo. 2
Second, Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the court denied injunctive relief and
the Secretary then distributed the withheld Title V funds to ANCs. Such payments could result in
this case becoming moot before receiving a full hearing before the D.C. Circuit. See City of
Houston. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“It is a well-
settled matter of constitutional law that when an appropriation has lapsed or has been fully
obligated, federal courts cannot order the expenditure of funds that were covered by that
appropriation.”); Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that “interim relief”
was proper where plaintiff States challenged the agency’s formula for distributing education
2
To varying degrees, the parties have sought to revisit the merits of the court’s decision. See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot. at 6–12;
Def,’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal, ECF No. 103, at 5–13. Wading into those thorny issues once more
is neither desirable nor necessary. It suffices to say that the questions Plaintiffs have raised are sufficiently
“substantial” to warrant an injunction pending appeal.
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funding, because, “[o]nce the . . . funds are distributed to the States and obligated, they cannot be
recouped”). Given the complexity and significance of the questions presented, this court should
not have the last say on this matter. Defendants respond that the harm Plaintiffs faced at the
preliminary injunction stage is now greatly diminished because they have received approximately
90% of the CARES Act funding to which they are entitled. Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Inj. Pending
Appeal of Intervenor-Defendants Alaska Native Village Corp. Assoc., Inc., and Assoc. of ANCSA
Regional Corp. Presidents/CEO’s, Inc., ECF No. 104, at 8. Yet, there remains hundreds of millions
of dollars in dispute. And, although not all of those funds would go to these Plaintiffs if they were
to prevail, the lesser amount at stake would not make the lost chance at appellate review sting any
less.
Third, the final two factors taken together—the balance of equities and the public interest—
cannot overcome the reasons favoring injunctive relief. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434
(2009) (“The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.”); id. at 435
(observing that the third and fourth factors “merge” when the government is the opposing party).
To be sure, the ANCs and, more importantly, the constituencies they serve will suffer some injury
from additional delay in receiving Title V funds. However, the public interest also rests in carrying
out Congress’s will, and that interest is not served if ANCs receive and spend tens of millions of
dollars of emergency relief to which they are not entitled. See League of Women Voters of United
States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (stating that “there is a substantial public interest
in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and
operations” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Although this court has concluded
that ANCs are eligible for those funds, the public interest rests with the D.C. Circuit deciding
whether this court got it right.
4
In summary, the injunction factors, applied on a sliding scale, favor granting Plaintiffs’
request for an injunction pending appeal.
III.
The Calista ANC-Intervenor Defendants urge the court, in effect, to punt Plaintiffs’ request
for injunctive relief to the D.C. Circuit. See Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal,
ECF No. 102 [hereinafter Calista Mot.] at 2 (“In all events, this Court is the wrong court to grant
the relief that plaintiffs seek.”). The court declines to do so. This court has an independent
obligation to consider Plaintiffs’ motion, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d); Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1), and it
must discharge that responsibility. That said, the Calista ANC-Intervenor Defendants are right to
be concerned that a delayed appeal would defeat the very purposes for which Congress
appropriated CARES Act funds on an emergency basis. See Calista Mot. at 2–3. The
Confederated Tribes Plaintiffs have not suggested that they intend to delay prosecuting an appeal;
to the contrary, they have said they will pursue expedited review. See Pls.’ Mot. at 2 n.1.
Nevertheless, to ensure prompt appellate consideration, the court will condition the requested stay
on Plaintiffs’ filing both a notice of appeal and a motion for expedited review before the
D.C. Circuit by no later than July 14, 2020. See Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, 240 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23 & n.1 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting injunction pending appeal
conditioned on seeking expedited review); accord Charles v. Office of the Armed Forces Medical
Examiner, Civil Action No. 1:09-cv-0199 (KBJ), 2013 WL 12332949, at *2 (D.D.C. May 9, 2013).
If Plaintiffs fail to move on an expedited basis, the stay will expire.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Confederated Tribes Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunction
Pending Appeal, ECF No. 99, is hereby granted, subject to one condition.
The court’s Order of June 26, 2020, ECF No. 98, is hereby stayed until the earlier of
September 15, 2020, or resolution of this matter by a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit, so long
as Plaintiffs file a notice of appeal and seek expedited review by July 14, 2020. If Plaintiffs do not
timely satisfy this condition, the injunction pending appeal shall expire on July 15, 2020. If the
D.C. Circuit has not resolved this case by September 15, 2020, this order may be extended upon
motion by a party or by the D.C. Circuit. Any motion filed before this court shall address whether
Title V funds will expire if the D.C. Circuit does not issue a decision by September 30, 2020.
Dated: July 7, 2020 Amit P. Mehta
United States District Court Judge
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