United States v. Magruder ( 2020 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    Criminal Action No. 19-203 (CKK)
    EDWARD MAGRUDER,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (July 20, 2020)
    In this criminal action, Defendant Edward Magruder pled guilty to unlawful possession
    with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1)
    and (b)(1)(A). Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
    Defendant Magruder and the Government agreed that a sentence of 144 months to 180 months of
    incarceration, followed by five years of supervised release, was an appropriate sentence. Prior to
    sentencing, Defendant Magruder has filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. ECF No. 27.
    Defendant Magruder argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because he
    had ineffective assistance of counsel based on his prior counsel’s failure to obtain a particular
    item of discovery and because he was coerced into accepting the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea. The
    Government opposes withdrawal of the guilty plea.
    Upon consideration of the pleadings,1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a
    1
    The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents:
    • Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (“Def.’s Mot.), ECF No. 27;
    • Gov.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (“Gov.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 28;
    • Def.’s Reply to Opp’n to Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 29;
    • Def.’s Suppl. to Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (“Def.’s Supp.”), ECF No. 30;
    • Gov.’s Suppl. to Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (“Gov.’s Supp.”), ECF
    No. 31; and
    whole, the Court DENIES Defendant Magruder’s Motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court
    concludes Defendant Magruder has not presented a fair and just reason for granting the
    withdrawal.
    I. LEGAL STANDARD
    Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, a defendant is permitted, before a sentence
    is imposed, to withdraw a guilty plea if the defendant can show “a fair and just reason for
    requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). While presentence withdrawal motions
    should be “‘liberally granted,’ they are ‘not granted as a matter of right.’” United States v.
    Thomas, 
    541 F. Supp. 2d 18
    , 23 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting United States v. Ahn, 
    231 F.3d 26
    , 30
    (D.C. Cir. 2000)). When ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, courts in this Circuit
    consider the following factors:2 “(1) whether the defendant asserted a viable claim of innocence;
    (2) whether the delay between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has substantially
    prejudiced the government’s ability to prosecute the case; and (3) whether the guilty plea was
    somehow tainted.” United States v. Taylor, 
    139 F.3d 924
    , 929 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). The third factor is viewed as the “most important.” 
    Id.
     (internal
    •   Def.’s Reply to Gov.’s Suppl. to Opp’n to Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (“Def.’s Reply
    to Supp.”), ECF No. 32.
    2
    Defendant Magruder argues that these factors are not applicable because they are “considered
    by the Appellate Court to determine if the court abused its discretion in not permitting a
    defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, 1. While the United States
    Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit does consider these factors in such a
    context, a number of district courts have still applied the factors when determining whether or
    not a defendant has shown a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea. See, e.g., United
    States v. Thomas, 
    541 F. Supp. 2d 18
    , 23 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[C]ourts look at [these] factors in
    deciding whether to grant a motion to withdraw a plea.”); United States v. Sibblies, 
    562 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 3 (D.D.C. 2008) (same); United States v. Tolson, 
    372 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 9 (D.D.C. 2005) (“The
    D.C. Circuit has recently reiterated this jurisdiction’s longstanding rule that a court adjudicating
    a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing must consider [these factors].”).
    2
    quotation marks omitted). In the present case, the Government does not claim that it would be
    “substantially prejudiced” by the withdrawal of Defendant Magruder’s guilty plea. Gov.’s
    Opp’n, ECF No. 28, 9 n.5. Therefore, this analysis focuses on the first and third factors,
    beginning with the third factor as it is the most influential. See United States v. Cray, 
    47 F.3d 1203
    , 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (adopting “more structured inquiry-focusing first on the most
    important, indeed determinative factor”).
    II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    On June 10, 2019, a criminal complaint was filed against Defendant Magruder, stating
    that he violated 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) by possessing with intent to distribute a
    mixture and substance containing one kilogram or more of heroin. ECF No. 1. That same day,
    Defendant Magruder was arrested and made an initial appearance before Magistrate Judge Robin
    Meriweather. Defendant Magruder was appointed counsel and was held in temporary detention.
    On June 13, 2019, a detention hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Meriweather, and
    Defendant Magruder consented to detention.
    On June 24, 2019, this Court held its first status conference with Defendant Magruder.
    Defense counsel indicated that he had received but had not yet reviewed the discovery and
    requested an additional 30 days. June 24, 2019 Minute Order. The Court held the next status
    conference on August 1, 2019, during which Defense counsel requested additional time to
    review discovery and to determine how to proceed. Aug. 2, 2019 Minute Order. The parties
    returned to the Court on September 13, 2019. At this time, Defendant Magruder indicated that he
    intended to proceed to trial and the Court ordered the parties to propose pre-trial deadlines. Sept.
    13, 2019 Minute Order. Also on that day, the Court ordered the Probation Office to complete a
    3
    criminal history calculation so that the parties would have access to the relevant information on
    the advisory sentencing guidelines prior to trial. ECF No. 6.
    When the parties returned to the Court for a status conference on October 4, 2019,
    Defense counsel indicated that Defendant Magruder had been provided with a plea offer.
    Defendant Magruder required additional time to consider the plea offer. Oct. 4, 2019 Minute
    Order.
    On October 8, 2019, the parties conducted another status conference. At this status
    conference, Defendant Magruder indicated that he intended to accept the Government’s plea
    offer. The plea offer, which was later formally accepted, was a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea of 144
    to180 months, with a mandatory minimum of 10 years. Oct. 8, 2019 Minute Order. During the
    status conference, Defense counsel explained that “Mr. Magruder appears to have at least two
    prior convictions that, if the Government had filed the 851 notices, would have put him in
    jeopardy of receiving a mandatory minimum term of incarceration of 25 years.” Tr. Oct. 8, 2019,
    ECF No. 19, 4:20-23. Even absent a 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
     notice, the Government stated that if
    Defendant Magruder pled to the indictment his advisory sentencing guidelines range would be
    262 to 327 months, with a mandatory minimum of 10 years. 
    Id. at 6:14-15
    . Defense counsel
    explained that the plea offer would reduce the incarceration time “a considerable amount.” 
    Id. at 5:1
    . Defendant Magruder affirmed that he had received and reviewed the evidence against him.
    
    Id. at 5:6-9
    .
    During the next October 22, 2019 status conference, the Court explained the Probation
    Office’s findings on Defendant Magruder’s criminal history calculation. The Court also stated
    that, as a career offender, Defendant Magruder would likely be eligible for a 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
    4
    notice by the Government, increasing the mandatory minimum sentence to 25 years. During the
    status conference, Defendant Magruder expressed some confusion as to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
    plea. Tr. Oct. 22, 2019, ECF No. 20, 7:13-14. The Court explained that Defendant Magruder
    faced a mandatory minimum of 10 years based on his charge. If the Government filed a 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
     notice, for which it appeared Defendant Magruder was eligible, the mandatory
    minimum would move up to 25 years. 
    Id. at 8:3-20
    . The Court stated that it had no control over
    the mandatory minimums and could not sentence Defendant Magruder to a lesser sentence than
    the mandatory minimum. 
    Id. at 9:3-4
    . The Court further explained that if the Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
    plea was accepted, Defendant Magruder’s sentence would have to be between 144 and 180
    months. 
    Id. at 8:11-15
    . The Court explained to Defendant Magruder “this is your decision. Your
    counsel can go over the evidence with you, can go over what the choices are that you have, what
    the consequences are, can give you advice; and you can decide to accept it or not.” 
    Id.
     at 12:12-
    15. After reviewing the effect of the plea offer, Defendant Magruder confirmed that all requested
    discovery had been provided. 
    Id. at 12:5-9
    . Defendant Magruder further stated that he was
    prepared to go forward with the plea agreement. 
    Id. at 13:14-17
    .
    On October 25, 2019, Defendant Magruder was placed under oath and pled guilty,
    accepting the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, setting a sentence of 144 to 180 months. ECF
    No. 13. The Court accepted the plea but held in abeyance accepting the proposed sentence until
    after the Court could review the presentence report.
    On November 20, 2019, the Court received a letter from Defendant Magruder which was
    dated October 25, 2019. ECF No. 17. In the letter, Defendant Magruder stated that he was not
    satisfied with his prior counsel based, in part, on his counsel’s alleged failure to properly
    5
    investigate the case. Defendant Magruder also expressed some confusion as to whether or not his
    plea agreement contained a mandatory minimum of 10 years. 
    Id.
     That same day, Defendant
    Magruder’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw. ECF No. 15.
    On December 2, 2019, the Court appointed Defendant Magruder new counsel and set
    another status conference in the case, allowing new counsel adequate time to prepare. The Court
    further stayed the deadlines for the sentencing briefing. Dec. 6, 2019 Minute Order. On
    December 12, 2019, the Court held a status conference where Defendant Magruder was
    represented by his new counsel. Defendant Magruder expressed that he was satisfied with his
    new counsel. The Court set a further status conference to allow Defendant Magruder time to
    speak with his new counsel about how to proceed. Dec. 12, 2019 Minute Order. On January 27,
    2020, the Court held another status conference at which Defendant Magruder indicated his
    intention to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court set a briefing schedule. Jan. 27,
    2020 Minute Order.
    Prior to the filing of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant Magruder’s new
    counsel filed a motion to withdraw due to a fundamental disagreement on the posture of the case.
    ECF No. 21. On March 6, 2020, the Court granted the motion to withdraw and again appointed
    new counsel for Defendant Magruder. Mar. 6, 2020 Minute Order. The Court further vacated the
    briefing schedule for the motion to withdraw and set a new status conference date. 
    Id.
    Prior to the next status conference, the Court was hindered by the COVID-19 restrictions.
    In Re: Court Operations in Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic,
    Standing Order 20-9(BAH), Mar. 16, 2020. The Court ordered Defendant Magruder to file a
    notice indicating if he intended to proceed with moving to withdraw his guilty plea so that the
    6
    Court could set further proceedings. Mar. 17, 2020 Minute Order.
    On May 6, 2020, Defendant Magruder filed a Notice indicating his intent to move to
    withdraw his guilty plea. ECF No. 26. The Court set a briefing schedule for Defendant
    Magruder’s Motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and that motion is currently before the Court.
    ECF No. 27.
    III. DISCUSSION
    Defendant Magruder contends that he should be able to withdraw his guilty plea because
    his prior counsel was ineffective for failing to discover a particular piece of discovery and
    because he was coerced into accepting a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea. The Court concludes that neither
    argument provides grounds for withdrawing his guilty plea.
    A. Tainted Plea
    If a plea is tainted because it was entered unconstitutionally, or contrary to Rule 11
    procedures, then the “standard [for allowing withdrawal of a plea] is very lenient.” United States
    v. Barker, 
    514 F.2d 208
    , 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Under such circumstances, pleas “should almost
    always be permitted to be withdrawn,” regardless if the defendant asserted his legal innocence.
    
    Id.
     A plea is “constitutionally valid” only if it “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
    among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” United States v. McCoy, 
    215 F.3d 102
    , 107 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 56 (1985)) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    First, Defendant Magruder argues that his plea was tainted because it was not voluntary
    or intelligent due to his prior counsel’s failure to properly investigate at least one piece of
    discovery. To withdraw a guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
    7
    defendant must satisfy the two-prong test introduced in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 688
    (1984). First, the defendant must show that the “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
    standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. Second, the defendant must prove
    that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687.
    As the first step under Strickland, Defendant Magruder must show that his prior counsel’s
    performance was deficient. To show deficient performance, Defendant Magruder must
    demonstrate that his “counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’
    by identifying specific ‘acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result
    of reasonable professional judgment.’” Taylor, 139 F.3d at 929 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
    687-88). It is well-established that an attorney has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or
    to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466
    U.S. at 691. Therefore, if the alleged deficient conduct is a failure to fully investigate, then the
    attorney’s decision “must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all circumstances, applying a
    heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgment.” Id.
    In the present case, Defendant Magruder represents that his prior counsel was deficient
    by failing to provide him with the relevant discovery; namely, a May 10, 2019 affidavit that was
    submitted in support of the warrant to obtain his geolocation data. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 27, 4-5.
    Defendant Magruder states that he received the affidavit only after the plea hearing and upon
    communicating with counsel for the Government. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, 2. Therefore,
    Defendant Magruder claims that his guilty plea “was not a knowing plea without the full gambit
    of material which only recently came to light.” Id.
    For purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, the Court will assume that Defense counsel’s
    8
    failure to provide Defendant Magruder with relevant discovery—the May 10, 2019 affidavit—
    was deficient. However, the Court finds that Defendant Magruder cannot show the second
    Strickland prong—that he was prejudiced by this error. To show prejudice, the defendant must
    show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
    pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 
    474 U.S. at 59
    . In circumstances
    where the counsel’s deficient conduct is a “failure to investigate or discover potentially
    exculpatory evidence, the determination of whether the error ‘prejudiced’ the defendant . . . will
    depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his
    recommendation as to the plea.” 
    Id.
     This inquiry “will depend in large part on a prediction
    whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.” 
    Id.
    Defendant Magruder argues that if he had been provided the May 10, 2019 affidavit, he
    could have identified two errors. First, that the seven outgoing calls made to the phone of Mr.
    Jhon Jairo Mosquera-Asprilla, a Colombian drug contact, occurred in March 2019, not in April
    2019; and second, that the claimed 16-minute call between Defendant Magruder and Mr.
    Mosquera-Asprilla on April 22, 2019, actually occurred for 13.5 minutes on March 22, 2019.
    Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 27, 5. According to Defendant Magruder, the discovery of these errors
    would have led him to file “a motion to suppress the warrant with a viable Frank’s issue
    ultimately defeating the probable cause leading to the signing off on the warrant.” Id. at 7.
    Lacking probable cause for a warrant, Defendant Magruder contends that he would have been
    “in a position to suppress the drugs seized on June 8, 2019, and he would have been in a position
    to have the charge dismissed against him.” Id.
    The Court disagrees with Defendant Magruder’s theory. Under Franks v. Delaware, in
    9
    order to successfully challenge an affidavit, the defendant must show that the false statements in
    the document were made by the affiant “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard
    for the truth” and that the false statements were “necessary to the finding of probable cause.” 
    438 U.S. 154
    , 155 (1978). Notably, “[a]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.”
    
    Id. at 171
    ; see also United States v. Lopez, No. 1:17-CR-269, 
    2018 WL 1290415
    , at *10 (N.D.
    Ohio Mar. 13, 2018), aff’d, 769 F. App’x 288 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding a single false statement is
    insufficient to support a Franks hearing); United States v. West, 
    503 F. Supp. 2d 192
    , 194
    (D.D.C. 2007) (refusing a Franks hearing where the mistake in the affidavit was small and not
    material); United States v. Ali, 
    870 F. Supp. 2d 10
    , 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying a Franks hearing
    where potentially negligent omissions in an affidavit were not material).
    Though Defendant Magruder established that the affidavit contained two errors,
    Defendant Magruder does not cite to any legal authority that suggests these errors would have
    been sufficient for a Franks motion. Defendant Magruder merely alleges that the errors were a
    “deception on the part of the [affiant], not a reasonable belief.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, 5.
    Nonetheless, the nature of the errors suggests that they were “typographical errors,” as the
    Government states in its opposition. Gov.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 29, 6 n.4. The affiant wrote “April,”
    rather than “March,” and “16-minutes,” instead of “13.5 minutes.” Defendant Magruder has
    further failed to show that these small errors were in any way material to the finding of probable
    cause. That the calls were made a month prior and that one of the calls lasted approximately two
    and a half minutes less than stated is unlikely to defeat probable cause. Such errors, while
    avoidable and possibly negligent on the part of the affiant, do not meet the high standard set forth
    in Franks. Therefore, despite Defense counsel’s failure to discover these errors, Defendant
    10
    Magruder has not proven that he was prejudiced by this failure as his Franks motion would have
    likely been denied. United States v. Holland, 
    117 F.3d 589
    , 594 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting a
    lawyer is not ineffective if he fails to file a frivolous motion).3
    In addition to arguing that disclosure of the May 10, 2019 affidavit would have led to the
    suppression of probable cause for the warrant, Defendant Magruder also argues that if he had
    seen the affidavit earlier, he could have requested access to his phone records to show that the
    March 22, 2019, 13.5-minute phone call to Mr. Mosquera-Asprilla did not happen. When
    Defendant Magruder recently requested his phone records, he was informed that the phone
    company does not maintain records for more than one year. As such, Defendant Magruder argues
    that he “lost the chance to defend himself and potentially present to the Court evidence that the
    Affidavit contained materially false averments resulting in no probable cause for the geolocation
    data warrant, namely that no call was made in March to Mosquera’s number.” Def.’s Mot., ECF
    No. 27, 5.
    However, Defendant Magruder provides no evidence in support of his argument that the
    March 22, 2019, 13.5-minute phone call did not occur. His argument is entirely speculative. The
    Government has produced telephone records showing that on March 22, 2019, Defendant
    Magruder called Mr. Mosquera-Asprilla’s phone number and that the call lasted approximately
    13.5 minutes. See Ex. 2, ECF No. 28-2. Defendant Magruder’s base speculation is insufficient to
    3
    The Court notes that the case cited in Defendant Magruder’s supplement, United States v.
    Jones, 
    565 U.S. 400
     (2012), does not change this analysis. See ECF No. 30. Jones concerned the
    installation of a Global-Positioning-System (“GPS”) tracking device on a vehicle for
    approximately 28 days without a valid warrant. See generally 
    565 U.S. 400
    . Defendant Magruder
    contends that Jones stands for the proposition that “even with a warrant, GPS monitoring for
    more than 28 days is unconstitutional.” ECF No. 30, 2. However, Defendant Magruder misreads
    Jones as it made no findings as to the constitutionality of GPS tracking with a warrant.
    11
    overcome the Government’s evidence that he made a 13.5-minute phone call to the number in
    question on March 22, 2019. As such, Defendant Magruder has failed to show that he was
    prejudiced by his inability to access his own phone records due to the lapse in time.
    In addition to finding that Defendant Magruder’s lack of access to this discovery material
    does not constitute a Strickland violation which tainted his plea, the Court further finds that such
    violation does not render Defendant Magruder’s plea not knowing or voluntary. At the October
    25, 2019 plea hearing, the Court conducted a thorough inquiry with Defendant Magruder,
    explained the rights that he was waiving through pleading guilty, and reviewed the terms of the
    plea agreement. See generally Ex. 3, ECF No. 28-3. The Court ensured that Defendant Magruder
    was competent. The Court further specifically inquired as to whether or not Defendant Magruder
    had reviewed the plea materials with Defense counsel. Id. at 7:5-11. Under oath, Defendant
    Magruder affirmed that he was “completely satisfied with the services of [his] attorney.” Id. at 7:
    24-8:1.
    Moreover, as has been explained, Defendant Magruder has pointed to no material
    discovery which was not provided to him. On October 22, 2019, Defendant Magruder affirmed
    that every item of discovery that he or his prior counsel had requested had been provided. Tr.
    Oct. 22, 2019, ECF No. 20, 12:1-9. Now, the only specific discovery that Defendant Magruder
    argues he should have received is the May 10, 2019 affidavit. However, this affidavit, and the
    errors contained in it, were not material as it does not tend to show that Defendant Magruder was
    innocent or that probable cause did not exist for the warrant. Additionally, the Government has
    provided evidence that Defendant Magruder’s prior counsel was provided with all the relevant
    discovery, including the same phone records that were provided to his current counsel for the
    12
    purposes of this Motion showing that Defendant Magruder made the calls to Mr. Mosquera-
    Asprilla. See Exs. 5, 6, 7, ECF No. 31-1.4
    Second, Defendant Magruder argues that his plea was tainted because he was “coerced
    into accepting the plea because the prosecution threatened to file an 
    18 U.S.C. § 851
    enhancement to his mandatory minimum which would have increased the mandatory minimum
    he was facing.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, 3. Additionally, Defendant Magruder asserts that he
    “thought he had no choice but to accept such an offer rather than seek to negotiate an open ended
    plea which would have given him the chance to argue for a sentence of 10 years rather than be
    limited to not less than 12 years.” 
    Id.
    Defendant Magruder offers no legal support for the suggestion that the presence of an
    enhancement would convert a valid guilty plea into an involuntary one. In this Circuit, “[o]nly
    physical harm, threats of harassment, misrepresentation, or . . . ‘bribes’ . . . render a guilty plea
    legally involuntary.” United States v. Pollard, 
    959 F.2d 1011
    , 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting
    Brady v. Unites States, 
    397 U.S. 742
    , 750 (1970)). Additionally, other courts have held contrary
    to Defendant Magruder’s proposition. See, e.g., United States v. Felice, 272 F. App’x 393, 396
    (5th Cir. 2008) (“Threats regarding additional charges or enhanced penalties are accepted
    practices in plea negotiations and are not considered the kinds of threats which undermine the
    voluntariness of a guilty plea.”); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
    434 U.S. 357
    , 364 (1978) (noting that
    while “confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a
    4
    In Defendant Magruder’s Reply to the Government’s Supplement, Defense counsel contends
    that she has not received all of the discovery from Defendant Magruder’s prior counsel, so she is
    unsure exactly what discovery material was not provided prior to Defendant Magruder’s guilty
    plea. Def.’s Reply to Supp., ECF No. 32. However, current Defense counsel agrees that the
    relevant phone records were provided to prior Defense counsel before Defendant Magruder’s
    guilty plea. 
    Id.
    13
    discouraging effect on defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult
    choices [is] inevitable … and permissible”). Moreover, at his plea hearing, Defendant Magruder
    answered “no” under oath when asked by the Court if “[a]nyone forced, threatened or coerced
    [him] in any way into entering this plea of guilty.” Ex. 3, ECF No. 28-3, 40:2-4. As a result,
    Defendant Magruder has failed to establish a claim of coercion.
    Additionally, the Government has produced evidence showing that if Defendant
    Magruder declined to accept the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea, the Government intended to file the 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
     enhancement. Ex. 5, ECF No. 31-1. The Government has also provided evidence
    that Defense counsel asked at least twice if the Government would agree to a plea below 140
    to180 months, and the Government stated, “I can’t go lower than 12-15.” Ex. 4, 2, ECF No. 31-
    1. The Government noted that even if an enhancement was not filed and Defendant Magruder
    elected to plead to the indictment, Defendant Magruder’s guidelines range would be 262 to 327
    months, significantly higher than what was agreed to in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea. Ex. 3, ECF
    No. 31-1.
    And, prior to accepting the plea, Defendant Magruder had multiple opportunities to ask
    questions about his plea offer. The Court explained to Defendant Magruder the effects of the
    Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea on the mandatory minimums. On October 22, 2019, prior to the plea
    hearing, the Court explained, “As to the two ranges that would be associated for you to make a
    decision how reasonable it is, frankly, to decide to accept or not accept the 144 to 180. If you do
    the—if you turn out to be a career offender, you are at offense level 37, category VI; and that’s
    262 to 327 months, with a large fine.” Tr. Oct. 22, 2019, ECF No. 20, 10:1-6. Without career
    offender status, the guidelines sentence was 120 to 150 months. 
    Id. at 10:7-10
    . The Court
    14
    explained that with the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea “you are agreeing to something that sort of
    straddles, to some degree, these.” 
    Id. at 10:11-12
    .
    Additionally, during the plea hearing Defendant Magruder affirmed that he viewed the
    plea materials individually and with his prior counsel. Ex. 3, ECF No. 28-3, 7:5-11. He further
    indicated that he had enough time to review the plea materials and to consider fully the offer. 
    Id. at 8:2-7
    . Defendant Magruder also affirmed that he had discussed with his prior counsel the
    mandatory minimum and the increased mandatory minimum if the Government filed the
    enhancement. 
    Id. at 25:1-10
    . Defendant Magruder indicated that he understood that his plea
    sentencing guideline range straddled the 262 to 327 months he would face as a career offender
    and the 120 to 150 months he would face if he was not a career offender. 
    Id. at 28:4-14
    . The
    Court notes that the Probation Office made a finding that Defendant Magruder would qualify as
    a career offender, and Defendant Magruder did not dispute this finding in any of his hearings or
    pleadings. As such, Defendant Magruder’s status as a career offender is unrebutted. Defendant
    Magruder also stated that he had talked to his prior counsel about the sentencing guidelines and
    how they would apply in his case. 
    Id. at 28:15-18
    . Defendant Magruder indicated that he
    understood that, without the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, he could be given a different sentence
    which, if a variance was granted, could be below the sentencing guidelines range but not below
    the mandatory minimum. 
    Id. at 29:15-24
    . Defendant Magruder stated the ramifications of
    accepting or not accepting the plea had been explained by his prior counsel. 
    Id. at 30:4-8
    .
    Defendant Magruder was repeatedly advised of his possible sentencing ranges and the
    ramifications of accepting his plea. Defendant Magruder has failed to show that his decision to
    accept the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea was not knowing or voluntary.
    15
    For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant Magruder’s plea was not tainted.
    B. Viable Defense
    Under the first factor, a defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea “must make out a
    legally cognizable defense to the charge against him.” McCoy, 
    215 F.3d at 106
     (quoting Cray, 
    47 F.3d at 1207
    ) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “general denial” is insufficient; instead, the
    defendant must “affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent,
    for he has waived his right simply to try his luck before a jury.” McCoy, 
    215 F.3d at 106
     (quoting
    Cray, 
    47 F.3d at 1207
    ) (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Thomas, the court
    held that while the defendant claimed to have “steadfastly proclaimed his innocence,” the
    defendant’s own “admissions weakened his assertion of innocence.” 
    541 F. Supp. 2d at 28
    (noting defendant admitted to knowingly possessing marijuana, selling marijuana to an
    undercover police officer within 1,000 feet of a school, and possessing a loaded firearm).
    Conversely, in United States v. McCoy, the court found that the defendant had “adequately
    presented cognizable defenses to the charges against him, ” as he “consistently argued that the
    police mistakenly identified him as the seller,” and “maintain[ed] that he did not know [his co-
    defendant] intended to sell cocaine base.” 
    215 F.3d at 106-07
    .
    Here, Defendant Magruder claims that he asserted a “legally cognizable defense to [his]
    offense” because “without the evidence law enforcement seized at the time [he] had been
    stopped and arrested, the government would have had no physical evidence to support their
    charges.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 29, 3. In other words, if Defendant Magruder had the
    opportunity to “review and study the full discovery,” he would have “discovered viable
    arguments to present in a motion to suppress the warrant” that led to the search and seizure of the
    16
    drugs and his arrest. Id. at 4.
    While Defendant Magruder does assert a potential defense––the filing of a Franks motion
    to suppress a warrant—Defendant Magruder’s understanding of this factor is misplaced. Even
    when a court views this factor under the lens of “legally cognizable defense,” as opposed to
    “viable claim of innocence,” a defendant still needs to “affirmatively advance an objectively
    reasonable argument that he is innocent.” United States v. Robinson, 
    587 F.3d 1122
    , 1131 (D.C.
    Cir. 2009); see also Cray, 
    47 F.3d at 1209
     (“A defendant appealing the denial of his motion to
    withdraw a guilty plea . . . must do more than make a general denial in order to put the
    Government to its proof; he must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that
    he is innocent.”); United States v. Sibblies, 
    562 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 6 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that
    “deprecating the government’s evidence amounts to only a general denial of guilt or an argument
    that the government could not prove its case”).
    Here, it is undisputed that Defendant Magruder does not allege actual innocence. Instead,
    Defendant Magruder argues that but for his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance he could have
    filed a Franks motion to suppress the warrant. Without so much as a general denial of guilt, the
    Court finds that this factor does not support a withdrawal of Defendant Magruder’s guilty plea.
    See U.S. v. Curry, 
    494 F.3d 1124
    , 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (faulting the defendant where his brief
    “does not include a single sentence declaring that he is actually innocent or disclaiming his
    admission of guilty at the plea proceeding”).
    Even if the Court were to assume that Defendant Magruder is not required to assert actual
    innocence and that a legally cognizable defense is sufficient, the Court concludes that Defendant
    Magruder has also failed to assert a legally cognizable defense. As the Court previously
    17
    explained, in order to prevail on a Franks motion to suppress a warrant, a defendant must show
    that any false statements in an affidavit were made “knowingly and intentionally, or with
    reckless disregard for the truth” and were “necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks,
    
    438 U.S. at 155
    . Here, Defendant Magruder has cited only two mistakes in the May 10, 2019
    affidavit. First, that the seven outgoing calls made to Mr. Mosquera-Asprilla’s phone occurred in
    March 2019, not in April 2019; and second, that the claimed 16-minute call between Defendant
    Magruder and Mr. Mosquera-Asprilla on April 22, 2019, actually occurred for 13.5 minutes on
    March 22, 2019. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 27, 5. As the Court previously explained, these mistakes
    are not material mistakes, and Defendant Magruder has provided no evidence that the mistakes
    were made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. See Supra Sec. III.A. As such, Defendant
    Magruder has failed to show that his potential Franks motion was likely to have resulted in a
    suppression of the warrant and has failed to state a legally cognizable defense. See Barker, 
    514 F.2d at 220
     (finding if defendant does not “effectively den[y] his culpability,” his “motion to
    withdraw need not be granted”).
    Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Magruder has failed to show that he has a
    viable claim of innocence or a cognizable defense to the crime for which he pled guilty.
    C. Prejudice
    As a final factor, the Court considers whether or not the delay between the guilty plea and
    the motion to withdraw has substantially prejudiced the Government’s ability to prosecute the
    case. In this case, the Government “does not claim that it would be substantially prejudiced by
    the withdrawal of the defendant’s guilty plea.” Gov.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 28, 9 n.5. Because the
    Government does not argue that it would be prejudiced by Defendant Magruder’s withdrawal of
    18
    his guilty plea, this factor does not interfere with Defendant Magruder’s motion to withdraw.
    However, this factor “has never been dispositive in our cases.” Curry, 
    494 F.3d at 1128
    (upholding denial of withdrawal of guilty plea even though the Government did not argue
    prejudice) (quoting United States v. Hanson, 
    339 F.3d 983
    , 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Accordingly,
    even though the Government does not claim prejudice from the withdrawal, Defendant
    Magruder’s motion to withdraw remains insufficient as he has failed to establish that his plea
    was tainted or that he has a viable claim of innocence or a cognizable defense.
    D. Hearing
    As a final matter, the Court must decide whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted in
    this case. Generally, when a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea, “the district court should
    hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of the defendant’s claims.” Taylor, 139 F.3d
    at 932. Claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, “frequently concern matters outside
    the trial record, such as whether counsel properly investigated the case, considered relevant legal
    theories, or adequately prepared a defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However,
    some motions to withdraw a guilty plea “can be resolved on the basis of the trial transcripts and
    pleadings alone.” Id. For example, in United States v. Tolson, faced with a motion to withdraw
    based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court determined that an evidentiary
    hearing was unnecessary because the court was “faced with but one or two fairly simple
    instances of attorney conduct that are alleged to be deficient.” 
    372 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 8-9 (D.D.C.
    2005), aff’d, 264 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Thus, the court was able to “easily adjudicate” the
    merit of the defendant’s contentions by relying solely on the pleadings and transcripts. Id.; see
    also Thomas, 
    541 F. Supp. 2d at 22-26
     (concluding evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because
    19
    defendant’s claim was insufficient to render plea invalid even when defendant argued that prior
    counsel failed to investigate fully); Robinson, 
    587 F.3d at 1127-33
     (finding district court did not
    err in denying evidentiary hearing as the defendants’ pleas were not tainted despite alleged
    coercion by the government).
    Here, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. Even if the Court credits
    Defendant Magruder’s claim that his prior counsel was deficient for failing to fully analyze the
    discovery, the Court has found that such deficiency did not prejudice Defendant Magruder as a
    potential Franks motion would not have been successful. An evidentiary hearing would not alter
    this finding. Additionally, Defendant Magruder’s description of the plea process, including his
    prior counsel’s actions during that process, are not controverted and would not be further
    illuminated by an evidentiary hearing.
    Additionally, the Court notes that “[a] district should ordinarily conduct an evidentiary
    hearing upon request.” See Thomas, 
    541 F. Supp. 2d at 23
     (emphasis added); Sibblies, 
    562 F. Supp. 2d at 3
     (reciting same standard). In this case, Defendant Magruder never requested that the
    Court hold an evidentiary hearing in connection with his motion to withdraw.
    For these reasons, the Court concludes that it would not be benefitted by an evidentiary
    hearing. See Curry, 
    494 F.3d at 1131
     (finding that there was “no need for the court to conduct an
    evidentiary hearing” where the facts were not in dispute).
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Magruder’s [27] Motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant Magruder has failed to show that his plea was tainted or that
    20
    he has a viable claim of innocence or a cognizable defense to the charge to which he pled guilty.
    An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    /s
    COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
    United States District Judge
    21