Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Mueller ( 2020 )


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  •                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    FREEDOM WATCH, INC.,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                                  No. 18-cv-88 (EGS)
    ROBERT S. MUELLER III, et al.
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff Freedom Watch, Inc., a non-profit organization,
    brings this action against Defendants Robert S. Mueller III
    (“Mr. Mueller”), United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
    and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) (collectively,
    “DOJ”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C.
    § 552. Freedom Watch seeks to obtain certain records from DOJ
    and the Special Counsel’s Office (“SCO”)—a component of DOJ—
    concerning the investigation into Russia’s interference in the
    2016 presidential election and related matters—specifically,
    communications to and from the media pertaining to the
    activities of the FBI, Mr. Mueller, and his staff.
    Pending before the Court is DOJ’s motion for summary
    judgment. Upon careful consideration of the motion, opposition,
    and reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record
    herein, the Court GRANTS DOJ’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
    I.   Background
    The following facts—drawn from the parties’ submissions—are
    undisputed, unless otherwise indicated. On May 17, 2017, then-
    Acting Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein appointed Mr. Mueller
    to serve as Special Counsel for DOJ and authorized him to
    investigate the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the
    2016 presidential election, including any matters arising from
    that investigation. Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 36-4 at 25
    (Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian
    Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related
    Matters, Order No. 3915-2017). 1 Seven months later, on January 2,
    2018, Freedom Watch submitted a FOIA request to DOJ, the FBI,
    and the SCO, seeking to obtain the following:
    [D]ocuments and records . . . that refer or
    relate with regard to communications to and
    from the media . . . concerning the activities
    of [Mr.] Mueller and/or his staff as well as
    the [FBI], concerning the investigation of
    alleged Russian collusion and related matters
    concerning the Trump Presidential Campaign and
    the Trump Transition Team . . . .
    E.g.,
    id. at 2
    0 
    (FOIA Request); Defs.’ Statement of Material
    Facts (“Defs.’ SOMF”), ECF No. 36-5 at 1 ¶ 1; Pl.’s Counter
    Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.’s SOMF”), ECF No. 37-1 at 2 ¶
    1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
    Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
    filed document.
    2
    1; Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s SOMF, ECF No. 38-1 at 1 ¶ 1. 2 Freedom
    Watch subsequently narrowed its FOIA request to “records of
    communications to and from the media rather than purely internal
    communications.” Defs.’ SOMF, ECF No. 36-5 at 1-2 ¶ 2.
    Before the FBI granted Freedom Watch’s request for
    expedited processing on January 23, 2018,
    id. at 2
    ¶ 4, Freedom
    Watch commenced the instant action on January 15, 2018,
    id. at 2
    ¶ 3. DOJ’s Office of Information Policy (“OIP”) informed Freedom
    Watch that its request for expedited processing had been granted
    for the records maintained by the SCO and DOJ’s Public Affairs
    Office (“PAO”) on February 20, 2018.
    Id. at 2
    ¶ 5. On the same
    day, DOJ filed the answer to Freedom Watch’s complaint.
    Id. at 2
    ¶ 6. Freedom Watch moved for summary judgment on March 23, 2018,
    see generally Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 10; the parties
    then filed status reports at the Court’s direction concerning
    DOJ’s production of the requested materials, see generally
    Docket for Civ. Action No. 18-88; and the Court denied as moot
    Freedom Watch’s motion for summary judgment in light of the
    Court’s Order directing DOJ to produce all non-exempt documents
    responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request, Min. Order of May
    25, 2018.
    2 From May 2017 to March 2019, Mr. Mueller investigated Russia’s
    interference in the 2016 election. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v.
    DOJ, No. CV 19-810 (RBW), 
    2020 WL 1060633
    , at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 5,
    2020).
    3
    DOJ released responsive materials to Freedom Watch,
    withholding, in part, certain records under FOIA exemptions.
    E.g., Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 36-3 at 57-80 (OIP’s Vaughn Index);
    Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 36-4 at 37-42 (FBI’s Vaughn Index). 3
    Following DOJ’s notice to the Court regarding a technical issue
    with its searches of responsive documents, see Defs.’ Status
    Report, ECF No. 24 at 1-3, Freedom Watch sought discovery and in
    camera review, see, e.g., Min. Order of Nov. 26, 2018; Joint
    Status Report, ECF No. 27 at 1-2; Pl.’s Resp. to Order of the
    Court, ECF No. 29 at 1. This Court denied Freedom Watch’s
    request for discovery and in camera review as premature,
    finding, among other things, that the request was based on mere
    conjecture. Min. Order of Jan. 3, 2019 (explaining that “there
    3 DOJ invokes Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C). E.g., Decl. of Vanessa
    R. Brinkmann (“Brinkmann Decl.”), ECF No. 36-3 at 4 ¶¶ 6-8;
    Decl. of David M. Hardy (“Hardy Decl.”), ECF No. 36-4 at 9 ¶ 18.
    Exemption 5 covers “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
    letters that would not be available by law to a party other than
    an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
    Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar
    files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
    unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
    Id. § 552(b)(6).
    Exemption 7(C) exempts from disclosure “records or information
    compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
    that the production of such law enforcement records or
    information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an
    unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
    Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
    And “[a] Vaughn index describes the documents withheld or
    redacted and the FOIA exemptions invoked, and explains why each
    exemption applies.” Prison Legal News v. Samuels, 
    787 F.3d 1142
    ,
    1145 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Vaughn v. Rosen, 
    484 F.2d 820
    (D.C. Cir. 1973); Keys v. DOJ, 
    830 F.2d 337
    , 349 (D.C. Cir.
    1987)).
    4
    [was] no basis in reality to believe that [DOJ’s] disclosure” of
    the technical issue “was, as Freedom Watch puts it, an ‘attempt
    to shield themselves from the public seeing evidence of their
    routinely leaking grand jury information to the media and other
    disclosures for their tactical motivations’”).
    On April 8, 2019, DOJ moved for summary judgment. See
    Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ MSJ”), ECF No. 36 at 1; see
    generally Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ MSJ (“Defs.’
    Mem.”), ECF No. 36-1. On May 9, 2019, Freedom Watch filed its
    opposition brief. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37. 4 On June
    10, 2019, DOJ filed the reply brief. See generally Defs.’ Reply,
    ECF No. 38. The motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s
    adjudication.
    II.   Legal Standard
    The “vast majority” of FOIA cases can be resolved on
    summary judgment. Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade
    Representative, 
    641 F.3d 521
    , 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A court may
    grant summary judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as
    to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under FOIA, “the
    underlying facts and the inferences to be drawn from them are
    4 Freedom Watch’s opposition brief was not accompanied by a
    proposed order as required by Local Civil Rule 7.1(c). See LCvR
    7.1(c) (“Each motion and opposition shall be accompanied by a
    proposed order.”).
    5
    construed in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester[,]”
    and summary judgment is appropriate only after “the agency
    proves that it has fully discharged its [FOIA] obligations . . .
    .” Moore v. Aspin, 
    916 F. Supp. 32
    , 35 (D.D.C. 1996) (citations
    omitted).
    When considering a motion for summary judgment under FOIA,
    the court must conduct a de novo review of the record. See
    5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The court may grant summary judgment
    based on information provided in an agency’s affidavits or
    declarations when they are “relatively detailed and non-
    conclusory,” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 
    926 F.2d 1197
    , 1200
    (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted), and “not controverted by
    either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency
    bad faith,” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 
    656 F.2d 724
    , 738
    (D.C. Cir. 1981). Such affidavits or declarations are “accorded
    a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely
    speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of
    other documents.’” SafeCard Servs., 
    926 F.2d 1197
    at 1200
    (citation omitted).
    III. Analysis
    Freedom Watch challenges DOJ’s response to its FOIA request
    on five fronts: (1) the adequacy of DOJ’s search; (2) the
    withholding of documents under Exemption 5’s deliberative
    process privilege; (3) the withholding of names and other
    6
    personal identifying information pursuant to Exemption 6;
    (4) the withholding of certain portions in a single e-mail under
    Exemption 7(C); and (5) DOJ’s segregability determinations.
    Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 3-13. The Court addresses each
    challenge in turn.
    A. The Adequacy of DOJ’s Search for Responsive Records
    To demonstrate the adequacy of its search at the summary
    judgment stage, DOJ “must show that it made a good faith effort
    to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods
    which can be reasonably expected to produce the information
    requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 
    920 F.2d 57
    , 68
    (D.C. Cir. 1990). “[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether
    there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the
    request, but rather whether the search for those documents was
    adequate.” Weisberg v. DOJ, 
    745 F.2d 1476
    , 1485 (D.C. Cir.
    1984). “The adequacy of the search, in turn, is judged by a
    standard of reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, upon
    the facts of each case.”
    Id. To meet
    its burden, an agency may
    provide “a reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the
    search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that
    all files likely to contain responsive materials . . . were
    searched.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 
    315 F.3d 311
    ,
    313-14 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). “If, however, the record leaves substantial doubt as
    7
    to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the
    agency is not proper.” Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 
    897 F.2d 540
    ,
    542 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
    Here, DOJ has demonstrated that it has met its FOIA
    obligations by conducting an adequate and reasonable search for
    the responsive records from within OIP, SCO, and the FBI. DOJ’s
    two declarations—(1) Brinkmann declaration; and (2) Hardy
    declaration—“explain in reasonable detail the scope and method
    of the search.” Kidd v. DOJ, 
    362 F. Supp. 2d 291
    , 295 (D.D.C.
    2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To
    satisfy the dictates of FOIA, [DOJ] must, at a minimum, ‘aver
    that it has searched all files likely to contain relevant
    documents.’” Huntington v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 
    234 F. Supp. 3d
    94, 103 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Am. Immigration Council v.
    Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    21 F. Supp. 3d 60
    , 71 (D.D.C. 2014)).
    For the reasons explained below, the Court is satisfied that OIP
    and the FBI conducted adequate searches for all locations likely
    to contain responsive documents. See, e.g., Brinkmann Decl., ECF
    No. 36-3 at 12 ¶ 25; Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 7 ¶¶ 14-15.
    1. OIP’s Search for Responsive Records
    OIP—the office responsible for processing FOIA requests for
    records from within OIP, DOJ’s six senior leadership offices,
    and the SCO—located 5,881 pages of records responsive to Freedom
    Watch’s FOIA request. Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 2 ¶ 1, 5
    8
    ¶ 9, 10 ¶ 21. Of particular relevance here, the first declarant
    avers that “OIP searched for potentially responsive records
    within two Offices: PAO and SCO.”
    Id. at 7
    ¶ 13. OIP reasonably
    determined that both PAO and the SCO likely had records
    responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request for two reasons:
    (1) Freedom Watch specifically requested communications from the
    SCO; and (2) PAO is the “office tasked with coordinating
    relations of DOJ with the news media.”
    Id. According to
    the first declarant, “OIP conducted broad
    searches of unclassified email records and computer hard drives
    for seventeen custodians across these Offices (fifteen within
    PAO and two within SCO).”
    Id. And the
    two “SCO custodians were
    public affairs professionals responsible for communications with
    the media, and both were on detail from other DOJ components—one
    from PAO and the other from the United States Attorney’s Office
    for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA).”
    Id.
    at 8
    ¶ 15.
    OIP’s search for responsive records included a search of the
    SCO’s general press inquiries electronic mailbox
    (Specialcounselpress@usdoj.gov).
    Id. The first
    declarant notes
    that “OIP did not search hard-copy/paper files” because “none
    were identified during the course of OIP’s search efforts.”
    Id. at 7
    n.2.
    With regard to potentially responsive records within PAO,
    the first declarant avers that OIP used the date range of July
    9
    1, 2015 through December 31, 2017 based on Freedom Watch’s
    proposed start date and cut-off date.
    Id. at 8
    ¶ 16. As to the
    SCO, OIP’s “initial search included all emails from the date the
    email accounts were created through December 31, 2017.”
    Id. According to
    the first declarant, OIP used the following search
    terms for both PAO and the SCO: “‘SCO,’ ‘OSC,’ ‘Special
    Counsel,’ or ‘Mueller’ combined with the terms ‘Russia*,’ ‘Trump
    Campaign,’ ‘Trump Presidential Campaign,’ or ‘Trump
    Transition.’”
    Id. at 8
    ¶ 17. As previously noted, DOJ
    experienced a technical issue with the initial searches, and OIP
    re-ran the searches.
    Id. at 9
    ¶ 18. In addition, OIP’s searches
    covered potentially responsive text messages from PAO and the
    SCO.
    Id. at 9
    ¶ 19. Uncovering a total of 5,881 pages of
    responsive records, OIP released, in part, 1,941 pages with
    redactions to Freedom Watch; and OIP released, in full, the
    remaining 3,939 pages without redactions.
    Id. at 12
    ¶ 26.
    2. FBI’s Search for Responsive Records
    The FBI located 320 pages of responsive records. Hardy
    Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 9 ¶ 18. Typically, the FBI searches its
    Central Records System that consists of “applicant,
    investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and
    general files compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course
    of fulfilling its integrated missions and functions as law
    enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence agency to
    10
    include performance of administrative and personnel functions.”
    Id. at 5
    ¶ 11. Given Freedom Watch’s request for communications
    to and from the media, however, the FBI reasonably determined
    that a targeted search within its Office of Public Affairs
    (“OPA”) would yield responsive records.
    Id. at 7
    ¶ 14. OPA—the
    office that “manages and oversees the FBI’s media relations”—
    approves and coordinates communications between FBI personnel
    and the media concerning FBI matters.
    Id. at 7
    ¶ 15.
    The FBI identified the OPA employees with media contacts,
    and searched the e-mail accounts of those employees using the
    date range of July 1, 2015 through December 31, 2017.
    Id. at 7
    -8
    ¶ 16. The FBI used search terms similar to OIP’s search terms.
    Id. 5 The
    second declarant avers that OPA sent the responsive
    records to the FBI’s Record/Information Dissemination Section
    (“RIDS”), and RIDS used the search terms to run “an automated e-
    mail search of the [OPA] employees’ e-mail accounts.”
    Id. at 8
    ¶
    17. RIDS located additional responsive records, adding to the
    total pages of responsive records.
    Id. at 9
    ¶¶ 17-18. Based on
    5 The FBI used the following search terms: “‘SCO’ AND ‘Russia’;
    ‘SCO’ AND ‘Trump campaign’; ‘SCO’ AND ‘Trump Presidential
    Campaign’; ‘SCO’ AND ‘Trump Transition’; ‘OSC’ AND ‘Russia’;
    ‘OSC’ AND ‘Trump campaign’; ‘OSC’ AND ‘Trump Transition’;
    ‘Special Counsel’ AND ‘Russia’; ‘Special Counsel’ AND ‘Trump
    Campaign’; ‘Special Counsel’ AND ‘Trump Presidential Campaign’;
    ‘Special Counsel’ AND ‘Trump Transition’; ‘Mueller’ AND
    ‘Russia’; ‘Mueller’ AND ‘Trump Campaign’; ‘Mueller’ AND ‘Trump
    Presidential Campaign’; ‘Mueller’ AND ‘Trump Transition[.]’”
    Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 8 ¶ 16.
    11
    the search and review, the second declarant avers that “[t]he
    FBI found no information or leads logically leading to other
    locations where responsive records would likely be located.”
    Id. at 9
    ¶ 17. In the final analysis, the FBI released 171 pages of
    responsive records in full, and 122 pages in part, withholding
    in full 27 pages.
    Id. at 9
    ¶ 18.
    3. DOJ’s Search Was Adequate Under the
    Reasonableness Standard
    DOJ argues—and the Court agrees—that “[r]easonableness, not
    perfection, is . . . the Court’s guiding principle in
    determining the adequacy of a FOIA search.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF No.
    36-1 at 13 (citing cases). Indeed, “[t]he adequacy of an
    agency’s search is measured by a standard of reasonableness, and
    is dependent upon the circumstances of the case.” 
    Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542
    (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Freedom Watch does not dispute the reasonableness standard. See
    Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 4. Rather, Freedom Watch contends
    that DOJ’s search was inadequate because DOJ’s “statement [of
    material facts] and declarations are deficient.”
    Id. In Freedom
    Watch’s view, DOJ’s statement and declarations “fail to provide
    a sufficient description of (1) the records searched; (2) who
    conducted the search; and (3) the search process.”
    Id. DOJ disagrees,
    arguing that “[n]othing in [Freedom Watch’s]
    opposition brief contravenes the declarations of Ms. Brinkmann
    12
    or Mr. Hardy, or provides any basis to rebut the presumption
    that their declarations, and the agencies’ searches, were
    executed in good faith.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 8.
    Freedom Watch’s three arguments are unavailing. First,
    Freedom Watch argues that DOJ’s description of the records
    searched is inadequate because DOJ “merely restate[s] general
    policy guidelines in an attempt to explain how [Freedom Watch’s]
    FOIA request was searched” and the “FBI failed to describe
    whether it searched paper records or all or any electronic
    records other than certain email accounts of personnel.” Pl.’s
    Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 4. DOJ responds—and the Court agrees—that
    “the Brinkmann and Hardy declarations set forth in detail how
    OIP and the FBI, respectively, conducted tailored and thorough
    searches for records responsive to [Freedom Watch’s] request.”
    Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 8.
    It is undisputed that Freedom Watch only seeks “records of
    communications to and from the media rather than purely internal
    communications.” Defs.’ SOMF, ECF No. 36-5 at 2 ¶ 2. Contrary to
    Freedom Watch’s assertion that the FBI’s determination as to its
    search failed to account for paper and other electronic records,
    see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 4, the Hardy declaration explains
    that the FBI determined that “the most logical location for
    ‘communication’ records to or from the media would be within the
    e-mails of specific authorized employees who have contact with
    13
    the media on a regular basis,” Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 7 ¶
    16. Furthermore, the Hardy declaration states that “[t]he FBI
    found no information or leads logically leading to other
    locations where responsive records would likely be located.”
    Id. at 9
    ¶ 17.
    In Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Aeronautics
    & Space Administration, 
    989 F. Supp. 2d 74
    , 93 (D.D.C. 2013), a
    member of this Court rejected a FOIA requester’s argument that
    the “agency should have searched for paper records” because
    “there [was] nothing to suggest that responsive documents
    exist[ed] in paper form” and “[n]o leads emerged during [the
    agency’s] search that required [the agency] to expand its search
    to include paper records.” Similarly, in this case, the FBI did
    not find any information or leads to extend its search beyond
    the OPA records. See Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 9 ¶ 17. The
    Court therefore finds that the Hardy declaration provides a
    rationale in a “relatively detailed” and “nonconclusory” fashion
    for the FBI’s search. Goland v. CIA, 
    607 F.2d 339
    , 352 (D.C.
    Cir. 1978).
    Freedom Watch’s next argument—that the Brinkmann and Hardy
    declarations fail to “disclose who carried out the searches,”
    Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 4—is foreclosed by case law in this
    District. “FOIA does not require the disclosure of the names or
    information about agency staff involved in processing FOIA
    14
    requests.” Kidder v. FBI, 
    517 F. Supp. 2d 17
    , 24 n.8 (D.D.C.
    2007). Courts in this District have repeatedly rejected the
    argument that an agency’s declaration must identify the
    individuals, by name, who conducted the searches. See, e.g.,
    Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
    611 F. Supp. 2d 54
    , 65
    (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that a FOIA requester’s “dispute[] that
    [the agency’s] searches were adequate because they [did] not
    identify, by individual name, who was conducting the search” was
    a “frivolous argument”); Hillier v. CIA, No. CV 16-CV-1836
    (DLF), 
    2018 WL 4354947
    , at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2018) (same);
    Bigwood v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    132 F. Supp. 3d 124
    , 142-43
    (D.D.C. 2015) (same). Moreover, as DOJ correctly points out,
    “the identities of agency staff who searched for responsive
    records would be exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 if
    [they] were contained in an agency record.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF
    No. 38 at 9 (citing 
    Harrison, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 65
    ).
    Although Freedom Watch is correct that agency declarations
    must “describe what records were searched, by whom, and through
    what processes,” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No 37 at 3 (quoting Sea
    Shepherd Conservation Soc’y v. IRS, 
    208 F. Supp. 3d 58
    , 69
    (D.D.C. 2016)), Freedom Watch ignores that the “by whom”
    requirement permits an “agency [to] rely on an affidavit of an
    agency employee responsible for supervising the search, even if
    that individual did not conduct the search herself,” Truesdale
    15
    v. DOJ, 
    803 F. Supp. 2d 44
    , 50 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations and
    internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Brinkmann and Hardy
    declarations meet that standard. See Brinkmann Decl., ECF No.
    36-3 at 2 ¶ 1; see also Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 2-3 ¶ 1.
    Freedom Watch’s third argument—that DOJ’s search is
    inadequate because DOJ’s declarants “did not say which search
    terms provided what information, how the records were searched,
    or what types of records were searched,” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37
    at 5—fares no better. DOJ argues—and the Court agrees—that
    Freedom Watch “cites no authority for the proposition that an
    agency must map out specifically which search terms yielded what
    specific potentially responsive records, and [DOJ is] not aware
    of any such requirement.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 10.
    “Courts in this [D]istrict, moreover, have declined to require
    agencies to provide the granularity of detail in their
    declarations that [Freedom Watch] seeks.” Coffey v. Bureau of
    Land Mgmt., 
    249 F. Supp. 3d 488
    , 501 (D.D.C. 2017). And DOJ
    retains “discretion in crafting a list of search terms that [it]
    believe[s] to be reasonably tailored to uncover documents
    responsive to the FOIA request.” Liberation Newspaper v. U.S.
    Dep’t of State, 
    80 F. Supp. 3d 137
    , 146 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted). “Where the search terms
    are reasonably calculated to lead to responsive documents, the
    Court should not ‘micro manage’ the agency’s search.”
    Id. 16 (quoting
    Johnson v. Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, 
    310 F.3d 771
    ,
    776 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Freedom Watch does not challenge DOJ’s
    search terms, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 5; thus, this Court
    will not micro-manage DOJ’s searches. Neither will the Court
    require additional details about DOJ’s searches because the
    Brinkmann and Hardy declarations are “relatively detailed and
    non-conclusory,” Mobley v. CIA, 
    806 F.3d 568
    , 581 (D.C. Cir.
    2015).
    The Court therefore finds that DOJ’s search is adequate
    under the standard of reasonableness. See 
    Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542
    . Accordingly, the Court GRANTS DOJ’s motion for summary
    judgment as to the adequacy of the search.
    B. Information Withheld Under Exemption 5’s Deliberative
    Process Privilege
    The Court next considers DOJ’s withholdings under Exemption
    5. “Exemption 5 permits an agency to withhold materials normally
    privileged from discovery in civil litigation against the
    agency.” Tax Analysts v. IRS, 
    117 F.3d 607
    , 616 (D.C. Cir.
    1997). To withhold a document under Exemption 5, the “document
    must meet two conditions: [1] its source must be a Government
    agency, and [2] it must fall within the ambit of a privilege
    against discovery under judicial standards that would govern
    litigation against the agency that holds it.” Stolt–Nielsen
    Transp. Grp. Ltd. v. United States, 
    534 F.3d 728
    , 733 (D.C. Cir.
    17
    2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Exemption
    5’s deliberative process privilege is one of the privileges
    against discovery, and that privilege protects from disclosure
    documents that would reveal an agency’s deliberations prior to
    arriving at a particular decision. Dent v. Exec. Office for U.S.
    Att’ys, 
    926 F. Supp. 2d 257
    , 267–68 (D.D.C. 2013).
    To fall within the scope of the deliberative process
    privilege, withheld materials must be both “predecisional” and
    “deliberative.” Mapother v. DOJ, 
    3 F.3d 1533
    , 1537 (D.C. Cir.
    1993). A communication is predecisional if “it was generated
    before the adoption of an agency policy” and deliberative if it
    “reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process.”
    Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 
    617 F.2d 854
    , 866
    (D.C. Cir. 1980). “[E]ven if the document is predecisional at
    the time it is prepared, it can lose that status if it is
    adopted, formally or informally, as the agency position on an
    issue[.]”
    Id. The deliberative
    process privilege is to be
    “construed as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government
    operation.” Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 
    646 F.2d 666
    , 667 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
    Here, OIP withheld, in part, 116 pages of responsive
    records that the Brinkmann declaration describes as
    “communications and ‘Weekly Press Reports’ generated by,
    exchanged within, and wholly internal to, the DOJ.” Brinkmann
    18
    Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 14 ¶ 32. OIP’s withholdings fall into two
    categories: (1) “deliberative discussions regarding press
    coverage and press inquiries”; and (2) “deliberative notes
    regarding press coverage and press inquiries.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF
    No. 36-1 at 20 (citing Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 14 ¶
    33); see also Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 36-3 at 58 (OIP’s Vaughn
    Index). The Court will analyze each category in turn.
    1. Deliberative Discussions Regarding Press
    Coverage and Press Inquiries
    The first category consists of three separate pages of
    internal communications with redactions to each page. E.g.,
    Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 13 ¶ 29; Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No.
    36-3 at 58. Specifically, the Brinkmann declaration states:
    This category of records consists of internal
    email communications from SCO staff to SCO’s
    public affairs officials providing press
    inquiries sent directly to them and noting
    preliminary thoughts on if and how the SCO
    might respond. In each instance, SCO staff are
    reacting in real time, sharing their opinions
    and suggestions for how to the SCO might
    respond to particular press inquiries.
    Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 15 ¶ 35.
    Freedom Watch hypothesizes that the communications involve
    “the secret meetings with Peter Carr, spokesperson for the [SCO]
    and media representatives.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 8.
    Freedom Watch contends that the redactions to DOJ’s internal
    communications in the first category are neither pre-decisional
    19
    nor deliberative. See
    id. at 6-7.
    DOJ argues—and the Court
    agrees—that the redactions to the communications are
    deliberative and pre-decisional. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 20-23.
    These documents squarely fall within the ambit of Exemption 5’s
    deliberative process privilege “[b]ecause these documents
    reflect intra-agency deliberations on communications with the
    media.” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. NSA, 
    49 F. Supp. 3d 1
    , 8 (D.D.C.
    2014), aff’d and remanded by 
    783 F.3d 1340
    (D.C. Cir. 2015);
    accord Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    736 F. Supp. 2d 202
    , 208 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that agency properly
    withheld under Exemption 5 “email messages involving
    recommendations and evaluations for how to respond to
    Congressional and media requests for information on [certain
    topics]”). Exemption 5 covers these pre-decisional documents
    because DOJ explains that “the redacted material contains
    evaluative discussion and preliminary assessments by [DOJ] staff
    as they analyzed, made recommendations, gave advice, and worked
    toward formulating strategies for responding to the press.”
    Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 21; see also Brinkmann Decl., ECF
    No. 36-3 at 17 ¶¶ 40-41.
    To be sure, courts in this District have consistently held
    that Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “media-related
    withholdings” reflecting an agency’s “ongoing decisionmaking
    about ‘how the agency’s activities should be described to the
    20
    general public.’” Competitive Enter. Inst. v. EPA, 
    12 F. Supp. 3d
    100, 118 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Nat’l Sec. Archive v. FBI,
    No. 88–1507, 
    1993 WL 128499
    , at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1993));
    accord Competitive Enter. Inst. v. EPA, 
    232 F. Supp. 3d 172
    , 188
    (D.D.C. 2017) (finding that Exemption 5 protected documents
    “clearly generated as part of a media strategy in response to
    FOIA litigation” and that “correspondence [was] predecisional in
    that it pre-dated the release of a public statement and [was]
    deliberative because it involved personal opinions and thoughts
    of staff members working to identify the options”).
    2. Deliberative Notes Regarding Press Coverage and
    Press Inquiries
    The second category consists of 113 pages of notes in the
    SCO’s “Weekly Press Report” that “document[s] and aid[s]
    determinations as to whether and how to address press
    inquiries.” Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 15 ¶ 37. A Weekly
    Press Report, generated by SCO’s public affairs officials, is a
    “chart with seven columns that documents the following: (1) date
    of the press inquiry; (2) the media outlet; (3) the name of the
    reporter; (4) the method of contact; (5) the subject of the
    inquiry; (6) research – which documents steps taken in
    preparation of a response, if any; and (7) a proposed final
    response to that inquiry.”
    Id. at 15-16
    ¶ 37. The Weekly Press
    Reports contain redacted information in the “research” and
    21
    “final response” columns, including “public affairs officials’
    notes of what steps should be taken in order to develop a final
    response to press inquiries, if any.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1
    at 21. As such, the “final response” column “does not actually
    include the ultimate (‘final’) response to the media.” Id.; see
    also Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 16 ¶ 38 (“Despite the
    naming of [the “final response”] column, the information within
    it does not consist of final responses to the press inquiries
    but rather, recommendations regarding a potential response.”).
    DOJ argues that the redacted information in the “research”
    and “final response” columns is deliberative because: (1) the
    notes summarize events, identify issues, and provide background
    information in order to determine the most important issues and
    information for senior SCO staff to review; and (2) SCO staff
    made decisions to include certain factual information in the
    notes during their research and preparation for a final
    response. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 22. DOJ goes on to argue
    that “the culling of other factual information was, in and of
    itself, a necessary part of the SCO’s deliberations.”
    Id. For its
    part, Freedom Watch appears to argue that the
    withholdings are not deliberative because the redacted
    information in the Weekly Press Reports do not discourage candid
    discussion, and that its FOIA request seeks only the final
    document that does not limit candid discussion. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF
    22
    No. 37 at 8. 6 Freedom Watch correctly points out that the “key
    question [is] . . . whether the disclosure of materials would
    expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in such a way as to
    discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby
    undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.”
    Id. (quoting Dudman
    Commc’ns. Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 
    815 F.2d 1565
    , 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). But the Brinkmann declaration
    directly addresses this point. See Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3
    at 17-18 ¶¶ 40-41.
    The declarant avers that the “[p]rotected portions of these
    records reflect proposed actions provided to the SCO public
    affairs officials by SCO staff regarding how to respond to press
    inquiries, notes on research and steps taken in the SCO’s
    preparation for responding to media inquiries, and selected
    media inquiries and publications flagged for awareness and
    determinations on whether any further actions may be necessary.”
    Id. at 17
    ¶ 40. The declarant states that release of the SCO’s
    public affairs officials’ notes would result in DOJ employees
    becoming “reticent to document notes of their internal decision-
    making processes, to share their opinions, and they would be
    6 To support its arguments as to the Exemption 5 withholdings,
    Freedom Watch cites 11 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)(4). Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No.
    37 at 8. That regulation, however, applies to the Federal
    Election Commission, see 11 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)(4), and Freedom
    Watch fails to explain its relevance. The Court therefore finds
    that 11 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)(4) is inapplicable to this case.
    23
    circumspect in their willingness to engage in internal
    discussions with other employees.”
    Id. at 17
    ¶ 41. In addition,
    the declarant avers that “[d]isclosure of such preliminary
    assessments and opinions would make officials contributing to
    pre-decisional deliberations much more cautious in providing
    their views.”
    Id. Having reviewed
    the averments in the Brinkmann
    declaration, the Court finds that the redacted information in
    the Weekly Press Report qualifies for protection under the
    deliberative-process privilege, and the disclosure of such
    information would “stifle the creative thinking and candid
    exchange of ideas necessary to produce good” work product.
    
    Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1569
    .
    Next, Freedom Watch contends that DOJ fails to “say whether
    the communications, however, preliminary, were used in a final
    decision.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 7. Freedom Watch, however,
    acknowledges DOJ’s assertion that the redacted information is
    pre-decisional because “the discussions ‘pre-date the final
    response.’”
    Id. (quoting Defs.’
    Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 20); see
    also Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 20 (“[T]he material is
    predecisional because it either consists of ongoing discussions
    that pre-dated the final responses to press inquiries, or
    reflects pre-decisional deliberations.”). Indeed, “courts have
    generally found that documents created in anticipation of press
    inquiries are protected even if crafted after the underlying
    24
    event about which the press might inquire” because “[t]he idea
    is that these sorts of documents reflect deliberation about the
    decision of how to respond to the press[.]” Protect Democracy
    Project, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    320 F. Supp. 3d 162
    , 177
    (D.D.C. 2018) (collecting cases). Here, DOJ argues—and the Court
    agrees—that “Ms. Brinkmann’s description of the materials
    withheld under Exemption 5 is more than sufficient to establish
    that they are pre-decisional.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 12.
    And Freedom Watch ignores the averment in the Brinkmann
    declaration that clearly explains the withholdings “pertain to
    entirely internal pre-decisional notes and emails among SCO
    staff.” Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 17 ¶ 40.
    Freedom Watch’s next argument is that the withholdings are
    not pre-decisional because the withholdings lost the protection
    under Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege when DOJ
    “ch[ose] expressly to adopt or incorporate” the redacted
    information in a final agency decision. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37
    at 7 (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
    421 U.S. 132
    , 161 (1975)). In Sears, the Supreme Court held “that,
    if an agency chooses expressly to adopt or incorporate by
    reference an intra-agency memorandum previously covered by
    Exemption 5 in what would otherwise be a final opinion, that
    memorandum may be withheld only on the ground that it falls
    within the coverage of some exemption other than Exemption 5.”
    
    25 421 U.S. at 161
    (“[W]hen adopted, the reasoning becomes that of
    the agency and becomes its responsibility to defend.”). But the
    United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
    Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) rejected a FOIA requester’s argument
    that the FBI waived the deliberative process privilege by
    adopting a legal opinion by DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel
    (“OLC”) in dealings with Congress and the Office of the
    Inspector General because the FOIA requester could not “point to
    any evidence supporting its claim that the FBI expressly adopted
    the OLC Opinion as its reasoning.” Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ,
    
    739 F.3d 1
    , 11 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The same is true here. As noted
    by DOJ, Freedom Watch “does not point to any evidence supporting
    its claim that OIP expressly adopted any of the withheld
    material in a final response.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 12.
    Finally, Freedom Watch concedes DOJ’s argument that the
    redacted information in the Weekly Press Report reflects the
    SCO’s pre-decisional deliberative process because such
    information constitutes “the culling of other factual
    information [that] was, in and of itself, a necessary part of
    the SCO’s deliberations.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 22; see
    also Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 5-8. Nonetheless, “the Court
    still has an independent duty to ‘determine for itself whether
    the record and any undisputed material facts justify granting
    summary judgment.’” Tokar v. DOJ, 
    304 F. Supp. 3d 81
    , 94 n.3
    26
    (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 
    843 F.3d 503
    , 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). Based on DOJ’s description of the
    redacted information in the Weekly Press Report, see, e.g.,
    Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 21-22; Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-
    3 at 15-18 ¶¶ 37-41; Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 36-3 at 58, the Court
    is satisfied that the redacted information that reflects the
    culling of certain factual information is exempt under Exemption
    5, see Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 
    641 F.3d 504
    , 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that Exemption 5
    covered factual summaries because those documents “were culled
    by the Committee from the much larger universe of facts
    presented to it” and reflected an “exercise of discretion and
    judgment calls”).
    In sum, the Court therefore finds that DOJ has carried its
    burden of demonstrating that the withholdings fall under
    Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege. See Coastal States
    Gas 
    Corp., 617 F.2d at 868
    (“[T]he agency has the burden of
    establishing what deliberative process is involved, and the role
    played by the documents in issue in the course of that
    process.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS DOJ’s motion for
    summary judgment as to Exemption 5.
    C. Information Withheld Under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)
    The Court next turns to the withholdings under Exemptions 6
    and 7(C). DOJ withheld six narrow categories of information
    27
    under Exemption 6: (1) the names and personal identifying
    information of certain DOJ and FBI employees based on the
    sensitive nature of the SCO’s work and the law enforcement
    conduct; (2) the reporters’ non-public contact information;
    (3) the third parties’ names and personal identifying
    information merely referenced in the records; (4) the non-public
    information of third parties contained in e-mails from
    reporters; (5) information concerning DOJ employees and
    reporters prior to the SCO’s investigation; and (6) details
    about purely personal material pertaining to DOJ employees,
    reporters, and third parties (i.e. vacation details, holiday
    plans, and religious observances). Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at
    24-29. And DOJ withheld portions of a single e-mail
    communication under Exemption 7(C), which contained information
    that a member of the media believed was potentially relevant to
    the SCO’s investigation.
    Id. at 30
    (citing Brinkmann Decl., ECF
    No. 36-3 at 25-26 ¶¶ 56-58).
    To begin, “[t]he privacy interest in Exemption 6 is
    narrower than in Exemption 7(C), so if the withholdings satisfy
    the former, no examination of the latter is necessary.” McCann
    v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    828 F. Supp. 2d 317
    , 322
    (D.D.C. 2011); see also Prop. of the People, Inc. v. DOJ, 405 F.
    Supp. 3d 99, 112 (D.D.C. 2019) (Sullivan, J.) (“Both exemptions
    are foundationally similar.”). “Exemption 6 protects
    28
    withholdings under the following criteria: first, the
    information must be contained within ‘personnel and medical
    files and similar files’; second, the disclosure of the
    information ‘would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
    personal privacy’; and third, if the first two requirements are
    met, the privacy interest must be weighed against the public
    interest in disclosure.” 
    McCann, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 322
    (quoting
    5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); citing Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the
    President, 
    97 F.3d 575
    , 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
    1. Similar Files
    DOJ satisfies the first requirement of the Exemption 6
    inquiry because the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the
    phrase “similar files,” recognizing that Exemption 6 covers all
    “information which applies to a particular individual.” U.S.
    Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 
    456 U.S. 595
    , 602 (1982); see
    also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 
    449 F.3d 141
    , 152 (D.C. Cir.
    2006) (explaining that Exemption 6 covers “not just files, but
    also bits of personal information, such as names and
    addresses”). “[I]nformation about an individual should not lose
    the protection of Exemption 6 merely because it is stored by an
    agency in records other than ‘personnel’ or ‘medical’ files.”
    Wash. Post 
    Co., 456 U.S. at 601
    .
    Nonetheless, Freedom Watch relies on Simpson v. Vance, 
    648 F.2d 10
    (D.C. Cir. 1980) for the proposition that “the
    29
    information sought – particularly the information concerning
    government personnel and third party information received from
    reporters – is not considered a personnel file[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n,
    ECF No. 37 at 10. In Simpson, the D.C. Circuit ruled that “[t]he
    [requested] information contained in [the State Department’s
    publication] [did] not fall within the meaning of ‘personnel’
    files or ‘similar’ files, and the additional fact that foreign
    service personnel [were] subject to terrorist attacks [did] not
    change the personal quality of the information contained in the
    materials at issue: no fact of an intimate nature or no
    embarrassing disclosure suddenly appear[ed] because [the D.C.
    Circuit was] told that the information might be abused by
    terrorists once 
    disclosed.” 648 F.2d at 17
    .
    Freedom Watch is wrong on the law, and the D.C. Circuit’s
    decision in Simpson upon which Freedom Watch relies is no longer
    good law. See Wash. Post. 
    Co., 456 U.S. at 602
    n.5; see also
    Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 9-10. As DOJ correctly notes, “[t]wo
    years after that decision, the Supreme Court, in [United States]
    Department of State v. Washington Post Company, 
    456 U.S. 595
    (1982), abrogated Simpson and held that the ‘similar files’
    language in Exemption 6 must be interpreted broadly, and that
    any information in government records that ‘applies to a
    particular individual’ meets the threshold for Exemption 6
    protection.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 13 (quoting Wash. Post.
    30
    
    Co., 456 U.S. at 602
    ). Freedom Watch’s reliance on Simpson is
    perplexing given that a member of this Court relied on the
    Supreme Court’s decision in United States Department of State v.
    Washington Post Company in a FOIA case brought by Freedom Watch,
    and explained that the “similar files” categorization “broadly
    include[s] documents containing purely personal information,”
    such as “personal e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and details
    of individuals’ personal lives.” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. 
    NSA, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 9
    (citations and internal quotation marks
    omitted). More troubling is that one of the cited cases in
    Freedom Watch’s opposition brief expressly states that “the
    Supreme Court issued its opinion in [United States] Department
    of State v. Washington Post [Company], 
    456 U.S. 595
    (1982),
    rejecting this [C]ircuit’s rule, see Simpson v. Vance, 
    648 F.2d 10
    , 13 (D.C. Cir. 1980), that the phrase ‘similar files’ in
    § 552(b)(6) is limited to files within which may be found
    ‘intimate details’ and ‘highly personal’ information.” Arieff v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 
    712 F.2d 1462
    , 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see
    also Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 9 (citing 
    Arieff, 712 F.2d at 1468-69
    ).
    2. Privacy Interests
    The Court next considers the second requirement—“the
    information must be of such a nature that its disclosure would
    constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
    31
    Wash. Post 
    Co., 456 U.S. at 598
    . “This, in turn, requires a two-
    part analysis.” SAI v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 
    315 F. Supp. 3d 218
    ,
    259 (D.D.C. 2018). First, the Court must “determine whether
    disclosure of the files would compromise a substantial, as
    opposed to de minimis, privacy interest, because [i]f no
    significant privacy interest is implicated . . . FOIA demands
    disclosure.” Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., 
    515 F.3d 1224
    , 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). If the agency demonstrates that “a substantial
    privacy interest is at stake, then [the Court] must balance the
    privacy interest in non-disclosure against the public interest.”
    Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t
    of Health & Human Servs., 
    554 F.3d 1046
    , 1050 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    “Substantial, in this context, means less than it might seem. A
    substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de
    minimis privacy interest.” Humane Soc’y of United States v.
    Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 
    386 F. Supp. 3d 34
    , 43
    (D.D.C. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Here, DOJ has demonstrated that the individuals’ privacy
    interests are substantial. OIP withheld the names and contact
    information of certain SCO and law enforcement personnel after
    “[c]onsidering the sensitive and often contentious nature of the
    work of the SCO, as well as the work law enforcement personnel
    conduct.” Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 24 ¶ 53. OIP and the
    32
    FBI withheld the personal e-mail addresses and telephone numbers
    of reporters on the basis that “the release of such information
    could subject those individuals to unwarranted harassment in
    their personal time and personal lives.”
    Id. at 2
    4 ¶ 54; see
    also Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 12 ¶ 27 (“[T]he public could
    draw negative conclusions based on their inquiries to OPA or
    devote unwanted attention and/or harassment toward the
    individuals based on their communications with OPA if their
    identities were publicly disclosed.”). In addition, OIP and the
    FBI withheld the names and personal identifying information of
    third parties referenced in the records at issue to prevent
    unwarranted harassment. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 27-29.
    Finally, OIP redacted purely personal information of reporters,
    third parties, and DOJ employees, such as “vacation details,
    holiday plans, religious observances, and other similar
    information unrelated to any government function or activity.”
    Id. at 2
    9.
    Freedom Watch argues that DOJ’s “examples” of the privacy
    interests of the government personnel, reporters, and third
    parties constitute a “speculative secondary effect condemned in
    Arieff.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 9. In dicta, the D.C.
    Circuit in Arieff stated that Exemption 6 “does not apply to an
    invasion of privacy produced as a secondary effect of the
    release . . . . [I]t is the very ‘production’ of the documents
    33
    which must ‘constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
    personal 
    privacy.’” 712 F.2d at 1468
    (citation omitted); see
    also Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 
    879 F.2d 873
    ,
    877 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Arieff, the government invoked
    Exemption 6 to withhold information that contained the names and
    amounts of prescription drugs supplied to the Office of
    Attending Physician to the United States Congress (“OAP”), but
    the information sought there did not identify a particular
    member of 
    Congress. 712 F.2d at 1466-68
    . The D.C. Circuit held
    that Exemption 6 did not cover the information about the
    prescription drugs because the records contained no information
    directly attributable to an individual.
    Id. at 1467
    (concluding
    that the FOIA requester “established no more than a ‘mere
    possibility’ that the medical condition of a particular
    individual might be disclosed”). The opposite is true here. The
    disclosure of the redacted information in this case would work a
    clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy because such
    information is attributable to individuals. See 
    Arieff, 712 F.2d at 1467-68
    . As stated by DOJ, “the release of the requested
    information would not result in a mere theoretical possibility
    of an invasion of privacy, or mere speculation regarding the
    names contained in the withheld material.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No.
    38 at 14.
    DOJ points out—and the Court agrees—that the release of
    34
    information connecting any individual to “the politically
    charged environment surrounding the SCO’s work” would subject
    him or her to unwarranted harassment. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1
    at 27-28. The historical significance and high-profile nature of
    the SCO’s investigation into the Russian government’s efforts to
    interfere in the 2016 presidential election have generated
    widespread debate and speculation. It is beyond dispute that the
    government employees in the SCO and the FBI were working in
    “sensitive agencies” and “sensitive occupations.” Long v. Office
    of Pers. Mgmt., 
    692 F.3d 185
    , 192 (2d Cir. 2012); see also
    Walston v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    238 F. Supp. 3d 57
    , 67 (D.D.C.
    2017) (Sullivan, J.).
    In Walston, this Court found that the agency properly
    withheld the names and other personal identifying information of
    low-level government employees who conducted an investigation
    into the plaintiff’s allegations of hacking activity by a
    government employee because the investigators had a “cognizable
    privacy interest in keeping their names from being disclosed”
    because they were “employed in a ‘sensitive agenc[y]’ and [had]
    ‘sensitive 
    occupations.’” 238 F. Supp. 3d at 67
    (citation
    omitted); cf. Judicial Watch, 
    Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 211
    (“It
    is well-established that information identifying law enforcement
    and support personnel can be withheld pursuant to Exemption
    7(C).”). For the same reasons, the Court therefore finds that
    35
    DOJ properly withheld the names and other personal identifying
    information of the government employees, reporters, and third
    parties in the responsive materials based on their substantial
    privacy interests.
    3. The Privacy Interests Outweigh the Public
    Interest
    The Court turns to the balancing of the privacy interests
    against the public interest. The privacy interests at stake here
    outweigh the public interest in the release of the redacted
    information. Freedom Watch contends that the disclosure of the
    redacted information “is necessary to disseminate to the public
    any information concerning grand jury leaks and other
    confidential information made by the media and leaked by the
    spokesperson.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 10. In response, DOJ
    argues that Freedom Watch’s assertion is nothing more than a
    “wholly unsubstantiated claim,” and that Freedom Watch “offers
    nothing to show why the public interest in the withheld material
    outweighs the substantial privacy interests involved.” Defs.’
    Reply, ECF No. 38 at 14. DOJ contends that Freedom Watch’s
    “suggestion of wrongdoing is pure speculation that is, of
    course, inaccurate and unsupported by any evidence.”
    Id. (citing Nat’l
    Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 
    541 U.S. 157
    , 173
    (2003)).
    “In this balancing analysis, [Freedom Watch] bears the
    36
    burden of establishing a legitimate public interest supporting
    disclosure which is in line with the core purpose of FOIA, to
    contribute to greater general understanding of agency practice
    and procedure.” 
    Walston, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 67
    (citation
    omitted). Freedom Watch has failed to do so. Freedom Watch has
    not demonstrated how the personal information of the government
    employees, reporters, and third parties will “help the public
    stay informed about ‘what their government is up to.’” Am.
    Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Exec. Office for Immigration
    Review, 
    830 F.3d 667
    , 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting DOJ v.
    Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 
    489 U.S. 749
    , 773 (1989)).
    The Court therefore finds that DOJ properly withheld the
    redacted information under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Accordingly,
    the Court GRANTS DOJ’s motion for summary judgment as to
    Exemptions 6 and 7(C). 7
    D. The Disclosure of Reasonably Segregable, Non-
    Privileged Material
    Finally, DOJ argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
    7 Having found that Freedom Watch failed to carry its burden of
    demonstrating that the disclosure of the redacted information
    would advance the public interest under Exemption 6, the Court
    need not decide whether Freedom Watch met its evidentiary burden
    under Favish. See 
    Favish, 541 U.S. at 174
    (When “the public
    interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials
    acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of
    their duties,” the FOIA requester has the burden under Exemption
    7(C) to “establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain
    disclosure” and “produce evidence that would warrant a belief”
    of “the alleged Government impropriety[.]”).
    37
    on its segregability determinations. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1
    at 31. Freedom Watch does not advance any legal arguments in
    opposition to DOJ’s segregability determinations. See Pl.’s
    Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 12. Rather, Freedom Watch argues that
    “without the Court’s in camera review, [DOJ has] not clearly
    demonstrated that the documents [Freedom Watch] seeks contain no
    reasonably segregable factual information.”
    Id. DOJ disagrees,
    arguing that “[t]he Brinkmann and Hardy declarations confirm
    that OIP and [the] FBI, respectively, conducted a line-by-line
    review to carefully determine in good faith what portions of
    responsive materials could be released and what portions must be
    withheld.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 16.
    The Court has an “affirmative duty” to consider whether DOJ
    has satisfied its segregability obligations. Trans–Pac. Policing
    Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv., 
    177 F.3d 1022
    , 1028 (D.C. Cir.
    1999). “Agencies are entitled to a presumption that they
    complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable
    material,” which must be overcome by some “quantum of evidence”
    from the FOIA requester. Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 
    494 F. 3d
    1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Such a presumption is warranted
    in this case.
    Here, the Brinkmann and Hardy declarations aver that all
    reasonably segregable, non-exempt information has been released
    to Freedom Watch. E.g., Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 25 ¶ 55
    38
    (“There is no additional, non-exempt information that can be
    segregated for release to Plaintiff.”); Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-
    4 at 15 ¶ 32 (“The FBI provided Plaintiff all non-exempt records
    or portions of records responsive to its FOIA request.”);
    id. at 16
    ¶ 36 (“The FBI . . . released all reasonably segregable, non-
    exempt information[.]”). The first declarant confirms that “OIP
    conducted a line-by-line review of the responsive documents to
    determine in good faith what material should be released
    consistent with FOIA’s requirements.” Brinkmann Decl., ECF No.
    36-3 at 25 ¶ 55. The second declarant confirms the same. Hardy
    Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 15 ¶ 32 (“During the processing of
    [Freedom Watch’s] request, a line by line review of each
    responsive page was conducted to identify non-exempt information
    that could be reasonably segregated and released.”).
    Freedom Watch fails to present a “quantum of evidence” that
    overrides the presumption in favor of DOJ’s segregability
    determinations. Sussman, 
    494 F. 3d
    at 1117. DOJ did not withhold
    in full any responsive materials. See, e.g., Defs.’ Reply, ECF
    No. 38 at 16; Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 36-3 at 57-80; Defs.’ Ex. 2,
    ECF No. 36-4 at 37-42. And Freedom Watch does not identify one
    document or piece of information to show that DOJ failed to
    satisfy its obligations to segregate exempt information from
    non-exempt information. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 12. The
    Court therefore finds that DOJ’s Vaughn indices and declarations
    39
    demonstrate that all reasonably segregable, non-exempt
    information has been released to Freedom Watch. The Court need
    not conduct an in camera review because DOJ adequately describes
    its segregability analysis and justifies its withholdings under
    Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C). See Mead Data Cent. v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Air Force, 
    566 F.2d 242
    , 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[A] district
    court need not conduct its own in camera search for segregable
    non-exempt information unless the agency response is vague, its
    claims too sweeping, or there is a reason to suspect bad
    faith.”). 8
    IV.   Conclusion
    For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS DOJ’s
    Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate Order accompanies this
    Memorandum Opinion.
    SO ORDERED
    Signed:       Emmet G. Sullivan
    United States District Judge
    March 23, 2020
    8 Freedom Watch requests an in camera review of the redacted
    information in the responsive materials. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37
    at 12. DOJ argues that “in camera review is particularly
    unwarranted because the agencies have demonstrated that the
    redacted material falls within Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C).”
    Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 17. The Court agrees. The Court will
    not exercise its discretion to conduct an in camera review. See
    5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also Canning v. U.S. Dep’t of
    State, 
    134 F. Supp. 3d 490
    , 502 (D.D.C. 2015) (“In camera review
    is a last resort.” (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted)). Having found that DOJ is entitled to summary
    judgment, the Court DENIES Freedom Watch’s request for an in
    camera review.
    40
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2018-0088

Judges: Judge Emmet G. Sullivan

Filed Date: 3/23/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/23/2020

Authorities (36)

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Johnson, Neil v. Exec Off US Atty , 310 F.3d 771 ( 2002 )

Truesdale v. United States Department of Justice , 803 F. Supp. 2d 44 ( 2011 )

Kidder v. Federal Bureau of Investigation , 517 F. Supp. 2d 17 ( 2007 )

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security , 736 F. Supp. 2d 202 ( 2010 )

Kidd v. Department of Justice , 362 F. Supp. 2d 291 ( 2005 )

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Military Audit Project, Felice D. Cohen, Morton H. Halperin ... , 656 F.2d 724 ( 1981 )

Taxation With Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue ... , 646 F.2d 666 ( 1981 )

John R. Mapother, Stephen E. Nevas v. Department of Justice , 3 F.3d 1533 ( 1993 )

Dudman Communications Corporation v. Department of the Air ... , 815 F.2d 1565 ( 1987 )

Robert G. Vaughn v. Bernard Rosen, Executive Director, ... , 484 F.2d 820 ( 1973 )

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