Dc2ny, Inc. v. Academy Bus, LLC ( 2020 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    DC2NY, INC.,                              :
    :
    Plaintiff,                         :    Civil Action No.:                 18-2127 (RC)
    :
    v.                                 :    Re Document No.:                  20
    :
    ACADEMY EXPRESS, LLC,                     :
    :
    Defendant.                         :
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
    PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
    DC2NY, Inc., which operates under the trade name BestBus, brought this lawsuit against
    Academy Express, LLC (“Academy Bus” or “Academy”), asserting contract claims, tortious
    interference claims, and a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
    (“RICO”), 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1961
    –68. The Court dismissed BestBus’s initial Complaint, DC2NY,
    Inc. v. Academy Bus, LLC, No. 18-cv-2127 (“Mot. Dismiss Op.”), 
    2019 WL 3779571
     (D.D.C.
    Aug. 12, 2019), ECF No. 10, and, later, granted in part and denied in part BestBus’s motion to
    file an Amended Complaint, DC2NY, Inc. v. Academy Bus, LLC, (“Mot. Amend. Op.”), 
    2020 WL 1536219
     (D.D.C. March 31, 2020), ECF No. 18. Now, before having actually filed the
    amended complaint that the Court ruled it could file, BestBus moves to amend its complaint for a
    second time to add facts establishing diversity jurisdiction and details supporting a claim that
    Academy violated the parties’ Transportation Service Agreement (“TSA”) by supplying BestBus
    with buses that allegedly had numerous quality deficiencies and that were of a lower quality than
    buses Academy supplied to a competitor, Vamoose Bus (“Vamoose”). 1 BestBus’s motion to
    amend is granted in part and denied in part.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The Court provided somewhat more detailed factual summaries of this case in its two
    earlier memorandum opinions. See Mot. Dismiss Op. at *1–4; see also Mot. Amend. Op. at *1–
    5. The Court reiterates many of those facts here and emphasizes additional facts raised for the
    first time in the Second Amended Complaint.
    BestBus is a D.C. corporation that provides express bus service in the mid-Atlantic area,
    including between the District of Columbia and New York City. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF
    No. 22-1. In 2013, BestBus entered into the TSA with Academy, a New Jersey LLC. 
    Id. ¶ 2
    .
    The TSA stated that Academy would be “BestBus’s exclusive provider of buses and drivers . . .
    for specified routes in the Mid-Atlantic corridor . . . .” 
    Id.
     It required Academy to provide bus
    transportation services and drivers to BestBus, 
    id.
     ¶¶ 25–28, pay a service rebate to BestBus, 
    id.
    ¶¶ 53–55, and refrain from competing with BestBus on existing and future bus routes, 
    id. ¶ 2
    .
    In 2014, Academy purchased Go Bus, a bus company based in New York that “provided
    buses to Vamoose, a direct competitor of BestBus in the D.C.-New York market.” 
    Id. ¶ 4
    .
    Academy began providing buses to Vamoose on the same D.C.-New York route operated by
    BestBus. 
    Id. ¶ 5
    . Although BestBus complained that Academy’s business with Vamoose
    violated the TSA, Academy executives stated that their business with Vamoose was temporary
    and that they were required to supply buses to Vamoose under a contract with Go Bus. 
    Id. ¶ 33
    .
    1
    BestBus originally also sought to allege additional facts supporting a claim that
    Academy violated the TSA by failing to provide BestBus with experienced and professional
    drivers, Pl.’s Second Mot. Amend. ¶ 3, ECF No. 20, but BestBus has since withdrawn its attempt
    to add those facts, Pl.’s Reply ¶ 1, ECF No. 22. The operative proposed Second Amended
    Complaint is ECF No. 22-1.
    2
    BestBus alleges that while Academy provided Vamoose with “newer models and better
    buses than the ones Academy supplied to BestBus for the same routes . . . Academy deliberately
    supplied BestBus with older buses, not the top-of-the-line buses for which BestBus had
    contracted.” 2 
    Id.
     ¶¶ 32–34. BestBus received complaints from passengers about breakdowns
    causing service delays, lost luggage, inoperative WiFi, faulty electrical outlets, and unusable
    restrooms. 
    Id. ¶ 34
    . As a result, BestBus suffered reputational harm and lost profits. 
    Id.
    BestBus complained to Academy about the quality of buses that Academy supplied to BestBus
    and requested that BestBus be provided with newer buses. 
    Id. ¶ 35
    . While Academy assured
    BestBus that the quality issues would be resolved, 
    id. ¶¶ 35, 37
    , BestBus asserts that “Academy
    took no steps to change its behavior and intentionally continued to supply BestBus with older
    buses . . . ,” 
    id. ¶ 35
    . After continuing disagreements between BestBus and Academy—including
    disagreements about bus quality, 
    id. ¶ 37
    , improper signage displaying signs for Vamoose on
    BestBus buses, 
    id. ¶ 38
    , Academy’s professed support for BestBus’s plan to establish a New
    York-Boston route while Academy was also attempting to acquire a New York-Boston route
    from Go Bus, 
    id.
     ¶¶ 40–45, and Academy’s failure to pay service rebates under the TSA, 
    id.
     ¶¶
    53–55—BestBus terminated the TSA in 2016, 
    id. ¶ 47
    . This lawsuit followed.
    BestBus asserted six claims in its original Complaint: (1) one civil RICO violation; (2)
    breach of contract claims regarding Academy’s acquisition of a New York-Boston Line operated
    by Go Bus, Academy’s provision of buses to Vamoose, Academy’s refusal to pay service rebates
    2
    BestBus’s First Amended Complaint stated that “Academy promised to provide top-of-
    the-line buses to BestBus . . . .” See Am. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 11. BestBus further emphasizes
    this point in the Second Amended Complaint, see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 59 (asserting that
    Academy’s failure to provide BestBus with “top-of-the-line” buses is a violation of the TSA);
    see also Pl.’s Reply ¶ 2 (asserting that the TSA required Academy to supply “top-of-the-line”
    buses to BestBus).
    3
    in 2016 and 2017, and Academy’s provision of allegedly low quality buses and unprofessional
    drivers to BestBus; (3) a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (4) a claim
    for tortious interference with business relations, (5) a claim for tortious interference with
    prospective business relations, and (6) a claim for conversion. Mot. Dismiss Op. at *3. The
    Court dismissed BestBus’s contract claims for failing to properly name “Academy Express,
    LLC” as the defendant, 
    id.
     at *5–6, tortious interference claims for failure to state a claim, 
    id.
     at
    *8–9, and RICO and conversion claims, 
    id. at *5, 9
    .
    On August 27, 2019, BestBus sought leave to amend its complaint. Pl.’s Mot. Amend.,
    ECF No. 11. In the First Amended Complaint, BestBus dropped the RICO and conversion
    claims, named Academy Express, LLC as the proper defendant, and alleged additional facts to
    support its tortious interference claims. Mot. Amend. Op. at *5 (citing Am. Compl.). On March
    31, 2020, the Court denied as futile BestBus’s proposed amendment of the tortious interference
    claims and the contract claim regarding driver professionalism, 
    id. at *10, 16
    , and granted
    BestBus’s proposed amendment of its remaining contract claims, including the claim regarding
    bus quality, 
    id. at *1
    . However, the Court explained that while BestBus “has a viable claim that
    Academy was contractually obligated not to provide Vamoose with any buses on competing
    routes, . . . BestBus ha[d] not pointed to any provision of the TSA that obligated Academy to
    provide BestBus with buses of any particular relative level of quality.” 
    Id. at *13
    . Thus,
    BestBus only had a claim regarding the absolute quality of the buses it received from Academy.
    
    Id.
     at *13–14. Finally, the Court also found that BestBus had failed to establish diversity
    jurisdiction and instructed BestBus to add only necessary jurisdictional facts to its Complaint.
    
    Id. at *7
     (“Leave to add facts to the complaint is granted only for the limited purpose of
    clarifying this Court’s jurisdiction . . . .”).
    4
    BestBus now seeks leave to amend for a second time. Pl.’s Second Mot. Amend. Here,
    BestBus seeks to add facts establishing diversity jurisdiction, see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–11,
    as well as facts supporting a claim that Academy violated the TSA by failing to supply BestBus
    with “top-of-the-line” buses and instead supplying BestBus with buses that had numerous quality
    issues, 
    id. ¶ 34
    , and buses that were older and of a lower quality than those Academy supplied to
    Vamoose, 
    id. ¶ 59
    . BestBus’s Second Amended Complaint adds details about the approximate
    dates on which various bus quality issues arose. See 
    id. ¶ 34
    . For example:
    On or about July 9, 2015, August 3, 2015, August 17, 2015, January 16. 2016, and
    April 28, 2016, passengers and BestBus staff complained about gas odors,
    bathroom odors, and inoperative bathrooms on BestBus buses[.]
    
    Id.
     While Academy does not oppose amendment of the complaint to add jurisdictional facts
    (which the Court has already approved), see Def.’s Op. at 2, ECF No. 21, Academy does oppose
    amendment to the extent that BestBus continues to assert that Academy “was contractually
    required to provide newer and/or ‘top-of-the-line’ buses” to BestBus, 
    id.
     at 3–4. The motion is
    now ripe for decision.
    II. LEGAL STANDARD
    A plaintiff may amend a complaint “once as a matter of course” within 21 days of serving
    it or within 21 days of the filing of a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). A plaintiff
    may only make other amendments with the written consent of the opposing party—which
    Academy has denied to the extent that BestBus seeks to add facts beyond those necessary to
    establish jurisdiction—or with the court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts should “freely
    give leave when justice so requires.” 
    Id.
     Courts have discretion to grant or deny a plaintiff’s
    motion to amend, Firestone v. Firestone, 
    76 F.3d 1205
    , 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and they may
    deny leave to amend under certain circumstances such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
    5
    motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
    allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]
    futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    , 182 (1962).
    “Courts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim
    would not survive a motion to dismiss.” James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 
    82 F.3d 1085
    , 1099
    (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Foman, 
    371 U.S. at
    181–82). To determine whether a proposed
    amendment would be futile, courts apply a standard similar to that applied in analyzing a motion
    to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
    Id.
     Accordingly, a proposed
    amended complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
    relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
    Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)). Under this standard, “[t]hreadbare recitals of
    the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to
    survive a motion to dismiss. 
    Id.
     A court must accept factual allegations in the complaint as true
    and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 555
    . However,
    a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, see Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    , nor
    must a court accept as true legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, see
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 555
    . These standards for evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings still apply
    in diversity cases where the governing substantive law is that of a state or the District of
    Columbia. See Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 
    783 F.3d 1328
    , 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
    III. ANALYSIS
    BestBus has yet to file the amended complaint that the Court permitted. Now it seeks
    leave to amend for a second time. Pl.’s Second Mot. Amend. In granting Academy leave to file
    a sur-reply in response to BestBus’s previous motion, the Court observed that opposing
    6
    amendment of the complaint was Academy’s second chance at “argu[ing] for dismissal of the
    case on more or less the same grounds, and that [Academy] w[ould] get a third opportunity when
    the Amended Complaint is filed.” Mot. Amend. Op. at *5 n.5. By filing a second Motion for
    Leave to Amend directly on the heels of the Court’s resolution of its previous motion, BestBus
    has dragged out this preliminary round of the litigation still further. The Court is being asked to
    evaluate for a third time whether BestBus has stated certain claims, and there is still every reason
    to think that Academy will move to dismiss once an amended complaint is actually filed. For
    now, BestBus seeks to add facts establishing diversity jurisdiction, see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶
    8–11, and facts supporting a claim that Academy violated the TSA by supplying BestBus with
    buses that had numerous quality deficiencies, see 
    id. ¶ 34
    , and that were of a lower quality than
    buses Academy supplied to Vamoose, see 
    id. ¶ 59
    .
    A. Diversity Jurisdiction
    The Court’s March 31, 2020, memorandum opinion concluded that BestBus’s First
    Amended Complaint lacked sufficient factual details to establish diversity jurisdiction. Mot.
    Amend. Op. at *6–7. Accordingly, the Court granted “leave for BestBus to add the necessary
    jurisdictional facts [and only those jurisdictional facts] before filing an amended complaint.” 
    Id.
    at 13–14. BestBus now seeks to cure this deficiency by adding facts about both parties’ principal
    places of business as well as the citizenship of Academy’s members in BestBus’s Second
    Amended Complaint. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–11. Academy does not oppose the addition of
    these facts, see Def.’s Op. at 2, which the Court’s prior order expressly contemplated would be
    added. The Court grants BestBus leave to add these jurisdictional facts.
    7
    B. Bus Quality
    BestBus’s First Amended Complaint alleged that “[b]y providing superior buses to
    Vamoose, a direct competitor of BestBus in the D.C.-New York market for express bus service,
    and by supplying BestBus with older buses that suffered breakdowns, and were otherwise
    defective, Academy violated Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the TSA.” Am. Compl. ¶ 62. The Court
    held that BestBus had a plausible claim that Academy violated the TSA by providing buses to
    Vamoose, but that BestBus did not have a plausible claim that the TSA was independently
    violated by Academy’s alleged provision of superior buses to Vamoose. See Mot. Amend. Op.
    at *13–14. The Court concluded that the TSA made no reference to bus quality anywhere other
    than Paragraphs 7 and 11, and that these did nothing more than incorporate applicable federal
    regulations that merely set “a floor for quality and compliance.” 
    Id. at *13
    . Thus, “nothing in
    the regulations [or the TSA] plausibly require” Academy to supply BestBus with buses of the
    same relative quality or age as those supplied to Vamoose. 
    Id.
     The TSA only required Academy
    to supply buses that met the absolute quality threshold outlined in the regulations. 
    Id.
     at *13–14.
    BestBus’s Second Amended Complaint still alleges that “[b]y providing buses to
    Vamoose . . . and by not supplying BestBus with top-of-the-line buses, but rather with older
    buses that suffered breakdowns and were otherwise defective, Academy violated Paragraphs 1,
    2, and 3 of the TSA.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 59. BestBus argues that the Court’s March 2020
    opinion found only that the regulations do not require Academy to supply BestBus with buses of
    any relative quality level, but that the Court failed to consider “whether any other provisions of
    the TSA could be read to include such a requirement.” Pl.’s Reply at 2. This misreads the
    Court’s opinion. The Court evaluated the TSA and concluded that the TSA said nothing about
    bus quality beyond its incorporation of the regulations. Mot. Amend. Op. at *13. Thus, in
    8
    concluding that nothing in the regulations plausibly requires buses of any relative quality level,
    the Court was also stating that nothing in the TSA did so either.
    Paragraph 59 of BestBus’s Second Amended Complaint continues to assert a claim for
    relative bus quality by stating that it received “older” buses that are not “top-of-the-line.”
    Second Am. Compl. ¶ 59. Neither the TSA nor the regulations plausibly requires Academy to
    provide BestBus with buses that are of the same age or quality as those provided to Vamoose.
    See Mot. Amend Op. at *13. Again, to be clear, BestBus has a viable claim that Academy was
    obligated not to provide any buses to Vamoose, but it has no independent claim that Academy
    was obligated not to provide better buses to Vamoose. 
    Id.
     at *13–14. Therefore, to the extent
    that BestBus seeks to add facts establishing a deficiency in relative bus quality, the proposed
    amendment is futile. When it comes to bus quality, BestBus only has a claim about absolute bus
    quality based on quality deficiencies that fail to meet the quality standard required under the
    regulations. 
    Id.
     at *13–14.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, BestBus’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
    Complaint is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. An order consistent with this
    Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
    Dated: September 2, 2020                                             RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
    United States District Judge
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2018-2127

Judges: Judge Rudolph Contreras

Filed Date: 9/2/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/2/2020