National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. United States Postal Service ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
Plaintiff,
No. 20-cv-2295(EGS)
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (“NAACP”) filed this lawsuit against Defendants
the United States Postal Service (“USPS” or “Postal Service”)
and Louis DeJoy (“Mr. DeJoy”), in his official capacity as
Postmaster General of the United States, alleging the following
claims: (1) Non-statutory review of unlawful agency action for
failure to follow the procedures required by 39 U.S.C. § 3661;
(2) Non-statutory review of unlawful agency action that is
arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with 39 U.S.C. §
101(e); (3) Mandamus to enforce 29 U.S.C. § 3991; and (4)
Mandamus to enforce 39 U.S.C. § 101(e). Plaintiff seeks a
preliminary injunction with regard to their first and second
claims. Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s motion, the response,
1
and reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record,
the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.
II. Background
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
In the Postal Reorganization Act (“PRA”), Public Law 91-375,
84 Stat. 719 (Aug. 12, 1970), Congress replaced the Post Office
Department with the Postal Service as “an independent establishment
of the executive branch of the Government of the United States,
under the direction of a Board of Governors, with the Postmaster
General as its chief executive officer.” 39 C.F.R. § 1.1. The PRA
establishes that the policy of the USPS includes the mandate to
“provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all
areas and . . . render postal services to all communities.” 39
U.S.C. § 101. The PRA also created an independent oversight body
for the USPS, the Postal Rate Commission. 39 U.S.C. § 501.
Congress passed the PRA to “[i]nsulate” the management of the
USPS “from partisan politics . . . by having the Postmaster
General responsible to the [Postal Rate] Commission, which
represents the public interest only, for his conduct of the
affairs of the Postal Service.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1104, 3660-61
(1970).
In the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (“PAEA”),
Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198 (Dec. 20, 2006) (codified at
39 U.S.C. § 3600 et seq.), Congress replaced the Postal Rate
2
Commission with the Postal Regulatory Commission (“PRC” or
“Commission”) and “strengthened its role.” Carlson v. Postal
Regul. Comm’n, 938 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
The USPS is responsible for “develop[ing] and promot[ing]
adequate and efficient postal services.” 39 U.S.C. § 3661(a).
“When the Postal Service determines that there should be a
change in the nature of postal services [that] will generally
affect service on a nationwide or substantially nationwide
basis,” it must “submit a proposal, within a reasonable time
prior to the effective date of such proposal, to the Postal
Regulatory Commission requesting an advisory opinion on the
change.” Id. § 3661(b).
Following the submission of a proposal, “[t]he Commission
shall not issue its opinion on any proposal until an opportunity
for hearing on the record under [the Administrative Procedure
Act] has been accorded the Postal Service, users of the mail,
and an officer of the Commission who shall be required to
represent the interests of the general public. The opinion shall
be in writing and shall include a certification by each
Commissioner agreeing with the opinion that in his judgment the
opinion conforms to the policies established under this title.”
39 U.S.C. § 3661(c).
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B. Factual Background
1. The COVID-19 Pandemic and Its Impact on Voting in
the 2020 Election. 1
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”)
declared a global pandemic as a result of the spread of COVID-
19. See Dr. Tedros Adhanom, WHO Director-General’s Opening
Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-
opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-
2020. On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared a
national emergency as a result of the outbreak. Proclamation No.
9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 18, 2020).
The virus that causes COVID-19 is highly contagious, is
believed to spread mostly from person-to-person when people are
in within six feet of each other, and may be spread by people
who are not showing symptoms of the virus. See Centers for
Disease Control, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): How to
Protect Yourself and Others (last updated Sep. 11, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-
1 The Court takes judicial notice of documents and information on
official government websites. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see also
Western Watershed Project v. Bernhardt, 2020 WL 3402379, * 3 n.4
(D.D.C. June 19, 2020). The Court takes judicial notice of
certain information at the World Health Organization website,
the Johns Hopkins University website, and the Mayo Clinic
website which is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because
they are “sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
4
sick/prevention.html. Symptoms range from mild to severe. See
Mayo Clinic, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), Symptoms and
Causes (updated Sep. 11, 2020),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/coronavirus/symptoms-causes/syc-20479963. Older
people and people with existing chronic medical conditions have
a higher risk of serious illness from COVID-19. Id. Such chronic
medical conditions include “serious heart disease . . . ,
cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, type 2 diabetes,
severe obesity, chronic kidney disease, sickle cell disease, and
weakened immune system from solid organ transplants.” Id. COVID-
19 can result in severe medical complications including
“pneumonia and trouble breathing, organ failure in more than one
organ, heart problems, acute respiratory distress syndrome,
blood clots, acute kidney injury, and additional viral and
bacterial infections.” Id. A disproportionate number of black
people have been infected and killed by the disease. The COVID
Tracking Project, The COVID Racial Data Tracker,
https://covidtracking.com/race.
As of October 10, 2020, just over one million people
worldwide, and 214,004 Americans have died from COVID-19. See
Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. Also as of October 6,
2020, over 37 million people worldwide have been infected, with
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the United States having more infections than any other country,
with just over seven and a half million infections. Id.
In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has provided guidance to voters
and election polling locations to prevent the spread of the
disease, including recommending “a wide variety of voting
options . . . such as alternative voting options that minimize
contact.” See CDC, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19):
Considerations for Election Polling Locations and Voters,
Interim Guidance to Prevent Spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) (last updated June 22, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-
polling-locations.html. Consistent with this guidance, states
have enacted temporary changes for the 2020 election including
expanding the ability to vote by mail. Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures, COVID-19 and Elections, (last updated Oct. 2,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/absentee-and-mail-voting-policies-in-effect-for-the-
2020-election.aspx.
2. USPS Implements Changes that Lead to Nationwide
Mail Delays
The key changes that Plaintiff challenges are the
prohibition on “late trips” and “extra trips” (collectively
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“Transportation Policy Changes”) 2 announced on July 10, 2020. 3
Reply, ECF No. 25 at 9. 4 Defendants have since clarified that
late or extra trips are not “banned”; however, they acknowledge
that they continue “at a reduced level” that began in July 2020.
Suppl. Cintron Decl., ECF No. 24-3 ¶ 4. By August 13, 2020, the
USPS had reduced the number of late trips by 71 percent. Email
from Mr. DeJoy to All Employees (“August 13, 2020 Email”), Aug.
13, 2020, ECF No. 25-1. Mr. DeJoy acknowledged that the
“transformative initiative has had unintended consequences that
impacted our overall service levels.” Id. at 2. On September 21,
2020, USPS issued “Operational Instructions” providing that
“transportation, in the form of late or extra trips that are
reasonably necessary to complete timely mail delivery, is not to
be unreasonably restricted or prohibited. Managers are
authorized to use their best business judgment to meet our
service commitments.” Ex. 1 to Notice Suppl. Material, ECF No.
29-1 at 4.
2 “Late trips” and “extra trips” have been employed by the USPS
to “complete timely mail delivery.” Ex. 1 to Notice Suppl.
Material, ECF No. 29-1 at 4.
3 Plaintiff originally challenged changes in addition to the
Transportation Policy Changes, see Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for
Prelim. Inj. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 8-1 at 22-23; but clarified that
they challenge the Transportation Policy Changes, see Reply, ECF
No. 25 at 9.
4 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
7
It is undisputed that the USPS did not seek an advisory
opinion pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 3661(b) from the PRC prior to
implementing these changes.
C. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 20, 2020. On
September 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, which requests that the Court enjoin Defendants from
enforcing certain USPS policies and practices. See Mem. in Supp.
of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 8-1. Defendants filed
their opposition on September 11, 2020. See Defs.’ Opp’n Mot.
Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 21. Plaintiff filed its
reply brief on September 16, 2020. See Pls.’ Reply (“Reply”),
ECF No. 25. The motion is ripe for the Court’s consideration.
III. Standard of Review
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish [1] that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2]
that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.’”
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (alteration
in original) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392
(D.C. Cir. 2011)). Where the federal government is the opposing
party, the balance of equities and public interest factors
merge. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). A
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preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled
to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is
merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a
trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch,
451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). In this Circuit, the four factors have
typically been evaluated on a “sliding scale,” such that if “the
movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors,
then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on
another factor.” Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d
1288, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), “the D.C.
Circuit has suggested that a positive showing on all four
preliminary injunction factors may be required.” Holmes v. FEC,
71 F. Supp. 3d 178, 183 n.4 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sherley, 644
F.3d at 393 (“[W]e read Winter at least to suggest if not to
hold that a likelihood of success is an independent, free-
standing requirement for a preliminary injunction.”) (quotation
marks omitted). Nonetheless, “the Circuit has had no occasion to
decide this question because it has not yet encountered a post-
Winter case where a preliminary injunction motion survived the
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less rigorous sliding-scale analysis.” ConverDyn v. Moniz, 68 F.
Supp. 3d 34, 46 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014).
IV. Analysis
Plaintiff argues that it is likely to succeed on the merits
of its Section 3661(b) claim because “Congress has mandated that
before implementing changes that have a nationwide impact on
mail delivery, the Postal Service must provide an opportunity
for public comment and seek an advisory opinion from the [PRC].”
Mot., ECF No. 8-1 at 13. Plaintiff further argues that in
rushing to make the Transportation Policy Changes, “Defendants
failed to consider key statutory objectives about reliable mail
service and the need to give the highest consideration to
delivery [of] important mail, including ballots and checks . . .
and failed to consider the adverse impact on timely delivery of
medications” which they contend is inconsistent with the mandate
set forth in Section 101. Id.
Defendants respond that Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing, that district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction
over Section 3661 claims, that the ultra vires doctrine does not
provide for judicial review here, and that Plaintiff’s claim
that defendants’ failure to comply with Section 101(e) was
arbitrary and capricious cannot be brought. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF
No. 21 at 33-38, 39-43, 43-49, 49-51.
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A. Plaintiff Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits Of Its 39
U.S.C. § 3661(b) Claim
1. Plaintiff Likely Has Standing to Bring this
Challenge
To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an
‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a
‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable
decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334,
2341 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992)). “These requirements apply whether an
organization asserts standing to sue, either on its own behalf,
or on behalf of its members.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v.
United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982).
“Standing to seek . . . forward-looking injunctive relief
requires [Plaintiff] to show [that it] is suffering an ongoing
injury or faces immediate injury. For a future injury, that
means submitting evidence showing that there is a substantial
risk that the harm will recur.” Narragansett Indian Tribal
Historic Pres. Office v. FERC, 949 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations in
original omitted).
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden
of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561
11
(citations omitted). “Since they are not mere pleading
requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's
case, each element must be supported in the same way as any
other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation.” Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate injury
to its members or to itself as an organization. “First, the fact
that one of the Plaintiff’s members [Mr. Earl Graham, a disabled
veteran] allegedly has been harmed by delayed mail in the past
does not entitle Plaintiff to standing now, at least when it is
seeking forward-looking injunctive relief” because Defendants
have provided “evidence that mail delays have been mitigated”
and so “there is no basis to conclude that this purported injury
is likely to recur.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 34-35 (citing
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107-108, 1983).
However, Mr. Graham has described persisting mail delays. Decl.
of Earl Graham, 5 ECF No. 8-3 ¶ 6 (“Before this summer, my mail-
order medications would arrive generally a few days after my
doctor approved any prescription. Since mid-July, however, my
medications have taken much longer to arrive, including
sometimes arriving one week or longer after my doctor has
5
Earl Graham is a member of the NAACP.
12
approved prescriptions.”); Second Decl. of Earl Graham, ECF No.
25-2 ¶ 2 (“The delays I discussed have continued since I
submitted by August 28, 2020 declaration.); ¶ 3 (“A week [after
an August 25, 2020 teleconference appointment with a Veterans
Affairs doctor] the medicine approved by my doctor during my
August 25, 2020, teleconference appointment still had not
arrived. Without the medication, I began experiencing serious
pain.”); ¶¶ 5-6 (explaining that he was eligible to be sent
medication through express mail due to the seriousness of the
pain he was experiencing and that he received the medication
sent via express mail within two days); ¶ 6 (“By the time the
delayed medication arrived, it had been almost two weeks since
my August 25, 2020 teleconference appointment.”). As Plaintiff
has provided evidence of continuing mail delays, Defendants’
reliance on City of L.A. for the proposition that the alleged
injury is unlikely to recur is misplaced. In that case, the
Supreme Court observed that “five months had elapsed between
[the traffic stop resulting in a chokehold] and the filing of
the complaint, yet there was no allegation of further
unfortunate encounters between [Mr.] Lyons and the police.” City
of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 108. Here, Plaintiff has provided
evidence demonstrating that mail delays persist.
As part of this argument, Defendants contend that the
Complaint does not allege what exactly caused the mail delays.
13
Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 34-35. However, Defendants’ own
evidence demonstrates that Mr. DeJoy has acknowledged that the
Transportation Policy Changes caused mail delays. See Ex. 5, Tr.
of Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Comm. Hr’g
on USPS Operations During COVID-19 and the Elections, Aug. 21,
2020, ECF No. 21-1 at 104 (Mr. DeJoy stating that the reduction
in late trips resulted in mail delays); Id. at 309, (Mr. DeJoy
stating that “[w]e are very concerned with the deterioration and
service and are working very diligently.”); Id. at 323 (Mr.
DeJoy stating that “[o]ur recovery process is taking too long.
This should have been resolved in a couple of—in a few days and
it’s-it’s not.”); Id. at 350 (Mr. DeJoy stating that “I think
there is a lot of different issues going on within the country
that are—impact mail delay, including the actions that we took
with regard to transportation.”); August 13, 2020 Email, ECF No.
25-1 at 4 (“Unfortunately, this transformative initiative has
had unintended consequences that impacted our overall service
levels.”)
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s members’ concerns
about future mail delays impacting their ability to vote fails
to establish standing because future injury must be “certainly
impending.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 35 (quoting Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2010)). Defendants contend
that “the Postal Service has numerous policies and practices
14
designed to ensure that ballots will be timely delivered before
the election,” that it is within Plaintiff’s members’ control to
timely mail their ballots, and so their injury is speculative.
Id. However, Defendants are incorrect to assert that standing to
obtain injunctive relief requires the injury to be “certainly
impending.” Rather, “[s]tanding to seek . . . forward-looking
injunctive relief requires [Plaintiff] to show [that it] is
suffering an ongoing injury or faces immediate injury. For a
future injury, that means submitting evidence showing that there
is a substantial risk that the harm will recur.” Narragansett
Indian Tribal Historic Pres. Office, 949 F.3d at 13 (internal
quotation marks, citations, and alterations in original
omitted). Accordingly, as explained above, Plaintiff has
demonstrated that its members face a “substantial risk that the
harm will recur” and has demonstrated injury to its members.
Third, Defendants contend that Plaintiff alleges issue
advocacy harm, which is insufficient to establish organizational
standing. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 35-37. Plaintiff responds
that it has provided evidence demonstrating that because of the
impact of the mail delays, it is “diverting resources away from
its ordinary voter registration activities, voter protection
activities, and education activities designed to promote voter
turnout” which pursuant to League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838
15
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), constitutes irreparable injury. Reply,
ECF No. 25 at 30.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(“D.C. Circuit”) recently articulated the test for determining
whether an organization satisfies the “irreparable harm” prong:
An organization is harmed if the “actions
taken by [the defendant] have ‘perceptibly
impaired’ the [organization's] programs.”
Fair Emp't Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v.
BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 71 L. Ed.
2d 214 (1982)); see also Nat'l Treasury Emps.
Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1430
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that the initial
question is whether “a defendant's conduct has
made the organization's activities more
difficult”). If so, the organization must then
also show that the defendant's actions
“directly conflict with the organization's
mission.” Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 101 F.3d
at 1430. The second step is required to ensure
that organizations cannot engage in activities
simply to create an injury. Id.
League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 8. “Irreparable harm” is a
higher burden than that necessary to establish Article III
standing. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 383 F. Supp. 3d
1, 11 (D.D.C. 2019) (“‘an identifiable trifle is enough for
standing’”) (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Reg’y
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)).
Plaintiff has provided evidence demonstrating that it “has
established a civic engagement program, which is designed to
encourage citizens to be fully engaged in the democratic
16
process, and to raise awareness for political, educational,
social and economic equality for communities of color in the
electoral and legislative process. . . [T]he program seeks to
increase turnout among Black voters in federal, state, and local
elections.” Decl. of Carmen Watkins, 6 ECF No. 8-2 ¶¶ 2, 6.
Plaintiff has also demonstrated that Defendants’ actions have
“made the organization’s activities more difficult,” League of
Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 8 (citation omitted); because
Plaintiff has explained that needing to address the impact of
the mail delays is causing it to “divert[] resources from the
regular activities of the NAACP’s civil engagement program,”
which includes “registering voters, contacting registered voters
to ensure that they have accurate voting information and
encouraging them to vote, organizing events to get out the vote,
and conducting voter protection activities during early voting.”
Id. ¶ 11.
Next, Plaintiff must show that “the defendant's actions
‘directly conflict with the organization's mission’” in order
“to ensure that organizations cannot engage in activities simply
to create an injury.” League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 8.
Plaintiff’s civic engagement program is clearly part of its
mission “to ensure the political, educational, social, and
6 Carmen Watkins is the Interim Vice President of Field
Operations for the NAACP.
17
economic equality of all persons and to eliminate race-based
discrimination.” Watkins Decl., ECF No. 8-2 ¶ 2. And as stated
above, the civic engagement program includes “registering
voters, contacting registered voters to ensure that they have
accurate voting information and encouraging them to vote,
organizing events to get out the vote, and conducting voter
protection activities during early voting.” Id. ¶ 11.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has provided evidence demonstrating that
to Defendants’ actions “directly conflict with [its] mission”
because it has needed to divert resources from the civic
engagement program to instead “organize transportation for
voters to drop off their absentee ballots” in various states.
Id. ¶¶ 8, 9, 10, 12.
Defendants fail to distinguish League of Women Voters in
their opposition brief and the authorities they point to support
Plaintiff’s ability to satisfy “irreparable harm,” a higher
burden than that necessary to establish Article III standing.
Plaintiff has provided evidence that due to mail delays caused
by Defendants’ action, they have needed in the past and will
need in the future to divert resources from their civic
engagement program to organize transportation to ensure that
votes are counted. This constitutes a “drain on the
organization’s resources”; not simply a “setback to the
organization’s abstract social interests.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home
18
Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Nat’l
Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C.
Cir. 1995)). Similarly, Plaintiff’s provision of services
through its civic engagement program demonstrates that it does
not engage solely in “pure issue-advocacy.” Ctr. for Law & Educ
v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Rather,
Plaintiff’s activities are more akin to those of Housing
Opportunities Made Equal (“HOME”), which the Supreme Court held
had standing in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. In so holding,
the Supreme Court stated:
If, as broadly alleged, petitioner’s steering
practices have perceptibly impaired HOME’s
ability to providing counseling and referral
services for low-and moderate-income home
seekers, there can be no question that the
organization has suffered injury in fact. Such
concrete and demonstrable injury to the
organization’s activities–with the consequent
drain on the organization’s resources—
constitutes far more than simply a setback to
the organization’s abstract social interests.
455 U.S. at 379. Similarly, here Plaintiff has provided evidence
demonstrating how mail delays are causing it to divert resources
from its usual civic engagement activities, which is
distinguishable from the situation in Int’l Acad. Of Oral
Medicine & Toxicology v. FDA, 195 F. Supp. 3d 243 (D.D.C. 2016),
where the Plaintiff failed to explain how the agency action
“forced it to divert or modify its activities in any meaningful
way from its standard programmatic efforts.” Id. at 259.
19
 For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has provided evidence
“showing that there is a substantial risk that the harm will
recur.” Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Pres. Office, 949
F.3d at 13.
Finally, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff cannot establish
causation or redressability because it seeks to enjoin changes
that have not occurred.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 38. Specifically,
Defendants argue that “the only specific change that was
actually implemented was additional guidance on complying with
long-established transportation schedules by departing on time
and thus mitigating extra trips.” Id. This, however, is
precisely what Plaintiff challenges. Reply, ECF No. 25 at 9, 19-
21.
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has demonstrated that
it likely has standing to bring its claims on behalf of its
members and itself as an organization.
2. This Court Likely Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Over The Section 3661 Claim
Defendants contend that this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over “complaints regarding” Section 3661 because
such complaints must first be made to the PRC and then to the
D.C. Circuit. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 39. The statutory
scheme provides as follows. 39 U.S.C. § 409(a) provides that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, the United States
20
district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against the Postal
Service.” One of the exceptions to this original jurisdiction is
set forth in 39 U.S.C. § 3662, which provides that “[a]ny
interested person . . . who believe[s] the Postal Service is not
operating in conformance with the requirements of a provision of
. . . this chapter (or regulations promulgated under any of
these provisions) may lodge a complaint with the [PRC] . . .”
Section 3662(b) requires the PRC to respond to the complaint
within 90 days and provides that if a complaint is not timely
responded to, a petition for review may be filed with the D.C.
Circuit, which also has jurisdiction to review final orders or
decisions of the PRC.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a procedural violation—that
the USPS failed to comply with the requirement that “[w]hen the
Postal Service determines that there should be a change in the
nature of postal services which will generally affect service on
a nationwide or substantially nationwide basis, it shall submit
a proposal, within a reasonable time prior to the effective date
of such proposal, to the Postal Regulatory commission requesting
an advisory opinion on the change.” 39 U.S.C. § 3661.
Defendants contend that “[c]ourts have repeatedly held that
39 U.S.C. §§ 3662 and 3663 constitute the exclusive
jurisdictional remedy for complaints about postal services that
21
fall within the statutory provisions specifically identified in
[S]ection 3662.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 40. However,
defendants have provided no mandatory authority to support their
assertion that Sections 3662 and 3663 constitute the exclusive
jurisdictional remedy for a claim that the USPS has failed to
comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section
3661. Indeed, Plaintiff points out that none of the cases cited
by defendants “concerns a failure to follow the procedural
requirements of [S]ection 3661” but rather “considered a
complaint about Postal Service prices and the manner in which
the Postal Service provides delivery services.” Reply, ECF No.
25 at 12.
“Whether a statute is intended to preclude initial judicial
review is determined by the statute’s language, structure, and
purpose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be
afforded meaningful review.” Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,
510 U.S. 200, 307 (1994) (internal citation omitted). The
language of the statute is broad: “[a]ny interested person . .
. who believe[s] the Postal Service is not operating in
conformance with the requirements of a provision of . . . this
chapter (or regulations promulgated under any of these
provisions) may lodge a complaint with the Postal Regulatory
Commission . . .” 39 U.S.C. § 3662. This could certainly be read
to mean that the failure of the USPS to comply with the
22
procedural requirement set forth in Section 3661 would be
encompassed by Section 3662. Plaintiff argues that the use of
the permissive “may” in Section 3662 coupled with the mandatory
phrasing “shall” in Section 3662(c) shows Congress did not
intend to limit jurisdiction over Section 3661 claims. See
Reply, ECF No. 25 at 10. The statute consistently uses the word
“may” when setting forth the procedure for filing complaints and
for seeking appellate review of the PRC’s determination (or
failure to make a determination): any interested person “may”
lodge a complaint with the PRC, and if the interested person is
unsatisfied with the response or does not receive a timely
response, they “may” file a petition with the D.C. Circuit. 39
U.S.C. §§ 3662(a), 3663. The use of the permissive “may” coupled
with the use of the mandatory “shall” suggests that Sections
3662(a) and 3663 were not intended to be the exclusive avenue
for bringing a procedural challenge to the USPS’s failure to
comply with Section 3661. See Bennett v. Panama Canal Co., 475
F.2d 1280, 1828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[T]he permissive
interpretation is conclusively proven to be correct [together
with the particular legislative history] by the fact that when
in the same statute Congress intended a mandatory direction it
used the auxiliary ‘shall’ not ‘may’-a contrast which is
generally significant . . . .”). This interpretation is
strengthened because the statute expressly provides that this
23
Court has original jurisdiction “over all actions brought by or
against the Postal Service” unless “otherwise provided in [title
39].” 39 U.S.C. § 409(a).
The availability of judicial review for the USPS’s failure
to comply with Section 3661 is consistent with the legislative
history of the PRA. In the discussion of the section of the PRA
that established the “procedures for changes in postal service,”
the House Committee Report states that “[t]he postal service is—
first, last, and always—a public service” and that the PRA
“require[s] [Postal Services management] to seek out the needs
and desires of its present and potential customers—the American
public.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1104 at 3668. The Committee Report
describes provisions in the act that “contain[] specific
provisions requiring justification and review of changes in
service.” Id.; see Buchanan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 259,
263 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he procedures mandated by 3661 are
sufficiently elaborate to amount to a significant impediment in
the path of the decision-making process of the Postal
Service.”).
The Court must also consider whether the claim may be
reviewed because there is no other meaningful or adequate avenue
for judicial review. See Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. at
307. District court jurisdiction may not be implicitly precluded
based on consideration of the following factors: (1) if “‘a
24
finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial
review’”; (2) if the claim is “‘wholly collateral to a statute’s
review provisions’”; and (3) if the claims are “‘outside the
agency’s expertise’” to discern “whether the particular claims
at issue fall outside an overarching congressional design.” 7
Jaresky v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Company Acct. Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477,
489-90 (2010). Mindful of the fact that there is a 90-day window
for the PRC to respond to a complaint brought pursuant to
Section 3661, Defendants contend that it does not matter that
the PRC cannot provide immediate relief because eventual relief
is sufficient as a matter of law. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 43
n.11. However, the authority upon which Defendants rely is
inapposite. In American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748 (D.D.C. 2019), the court held that
meaningful judicial review was not foreclosed because Plaintiffs
were unable to obtain “pre-implementation review of executive
orders or immediate relief barring all agencies from
implementing the executive orders,” Id. at 755 (internal
quotation marks omitted); because there the parties agreed to
consolidate their preliminary injunction requests with the
7 Defendants’ assertion that the three factors must be met is
incorrect. See Jaresky v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2015).
25
merits, see Scheduling Order, Civil Action No. 18-1261, ECF No.
16 at 1.
With regard to the first consideration—whether Plaintiff
would be denied meaningful review—it is clear that it would.
There is no dispute that the USPS did not comply with Section
3661 in implementing the Transportation Policy Changes, and
Plaintiff has provided evidence demonstrating that the changes
have resulted in mail delays which cause Plaintiff’s members and
Plaintiff as an organization harm. See supra IV.A.1.
Accordingly, even if there was a “fairly discernible” intent in
the statutory scheme to preclude district court jurisdiction,
requiring Plaintiff to go through the PRC process would deny it
meaningful review. See Berkley v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC,
896 F.3d 624, 631 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “plaintiffs are
denied meaningful review when they are subject to some
additional and irremediable harm beyond the burdens associated
with the dispute resolution process” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)); Krescholleck v. S. Stevedoring Co., 78
F.3d 868, 875 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the plaintiff had
“alleged a sufficiently serious irreparable injury to lead us to
conclude that the administrative review process is insufficient
to afford him full relief”). And persuasive authority holds that
this factor is the “most important.” Berkley, 896 F.3d at 630.
Accordingly, this first factor weighs in favor of finding
26
Congress intended district courts to have jurisdiction over
claims such as the one brought by Plaintiff. The second
consideration–whether the claim is wholly collateral to the
statutory scheme—is “‘related’ to whether ‘meaningful judicial
review’ is available, and the two considerations are analyzed
together.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d
748, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Jarskey, 803 F.3d at 22.) The
question to ask is “whether the plaintiffs ‘aimed to obtain the
same relief they could seek in the agency proceeding.’” Id. at
758-60 (quoting Jarskey, 803 F.3d at 23). Here, the relief
Plaintiff seeks cannot be meaningfully redressed through filing
a Section 3662 complaint.
The third consideration is whether the claim is “beyond the
expertise” of the PRC. Plaintiff’s claim is that the USPS failed
to comply with the procedural requirement set forth in Section
3661. This procedural claim does not require the “agency
expertise” the statutory procedures contemplate. Berkley, 896
F.3d at 630. Accordingly, precluding district court jurisdiction
here would completely deny Plaintiff meaningful review given the
timing of the implementation of the Transportation Policy
Changes.
For all these reasons, the Court likely has subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Section 3661(b) claim. See
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. DeJoy, Civil Action No. 20-4096,
27
2020 WL 5763553, *22 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2020) (stating that
“Congressional intent to preclude district courts from hearing
claims relating to [S]ection 3661(b) is not fairly discernible
from the text, structure, and legislative history of the PRA.”).
3. Plaintiff’s Section 3661(b) Claim Is Likely
Reviewable Pursuant To The Ultra Vires Doctrine
While as a general matter “the Postal Service is exempt
from review under the Administrative Procedure Act, . . . its
actions are reviewable to determine whether it has acted in
excess of its statutory authority.” N. Air Cargo v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 674 F.3d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2012). “The scope of Non-APA
review is narrow . . . [and] is available only to determine
whether the agency has acted ultra vires—that is whether it has
exceeded its statutory authority.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 844 F.3d 260, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Defendants contend that ultra vires review is unavailable
because: (1) Plaintiff cannot show that USPS acted “in excess of
its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition”
because they cannot show that USPS violated Section 3661(b); and
(2) Plaintiff has a “meaningful and adequate means of
vindicating [their] statutory rights” because they can file a
complaint with the PRC pursuant to Section 3662. Defs.’ Opp’n,
ECF No. 21 at 44 (citing Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n
28
AFL-CIO v. Fed. Serv. Impasses Panel, 437 F.3d 1256, 1258 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s claim is
reviewable:
“Even where Congress is understood generally
to have precluded review, the Supreme Court
has found an implicit but narrow exception,
closely paralleling the historic origins of
judicial review for agency actions in excess
of jurisdiction.” Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d
487, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing the leading
case, Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188, 79
S. Ct. 180, 183-84, 3 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1958)
(finding judicial review proper despite
statutory preclusion of judicial review, where
the NLRB acted “in excess of its delegated
powers and contrary to a specific prohibition”
in the NLRA)).
Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v. U.S. Postal Service, 321 F.3d 116,
1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s claim here is that the
USPS failed to comply with the requirement Congress set forth in
Section 3661. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim “clearly admit[s]
of judicial review.” Id. at 1173.
4. USPS Likely Failed to Comply with Section 3661(b)
The scope of non-APA review includes, among other things,
“a straightforward question of statutory interpretation.” Nat’l
Ass’n of Postal Sup’rs v. U.S. Postal Serv., 602 F.2d 420, 432
(D.C. Cir. 1979). In conducting this review, “[t]he judicial
role is to determine the extent of the agency’s delegated
authority and then determine whether the agency has acted within
29
that authority. In this as in other settings, courts owe a
measure of deference to the agency’s own construction of its
organic statute, but the ultimate responsibility for determining
the bounds of administrative discretion is judicial.” Id. at
432-33 (internal citations omitted).
Section 3661(b) provides that “[w]hen the Postal Service
determines that there should be a change in the nature of postal
services which will generally affect service on a nationwide or
substantially nationwide basis, it shall submit a proposal,
within a reasonable time prior to the effective date of such
proposal, to the Postal Regulatory Commission requesting an
advisory opinion on the change.”
Persuasive authority has construed Section 3661(b) as
follows:
The language of the statute . . . indicates
that three factors must coexist before 3661
applies. First, there must be a ‘change.’ This
implies that a quantitative determination is
necessary. There must be some meaningful
impact on service. Minor alterations which
have a minimal effect on the general class of
postal users do not fall within 3661. Second,
the change must be ‘in the nature of postal
services.’ This involves a qualitative
examination of the manner in which postal
services available to the user will be
altered. Third, the change must affect service
‘on a nationwide or substantially nationwide
basis.’ A broad geographical area must be
involved. These three factors combine to
demonstrate that Congress intended the
safeguards of 3661 to apply only when changes
of significance were contemplated.
30
Buchanan v. U.S. Postal Service, 508 F.2d 259, 263 (5th Cir.
1975).
There is no dispute that the USPS did not comply with
Section 3661(b) prior to implementing the Transportation Policy
Changes. Defendants argue that the Transportation Policy Changes
do not implicate Section 3661(b) because: (1) there has been no
“meaningful impact on service;” (2) postal services available to
the user have not been altered; and (3) the changes have not
affected service in a broad geographical area. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF
No. 21 at 46 (quoting and citing Buchanan 508 F.2d at 263). In
support, Defendants argue that “[t]he only notable change USPS
has made has been to renew its emphasis on adhering to its
published schedule, including developing written guidance
clarifying the circumstances under which extra truck trips were
acceptable, in order to mitigate the number of unplanned and
unnecessary trips” which is not a “change” that is contemplated
in Section 3661. Id. at 46-47. Defendants contend that this “is
not a new policy but rather has a renewed focus on ensuring the
Postal Service complies with its existing policies, and that it
operates as efficiently as possible.” Id. Defendants conclude
that this is “precisely the type of management direction to
which [S]ection 3661 does not apply.” Id. at 47.
31
The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff is likely to succeed
on its claim that Defendants violated Section 3661(b) by failing
to submit the Transportation Policy Changes to the PRC. First,
it was a “change” because it has had a “meaningful impact on
service.” Buchanan, 508 F.2d at 263. Plaintiff points to
evidence showing that the reduction in extra and late trips has
resulted in changes to service standards nationwide because it
has resulted in nationwide delays. See supra at 6-7, 13-14; see
also August 13, 2020 Email, ECF No. 25-1 at 4 (“We have also
reduced extra trips by 71 percent – a tremendous achievement.”)
Furthermore, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Defendants’
position that the Transportation Policy Changes do not
constitute a “change” is not supported by the USPS’s own
statements. See id. at 3-4 (“In order to transform . . . we must
make a significant number of changes that will not be easy . . .
); Id. at 4 (“Unfortunately, this transformative initiative has
had unintended consequences that impacted out overall service
levels. However, recent changes are not the only contributing
factors.”); Id. (“I ask that you bear with me while we work
through these changes to transform for the better . . .”).
Second, the changes were “in the nature of postal
services,” 39 U.S.C. § 3661(b) because they qualitatively
altered “the manner in which postal services [are] available to
the user,” Buchanan, 508 F.2d at 263. As stated above, Plaintiff
32
points to evidence showing that the reduction in extra and late
trips resulted in nationwide delays.
Third, the changes affected service “on a nationwide or
substantially nationwide basis,” 39 U.S.C. § 3661(b) because
“[a] broad geographical area [was] involved,” Buchanan, 508 F.2d
at 263. Defendants’ own evidence demonstrates that service was
affected on a nation-wide basis. See Defs.’ Ex. 14, ECF No. 21-1
at 452-53 (Mr. DeJoy stating that the reduction in late and
extra trips occurred in “[e]very state a truck moves in”).
Defendants contend that pursuant to past practice, the
types of “nationwide changes that trigger 3661’s review are
general changes to postal facility hours or service standards
for mail delivery”; and not the type of operational change at
issue here. Id. at 47-49. However, based on the analysis above,
the significant reduction in late and extra trips has resulted
in a change to service standards.
While it is clear that Congress did not intend for the
courts to micromanage the operations of the USPS, requiring the
USPS to comply with the statutory requirement that it obtain an
advisory opinion from the PRC and provide for notice and comment
prior to implementing “a change in the nature of postal services
which will generally affect service on a nationwide or
substantially nationwide basis” is not micro-managing; it is
requiring the USPS to act within its statutory authority.
33
Furthermore, Congress clearly intended Section 3661 to require
an opportunity for public participation and for independent
review before the USPS implements service changes that will have
a broad effect. The broad scope of the Transportation Policy
Changes demonstrates on its face that it is precisely the kind
of change that is to be the subject of the public-participation
and independent review safeguards provided by Section 3661.
Finally, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has a
“meaningful and adequate means of vindicating their statutory
rights” by filing a complaint with the PRC and then seek
judicial review in the D.C. Circuit if unsatisfied, they cannot
establish ultra vires jurisdiction. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at
44. Plaintiff responds—and the Court agrees—that the PRC
complaint process, even if it is available for their procedural
challenge, would not redress its injury due to the timeframes
involved. Reply, ECF No. 25 at 18. Because the Court finds that
Plaintiff has shown it will likely succeed on its claim that
Defendants’ Transportation Policy Changes likely violated 39
U.S.C. § 3661(b), the Court need not evaluate Plaintiff’s claim
that Defendants acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to
the mandate of Section 101(e) at this time.
34
C. Plaintiff Faces Irreparable Harm
“In this Circuit, a litigant seeking a preliminary
injunction must satisfy ‘a high standard’ for irreparable
injury.” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (quoting Chaplaincy of
Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297). The movant must
demonstrate that it faces an injury that is “both certain and
great; it must be actual and not theoretical,” and of a nature
“of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for
equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co. v.
FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quotation marks and
emphasis omitted). Furthermore, an organization faces
irreparable harm where (1) the “actions taken by [the defendant]
have ‘perceptibly impaired’ the [organization’s] programs,”
League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., 28 F.3d at 1276),
and (2) “the defendant’s actions ‘directly conflict with the
organization’s mission,” id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps.
Union, 101 F.3d at 1430.
With regard to the irreparable harm to its members,
Plaintiff argues and submits evidence demonstrating that the
“changes that USPS implemented without following the required
[S]ection 3661 process have caused delays that harm, and will
continue to harm, NAACP members.” Mot., ECF No. 8-1 at 38.
Defendants counter first, that there is no procedural injury
35
because “Plaintiff cannot state a claim under [S]ection 3661 and
thus cannot have suffered any procedural injury as a result of
any violation of that statute.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 52.
However, the Court has determined that Defendants likely
violated Section 3661(b). See supra Section IV.A.4. And a
failure to comply with Section 3661(b) is sufficient to show
irreparable harm. See Buchanan, 375 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (N.D.
Ga. 1974) (“The denial of . . . a [Section 3661] hearing, should
one be required, is sufficient irreparable injury to support
interlocutory injunctive relief, for it is clear that no hearing
will be conducted and that the changes will continue unless
enjoined.”) aff’d in relevant part, 508 F.2d at 266 (stating
that the district court “was correct in its determinations that
plaintiffs had properly established that there was a substantial
threat of irreparable injury”). Second, Defendants counter that
“Plaintiff has not identified that its members are likely to
suffer any injuries in terms of the potential future delay of
their ballots” in light of the USPS’s service improvements,
noting that all Mr. Graham has to do is “mail[] his ballot a
reasonable time before the election (which is approximately two
months away).” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 52. However, Mr.
Graham’s ability to return his ballot on time is not wholly
within his control as the mailing of ballots is a matter of
state law. See supra Section II.B.1 Furthermore, Plaintiff has
36
demonstrated that mail delays have persisted. See generally
Second Decl. of Earl Graham, ECF No. 25-2.
With regard to irreparable harm to Plaintiff as an
organization, Plaintiff argues and submits evidence
demonstrating that “the delays caused by the Postal Service’s
changes have harmed, and continue to harm, the NAACP itself by
frustrating its mission and requiring it to divert resources to
counteract the effect of USPS’s action.” Mot., ECF No. 8-1 at
39-40. Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s claimed injury to its
resources fails because “Plaintiff has not established that mail
delays were necessarily the result of the challenged policies,
or that future delays, if there are any, would be the result of
these Postal Service operational changes,” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No.
21; and that in view of the steps USPS has taken to improve
service performance, Plaintiff cannot show that “future harm is
imminent or likely to recur,” id. at 53. However, the Court has
already determined that Plaintiff as an organization has
demonstrated irreparable harm. See supra at 15-20.
Accordingly, both Plaintiff’s members and Plaintiff as an
organization face irreparable harm absent a preliminary
injunction.
37
D. The Balance Of Equities And Public Interest Favor An
Injunction
The balance-of-equities factor directs the Court to
“‘balance the competing claims of injury and . . . consider the
effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the
requested relief.’” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (quoting
Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). “When the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, while preventing harm to one party, causes injury to
the other, this factor does not weigh in favor of granting
preliminary injunctive relief.” Id.; see also Serono Labs., Inc.
v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1998). By contrast,
the balance of equities may favor a preliminary injunction that
serves only “‘to preserve the relative positions of the parties
until a trial on the merits can be held.’” 64 F. Supp. 3d 195,
205 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395). “The
purpose of . . . interim relief is not to conclusively determine
the rights of the parties, University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451
U.S. 390, 395 (1981), but to balance the equities as the
litigation moves forward. In awarding a preliminary injunction a
court must also ‘conside[r] . . . the overall public interest,’
Winter, 555 U.S. at 26.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017).
38
Plaintiff argues that, as it explained in its argument that
it has standing to bring its claims, without an injunction, “the
NAACP and its members will suffer serious and immediate harms
that could not be sufficiently remedied later . . . [and that]
the Postal Service would not be harmed by an order requiring it
to follow the law, and the public interest is served when
administrative agencies comply with their statutory
obligations,” noting that “[t]his point applies fully to
procedural obligations imposed by statute.” Mot., ECF No. 8-1 at
41-42. Plaintiff also notes that “the public would not be harmed
(to the contrary) by the restoration of reliable postal service,
providing the timely delivery of medicines and checks and other
important mail.” Id. at 42.
Defendants fail to respond to Plaintiff’s arguments,
responding only that they are “undertaking extensive efforts to
facilitate the timely delivery of Election Mail” and that
“Plaintiff’s member voters have an opportunity to avoid any harm
by mailing in their ballots without delay.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF
No. 21 at 54. Defendants also contend that ensuring “full
compliance could [inappropriately] require the Court to act as
an overseer of the agency’s day-to-day activities.” Id.
The balance of the equities and the public interest favor an
injunction. First, Defendants identify no harms to themselves
whereas Plaintiff has demonstrated serious, immediate, and
39
recurring harms to its members and to itself as an organization.
Defendants’ suggestion that an injunction could require the
Court to oversee the USPS’s “day-to-day activities” is without
merit given that the Court will issue a targeted preliminary
injunction enjoining the USPS from implementing the
Transportation Policy Changes. Second, “there is a substantial
public interest ‘in having governmental agencies abide by the
federal laws that govern their existence and operations.’”
League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 12 (quoting Washington v.
Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994).
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
motion for a preliminary injunction. Any request to stay this
decision pending appeal will be denied for substantially the
same reasons as those articulated in this Opinion. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
October 10, 2020
40