United States v. Edmond ( 2021 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Crim. Action No. 89-162 (EGS)
RAYFUL EDMOND, III,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
In 1990, Defendant Rayful Edmond, III (“Mr. Edmond”) was
sentenced to life in prison after a jury convicted him on
various charges stemming from his leading role in a large-scale
cocaine distribution operation in the District of Columbia.
United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(per curiam). Nearly thirty years later, the government moved to
reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35(b)(2)(C), which expressly authorizes a
district court, on the government’s motion, to reduce a
defendant’s sentence if, after sentencing, the defendant
provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting
another person. During the Rule 35(b) motion hearing, the Court
heard sworn testimony from a number of witnesses, including the
Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) who prosecuted this
case and testified that Mr. Edmond’s more than thirty years in
prison and his decades-long cooperation have made him a changed
man. See generally Mot. Hr’g Tr. (Oct. 16, 2019), ECF No. 273. 1
What troubles the Court deeply, however, is that Mr. Edmond
stands convicted of having run “the largest cocaine distribution
operation in the history of the nation’s capital.” Edmond,
52 F.3d at 1091. Although there are no statutorily defined
victims in this case, it is beyond dispute that Mr. Edmond’s
involvement in the criminal enterprise damaged this community
deeply and resulted in the destruction of the lives of many
individuals. See Joint Status Report, ECF No. 264 at 1; see also
Gov’t’s Resp., ECF No. 224 at 2. To obtain the views of the
community regarding the potential for a reduction in
Mr. Edmond’s sentence, the Court appointed the Attorney General
of the District of Columbia (the “Attorney General”) as amicus
curiae. With a sample size of more than five hundred residents,
a key conclusion from the data collected by the Attorney General
is clear: “the community is starkly divided as to whether the
Court should reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence.” Br. of D.C. Att’y
Gen. as Amicus Curiae (“Amicus Br.”), ECF No. 246 at 4.
The parties agree that a sentence reduction is warranted.
The parties, however, disagree on the amount by which the Court
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
2
should reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence. The government recommends
Mr. Edmond’s mandatory life sentence be reduced to forty-years’
imprisonment based on its assessment of his substantial
assistance and the gravity of his crimes. Gov’t’s Resentencing
Recommendation, ECF No. 249 at 1. Seeking a greater sentence
reduction, Mr. Edmond recommends that his sentence be reduced to
a sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration, citing his
substantial assistance and the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities. E.g., Def.’s Proposed Findings of Facts
& Conclusions of Law (“Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br.”), ECF No. 300 at
18; Joint Status Report, ECF No. 264 at 2.
In deciding the Rule 35(b) motion, the parties agree that
the Court should employ a two-part inquiry, and the Court may
consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See,
e.g., Gov’t’s Mot. to Reduce Sentence (“Gov’t’s Mot.”), ECF No.
215 at 6-7; Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 228 at 2; Gov’t’s Post-Hr’g
Br., ECF No. 298 at 3. Under the Rule 35(b) two-step analysis,
the Court must first find that Mr. Edmond has provided
substantial assistance, and then decide the extent to which
Mr. Edmond’s sentence should be reduced. Contrary to the
government’s position, however, nothing in the text of Rule
35(b) limits the Court’s discretion to award a reduction by an
amount greater than the government’s recommendation. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 35(b). The Court deems it appropriate to consider the
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Section 3553(a) factors to guide the Court’s exercise of
discretion to reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence by an amount greater
than the government’s recommendation.
In resolving the government’s Motion to Reduce Sentence,
the Court takes into consideration the unparalleled magnitude of
Mr. Edmond’s crimes—indeed the Court has not seen other
instances of drug dealing of this magnitude—and balances that
against the unparalleled magnitude of Mr. Edmond’s cooperation.
Upon careful consideration of the motion, the parties’
submissions, the applicable law, the entire record herein, and
for the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that:
(1) Mr. Edmond’s previously-imposed term of life imprisonment is
reduced to twenty years; and (2) a life term of supervised
release is warranted. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the
government’s motion.
II. Background
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Between 1985 and 1989, Mr. Edmond led a large-scale cocaine
distribution conspiracy. Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1091. Mr. Edmond’s
operation generated millions of dollars from the wholesale and
retail distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine. Presentence
Report (“PSR”) (Aug. 27, 1990), ECF No. 230 at 6 ¶ 5. According
to the government, Mr. Edmond and his associates were
“unscrupulous in their pursuit of cold cash,” and their
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collection of valuable items included: “[e]pensive cars,
thousand dollar shirts, gold medallions worth $60,000, diamond
encrusted Rolex watches, swimming pools, hundreds of tennis
shoes, and wads of $100 bills[.]” Gov’t’s Mem. in Aid of
Sentencing, ECF No. 253 at 4. In April 1989, Mr. Edmond was
arrested on various criminal charges. Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1083.
Mr. Edmond was committed without bond on April 15, 1989. PSR,
ECF No. 230 at 1.
1. Mr. Edmond’s Conviction
On December 6, 1989, a jury found Mr. Edmond guilty of the
following crimes: (1) engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise (“CCE”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(b), 853
(“Count One”); (2) conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine and more
than 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(“Count Two”); (3) unlawfully employing a person under 18 years
of age, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 845(b) (recodified at 21
U.S.C. § 861) (“Count Five”); (4) interstate travel in aid of
racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (“Count
Eleven”); and (5) unlawful use of a communications facility, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (“Counts Fourteen, Fifteen,
Sixteen, and Eighteen”). E.g., Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1087; Crim.
Docket, ECF No. 1 at 9.
To calculate the sentencing range under the United States
5
Sentencing Commission’s (“Sentencing Commission”) 1989
Guidelines Manual, Mr. Edmond’s conviction for Count One was
excluded from the calculations because that crime carries a
mandatory life sentence. E.g., PSR, ECF No. 230 at 14 ¶ 28;
Probation Mem., ECF No. 265 at 2 n.1. Mr. Edmond’s convictions
for Counts Two, Five, Eleven, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, and
Eighteen were grouped together pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d).
PSR, ECF No. 230 at 14 ¶ 28. The base offense level was 36
because the “offenses involv[ed] the distribution of more than
50 kilograms of cocaine” under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). Id.; see
also Sentencing Hr’g Tr. (Sept. 17, 1990), ECF No. 255 at 53
(finding that the conspiracy involved “more than 50 kilograms of
cocaine and more than 500 grams of cocaine base”).
Mr. Edmond’s base offense level was then increased by six
levels. See PSR, ECF No. 230 at 14 ¶¶ 30-31, 15 ¶¶ 32-34; see
also Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 255 at 53-56. First, two
levels were added for the possession of a dangerous weapon
during the commission of the offense under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1). Id. at 14 ¶ 30; see also Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF
No. 255 at 53 (finding that “one or more of [Mr. Edmond’s] co-
conspirators knowingly possessed a firearm during the course of
the conspiracy of which [Mr. Edmond stood] convicted and that
such possession was reasonably foreseeable to [Mr. Edmond]”).
Next, four levels were added as a role adjustment under U.S.S.G.
6
§ 3B1.1(a) because “[Mr. Edmond] was the leader of an
organization involving more than five participants.” PSR, ECF
No. 230 at 14 ¶ 31; see also Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 255 at
55-56. Although the PSR added two levels for an obstruction of
justice adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, the sentencing judge
ultimately rejected that adjustment. See PSR, ECF No. 230 at 15
¶ 33; see also Sentencing Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 255 at 56. As a
result, the adjusted offense level was 42. Def.’s Am. Sentencing
Mem., ECF No. 260 at 8.
2. Mr. Edmond’s Sentence
Judge Charles R. Richey sentenced Mr. Edmond on February
13, 1990, and entered the Judgment and Commitment on February
16, 1990. Judgment & Commitment (“J & C”) (Feb. 16, 1990), ECF
No. 250 at 1. Judge Richey sentenced Mr. Edmond to life
imprisonment on Counts One, Two, and Five; sixty months on Count
Eleven; and forty-eight months on Counts Fourteen, Fifteen,
Sixteen, and Eighteen. Id. at 2. Judge Richey ordered the
sentences to run concurrently. Id. Judge Richey imposed the
following terms of supervised release: (1) eight years on Count
Five; (2) four years on Count Two; and (3) three years on Counts
Eleven, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, and Eighteen, to run
concurrently. Id. at 3. Judge Richey ordered Mr. Edmond to pay a
special assessment of $400. Id.
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On July 30, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”), on its own
motion, vacated the sentences of Mr. Edmond and his co-
defendants, and remanded the cases for resentencing. E.g.,
United States v. Edmond, No. 90-3049 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 1990)
(per curiam) (unpublished); App., No. 15-3063 (D.C. Cir. Mar.
10, 2016), Doc. 1603360 at 113-14; Gov’t’s Consolidated Br.,
United States v. Jones, Nos. 15-3063, 15-3064, 2016 WL 3213186,
at *4 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2016); PSR, ECF No. 230 at 3; Crim.
Docket, ECF No. 1-1 at 23. Following the directive of the D.C.
Circuit, Mr. Edmond “was brought before [Judge Richey] for
resentencing on September 17, 1990[.]” Order, ECF No. 219 at 1.
On that day, Judge Richey sentenced Mr. Edmond to the
following concurrent terms of imprisonment: (1) mandatory life
without parole on Count One; (2) life without parole on Counts
Two and Five; (3) sixty months on Count Eleven; and (4) forty-
eight months on Counts Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, and Eighteen.
E.g., J & C (Sept. 19, 1990), ECF No. 217 at 2. Judge Richey
imposed the following terms of supervised release: (1) eight
years on Count Five; (2) four years on Count Two; and (3) three
years on Counts Eleven, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, and
Eighteen, to run concurrently. Id. at 3. Judge Richey ordered
Mr. Edmond to pay a special assessment of $400. Id. Judge Richey
made clear that the September 19, 1990 Judgment and Commitment
8
“represents the final and only sentence of [Mr. Edmond]” in this
case. Order, ECF No. 219 at 1.
On April 28, 1995, the D.C. Circuit vacated Mr. Edmond’s
conviction for Count Two pursuant to the parties’ agreement.
Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1108, 1113. Mr. Edmond’s conviction for Count
One—the conviction for engaging in a CCE under 21 U.S.C. §
848(b)—was based, in part, upon a finding that he engaged in a
conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count Two). Id. at 1107-08.
The government agreed that it was impermissible for Mr. Edmond
to be subjected to cumulative penalties for violations of
Section 846 and Section 848. Id. at 1108. Mr. Edmond’s
convictions for the other counts remained the same. See id. at
1113.
According to the PSR, Mr. Edmond had three pending counts
of first-degree murder while armed and one count of using and
carrying a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking
offense. PSR, ECF No. 230 at 15 ¶ 41. Judge Richey severed those
offenses from the conspiracy and drug-related charges. Edmond,
52 F.3d at 1084. The government did not adduce evidence of any
violent crimes at the 1989 trial. See Gov’t’s Resp., ECF No. 224
at 4. On January 3, 1991, Judge Richey entered an Order
dismissing without prejudice Count Twenty-One of the indictment
charging Mr. Edmond with homicide. Order (Jan. 3, 1992), Crim.
Docket, ECF No. 1-1 at 76. The parties agree that those charges
9
were dismissed and never pursued against Mr. Edmond. See, e.g.,
Gov’t’s Resp., ECF No. 224 at 4 n.2; Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215
at 2 n.1; Joint Status Report, ECF No. 264 at 2. To date,
Mr. Edmond has served nearly thirty-two years in prison.
3. Mr. Edmond’s Conviction and Sentence in the
Middle District of Pennsylvania
While serving his sentence at the United States
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP Lewisburg”),
Mr. Edmond was charged in a criminal information in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
following a two-year wiretap investigation. See generally
Information (filed Aug. 6, 1996), ECF No. 291 at 1-8; see also
Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 46. 2 From 1992 to 1994, Mr. Edmond
used his prison privileges (i.e. telephone, visitation, and
mailing) at USP Lewisburg to broker drug deals between his
associates in the District of Columbia metropolitan area and his
fellow inmates with connections to individuals at cocaine
production facilities in Colombia, South America. Plea Hr’g Tr.
(Aug. 8, 1996), ECF No. 295 at 6-7.
On August 8, 1996, Mr. Edmond pled guilty to conspiracy to
2 The Court takes judicial notice of the proceedings and court
records in United States v. Rayful Edmond III, Crim. Action
No. 96-203 (M.D. Pa.). See Luke v. United States, No. 13-5169,
2014 WL 211305, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2014). The Clerk of
Court docketed certain records from Mr. Edmond’s Middle District
of Pennsylvania case in this case. See generally Docket for
Crim. Action No. 89-162.
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possess with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, in
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Plea Agreement (filed Aug.
6, 1996), ECF No. 292 at 1-19. Eleven months later, on July 23,
1997, Judge Malcolm Muir of the Middle District of Pennsylvania
sentenced Mr. Edmond to thirty years of imprisonment, to be
followed by a ten-year term of supervised release. E.g., J & C
(M.D. Pa. July 24, 1997), ECF No. 241-1 at 2-3; Sentencing Hr’g
Tr. (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1997), ECF No. 296 at 41-42. Judge Muir
ordered and signed a forfeiture decree in the amount of
$200,000. J & C, ECF No. 241-1 at 3.
Because Judge Muir did not order Mr. Edmond’s sentence to
run concurrently with his previously-imposed sentence in this
Court, Mr. Edmond’s sentence in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania runs consecutively to his sentence in this case.
See J & C (M.D. Pa. July 24, 1997), ECF No. 241-1 at 2; see also
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at
different times run consecutively unless the court orders that
the terms are to run concurrently.”). The parties agree that
Mr. Edmond will begin serving his sentence in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania upon the completion of his sentence in
this case. See Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 8 n.5; see also
Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 260 at 10 n.8.
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4. Mr. Edmond’s Cooperation
In 1994, law enforcement officials approached Mr. Edmond
about cooperating with the government, and he orally agreed to
do so. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 46-47, 58, 64, 70, 74; see
also Gov’t’s Decl., ECF No. 264-1 at 3 (“From 1990-94,
[Mr. Edmond] assisted with at least 20 cold cases.”). Mr. Edmond
executed a written agreement to cooperate in early 1995. Gov’t’s
Mot. for Sentencing Reduction, United States v. Constance D.
Perry (“Perry”), Crim. Action No. 89-162-24, ECF No. 293 at 5 ¶
10. Mr. Edmond agreed to offer substantial assistance while
incarcerated at USP Lewisburg, a maximum-security institution,
with inmates who were “among the most dangerous recidivists in
the nation.” Id. (“Had other inmates learned of [Mr.] Edmond’s
cooperation, he would have been killed.”). And “[d]espite
imminent danger, [Mr.] Edmond agreed to cooperate.” Id.Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania case, the government agreed to file a
Rule 35(b) motion on behalf of Mr. Edmond’s mother and co-
defendant—Constance D. Perry (“Ms. Perry”)—in exchange for his
substantial assistance. See, e.g., Plea Agreement, ECF No. 292
at 5-6 ¶ 10. Mr. Edmond acknowledged that his substantial
assistance would not result in the filing of a Rule 35(b) motion
on his behalf. Id. at 7 ¶ 11. In other words, Mr. Edmond’s
cooperation solely benefited Ms. Perry as the third-party
12
beneficiary of the plea agreement, and Ms. Perry would receive a
sentence reduction based on Mr. Edmond’s substantial assistance
as prescribed in the government’s Rule 35(b) motion in Ms.
Perry’s case. Id.a. Mr. Edmond’s Substantial Assistance as the
Basis for the Rule 35(b) Motion in
Ms. Perry’s Case
In moving for a sentence reduction for Ms. Perry on October
1, 1997, the government set forth the extent, nature, and value
of Mr. Edmond’s substantial assistance. See generally Gov’t’s
Mot. for Sentencing Reduction, United States v. Constance D.
Perry, Crim. Action No. 89-162-24, ECF No. 293 at 5 ¶ 9 (“Since
July 20, 1994, [Mr. Edmond] has rendered substantial assistance
to the Government in the prosecution and investigation of
others.”). 3 The government explained that Mr. Edmond’s
cooperation could be divided into four categories. Id. at 5 ¶
10, 5 ¶¶ 10-11, 6-7 ¶ 12, 7 ¶ 13, 7-8 ¶ 14, 8 ¶ 15.
3 In 1990, Judge Richey sentenced Ms. Perry to 293 months of
imprisonment following her conviction for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine. Gov’t’s Notice to Def. of Intent to File
Mot. for Sentencing Reduction, ECF No. 286 at 1 ¶ 1. On July 2,
1996, Judge Richey resentenced Ms. Perry to 170 months of
imprisonment in accordance with a decision from the D.C.
Circuit, which “did not reflect any reduction based upon the
cooperation of [Mr. Edmond], but was based solely upon [the D.C.
Circuit’s] requirement to conduct a resentencing hearing.” Id.at 3 ¶ 7. On June 2, 1998, Judge John Garrett Penn, having been
reassigned the case, reduced Ms. Perry’s previously-imposed
sentence to time-served. E.g., Resentencing Hr’g Tr. (June 2,
1998), ECF No. 285 at 17; Revised J & C (June 29, 1998), ECF No.
294 at 1-2.
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First, “[Mr.] Edmond agreed to work with the Government in
a covert drug investigation commencing [in August 1994].” Id. at
5 ¶ 10. Next, Mr. Edmond testified as a government witness in
two criminal trials in the Middle District of Pennsylvania:
(1) in the first trial, his testimony contributed to at least
two of his fellow inmates (Freddie Aguilera and Nelson Garcia)
being convicted and sentenced to life in prison for agreeing to
ship cocaine from Colombia to Mr. Edmond’s associates in the
District, id. at 5-6 ¶ 11; and (2) in the second trial, his
testimony over the course of eight days led to the convictions
of two individuals (Michael A. Jackson and James Marshall
Corbin), id. at 6 ¶ 12.
Third, “[Mr.] Edmond participated in the reverse undercover
sting of DC drug dealers who had been the recipients of cocaine
shipped at his behest to them in 1992 from the Trujillo-Blanco
Colombian cartel family.” Id. at 7 ¶ 13. In August 1996,
Mr. Edmond invited those targets to purchase cocaine from a
shipment that would be delivered to the District, and the
undercover operation led to “the seizure of $190,000 in drug
proceeds.” Id. In April 1997, Judge Thomas F. Hogan accepted
Mr. Edmond’s testimony that resolved a dispute regarding the
1992 drug conduct of two conspirators, and his testimony was
corroborated by wiretap evidence. Id. In the end, the undercover
operation led to the convictions of eight defendants: (1) Rodney
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Murphy; (2) Jimmy Robinson; (3) Lecount Jackson; (4) Adolph
Jackson; (5) Darrell Coles; (6) Marcus Haynes; (7) Johnny
Cherry; and (8) Christopher Johnson. Id.Finally, Mr. Edmond provided the Field Office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, with information regarding two homicides that were
committed at USP Lewisburg in 1994, and Mr. Edmond was expected
to testify as a government witness at the trials for both
homicides. Id. at 7-8 ¶ 14. Also, the government indicated that
Mr. Edmond was willing to provide testimony in the fall of 1997,
with the approval of the Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, to “various Congressional oversight committees that
[were] investigating issues involving drug trafficking and
prison reform.” Id. at 8 ¶ 15.
The government summarized Mr. Edmond’s cooperation as
follows:
[Mr.] Edmond’s assistance to law enforcement
has proven to be very substantial and has
directly led to numerous convictions of major
national and international drug traffickers.
In addition, [Mr.] Edmond has provided law
enforcement with information that may help the
Bureau of Prisons reconsider policies
regarding privileges granted to maximum
security inmates that are inconsistent with
the Bureau of Prison’s mission to incapacitate
certain inmates. Finally, [Mr.] Edmond’s
cooperation and the attendant publicity may
have helped rectify serious social problems in
D.C. by demoralizing other drug dealers. His
cooperation has also helped to dispel his
15
legendary image among the drug culture and now
serves to discourage others from imitating his
conduct as a drug king-pin.
Id. at 8-9 ¶ 16.
b. Mr. Edmond’s Substantial Assistance as the
Basis for the Rule 35(b) Motion in this Case
After Ms. Perry’s sentence reduction, Mr. Edmond continued
to cooperate with the government, and “[i]t is that cooperation
that serves as the basis for this motion.” Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No.
215 at 3; see also Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 260 at 4
(“Mr. Edmond’s cooperation formally ended in approximately
2014.”). Mr. Edmond “provided general background information
from 1999 to 2015.” Gov’t’s Decl., ECF No. 264-1 at 3.
The government divides Mr. Edmond’s cooperation from 1998
through the fall of 2014 into the following four categories:
[i] providing testimony for the government at
criminal trials, [ii] providing background
information to the government to assist with
ongoing narcotics trafficking investigations,
[iii] providing background information
pertaining to the investigations of cold case
homicides, and [iv] providing information to
the government to assist in instituting prison
reforms intended to curtail inmates’ ability
to conduct criminal activities.
Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 3-4.
i. Testimony at Criminal Trials
In 2002, Mr. Edmond testified as a government witness for
approximately four days in the trial of six defendants in United
States v. Kevin L. Gray, et al., Crim. Action No. 00-157, before
16
Judge Royce C. Lamberth. Id. at 4. Prior to his arrest in 1989,
Mr. Edmond had conducted drug transactions with many of the
defendants in that case. Id. As noted by the government, “[t]he
Gray racketeering drug enterprise covered criminal activity
spanning more than a decade and was perhaps the most violent
drug trafficking group ever prosecuted in this district.” Id.;
see also Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 61 (Barbara Watkins:
“Kevin Gray and his crew were responsible for over 30 homicides
in the D.C. area.”). Mr. Edmond’s testimony led to the
convictions of all six defendants for “RICO conspiracy and
related charges in connection with multiple first-degree murders
and drug offenses.” Letter from Amy Jeffress (Dec. 27, 2019),
ECF No. 301 at 1.
In 2003, Mr. Edmond testified as a government witness in a
trial concerning drug trafficking in the Western District of
North Carolina. Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 4. In addition,
Mr. Edmond “was prepared to testify in a second case in this
district, but the case was resolved via a guilty plea, in part
due to the defendant’s cooperation.” Id.ii. Background Information for Ongoing
Narcotics Trafficking
Investigations
Mr. Edmond “has supplied background and associational
information that has been used in drug trafficking
investigations; in particular, his information has been used in
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numerous wiretap investigations.” Id. (noting that Mr. Edmond’s
“information was not the sole basis for the wiretaps in any of
these investigations”). The government asserts that “[b]ased, in
part, on [Mr. Edmond’s] assistance in this regard, over 100 drug
dealers were arrested, prosecuted, and convicted.” Id. The
government avers that the information from Mr. Edmond and others
was “used to obtain wiretaps in narcotics investigations” in
twelve different matters. Gov’t’s Decl., ECF No. 264-1 at 1.
In the first matter, the wiretap led to thirty-nine
indictments involving sixty-five defendants. Id. at 2. The
wiretap in the second matter led to five indictments involving
fourteen defendants. Id. In the third matter, the wiretap led to
one indictment involving twenty-two defendants. Id. The wiretap
in the fourth matter led to one indictment involving fourteen
defendants. Id. In the fifth matter, the wiretap led to three
indictments involving twenty-seven defendants. Id. The wiretap
in the sixth matter led to fifteen indictments involving twenty-
nine defendants. Id. In the seventh matter, the wiretap led to
four indictments involving thirty-six defendants. Id. The
wiretap in the eighth matter led to five indictments involving
five defendants. Id. In the ninth matter, the wiretap led to
sixteen indictments involving fifty-eight defendants. Id. The
wiretap in the tenth matter led to ten indictments involving
thirty defendants. Id. In the eleventh matter, the wiretap led
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to two indictments involving twelve defendants. Id. Finally, the
wiretap in the twelfth matter led to ten indictments involving
twenty-eight defendants. Id.iii. Information Concerning Cold Case
Homicides
Mr. Edmond “has provided information to local law
enforcement investigating cold case homicides,” including “a
significant amount of information concerning relevant
relationships.” Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 5. Mr. Edmond
“participated in monthly telephone calls with AUSA John
Dominguez, who relayed questions from law enforcement, which
allowed them to collect information about relationships between
the decedents and suspects not otherwise known to the
investigators.” Gov’t’s Decl., ECF No. 264-1 at 2. Mr. Edmond
“has often been able to provide information to investigators
regarding friendships, rivalries, or feuds, among decedents and
suspects.” Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 5.
Mr. Edmond’s information assisted law enforcement with
“focus[ing] [its] attention on others once learning that a
suspect had a motive to commit murder even when those murders
occurred after the defendant has been incarcerated.” Gov’t’s
Decl., ECF No. 264-1 at 2. The government notes that “none of
[Mr. Edmond’s] information about cold cases led directly to
arrests,” but “the information helped homicide detectives focus
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limited resources by relating historical information about which
drug dealer was allied with whom and which dealer was arguing
with another dealer.” Id. at 2-3. Mr. Edmond’s information
contributed to the “local cold case squad . . . solving old
homicides in the District of Columbia.” Id. at 2.
iv. Information for Instituting Prison
Reforms
Following Mr. Edmond’s drug trafficking operation at USP
Lewisburg, the Office of the Inspector General (“IG”) of the
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) opened an
investigation into the telephone and visitation privileges at
federal prisons. Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 5. Mr. Edmond
“spent hours explaining to IG officials how he and other inmates
had exploited their prison telephone privileges for criminal
purposes.” Id. In response to the information provided by Mr.
Edmond and others, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) “completely
revamped the inmate telephone system, eliminating inmates’
ability to make three way/conference calls and long distance
calls.” Id. Additionally, BOP and law enforcement officials
began vetting the calls by inmates and restricting their access
to pre-approved telephone numbers. Id.In April 2000, an IG official testified before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the United States
Senate Judiciary Committee concerning the “Use of Prison
20
Telephones by Federal Inmates to Commit Crime.” Statement of
Glenn A. Fine, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 6, 2000),
https://oig.justice.gov/node/729. According to this testimony,
IG officials interviewed Mr. Edmond “about his experience using
prison telephones to commit crimes” and “[Mr.] Edmond said that
he had little concern about conducting drug deals using prison
telephones because he knew that most calls were not being
monitored.” Id. Based on the interviews with Mr. Edmond and
others, the IG officials recognized that “the problem [was]
significant,” and they recommended that “BOP take steps to curb
prison telephone abuse.” Id. The IG’s review reached a number of
conclusions, including that the “inmate call monitoring system
[was] ineffective,” and it “highlighted the serious nature of
inmate abuse of prison telephones, including murders and drug
deals arranged using BOP telephones.” Id.B. The Government’s Rule 35(b) Motion
On August 22, 2018, Mr. Edmond filed a motion to compel the
government to file a motion to reduce his sentence. See
generally Def.’s Sealed Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 202; see
generally Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 268. 4 Months later, on February
15, 2019, the government filed the instant motion pursuant to
4 The case was randomly reassigned to the Court on August 28,
2018 due to the death of Judge John Garrett Penn. Min. Entry of
Aug. 28, 2018.
21
Rule 35(b)(2)(C) based on Mr. Edmond’s substantial assistance.
Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 1. Thereafter, Mr. Edmond filed his
response. See Def.’s Sealed Resp., ECF No. 220-2 at 1-3; see
also Def.’s Redacted Resp., ECF No. 221 at 1-3.
On May 21, 2019, the Court held a status hearing, and the
parties agreed that the Court should adopt the two-step inquiry
to evaluate the government’s Rule 35(b) motion. Status Hr’g Tr.
(May 21, 2019), ECF No. 236 at 6-7, 44-45. The Court appointed
the Attorney General as amicus curiae on May 24, 2019, 5 and
directed amicus curiae to file a brief regarding the views of
the community as to whether to reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence.
Min. Orders of May 24, 2019. 6 The Attorney General filed the
amicus brief on August 30, 2019, see Amicus Br., ECF No. 246 at
4; and neither party responded to the amicus brief, see
generally Docket for Crim. Action No. 89-162.
The government filed its sentencing recommendation on
September 6, 2019, see Gov’t’s Resentencing Recommendation, ECF
5 The Court expresses its sincere appreciation to the Attorney
General and the Office of the Attorney General.
6 The Court ordered briefing on how it “may obtain the views of
victims, family members of victims, and members of the
community, including whether the Attorney General for the
District of Columbia could appropriately represent the views of
the members of the community.” Min. Order of Mar. 6, 2019. The
parties agree that there were no statutorily defined victims in
this case. See Gov’t’s Resp. to Court’s Minute Order, ECF
No. 224 at 2, 9-11; see also Def.’s Resp. to Court’s Minute
Order, ECF No. 228 at 1.
22
No. 249 at 1; Mr. Edmond then filed his sentencing memorandum on
October 2, 2019, see Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 260 at
9-10; and the government filed its response on October 9, 2019,
see generally Gov’t’s Resp., ECF No. 263.
On October 16, 2019, the Court held a motion hearing, at
which Mr. Edmond, the lead prosecutor, former law enforcement
officials, and community leaders testified. Min. Entry of Oct.
16, 2019. The Court heard sworn testimony from the following
eight witnesses called by Mr. Edmond: (1) AUSA John Dominguez
(“Mr. Dominguez”); (2) Barbara Watkins (“Ms. Watkins”);
(3) Steven Benjamin (“Mr. Benjamin”); (4) Rick Watkins
(“Mr. Watkins”); (5) Tyrone Parker (“Mr. Parker”);
(6) Rev. Willie Wilson (“Rev. Wilson”); (7) Rev. Thson Rowe
(“Rev. Rowe”); and (8) Bishop Patrina Steadman
(“Bishop Steadman”). Id. As explained below, the Court credits
the testimony of each witness. The government declined to cross
examine Mr. Edmond and the other witnesses. See generally Mot.
Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273.
On December 9, 2019, the government filed a post-hearing
brief and proposed findings of fact. See generally Gov’t’s Post-
Hr’g Br., ECF No. 298; see generally Gov’t’s Proposed Findings
of Fact, ECF No. 299. Mr. Edmond filed his post-hearing
submission on January 10, 2020. See generally Def.’s Post-Hr’g
Br., ECF No. 300.
23
The briefing is now complete, and the motion is ripe and
ready for the Court’s adjudication.
III. Legal Standard
“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to
‘modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,’
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); but the rule of finality is subject to a
few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522,
526 (2011). One such exception is Rule 35 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (“[T]he court
may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent
otherwise expressly permitted . . . by Rule 35[.]”). “Rule 35
delineates a limited set of circumstances in which a sentence
may be corrected or reduced,” and “it authorizes a reduction for
substantial assistance on the Government’s motion, Rule 35(b).”
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010).
Rule 35(b)(2)(C) provides that “[u]pon the government’s
motion made more than one year after sentencing, the court may
reduce a sentence if the defendant’s substantial assistance
involved . . . information the usefulness of which could not
reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant until more
than one year after sentencing and which was promptly provided
to the government after its usefulness was reasonably apparent
to the defendant.” “In evaluating whether the defendant has
provided substantial assistance, the court may consider the
24
defendant’s presentence assistance.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(3).
And “the court may reduce the sentence to a level below the
minimum sentence established by statute.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
35(b)(4).
The decision to grant or deny a Rule 35(b) motion is within
the district court’s discretion. E.g., United States v. Pollard,
865 F.2d 1330, 1988 WL 145115, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United
States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1982) (“A Rule 35
motion is essentially a plea for leniency and is addressed to
the sound discretion of the district court.”). “[I]n deciding a
Rule 35(b) motion, a district court makes two inquiries. First,
it must determine whether the defendant in fact provided
substantial assistance. Second, if so, it must then determine
what, if any, reduction in sentence is warranted.” United States
v. Katsman, 905 F.3d 672, 674 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing United
States v. Tadio, 663 F.3d 1042, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 566 U.S. 1029 (2012); United States v. Park, 533 F.
Supp. 2d 474, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
IV. Analysis
The main dispute in this case is the amount by which the
Court should reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence. The parties agree on
three threshold matters that are critical to the Court’s Rule
35(b) analysis. First, Mr. Edmond has provided substantial
assistance to the government. See Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at
25
3-7; see also Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 260 at 1-4.
Second, Mr. Edmond is eligible for a discretionary sentence
reduction under Rule 35(b)(2)(C). See Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215
at 1, 7; see also Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 260 at 1,
9-10. Third, the Court may consider the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) to reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence. See Gov’t’s
Mot., ECF No. 215 at 6; see also Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 228 at 2.
The parties, however, disagree on the extent of
Mr. Edmond’s sentence reduction at the second step of the Rule
35(b) analysis. The government recommends a forty-year prison
term, and Mr. Edmond recommends a fifteen-year prison term. See
Gov’t’s Resentencing Recommendation, ECF No. 249 at 1; see also
Joint Status Report, ECF No. 264 at 2. Mr. Edmond asserts that
the government’s recommendation is a starting point for the
Court’s analysis, and he argues that it is within the Court’s
discretion to reduce his sentence by an appropriate amount when
considering his substantial assistance and the Section 3553(a)
factors. Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 9. The government,
however, contends that “this Court may consider those factors
only to grant a smaller reduction than requested by the
government, not to increase the reduction beyond the amount
justified by the defendant’s assistance alone.” Gov’t’s Post-
Hr’g Br., ECF No. 298 at 3. In the government’s view, “the scope
and purpose of this Rule 35 proceeding is exceedingly narrow.”
26
Id. at 4.
Before analyzing the parties’ arguments, the Court first
finds that Mr. Edmond has provided substantial assistance. The
Court then considers the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) to determine the extent of the reduction, concluding
that the Court may reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence by an amount
greater than what the government has recommended in this case.
A. Mr. Edmond Has Provided Substantial Assistance
The Court begins the two-step analysis with “determin[ing]
whether [Mr. Edmond] has offered substantial assistance
sufficient to trigger [the Court’s] authority to reduce [his]
sentence.” Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1047. At the first step of the
analysis, “the district court does not consider the facts of the
defendant’s crime, the defendant’s personal characteristics, or
any other § 3553(a) factors.” Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1048. “Rule
35(b) departures address only postsentencing cooperation with
the Government, not postsentencing rehabilitation generally, and
thus a defendant with nothing to offer the Government can gain
no benefit from Rule 35(b).” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S.
476, 502 n.15 (2011). For the reasons explained below, the Court
finds that Mr. Edmond has provided substantial assistance to the
government.
Mr. Edmond’s cooperation from 1998 to 2014 serves as the
basis of the government’s Rule 35(b) motion. See Gov’t’s Mot.,
27
ECF No. 215 at 1, 3. The government maintains that Mr. Edmond
“has provided substantial assistance in the investigation and
prosecution of others, and this assistance was provided more
than one year after his sentencing in this matter.” Id. at 1.
And the government asserts that Mr. Edmond’s “cooperation has
been both deep and wide.” Id. at 7.
According to the government, “Mr. Edmond was ready, willing
and able to testify in several significant drug trafficking
cases in the District of Columbia and in a Federal District in
North Carolina.” Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 27.
Mr. Dominguez, one of the lead prosecutors in the Edmond case,
explained that “the practice of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, when
it comes to providing assessment for substantial assistance to
law enforcement, is that a witness” must “testify or [be]
willing to testify.” Id. at 91. For example, Mr. Edmond was
willing to testify as a government witness in a drug trafficking
case against Bill Willis and “Dump Truck Smitty.” Id. Although
Bill Willis pled guilty, Mr. Dominguez explained that Mr. Edmond
is “not deprived of an opportunity to get a benefit for being
willing to cooperate just because somebody decides to plead
guilty.” Id. at 91-92.
Mr. Dominguez worked closely with Mr. Edmond as he
cooperated with the government over the years, and he testified
that the “value [of Mr. Edmond] as a cooperator was tremendous.”
28
Id. at 101-102. When asked to rank Mr. Edmond’s cooperation,
Mr. Dominguez testified that: (1) it was “off the chart”;
(2) “[it was] extraordinary”; and (3) no other cooperation
compares to Mr. Edmond’s cooperation during his tenure as an
AUSA for thirty-five years and as the head of the Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force program in the U.S. Attorney’s
Office. Id. at 98.
Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Watkins both testified that
Mr. Edmond’s assistance to the government was useful, truthful,
and exceptional. Mr. Benjamin, a former FBI Special Agent,
testified that Mr. Edmond’s cooperation was “[e]xceptional in
every way” based on his experience of working on several drug
cases and with hundreds of cooperators during his career. Id. at
55. On a scale of one to ten, Mr. Benjamin rated Mr. Edmond’s
cooperation at eleven. Id. at 57. Similarly, Mr. Watkins, a
retired police officer, testified that Mr. Edmond “went above
and beyond what any normal cooperator would do.” Id. at 68.
As outlined above, the government divides Mr. Edmond’s
cooperation into four categories. Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at
3-4. With regard to the first category, Mr. Edmond testified in
two criminal trials. Gov’t’s Proposed Findings of Fact, ECF No.
299 at 2-3 ¶¶ 6-7. The usefulness of Mr. Edmond’s testimony as a
government witness is undisputed here. See id.; see also Def.’s
Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 4-5.
29
A former prosecutor—who was “responsible for preparing
[Mr. Edmond] and sponsoring his testimony at trial” in the Gray
case—stated that: (1) “Mr. Edmond was fully cooperative”;
(2) “[the prosecution] found his testimony credible”; and
(3) “he was an important witness at trial.” Letter from Amy
Jeffress (Dec. 27, 2019), ECF No. 301 at 1. At the time that
Mr. Edmond was cooperating with the government regarding the
Gray case, Ms. Watkins, a former police officer, was detailed to
the FBI and was working undercover. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273
at 60. Ms. Watkins testified that “Mr. Edmond supplied
information regarding the Kevin Gray case and a few other
cases,” and she “was with the prosecutor that went to interview
[Mr. Edmond].” Id. at 61.
Ms. Watkins further testified that Mr. Edmond “gave
extensive testimony which resulted in the convictions” in the
Gray case, and Mr. Edmond participated in a debrief session with
the government about the Gray case where law enforcement “could
[not] keep up with how fast he was giving us the information, so
we were trying to write, and he [was] steadily pouring out the
information.” Id. at 61. Mr. Edmond “was very, very upfront and
informative.” Id. Ms. Watkins recalled that Mr. Edmond provided
information to her on at least four to five different cases. Id.
at 62. When asked to rate Mr. Edmond’s cooperation on a scale of
one to ten, Ms. Watkins testified that Mr. Edmond “was very
30
productive. On a scale of 1 to 10, 11.” Id.
As to the criminal trial in the Western District of North
Carolina, Mr. Dominguez described Mr. Edmond’s willingness to
testify as a government witness. Id. at 86. Mr. Edmond confirmed
that he, in fact, provided testimony during the trial in North
Carolina about the defendant who sold drugs and purchased drugs
from Mr. Edmond. Id. at 150. The government acknowledged that
Mr. Edmond testified on behalf of the government in that drug
trafficking trial. Gov’t’s Proposed Findings of Fact, ECF No.
299 at 3 ¶ 7.
With respect to the second category, it is beyond dispute
that Mr. Edmond provided background information to law
enforcement concerning narcotics trafficking investigations. See
id. at 3-4 ¶¶ 9-10; see also Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300
at 4. Mr. Dominguez testified that Mr. Edmond provided useful
information as a confidential informant during the investigation
of Phyllis Webster (“Ms. Webster”). Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273
at 86-87. Previously, Mr. Edmond had sold a kilogram of cocaine
to Ms. Webster. Id. at 86. Mr. Dominguez further testified that
Mr. Edmond’s information assisted the government in 1999 in
“building a wiretap investigation against [Ms. Webster] and her
supplier.” Id. at 87.
Mr. Dominguez testified that Mr. Edmond assisted law
enforcement with interpreting “thousands and thousands” of hours
31
of wiretaps. Id. at 80. The usefulness of Mr. Edmond’s
information is evident because the government obtained wiretaps
in narcotics investigations based on information provided by
Mr. Edmond and others. Mr. Edmond’s information, along with the
information from others, led to 111 indictments and 340
convictions. Gov’t’s Proposed Findings of Fact, ECF No. 299 at
3-4 ¶ 10.
As to the third category, it is undisputed that Mr. Edmond
“provided information to the local cold case squad to assist in
solving old homicides in the District of Columbia,” and he
“participated in monthly telephone calls with the assigned AUSA,
who relayed questions from law enforcement, which allowed them
to collect information about relationships between the decedents
and suspects not otherwise known to the investigators.” Id. at 4
¶ 11; see also Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 6. Mr.
Edmond testified that he provided information to law enforcement
about cold case homicides, stating that law enforcement “had
about 3,000 cold cases, and they wanted to close them.” Mot.
Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 148. Mr. Watkins testified that Mr.
Edmond’s information about the cold case homicides was “very
helpful.” Id. at 67. According to the government, Mr. Edmond’s
information, including historical information, was helpful to
homicide detectives with limited resources. Gov’t’s Proposed
Findings of Fact, ECF No. 299 at 4 ¶ 11.
32
Finally, Mr. Edmond’s assistance to the IG resulted in a
complete reevaluation of BOP’s inmate telephone system. Id. at 5
¶ 12. As outlined above, Ms. Perry received the benefit of
Mr. Edmond’s substantial assistance as to her sentence reduction
under Rule 35(b), which included the government’s indication
that Mr. Edmond was willing to provide testimony to Congress
about issues related to drug trafficking and prison reform. See
Gov’t’s Mot. for Sentencing Reduction, Perry, Crim. Action No.
89-162-24, ECF No. 293 at 7-8 ¶ 14. While a Congressional
committee heard testimony in 2000 from an IG official about
Mr. Edmond’s involvement in using prison telephones to commit
crimes, the Court distinguishes Mr. Edmond’s willingness to
potentially testify before Congress in the fall of 1997 as
relevant to Ms. Perry’s case from his cooperation with respect
to the IG’s review of BOP’s inmate telephone system in this
case.
Prior to the IG’s review of the telephone system,
Mr. Benjamin testified that “Mr. Edmond was simply one of many
[who] were on the phones at [USP] Lewisburg conducting anything
from tax fraud to major drug deals.” Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273
at 58. “And [the inmates] would simply make a collect call, have
their person outside [of the prison] forward them to Colombia or
wherever, and arrange a drug deal.” Id. After the issue with the
telephone system became public, Mr. Dominguez testified that DOJ
33
sought to implement changes to the telephone privileges of
inmates and investigate the issue. Id. at 92-94. Mr. Dominguez
coordinated the appointments and interviews between Mr. Edmond
and the IG’s office. Id. at 92.
Mr. Benjamin testified that Mr. Edmond’s cooperation
assisted DOJ and BOP with “fixing the problem with the phone
systems.” Id. at 58. Mr. Dominguez explained that Mr. Edmond’s
“information was a great force for change,” id. at 93; and
Mr. Edmond “help[ed] [BOP] accomplish their mission of
incapacitating people who have been removed from society for
crimes,” id. at 94. Specifically, “[Mr.] Edmond was candid about
how easy it was for [him] and other inmates to abuse the
privileges to make criminal phone calls on these phones to, as
[Mr.] Edmond says, make collect phone calls to Colombia to order
up kilo[grams of cocaine] to be delivered to people in D.C. or
Baltimore.” Id. Mr. Dominguez further testified that IG
officials “spent a lot of time interviewing [Mr.] Edmond about
the vulnerabilities of the phone system.” Id. As a result, the
IG’s office issued a report, and BOP implemented certain
changes, including: (1) “inmates are not allowed to make collect
phone calls”; (2) inmates are prohibited from making three-way
calls; and (3) inmates “can only call certain people on approved
phone calling lists.” Id.
34
The Court credits the government’s evaluation of
Mr. Edmond’s substantial assistance, and the testimony of the
prosecutor and former law enforcement officials who, during the
motion hearing, attested to Mr. Edmond’s extensive cooperation.
The Court observes that certain witnesses—Mr. Edmond,
Mr. Parker, and Rev. Wilson—testified about Mr. Edmond’s
assistance in negotiating a “truce” between two gangs in 1997,
which contributed to a decline in violence in the Simple City
Benning Terrace. See Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 113-17, 120-
22, 145-47; see also Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 6. The
government, however, did not present any information regarding
Mr. Edmond’s involvement with brokering the truce. Although the
Court credits the testimony of these witnesses, the Court defers
to the government’s assessment of Mr. Edmond’s substantial
assistance.
After carefully considering the government’s factual
proffers, the parties’ submissions, and the sworn testimony of
the witnesses, the Court finds that Mr. Edmond has provided
substantial assistance within the meaning of Rule 35(b)(2)(C).
B. Mr. Edmond Is Entitled to a Discretionary Sentence
Reduction by an Amount Greater than the Government’s
Recommendation
The Court turns to the second step of the Rule 35(b)
analysis. See Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1048 (“If a defendant has
provided substantial assistance, the court proceeds to the
35
second step and determines the extent to which the defendant’s
sentence should be reduced.”). “At this step, the non-assistance
factors of § 3553(a) properly guide a district court’s exercise
of its discretion in determining the extent of the reduction.”
Id.
The Court first evaluates the scope of its discretion to
consider the Section 3553(a) factors to reduce Mr. Edmond’s
sentence, and then addresses the extent of the sentence
reduction.
1. The Court’s Discretion to Reduce Mr. Edmond’s
Sentence Under Rule 35(b)
The parties agree that the Court may exercise its
discretion to consider the Section 3553(a) factors and reduce
Mr. Edmond’s sentence. See Gov’t’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 298 at
3; see also Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 9. 7 Indeed, the
D.C. Circuit has made clear that “[i]t is well established that
a Rule 35 motion . . . is addressed to the trial judge’s
discretion.” Pollard, 1988 WL 145115, at *1. The remaining
question is whether the Court may exercise its discretion to
7 The Court agrees with the majority view that a district court
may consider the Section 3553(a) factors when ruling on a Rule
35(b) motion. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 932 F.3d 279, 284
(5th Cir. 2019) (“[N]othing in [Rule 35(b)] precludes
consideration of those factors.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 899(2020); but see United States v. Grant, 636 F.3d 803, 816 (6th
Cir. 2011) (concluding that “the § 3553(a) factors have no role
in Rule 35(b) proceedings”).
36
reduce a defendant’s sentence by an amount greater than the
government’s recommended sentence.
In moving for a sentence reduction under Rule 35(b), the
government asserted that “[w]hether to reduce a sentence
pursuant to Rule 35 and the amount of any reduction is within
the discretion of the Court.” Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 6.
The government maintained that the Court “may consider the full
range of statutory sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
irrespective of the direction in which those factors cut.” Id.Initially, the government took the position in this case that
“[t]he Court may use those § 3553 factors to reduce the sentence
by an amount greater than, less than, or the same as what the
defendant’s assistance, considered alone, would warrant.” Id.
The government explained that “the amount of reduction should
always be determined in reference to the starting point and by
considering the § 3553 factors in combination with the amount of
assistance rendered by the defendant.” Id. (citing Tadio, 663
F.3d at 1055; United States v. Manella, 86 F.3d 201, 205 (11th
Cir. 1996) (per curiam)).
Recognizing that the D.C. Circuit has not addressed this
issue, the government’s position reflected the same position
taken by the government in United States v. Tadio, 663 F.3d 1042(9th Cir. 2011). See Id. at 6, 7 n.3. In Tadio, the government
argued that “a district court cannot rule in a vacuum, absent
37
critical factors, and that Rule 35(b) does not prohibit the
consideration of [the] § 3553(a) factors in deciding to what
extent a defendant’s sentence should be reduced for substantial
assistance.” Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1046 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The government contended that “the district court did
not err in considering the non-assistance factors when it
decided whether to grant a sentence reduction greater than what
[the defendant’s] assistance, considered alone, warranted.” Id.
at 1044.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(“Ninth Circuit”) agreed with the government and affirmed the
district court’s consideration of the Section 3553(a) non-
assistance factors in determining the amount of the defendant’s
sentence reduction under Rule 35(b). Id. at 1055. The Ninth
Circuit explained:
[A] Rule 35(b) proceeding is a resentencing in
which the starting point is the original
sentence, and in which the amount of
assistance rendered by the defendant is the
triggering factor for any reduction. The
district court may properly consider the
§ 3553(a) factors in determining the amount of
reduction and it may use those non-assistance
factors to reduce the sentence by an amount
greater than, less than, or the same as what
the defendant’s assistance, considered alone,
would warrant. But the amount of reduction
should always be determined in reference to
the starting point and by considering the non-
assistance factors in combination with the
amount of assistance rendered by the
defendant.
38
Id.
The government changed its position in this case, however.
Compare Status Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 236 at 45 (“[The government]
would ask the Court to consider the [Section 3553(a)] factors
only if the Court was going to impose less of a reduction than
the government asked for.”) and Gov’t’s Resp., ECF No. 224 at 7,
with Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 6. To support its position,
the government relies on persuasive authority for the
proposition that “this Court may consider [the Section 3553(a)]
factors only to grant a smaller reduction than requested by the
government, not to increase the reduction beyond the amount
justified by the defendant’s assistance alone.” Gov’t’s Post-
Hr’g Br., ECF No. 298 at 3 (citing cases). The parties agree
that the D.C. Circuit has not weighed in on this issue. See id.
at 4 n.2; see also Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 228 at 2 n.1.
Federal appellate courts disagree “on the proper role
played by non-assistance factors in determining the extent of a
sentence reduction once a defendant has satisfied the
substantial assistance criterion of Rule 35(b).” Tadio, 663 F.3d
at 1047 (collecting cases). Some courts have held that a
district court may only consider the Section 3553(a) factors to
reduce a sentence by less than the amount that a defendant would
be entitled to based solely on the defendant’s assistance. E.g.,
39
United States v. Mora, 703 F. App’x 836, 843 (11th Cir. 2017)
(“While a court may deny or limit the size of a sentence
reduction based on its consideration of factors other than the
defendant’s substantial assistance, it may only award a
reduction on the basis of the defendant’s substantial
assistance.”); United States v. Webster, 666 F.3d 1023, 1026
(7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] district court hearing a Rule 35(b) motion
may not use the § 3553(a) factors to further reduce the
defendant’s sentence once the value of his assistance has been
assessed.”); United States v. Rublee, 655 F.3d 835, 839 (8th
Cir. 2011) (“If the court decides to grant the Rule 35(b)
motion, its decision to limit the § 3553(e) reduction, as
opposed to extending it further downward, need not be based only
on factors related to the assistance provided.”).
Other courts have held that a district court may consider
the Section 3553(a) factors to award a sentence reduction under
Rule 35(b) that is greater than, less than, or the same as the
reduction that the defendant’s assistance would warrant. E.g.,
Katsman, 905 F.3d at 675 (“Section 3553(a) does not limit the
consideration of those factors to the original sentencing
decision, nor does it prohibit courts from considering them
during a resentencing proceeding.”); United States v. Davis, 679
F.3d 190, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a “district court
can consider other sentencing factors, besides the defendant’s
40
substantial assistance, when deciding the extent of a reduction
to the defendant’s sentence after granting a Rule 35(b)
motion”); Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1043 (“The sentence imposed must be
related to the degree of assistance rendered, but a district
court may consider non-assistance factors in awarding a
reduction, whether that reduction is greater than, less than, or
equal to the reduction that a defendant’s assistance, considered
alone, would warrant.”). The Court is persuaded by the courts
that have held that a district court may consider the
Section 3553(a) factors in deciding the extent of a Rule 35(b)
reduction, including whether to award a greater reduction than
is warranted by the defendant’s assistance alone.
A district court does not possess unfettered discretion in
the context of a Rule 35(b) motion. See Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1055(“We caution that a resentencing under Rule 35(b) is not the
equivalent of a de novo sentencing.”). That being said, the
Court has the discretion to reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence, and
the Court’s authority to do so has been triggered by
Mr. Edmond’s substantial assistance. See id. at 1047, 1055. And
the Court’s consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors to
reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence by an amount greater than the
government’s recommended reduction does not “convert [this] Rule
35(b) proceeding into a full resentencing.” Gov’t’s Post-Hr’g
Br., ECF No. 298 at 3. The government’s position—that “this
41
Court may consider [the Section 3553(a)] factors only to grant a
smaller reduction than requested by the government,” Gov’t’s
Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 298 at 3; and “it may do so only to
ensure that the government’s recommended assistance-based
reduction is not unreasonably generous,” id. at 5—reads
limitations into Rule 35(b) that do not exist. The text of Rule
35(b) does not support the government’s position. See Katsman,
905 F.3d at 675.
Rule 35(b) provides that “[u]pon the government’s motion
made more than one year after sentencing, the court may reduce a
sentence if the defendant’s substantial assistance involved . .
. information the usefulness of which could not reasonably have
been anticipated by the defendant until more than one year after
sentencing and which was promptly provided to the government
after its usefulness was reasonably apparent to the defendant.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Nothing in the
text of Rule 35(b) prohibits the Court’s consideration of the
Section 3553(a) factors in determining the extent of a sentence
reduction. See Katsman, 905 F.3d at 675 (“The use of ‘may’ in
Rule 35 implies discretion, and discretion can best be exercised
by considering the various sentencing factors.”). “Indeed, to
read Rule 35(b) as requiring the court to resentence a
defendant, considering only substantial assistance in isolation
from other factors, ‘leaves too little discretion for the court
42
to exercise’ in determining whether a reduced sentence is
warranted or prudent under the circumstances.” Id. (quoting
Manella, 86 F.3d at 204–05).
As Mr. Edmond points out, “the extent of any reduction
granted is within the court’s discretion,” and “the Court should
consider [the] government’s recommendation as a starting point
for its analysis.” Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 9.
Furthermore, the Court is not bound by the government’s
recommendation. See United States v. Grant, 493 F.3d 464, 467
(5th Cir. 2007) (“[O]nce the government moves for a reduction in
sentence, the sentencing court is not bound by the government’s
recommendation on whether or how much to depart but must
exercise its independent discretion.”); see also United States
v. Washington, 293 F. Supp. 2d 930, 932-33 (E.D. Wis. 2003)
(concluding that a reduction greater than the government’s
recommended reduction was warranted).
In the government’s own words, district courts “are of
course not bound to follow [the government’s] recommendation
just because [the government] sponsored [a Rule 35(b)] motion.”
United States v. Jonathan L. Franklin, Crim. Action No. 04-128-
01 (RMC), Resentencing Hr’g Rough Tr. (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2012) at
8. In Franklin, the government asserted that “[o]nce [the
government] sponsor[s] the [Rule 35(b)] motion and [the district
court] grant[s] the motion finding good cause for [a]
43
substantial assistance departure, [then the district court has]
the discretion to impose” a sentence reduction. Id. The court
agreed, granted the Rule 35(b) motion, rejected the government’s
recommendation of 420 months of imprisonment, and reduced the
defendant’s life sentences to thirty years. Id. at 1, 47; see
also Franklin, Crim. Action No. 04-128-01 (RMC), Am. J & C,
(D.D.C. May 8, 2012), ECF No. 1195 at 4.
* * *
In sum, Rule 35(b) vests the Court with the discretion to
reduce a sentence by an amount it deems appropriate under the
circumstances after it finds that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance and taking into account the degree of
assistance rendered by the defendant. Because the Court must
exercise its independent discretion to determine the extent of
the sentence reduction under Rule 35(b), it will consider the
Section 3553(a) non-assistance factors to guide its exercise of
discretion in reducing Mr. Edmond’s sentence.
2. Consideration of the Section 3553(a) Factors to
Determine the Extent of the Reduction and the
Term of Supervised Release
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, a district court
considers the following seven factors:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence
imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and
44
to provide just punishment for the offense;(B)
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;(C) to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide
the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective
manner;(3) the kinds of sentences
available;(4) the kinds of sentence and the
sentencing range established for—(A) the
applicable category of offense committed by
the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines . . . (5) any pertinent
policy statement . . .(6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the
need to provide restitution to any victims of
the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “A district court, however, need not
consider every § 3553(a) factor in every case.” United States v.
Fry, 851 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Section 3553(a) calls for “an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 50 (2007). That section requires the Court to “impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the purposes” of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors to determine the
extent of a sentence reduction is prudent because “[i]n some
instances, . . . a defendant’s individual circumstances will
have changed, or information that sheds new light on the nature
of the offense will have emerged, since the date of sentencing.”
45
Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1053.
“Rule 35(b) authorizes a district court to reduce any
aspect of a defendant’s sentence, including supervised release
terms and orders of restitution not mandated by statute.” United
States v. Spallone, 399 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 2005). Supervised
release “serves an entirely different purpose than the sentence
imposed under § 3553(a),” Pepper, 562 U.S. at 502 n.15; and it
“fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by
incarceration.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 54
(2000). A district court may “extend a term of supervised
release if less than the maximum authorized term was previously
imposed, and may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of
supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or
termination of the term of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2). In doing so, the Court must consider the factors
set forth in Section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e). 8
For the reasons explained below, the Section 3553(a)
factors weigh in favor of reducing Mr. Edmond’s sentence and
imposing a life term of supervised release.
8 Mr. Edmond has no restitution obligation because there are no
statutorily defined victims, rendering inapplicable the seventh
factor under Section 3553(a)(7). See J & C, ECF No. 217 at 1-4.
46
a. Nature and Circumstances of the Offenses and
the History and Characteristics of the
Defendant
i. Nature and Circumstances of the
Offenses
As to the nature and circumstances of the offenses, the
starting point is the original sentence, and Mr. Edmond’s
sentence of mandatory life imprisonment reflects the nature and
circumstances of his crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); see
also Tadio, 663 at 1055. Mr. Edmond’s offenses—violations of 21
U.S.C. §§ 843(b), 848(b), 853, 861 and 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)—are
very serious. See Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1087. Mr. Edmond
acknowledges that his criminal conduct resulted in “devastation
and destruction.” Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 4. As the
government correctly points out, Mr. Edmond “stands convicted of
having run one of our city’s largest and most destructive
narcotics distribution operations,” and “after having been
convicted of that, he went on to run a large scale narcotics
distribution operation from prison.” Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215
at 7-8.
Based on the views of the community gathered by the
Attorney General, “Mr. Edmond had a profound and personal impact
on the lives of District residents, and community members in all
eight wards were grateful to the Court for hearing their
voices.” Amicus Br., ECF No. 246 at 9. Some residents of the
47
District recounted the harms caused by Mr. Edmond’s crimes,
including drug addiction, death, the spread of the crack
epidemic, and “its lingering impact on the District.” Id. at 16.
Other residents, however, attributed the crack epidemic to
“racially motivated policies of the federal government and that
Mr. Edmond was a victim of those policies.” Id. While some
residents opposed Mr. Edmond’s release from custody, id. at 12-
13; others believed that he “has already served enough time for
his crimes” and that “a life sentence for drug offenses was
excessive[,]” id. at 14. And some residents cited a host of
reasons for why thirty years in prison is “sufficient
punishment,” including the financial cost to taxpayers and that
individuals change after a number of years. Id. at 15. While
there are no statutorily defined victims in this case, it is
appropriate for the Court to take into consideration the impact
Mr. Edmond’s criminal conduct had on the community. Here, the
government explicitly asks the Court to take into account the
harm Mr. Edmonds inflicted upon the community. Mot. Hr’g Tr.,
ECF No. 273 at 31.
Mr. Edmond concedes the seriousness of his underlying
criminal conduct, and he expresses remorse for his actions. See
id. at 138 (“I just knew [selling drugs] was wrong . . . I just
felt sick about it, you know, because I was hurting people. I
had already hurt my family . . . ”); id. at 154 (“I’m very
48
remorseful . . I’m sorry for everybody that I hurt . . . ”). As
previously stated, the Court found Mr. Edmond’s testimony to be
credible, and the government declined to cross examine him. Mr.
Edmond admittedly devastated the community, but he has served
more than thirty years in prison for his crimes in this case.
See Gov’t’s Mot., ECF No. 215 at 7. Furthermore, the government
emphasizes that there is no “direct evidence of Mr. Edmond being
implicated in the acts of violence” related to the criminal
enterprise. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 49-50. In fact, “at
the 1989 trial the government did not adduce evidence of any
violent crimes.” Gov’t’s Resp., ECF No. 224 at 4.
ii. Mr. Edmond’s History and
Characteristics
Mr. Edmond’s history and characteristics favor a sentence
reduction and an extended period of supervision. Mr. Edmond is a
native of the District, and he was primarily raised by his
mother. PSR, ECF No. 230 at 17 ¶ 49. His parents never married,
and his father spent the majority of his time outside of the
household. Id. According to Mr. Edmond, he was born into a life
of crime because some individuals in his neighborhood, including
his own family members, sold drugs when he was a child. Mot.
Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 155. Nonetheless, Mr. Edmond takes full
responsibility for his actions. Id.
Mr. Edmond graduated from high school, and he is the father
49
of two children. PSR, ECF No. 230 at 17 ¶ 50, 18 ¶ 53.
Mr. Edmond has two granddaughters. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at
156. Mr. Edmond has many supportive family members, friends, and
religious leaders. See, e.g., id. at 119, 122, 125-27, 130-35;
Letter from Rachelle Edmond-Millington (Nov. 8, 2019), ECF No.
287 at 1-2; Letter from Elpiniki N. Koudellou (Nov. 7, 2019),
ECF No. 288 at 1-2. Although some of Mr. Edmond’s family members
were co-defendants, none of them have been re-arrested or
reincarcerated. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 157. Mr. Edmond’s
family members are homeowners and business owners who have
defied the statistical odds of recidivism. Id. at 99-100, 157.
Mr. Edmond was twenty-four years old when he was
incarcerated for his crimes in this case. See Gov’t’s Mot., ECF
No. 215 at 7. The Court gives considerable weight to the fact
that Mr. Edmond had no prior criminal history before this case.
See Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 11; see also PSR, ECF
No. 230 at 15 ¶¶ 37-38. Mr. Edmond, however, continued to engage
in criminal activity at USP Lewisburg following his sentence in
this case. Placing in context this criminal conduct, Mr. Watkins
testified that Mr. Edmond’s further crimes while in prison
reflected “pressure[] to maintain his status, as any of the high
profile prisoners are in the penitentiary.” Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF
No. 273 at 65. Mr. Watkins explained that Mr. Edmond “had to
maintain whatever [he] came in there from the street for. If
50
not, [he] went to the lower order, the lower rung of the ladder
amongst all the prisoners and [would be] treated completely
differently, so [he was] pretty much forced into maintaining the
same posture [he] had before [he] came to prison.” Id. Despite
such pressure, Mr. Edmond seized on the opportunity to “get out
of the game” through cooperation. Id.
iii. Mr. Edmond’s Cooperation and
Character
The Court may also consider Mr. Edmond’s cooperation with
the government under Section 3553(a)(1). See United States v.
Kaufman, 791 F.3d 86, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “No matter how
horrible an offender’s crimes, how unlikely his prospect of
rehabilitation, how dangerous he might be, an informer deserves
a reward for the benefit conferred on society by his assistance
in investigating and prosecuting wrongdoers.” United States v.
Torres Teyer, No. 01 CR. 21 (GEL), 2006 WL 3511885, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2006). To reward Mr. Edmond for his
cooperation, the government moved to reduce his sentence in this
case.
The Court takes into account Mr. Edmond’s decades-long
cooperation because it indicates that his “character is less
incorrigible than it may have otherwise appeared, and that the
need for protection of the public—a critical goal of sentencing
under § 3553(a)(2)(C)—is to some extent reduced.” Id. at *9. It
51
is undisputed that Mr. Edmond “voluntarily began assisting the
government without having a written agreement in place.” Def.’s
Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 16. In 1994, Mr. Edmond began
cooperating with law enforcement, and he entered into a formal
cooperation agreement the next year. Gov’t’s Mot. for Sentencing
Reduction, Perry, Crim. Action No. 89-162-24, ECF No. 293 at 5 ¶
10. The Court credits Mr. Edmond’s sworn testimony that his
cooperation reflects his stated desire to right his wrongs. See
Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 154. With respect to his decision
to cooperate with the government, Mr. Edmond explained: “I was
looking for a way out, and I figured if I start cooperating with
the government, that would give me a way, I wouldn’t have to
sell drugs again.” Id. at 141. As such, Mr. Edmond’s decision
demonstrates his efforts to cut ties with the criminal world.
See id. at 141-42.
The Court also considers the degree of Mr. Edmond’s
cooperation. Having already determined that Mr. Edmond provided
substantial assistance, the Court finds that the degree of his
substantial assistance is very high. The uncontroverted
testimony of Mr. Dominguez, Ms. Watkins, Mr. Benjamin, and
Mr. Watkins indicates that the degree of Mr. Edmond’s
cooperation was exceptionally high. As previously stated,
Mr. Dominguez testified that Mr. Edmond’s cooperation: (1) was
“off the chart”; (2) “[it was] extraordinary”; and (3) no other
52
cooperation compares to Mr. Edmond’s cooperation during his
career as a federal prosecutor. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at
98. Ms. Watkins testified that Mr. Edmond’s cooperation “was
very productive. On a scale of 1 to 10, 11.” Id. at 62.
Mr. Benjamin testified that Mr. Edmond’s cooperation was
“[e]xceptional in every way” based on his experience of working
on several drug cases and with hundreds of cooperators during
his career. Id. at 55. On a scale of one to ten, Mr. Benjamin
rated Mr. Edmond’s cooperation at eleven. Id. at 57. Mr. Watkins
testified that Mr. Edmond “went above and beyond what any normal
cooperator would do.” Id. at 68.
Apart from his formal cooperation with the government,
Mr. Edmond, Mr. Parker, and Rev. Wilson testified about certain
gang activity in 1997. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 113-17,
120-22, 145-47. To his credit, “Mr. Edmond worked with the
Alliance of Concerned Men to intervene in and put an end to an
ongoing war between two youth gangs.” Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF
No. 300 at 6. While incarcerated, Mr. Edmond joined a meeting
via telephone with the members of the rival gangs, and his
“words had a clear impact as the violence decreased after the
meeting.” Id. In addition, Mr. Edmond spoke to at-risk youth on
a monthly basis, and he described to them the horrors of prison
life in hopes of steering them away from prison. Mot. Hr’g Tr.,
ECF No. 273 at 145. Mr. Edmond testified that he intends to
53
continue assisting the government and helping the community upon
his release. See id. at 154.
Bishop Steadman and Mr. Edmond “grew up together” and since
Mr. Edmond’s arrest in 1989, they maintained their personal
relationship through letters and telephone conversations. Id. at
131. Bishop Steadman testified that Mr. Edmond is not the same
person he was in 1989 because he is now a person of faith with a
sincere heart. Id. at 131-33. Bishop Steadman has facilitated an
opportunity for Mr. Edmond to speak to her congregation,
especially young people at her church. Id. at 132-33. In Bishop
Steadman’s view, Mr. Edmond’s experience will have a positive
impact on the nation, and it will deter others from taking a
similar path. Id. at 133.
Weighing the nature and circumstances of the offenses,
Mr. Edmond’s history and characteristics, and his cooperation
and character, the Court finds that requiring Mr. Edmond to
serve a longer period of incarceration than the time he has
already served is not necessary. The Court also finds that a
life term of supervised release is warranted. Certain statutory
provisions, including 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 861, authorize the
imposition of life terms of supervised release.
54
b. The Need for the Sentence Imposed to Reflect
the Seriousness of the Offense, Promote
Respect for the Law, Provide Just Punishment
for the Offense, Afford Adequate Deterrence
to Criminal Conduct, Protect the Public from
Further Crimes of the Defendant, and Provide
the Defendant with Needed Educational or
Vocational Training, Medical Care, or Other
Correctional Treatment in the Most Effective
Manner
The second and third factors also weigh in favor of
reducing Mr. Edmond’s sentence as well as imposing a life term
of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), (3). The
government contends—and Mr. Edmond does not dispute—that the
Court should consider the gravity of his crimes. See Gov’t’s
Mot., ECF No. 215 at 7; see also Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No.
300 at 9. Indeed, Judge Richey imposed the sentence to “reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense[s].” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). The parties do not argue that serving more than
thirty years in prison has no deterrent effect. A longer period
of incarceration for Mr. Edmond is not necessary to deter
criminal conduct.
Nor would requiring Mr. Edmond to serve life in prison
reflect the need for “educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Mr. Edmond earned
a high school diploma in 1982, and he attended college for a
55
brief period. PSR, ECF No. 230 at 18 ¶ 53. While incarcerated,
Mr. Edmond has taken educational and vocational courses in a
variety of subjects, including European Civilization and
religious studies, and he has completed a drug education
program. See Gov’t’s Sealed Submission, ECF No. 247-1 at 2-3, 6.
Mr. Edmond’s courses, including family budgeting and wellness,
and his work assignments demonstrate that he has taken advantage
of opportunities aimed at assisting him in the re-entry into the
community. See id. at 2, 6. The progress report from BOP states
that Mr. Edmond “is considered fully employable upon release.”
Gov’t’s Sealed Submission, ECF No. 247-1 at 4.
Next, the Court considers Mr. Edmond’s disciplinary reports
under Section 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-
(C) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct [and] to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”).
Mr. Edmond’s disciplinary record includes a number of
infractions over the years. See Gov’t’s Sealed Submission, ECF
No. 247-1 at 3-4, 7-15, 18, 23-26, 28-36, 40-52, 54-58.
Nonetheless, the government has not presented—and the Court is
not aware of—any recent disciplinary infractions in Mr. Edmond’s
record. The most recent progress report shows that Mr. Edmond
incurred infractions in 1991, 1993, 1999, and 2007. Id. at 3-4.
56
And the report states that “Mr. Edmond has not been a management
problem” and “[o]verall, his adjustment has been considered
satisfactory.” Id. at 2.
Mr. Edmond’s disciplinary record is not spotless, but it
underscores the need for the extension of the previously-imposed
terms of supervised release. Neither party, however, points to
Mr. Edmond’s disciplinary infractions as an impediment to his
sentence reduction. On balance, the Court cannot find that a
longer period of incarceration for Mr. Edmond is necessary to
deter criminal conduct or protect the public from future crimes.
c. The Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range
Using the applicable Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the
time of sentencing, the Probation Officer calculated a final
offense level of 42 and a Criminal History Category of I. Letter
from Glenn R. Schmitt, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Sept. 27, 2019),
ECF No. 262 at 1 [hereinafter “Sentencing Comm’n Letter”].
Mr. Edmond’s CCE conviction carried a mandatory life sentence.
Id. at 2. Before application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1, Mr. Edmond’s
guidelines range was 360 months (i.e. thirty years) to life. Id.
at 1. Because Mr. Edmond faced a minimum penalty of life
imprisonment, the Guidelines range was life to life. Id. (citing
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1).
Using the Sentencing Guidelines in the Sentencing
Commission’s 2018 Guidelines Manual for purposes of this Rule
57
35(b) proceeding, the Probation Officer determined that the
applicable guideline for Counts Five, Fourteen, Fifteen,
Sixteen, and Eighteen was U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, and the applicable
guideline for Count Eleven was U.S.S.G. § 2E1.2. Probation Mem.,
ECF No. 265 at 2. The Probation Officer excluded Count One—the
CCE conviction—because 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) requires a mandatory
life sentence. Id. The Probation Officer grouped together Counts
Five, Eleven, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, and Eighteen under
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). Id. The Probation Officer calculated a base
offense level of 34.
The Probation Officer applied a two-level increase under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because a firearm or dangerous weapon was
possessed during the commission of the offenses, and a four-
level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for Mr. Edmond’s role
as the leader of an organization involving more than five
participants. Probation Mem., ECF No. 265 at 2-3. The Probation
Officer calculated a total offense level of 40. Id. at 3.
Mr. Edmond’s total offense level, combined with Criminal History
Category I, resulted in a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months
(i.e. 24.3 to 30.4 years) before the application of U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.1. Sentencing Comm’n Letter, ECF No. 262 at 2. “Regardless
of the foregoing, though, engaging in a [CCE] in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 848(b) is punishable by a mandatory life sentence.”
United States v. Millan, No. 91-CR-685 (LAP), 2020 WL 1674058,
58
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020).
Mr. Edmond objects to the two-level increase under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm or dangerous weapon on
two grounds: (1) he “has no such convictions”; and (2) “[i]t is
well settled that any fact which increases the mandatory minimum
is considered an ‘element’ of the crime and must be submitted to
the jury.” Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 15 n.3 (citing
United States v. Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)). Mr. Edmond’s
reliance on Alleyne is misplaced. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court
held that “any fact that . . . increases the mandatory minimum
is an element that must be submitted to the jury.” 570 U.S. at
103 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court
explained that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty
for a crime is an element that must be submitted to the jury and
found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Nothing of the kind is
present here.
The application of the two-level increase under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) does not increase Mr. Edmond’s penalty beyond the
statutory minimum or maximum, as Mr. Edmond already faces a
mandatory life sentence for his CCE conviction under 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(b). As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “Alleyne . . .
dealt with an increase to the statutory range—not increases to a
defendant’s range under the Sentencing Guidelines[.]” United
States v. Bell, 795 F.3d 88, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2015). At bottom,
59
the issue of whether the two-level increase is applicable here
does not change the fact that the starting point is Mr. Edmond’s
mandatory life sentence. Cf. Millan, 2020 WL 1674058, at *3.
The Court rejects Mr. Edmond’s argument that his mandatory
life sentence for his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) should
not be considered as a starting point and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (the
“Safety Valve”) abrogated his mandatory minimum sentence for two
reasons. See Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 188-89. First, the
original sentence is the starting point in the Rule 35(b)
context. Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1055. The government correctly notes
that “[t]he mandatory life sentence that was imposed on
[Mr. Edmond] is the proper benchmark from which the Court should
measure any sentence reduction – not an irrelevant Guidelines
range.” Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 263
at 3 n.3. And Mr. Edmond appears to concede this point. See
Joint Status Report, ECF No. 264 at 2 (Mr. Edmond’s Position:
“[T]he focal point of Mr. Edmond’s original sentence was the
mandatory life provision under § 848 ([CCE]).”).
Next, the government argues—and Mr. Edmond does not
dispute—that the “Safety Valve” under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 does not
apply here because of Mr. Edmond’s CCE conviction. Gov’t’s Post-
Hr’g Br., ECF No. 298 at 6; see generally Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br.,
ECF No. 300. To be eligible for the Safety Valve under Section
5C1.2 of the Guidelines, a court must find, inter alia, that the
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defendant “was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor
of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing
guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal
enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5C1.2(a)(4). Here, the Court cannot find that Mr. Edmond is
eligible for the Safety Valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 because of
Mr. Edmond’s CCE conviction.
Although Mr. Edmond faces a mandatory life sentence under
21 U.S.C. § 848(b), Mr. Edmond argues—and the government does
not dispute—that Rule 35(b) allows the Court to reduce his
sentence below the mandatory sentence. See Def.’s Am. Sentencing
Mem., ECF No. 260 at 4 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(4)); see
also Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 263 at
1-3.
d. The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing
Disparities
As to the sixth factor, the Court considers “the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). A reduction in Mr. Edmond’s sentence is
consistent with Section 3553(a)(6)’s requirement of treating
similarly situated defendants alike. See id. Mr. Edmond argues
that a reduction greater than the government’s recommendation is
justified after considering the sentences of other cooperating
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defendants. Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 260 at 5-7. To
support his position, Mr. Edmond relies on cases in which
defendants—specifically, Salvatore Gravano (“Mr. Gravano”) and
Alberto Martinez (“Mr. Martinez”)—offered substantial assistance
and the government recommended prison sentences of less than
forty years. Id. at 5-7.
The government contends that its recommendation in this
case would not create an unwarranted sentencing disparity.
Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 263 at 2.
The government advances two primary arguments. First, “[t]he
D.C. Circuit . . . has recognized that sentence reductions for
cooperation do not create unwarranted disparities.” Id. (citing
United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
Next, the government contends that “it is neither feasible nor
productive to attempt to compare [Mr. Edmond’s] cooperation to
that of others in different times and places” because
“cooperation by its very nature is fact specific.” Id. at 3.
The Court is not persuaded by the government’s arguments.
First, the government’s reliance on Hemphill and Bras is
misplaced because both cases are readily distinguishable from
this case. In Hemphill, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the
district court that the disparity was reasonable between the
defendant’s ten-year sentence and his co-conspirator’s five-year
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sentence because the co-conspirator “pled guilty and testified
against her co-conspirators.” 514 F.3d at 1364. In Bras, the
D.C. Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that there was a
disparity between his thirty-seven month sentence and his co-
conspirators’ probation sentences because: (1) his co-
conspirators were not comparators; and (2) the co-conspirators
“provided substantial assistance in the investigation of the
scheme, while [the defendant] did not.” 483 F.3d at 114.
Unlike the defendants in Hemphill and Bras, Mr. Edmond does
not attempt to compare his sentence to his co-defendants. See
Def.’s Am. Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 260 at 5-7. Contrary to the
government’s contention, Mr. Edmond does not ask the Court to
compare his cooperation with that of another defendant. See id.Rather, Mr. Edmond argues that Mr. Gravano and Mr. Martinez are
similarly situated defendants. Id.Mr. Edmond points out that Mr. Gravano was sentenced to
five years of imprisonment based on the government’s
recommendation after he admitted to several crimes, including
nineteen murders. Id. at 6. And “[u]pon information and belief,”
Mr. Edmond asserts that “the government recommended a thirty-
five year sentence for [Mr.] Martinez, the leader of a drug
enterprise that admitted to killing ten people.” Id. at 7.
Mr. Edmond notes that Najibullah Zazi (“Mr. Zazi”), a convicted
terrorist, received a ten-year sentence based on the
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government’s recommendation. Id. at 7 n.5. Mr. Edmond, however,
fails to provide the Court with the records or details of the
alleged comparators, such as their Sentencing Guidelines ranges.
Without such information, the Court cannot discern whether Mr.
Gravano, Mr. Martinez, and Mr. Zazi are appropriate comparators
within the meaning of Section 3553(a)(6).
Mindful of its obligation under Section 3553(a)(6) to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly
situated defendants, the Court requested that the Sentencing
Commission examine cases similar to Mr. Edmond’s case for
purposes of this Rule 35(b) proceeding. See generally Min. Order
of Oct. 7, 2019. The Sentencing Commission’s analysis was
threefold. First, the Sentencing Commission “examined cases with
identical guideline factors as that which applied in
Mr. Edmond’s case (but using the current guidelines manual) to
determine the sentence imposed in similar cases over the last
ten years.” Sentencing Comm’n Letter, ECF No. 262 at 1. Next,
the Sentencing Commission “examined offenders convicted under
each of the five statutes [applicable to Mr. Edmond] within the
last ten years where the guideline range in effect was life to
life to determine the sentenced imposed.” Id. Finally, the
Sentencing Commission “reviewed cases where a Rule 35(b) motion
was granted in the last five years and where the offender was
initially convicted under one of the five statutes [applicable
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to Mr. Edmond] and where the guideline range in effect at the
original sentencing was life to life.” Id. at 2. 9
The Sentencing Commission’s September 2019 results, in
pertinent part, are as follows:
For 21 U.S.C. § 848, 110 cases with at least
a CCE conviction and a guideline minimum of
life imprisonment were reported to the
Commission in the past ten years. The
defendants in twenty-eight of those cases
received a departure for substantial
assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The average
sentence imposed was 181 months (or fifteen
years), with sentences ranging from one day to
360 months (or thirty years). In the past five
years, six Rule 35(b) cases were reported to
the Commission. The average sentence imposed
in those Rule 35(b) cases was 185 months
(fifteen years and four months), with
sentences ranging from 72 months to 396 months
(i.e. six years to thirty years and two
months).
Id.
Having carefully considered the foregoing results, a
reduction of Mr. Edmond’s sentence greater than the government’s
9 Neither party objected to the Sentencing Commission’s analysis
with respect to the applicable Guidelines and statutes. See
Joint Status Report, ECF No. 264 at 1-2. The Court disregards
the Sentencing Commission’s analysis of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count
Two) because the D.C. Circuit vacated that conviction. See
Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1108, 1113. The Court agrees with Mr. Edmond
that the Sentencing Commission’s statement—that “Mr. Edmonds
[sic] was held responsible for several murders,” Sentencing
Comm’n Letter, ECF No. 262 at 2—is unsupported by the record.
See Joint Status Report, ECF No. 264 at 2 (“[T]here can be no
genuine dispute as to the lack of Mr. Edmond’s involvement in
murder.”). Accordingly, the murder guideline under U.S.S.G.
§ 2A1.1 is inapplicable here.
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recommendation is needed to “avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). On
average, Mr. Edmond’s sentence for the CCE conviction is out of
step with the sentences for CCE convictions and sentence
reductions in Rule 35(b) cases with CCE convictions. See
Sentencing Comm’n Letter, ECF No. 262 at 2.
* * *
As the Court articulated during the October 16, 2019 motion
hearing, the task of rendering a decision in this case is
extraordinarily difficult and challenging. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF
No. 273 at 3-4. In determining an appropriate sentence
reduction, the Court must balance the applicable Section 3553(a)
factors, which includes considering the nature and degree of
Mr. Edmond’s substantial assistance. And the Court must balance
the gravity of Mr. Edmond’s crimes.
On the one hand, Mr. Edmond’s crimes were exceptionally
grave. As the government points out, Mr. Edmond “conducted the
largest, most destructive drug organization that this city’s
ever seen.” Id. at 31. Mr. Edmond acknowledges that his criminal
conduct resulted in “devastation and destruction” in this
community. Def.’s Post-Hr’g Br., ECF No. 300 at 4. More than 500
residents of the District of Columbia responded to the Attorney
General’s solicitation for comment on the government’s motion to
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reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence, which is a testament to the
lasting impact his criminal conduct has had on this community.
See Amicus Br., ECF No. 246 at 4. The Court is well aware of the
lasting negative impact Mr. Edmond’s criminal conduct has had on
this community. The Court recognizes the pain and suffering of
the individuals affected by his criminal conduct.
On the other hand, Mr. Edmond has spent thirty-one years in
prison since the imposition of his sentence, and he has been
incarcerated for nearly thirty-two years since his initial
arrest. While incarcerated, Mr. Edmond cooperated with the
government. The government affirms that Mr. Edmond’s cooperation
“was important and wide and deep.” Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at
31. Indeed, the Court has found that Mr. Edmond provided
substantial assistance to the government and that the degree of
his assistance was exceptionally high. In addition to Mr.
Edmond’s expressed remorse for his actions, Mr. Edmond’s
decision to cooperate—and his lengthy period of cooperation—is
an expression of genuine remorse. Mr. Edmond clearly provided
above-average cooperation. Furthermore, his cooperation
demonstrates that the need to protect the public from future
crimes has lessened. The Sentencing Commission’s data indicates
that the average sentencing reduction for a defendant convicted
of a CCE offense is fifteen years. Based on the Court’s detailed
analysis of the applicable Section 3553(a) factors, as set forth
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above, Mr. Edmond’s individual circumstances have changed since
the date of sentencing. See Tadio, 663 F.3d at 1053. The Court
is persuaded that it is appropriate to reduce Mr. Edmond’s life
sentence.
After balancing the relevant Section 3553(a) factors, the
Court in its discretion finds that it is appropriate under the
facts and circumstances to reduce Mr. Edmond’s sentence and that
a sentence of twenty years of imprisonment is “sufficient, but
not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of
sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court also finds that a
life term of supervised release is necessary to fulfill the
postsentencing rehabilitation goals of supervised release. See
Pepper, 562 U.S. at 502 n.15; see also Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59.
3. Remaining Considerations
Finally, Mr. Edmond urges “the Court to consider the fact
that he has been confined under conditions that are
significantly more restrictive than other inmates.” Mot. Hr’g
Tr., ECF No. 273 at 34. Mr. Edmond notes that inmates with
similar restrictions face certain hardships due to restrictive
security measures. Def.’s Notice of Obj., ECF No. 270 at 1 n.1.
Citing information provided to the United States Senate’s
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Mr. Edmond points out that “a ‘protected
witness sentenced inmate, in terms of hardship of sentence,
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serves 3 days in equivalent for every 1 day of the general
population prisoner.’” Id. (quoting Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 270-1
at 3). The BOP Director testified before the Subcommittee and
confirmed that “imprisoned protected witnesses frequently have a
tougher time in prison than do inmates who ARE NOT COOPERATING
WITH THE AUTHORITIES.” Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 270-1 at 3. The
government does not deny that Mr. Edmond’s conditions of
confinement have been more restrictive than other inmates. Mot.
Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 187.
To recap, Mr. Edmond initially agreed to cooperate with
law enforcement in 1994. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 46-47,
58, 64, 70, 74. It is undisputed that Mr. Edmond’s cooperation
put his life and the lives of his family members at great risk
because: (1) his roommate was the “third largest cocaine
producing person in the world,” id. at 78; (2) his roommate’s
mother was the “Black [W]idow,” id. at 79; and (3) his fellow
inmates were Colombian drug dealers and leaders of the Medellín
Cartel, id. at 78, 82. After he decided to cooperate with the
government, Mr. Edmond’s movement was significantly more
restricted than other inmates. Id. at 147-148. Those
restrictions limited Mr. Edmond’s ability to communicate with
his family and the at-risk youth at the church. Id. at 148.
Mr. Edmond’s conditions of confinement were restricted up until
approximately 2018. Id.69
Mr. Edmond does not cite any authority that permits the
Court to take into consideration that his conditions were
significantly more restrictive than other inmates in the context
of a Rule 35(b) motion. In a different context, a sentencing
judge may consider a deportable non-U.S. citizen’s conditions of
confinement. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 650
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that district courts may “depart below
the range indicated by the Sentencing Guidelines where the
defendant, solely because he is a deportable alien, faces the
prospect of objectively more severe prison conditions than he
would otherwise”). Although the Court is sympathetic to the
restrictive nature of Mr. Edmond’s conditions of confinement
during his cooperation over the years and his request for the
Court to consider those conditions, Mr. Edmond fails to cite
authority to support his request.
The government argues that it would be inappropriate for
the Court to consider Mr. Edmond’s conditions, but the
government does not rely on case law in support of its position.
See Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 273 at 187. The government contends
that Mr. Edmond himself is to blame for the more restrictive
conditions of confinement based on his decision to cooperate
with the government. Id. The government asserts:
With respect to Mr. Edmond’s time in prison
being more difficult, we’re not quibbling with
the defense, but we [sic] just asking the
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Court to consider, that’s the product of what
-- the situation Mr. Edmond was in,
Mr. Edmond’s cooperation, so it’s not really
appropriate to say his time was more difficult
than others, when that was all a product of
his actions, his choices, and how he got here
today vis-à-vis cooperating.
Id.The government’s position is perplexing given that it is at
odds with the rationales for cooperation. Cooperation benefits
society at large by furthering law enforcement’s efforts to
investigate and prosecute criminals, and it encourages others to
do the same. See Torres Teyer, 2006 WL 3511885, at *8. The
government received the benefit of Mr. Edmond’s decades-long
cooperation. There is no dispute that the details of his
cooperation placed his life in jeopardy. But the government’s
position ignores the grave risk to Mr. Edmond’s life and the
lives of his family members associated with his weighty decision
to cooperate with the government. Although the Court does not
consider the post-sentencing conditions of confinement, the
Court did consider Mr. Edmond’s cooperation when evaluating the
first factor under Section 3553(a)(1).
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the
government’s Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to Rule
35(b)(2)(C). Mr. Edmond’s previously imposed sentence of
imprisonment is reduced to twenty years of imprisonment, and his
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previously imposed terms of supervised release are extended to a
life term of supervised release. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
February 23, 2021
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