Wall v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LUCAS WALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. Action No. 20-2075
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE (EGS/GMH)
INSURANCE CO., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Lucas Wall (“Mr. Wall”), proceeding pro se,
brings this lawsuit against Reliance Standard Life Insurance
Company (“Reliance”) and Dr. Tajuddin Jiva, M.D. (“Dr. Jiva”)
(collectively, “Defendants”), seeking damages following the
termination of his disability benefits. Second Am. Compl., ECF
No. 32; 1 Wall v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. CV 20-2075
(EGS), 2021 WL 2209405, at *12 (D.D.C. June 1, 2021). As
relevant here, Mr. Wall alleges one count of medical malpractice
against Dr. Jiva. See Wall, 2021 WL 2209405, at *12.
On February 1, 2022, the Court referred this case to a
magistrate judge for full case management, see Minute Order
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of
the filed documents.
1
(Feb. 1, 2022); and the case was randomly assigned to Magistrate
Judge G. Michael Harvey, see Docket Civ. Action No. 20-2075. Dr.
Jiva thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss
the count against him. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Mot. J.
Pleadings Dismiss Count VII of Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73. On
July 5, 2022, Magistrate Judge Harvey issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R. & R.”) recommending that the Court grant Dr.
Jiva’s motion. See R. & R., ECF No. 83.
Pending before the Court are Mr. Wall’s Objections to the
R. & R., see Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate’s R. & R. on Def. Tajuddin
Jiva’s Mot. J. Pleadings (“Pl.’s Objs.”), ECF No. 84; and Mr.
Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order,
see Pl.’s Mot. Vacate Part of Ct.’s June 1, 2021, Order &
Reinstate Counts II & IV of Second Am. Compl. Against Def.
Tajuddin Jiva (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 85. Upon careful
consideration of the R. & R., the objections, and opposition
thereto; the motion and opposition thereto; the applicable law;
and the entire record herein, the Court hereby ADOPTS Magistrate
Judge Harvey’s R. & R., see ECF No. 83; GRANTS Dr. Jiva’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, see ECF No. 73; and DENIES Mr.
Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order,
see ECF No. 85.
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II. Background
A. Factual
The background of this litigation was set forth in the
Court’s prior opinion and will not be repeated here. See Wall,
2021 WL 2209405, at *1. In short, Mr. Wall alleges that Reliance
underwrites and administers his long-term disability benefits
through a policy for the employees of the American Association
of State Highway & Transportation Officials, by whom he was
employed from June 2008 until March 2012. See Second Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 1-2. In March 2012, Mr. Wall became “Totally
Disabled” due to Non-24-Hour Sleep/Wake Disorder. Id. ¶ 1. He
received long-term disability benefits until January 29, 2020,
when Reliance notified him that it was terminating his benefits.
Id. ¶ 11.
On April 30, 2020, Mr. Wall appealed Reliance’s termination
decision. Id. ¶ 15. He alleges that Reliance then commissioned a
“peer review” by Dr. Jiva and that he submitted a rebuttal to
Dr. Jiva’s report. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Reliance denied his appeal on
July 29, 2020. Id. ¶ 20. Thereafter, Reliance had Mr. Wall
undergo an Independent Medical Examination, after which the
termination of his benefits was reversed. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
B. Procedural
On April 5, 2022, Dr. Jiva moved for judgment on the
pleadings. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Mot. J. Pleadings
3
Dismiss Count VII of Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73. Mr. Wall
filed a brief in opposition on April 24, 2022, see Pl.’s Opp’n
Def. Tajuddin Jiva’s Mot. J. Pleadings, ECF No. 75; and Dr. Jiva
filed his reply brief on May 2, 2022, see Def. Tajuddin Jiva,
M.D.’s Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. J. Pleadings Dismiss Count
VII, Pl.’s Medical Malpractice Claim, from Second Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 77. On July 5, 2022, Magistrate Judge Harvey issued his
R. & R. recommending that the Court grant Dr. Jiva’s motion. See
R. & R., ECF No. 83.
On July 19, 2022, Mr. Wall submitted Objections to the R. &
R. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84. Dr. Jiva filed an opposition
brief on August 2, 2022. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Resp.
Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s R. & R. (#83) on Def.’s Mot. J.
Pleadings (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 87.
Mr. Wall also filed a Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s
June 1, 2021 Order on July 20, 2022. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85.
Dr. Jiva filed his opposition on August 2, 2022. See Def.,
Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. (#85) Vacate Part of
Ct.’s June 1, 2021 Order (#26) (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 86.
The objections and the motion are now ripe and ready for
adjudication.
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III. Legal Standard
A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party
may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has
entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-(2).
A district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge.”). A district court “must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or general
objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the
Court reviews the [R. & R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v.
Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous
standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled to great
deference” and “is clearly erroneous only if on the entire
evidence the court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of Columbia,
No. CV 16-1920 (CKK), 2019 WL 4345712, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12,
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v.
Mukasey, 608 F. Supp. 2d 50, 52 (D.D.C. 2009)).
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Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the
proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made
and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections
which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the
magistrate judge are not ‘properly objected to’ and are
therefore not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 991
F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Astrue, No.
08-2133, 2009 WL 3541001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009)). The
Court reviews Mr. Wall’s objections de novo.
B. Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay
trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) is appropriately
granted when, at the close of the pleadings, “no material issue
of fact remains to be solved, and [the movant] is clearly
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Montanans for Multiple
Use v. Barbouletos, 542 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
When evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c), courts employ the same standard that governs a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med.
Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2004). A court must
treat the factual allegations in the complaint as true, “even if
6
doubtful in fact,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007); but it need not accept as true legal conclusions set
forth in a complaint, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Accordingly, a court must accept the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded factual allegations to the extent that “they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief,” id. at 679; and “may
thus only grant judgment on the pleadings if it appears, even
accepting as true all inferences from the complaint’s factual
allegations, that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts
entitling him to relief,” Lans v. Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg
LLP, 786 F. Supp. 2d 240, 265 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing In re United
Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F. Supp. 914,
915 (D.D.C. 1994)).
C. Motion to Vacate Order
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs Mr. Wall’s
Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order, ECF No.
85, because the Court has not entered a final judgment. Shapiro
v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. CV 13-555 (RDM), 2016 WL 3023980, at
*2 (D.D.C. May 25, 2016) (applying Rule 54(b) to a motion for
reconsideration “[b]ecause the Court ha[d] not entered final
judgment”). Under Rule 54(b), “the Court [may] revisit any order
that adjudicates ‘fewer than all the claims or rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . at any time
7
before’ the entry of final judgment.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b)).
The standard for determining whether or not to grant a Rule
54(b) motion is the “as justice requires” standard. Jud. Watch
v. Dep’t of Army, 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D.D.C. 2006). Under
this flexible standard, the Court considers “whether the court
patently misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the
adversarial issues presented, made an error in failing to
consider controlling decisions or data, or whether a controlling
or significant change in the law has occurred.” In Def. of
Animals v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 543 F. Supp. 2d 70, 75
(D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Montgomery v. Internal Revenue Serv., 356 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79
(D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 40 F.4th 702 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[T]here
must be some ‘good reason’ to reconsider an issue already
litigated by the parties and decided by the court, such as new
information, a misunderstanding, or a clear error.”).
The moving party has the burden of demonstrating “‘that
some harm, legal or at least tangible, would flow from a denial
of reconsideration.’” In Def. of Animals, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 76(quoting Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 540 (D.D.C.
2005)). “[E]ven if justice does not require reconsideration of
an interlocutory ruling, a decision to reconsider is nonetheless
within the court’s discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks
8
omitted). However, this discretion is “limited by the law of the
case doctrine and ‘subject to the caveat that where litigants
have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither
be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it
again.’” Id. (quoting Singh v. George Wash. Univ., 383 F. Supp.
2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005)).
D. Pro Se Litigants
“[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in
all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,
No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,
2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The
pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally
construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even
so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658
F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656
F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply
with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239;
Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2.
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III. Analysis
A. New York Law Governs Mr. Wall’s Medical Malpractice
Claim
Mr. Wall objects to Magistrate Judge Harvey’s conclusion
that New York substantive law should govern this dispute and
argues that District of Columbia substantive law should apply
instead. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 7-10. For the reasons
that follow, the Court concludes that New York law applies to
Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim and ADOPTS this portion of
Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R.
To resolve Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim against Dr.
Jiva, the Court first must determine whether New York or
District of Columbia law governs the dispute. 2 Magistrate Judge
Harvey resolved the dispute in favor of New York law on two
grounds: (1) New York law applies because the parties implicitly
agree that New York law applies, see R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 6-7;
and (2) New York law applies because New York has a greater
interest in applying its law to this dispute, see id. at 8-12.
Mr. Wall objects to both conclusions, see Pl.’s Objs., ECF No.
84 at 7-10; and the Court addresses each objection in turn.
2 As Magistrate Judge Harvey explained in the R. & R., New York
and District of Columbia law are the only options to resolve
this choice-of-law question. See R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 6 & n.4.
The medical malpractice claim involves Dr. Jiva, who is a
resident of New York, and Mr. Wall, who is a resident of the
District of Columbia. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 at 2.
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1. The Parties’ Agreement
Mr. Wall first argues that he did not agree—implicitly or
otherwise—that New York law governs this dispute. See id. at 7-
8. He contends that, as a pro se litigant, he did not waive or
forfeit any choice-of-law arguments because he “ha[s] no concept
of ‘choice of law’” and is “therefore entitled to deference in
raising these arguments now.” Id. at 7. For further support, he
points to his briefing on Dr. Jiva’s motion and reasons that his
reference to the law of other jurisdictions—including, for
example, Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, and
Virginia—confirms that he did not understand the choice-of-law
question. Id. at 7-8 (citing R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 7). Dr. Jiva
responds that Mr. Wall waived any argument that District of
Columbia law applies here because he did not raise that argument
in his Rule 12(c) opposition briefing. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 87
at 2 (citing Essroc Cement Corp. v. CTI/D.C., Inc., 740 F. Supp.
2d 131, 138-39 (D.D.C. 2010); Am. Civ. Constr., LLC v. Fort Myer
Constr. Corp., 296 F. Supp. 3d 198, 203-04 (D.D.C. 2018)). He
further argues that Mr. Wall’s ignorance of choice-of-law
principles is no excuse. See id.The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey’s analysis
and conclusion. In deciding a choice-of-law question, a court
may apply the law of the jurisdiction that the parties agree
11
governs the dispute. See Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d
591, 626 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (applying Delaware law where
parties agreed to apply Delaware law); Am. Civ. Constr., LLC,
296 F. Supp. 3d at 204 (applying District of Columbia law to
contract dispute where parties “appear[ed] to implicitly agree”
that District of Columbia law should govern). The parties’
agreement also serves as waiver of any objection to the court’s
application of that law. See Perry Cap. LLC, 864 F.3d at 626
n.24. Here, the parties—including Mr. Wall—have agreed that New
York law should govern the medical malpractice claim. Dr. Jiva
argued that New York law should apply in his Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. See Mem. in Supp. of Def. Tajuddin Jiva,
M.D.’s Mot. J. Pleadings Dismiss Count VII, Pl.’s Medical
Malpractice Claim, from Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73-1 at 4-6.
Mr. Wall accepted that New York law would govern this claim in
his opposition brief. See Pl.’s Opp’n Def. Tajuddin Jiva’s Mot.
J. Pleadings, ECF No. 75 at 3 (“There are four basic elements of
a compensable medical malpractice claim in New York.”); id. at 4
(“Dr. Jiva ignores that New York law defines medical misconduct
as including ‘Practicing the profession with gross negligence on
a particular occasion’ and ‘Practicing the profession with gross
incompetence.’” (quoting N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530)); id. at 8
(“There is no distinction in New York between malpractice
insurance available to doctors performing independent medical
12
exams than to those practicing medicine in more traditional
contexts.” (citing Bazakos v. Lewis, 911 N.E.2d 847 (N.Y.
2009))). Mr. Wall did not suggest that the law of any
jurisdiction other than New York should apply to this claim,
thereby conceding that New York law governs. See Buggs v.
Powell, 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.D.C. 2003) (“It is
understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an
opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain
arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those
arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”
(citing FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 2002))).
Mr. Wall’s status as a pro se plaintiff does not change the
Court’s conclusion. True, the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff
are “subject to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.’” Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 520). Nevertheless, the
Court cannot ignore the fact that Mr. Wall failed to address Dr.
Jiva’s specific argument that New York law applies to the
medical malpractice claim. See Boritz v. United States, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2010) (treating argument as conceded
where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to it despite
submitting an opposition brief). Nor can it avoid Mr. Wall’s
specific references to New York law. See supra. The Court is
13
therefore satisfied that Mr. Wall agreed that New York law
governs his medical malpractice claim.
2. Choice-of-Law Analysis
Mr. Wall also objects to Magistrate Judge Harvey’s choice-
of-law analysis. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 8-10. He
concedes, as he must, that Magistrate Judge Harvey relied on the
appropriate legal standard. Id. at 8-9. That is: a federal court
sitting in diversity must “apply the choice-of-law rules of the
jurisdiction in which they sit.” Ideal Elec. Sec. Co. v. Int’l
Fid. Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 143, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Lee v.
Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1278–79 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
District of Columbia law requires that the Court first determine
whether a “true conflict” exists between the laws of the
jurisdictions. See Margolis v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 818 F. Supp.
2d 91, 100 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Estate of Doe v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2011);
Sloan v. Urban Title Servs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132
(D.D.C. 2010); GEICO v. Fetisoff, 958 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir.
1992)). Where, as here, there is a true conflict, the Court
applies the District of Columbia’s “‘modified governmental
interests analysis which seeks to identify the jurisdiction with
the most significant relationship to the dispute.’” Id. (quoting
Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168, 180 (D.C.
2006)). Under this approach, the Court considers four factors:
14
(1) the place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile or place
of business of the parties, and (4) the place where the parties’
relationship is centered. See Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt,
P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. 2007) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145). “As a rule,
‘the state with the most significant relationship should also be
the state whose policy is advanced by application of [its]
law.’” Id. at 1118 (quoting Hercules & Co. Ltd. v. Shama Rest.
Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 41 n.18 (D.C. 1989)).
Mr. Wall objects to four points in the R. & R. See Pl.’s
Objs., ECF No. 84 at 8-10. First, he argues that Magistrate
Judge Harvey incorrectly determined that the first factor—the
place where the injury occurred—weighs in favor of New York. See
id. at 8. He contends that the injury occurred in the District
of Columbia because that is “where [he] reside[s] and was forced
to do without half [his] income after [his] long-term disability
benefits were revoked as a result of Dr. Jiva’s shoddy peer
review.” Id. Dr. Jiva does not specifically address this point
in his opposition briefing. See generally Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No.
87. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey
that this factor does not support either jurisdiction. See R. &
R., ECF No. 83 at 11-12. As the Court explained in its prior
Memorandum Opinion, Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim “is not
15
related to the denial of benefits, but rather alleges that Dr.
Jiva’s conduct breached the applicable standard of care.” Wall,
2021 WL 2209405, at *11. This point is essential: Mr. Wall’s
medical malpractice claim survived because it did not conflict
with the provisions or object of ERISA. See id. The claim did
not conflict with ERISA because it focused on an injury other
than the denial of benefits. See id. As such, the Court is
persuaded that the injury for this claim must have occurred when
Dr. Jiva transmitted his report to Reliance, not when Mr. Wall
was denied his benefits. See id. Because Dr. Jiva transmitted
his report from New York to Pennsylvania, New York does not have
a strong claim on this factor. Further, because the transmission
of the report did not involve the District of Columbia, the
District of Columbia does not have a claim on this factor
either. The Court therefore concludes that Magistrate Judge
Harvey correctly determined that the first factor does not
support application of the law of either jurisdiction.
Second, Mr. Wall contends that the second factor—the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred—favors application
of District of Columbia law. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 9-
10. Specifically, he argues that Dr. Jiva’s conduct “directly
led” to his injuries. Id. at 10. This argument is unpersuasive.
The inquiry is where Dr. Jiva’s conduct occurred. Because Dr.
Jiva acted in New York, this second factor points in favor of
16
New York law. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 ¶ 256 (stating
that Defendant Jiva “practices in New York”); Ex. 22, ECF No.
21-22 at 2 (stating that Dr. Jiva’s “[r]eport was written in New
York state”).
Third, Mr. Wall argues that the fourth factor—the place
where the parties’ relationship is centered—should weigh in
favor of District of Columbia law. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84
at 9. He does not explain this objection. See generally id.
Because the Court detects no error in the R. & R., the Court
agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that the parties’
relationship is centered in New York. See Houlahan, 979 F. Supp.
2d at 88 (“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or
general objections, . . . the Court reviews the [R. & R.] only
for clear error.”).
Fourth, Mr. Wall contends that the District of Columbia has
the stronger interest in having its law applied to this claim.
See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 9. He points to: (1) “the general
public policy interest of ensuring that D.C. residents receive
adequate medical care and are not injured by physicians who are
sworn to help people”; (2) the “special concern” that people
with disabilities “receive[] the disability benefits to which
[they are] entitled”; and (3) the financial harm the
jurisdiction suffers when people with disabilities who are
denied disability benefits become public charges. Id. Mr. Wall
17
has misconstrued the caselaw here. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has explained that
“‘[t]he state where the defendant’s conduct occurs has the
dominant interest in regulating it,’ . . . particularly so
where, as here, it is impossible meaningfully to separate the
injury from the tortious conduct, and where other factors—such
as the residence or place of business of the parties—do not
point in the opposite direction.” Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d
639, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Biscoe v. Arlington Cnty.,
738 F.2d 1352, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 146). Here, Dr. Jiva’s conduct occurred in
New York. Further, the fourth factor also weighs in favor of
application of New York law, and the first and third factors do
not favor application of the law of either jurisdiction. See
supra. Accordingly, New York has the stronger interest in having
its law applied to this medical malpractice claim. See also Drs.
Groover, Christie & Merritt, 917 A.2d at 1118 (“As a rule, ‘the
state with the most significant relationship should also be the
state whose policy is advanced by application of [its] law.’”
(quoting Hercules, 566 A.2d at 41 n.18)).
The Court therefore concludes that New York law governs Mr.
Wall’s medical malpractice claim and ADOPTS this portion of
Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R.
18
B. The Court Will Not Permit Mr. Wall to Pursue His
Previously Dismissed Negligence and Bad Faith Claims
Against Dr. Jiva
Mr. Wall asks the Court to “reinstate” his negligence and
bad faith claims against Dr. Jiva. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84
at 1-7; Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1-8. He admits “uncertainty as
to how the Court must achieve th[is] result,” Pl.’s Objs., ECF
No. 84 at 6; and provides two routes: (1) reject Magistrate
Judge Harvey’s recommendation that the Court grant Dr. Jiva’s
motion and instead convert the medical malpractice claim into a
negligence claim, see id. at 1-7; or (2) vacate the Court’s June
1, 2021 Order dismissing Counts II and IV of the Second Amended
Complaint and reinstate those claims against Dr. Jiva, see Pl.’s
Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1-8. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES
Mr. Wall’s motion.
1. Magistrate Judge Harvey Appropriately Considered
Only Mr. Wall’s Medical Malpractice Claim Against
Dr. Jiva
Mr. Wall first argues that, upon concluding that a
physician-patient relationship did not exist, Magistrate Judge
Harvey should have reinstated his negligence and bad faith
claims against Dr. Jiva instead of granting Dr. Jiva judgment on
the pleadings. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 1-7. He reasons
that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate because the
Second Amended Complaint contains material facts that Dr. Jiva
did not dispute. See id. at 2-3. He further contends that
19
Magistrate Judge Harvey erred by failing to consider whether the
medical malpractice claim could be converted into negligence and
bad faith claims given the caselaw in New York permitting the
latter two claims to proceed without the existence of a
physician-patient relationship. See id. at 3-6.
The Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Harvey
appropriately recommended that Dr. Jiva be granted judgment on
the pleadings. As explained supra, Magistrate Judge Harvey
correctly determined that there was no physician-patient
relationship between Mr. Wall and Dr. Jiva. The facts Mr. Wall
discusses in his Objections to the R. & R. go to the elements of
a medical malpractice claim. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 1-7.
But because “‘[l]iability for medical malpractice may not be
imposed in the absence of a physician-patient relationship,’”
Blau v. Benodin, 140 N.Y.S.3d 576, 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)
(quoting Thomas v. Hermoso, 973 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013)); Dr. Jiva did not need to establish anything else to
succeed in his motion.
The only appropriate action for the Court to take, then, is
to grant Dr. Jiva judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c). Magistrate Judge Harvey had no occasion to consider
taking any other action, including reinstating claims that this
Court previously dismissed, because Dr. Jiva’s motion was the
only motion before him. See Docket for Civ. Action No. 20-2075.
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Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Harvey’s
recommendation that the Court grant Dr. Jiva judgment on the
pleadings.
2. The Court Agrees with Its Prior Decision to
Dismiss Mr. Wall’s Negligence and Bad Faith
Claims Against Dr. Jiva
Mr. Wall has also filed a motion asking the Court to vacate
the part of its June 1, 2021 Order dismissing his negligence and
bad faith claims against Dr. Jiva. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85.
The Court construes the Motion to Vacate as a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 54(b). See Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of
Just., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 n.8 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that Rule
54(b) supplies the appropriate standard where a party asks the
court to alter or amend an interlocutory judgment). Rule 54(b)
provides that an order or decision which “adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties” is subject to revision “at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A Rule
54(b) motion for reconsideration should be granted “as justice
requires.” Cobell, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 539. What “justice
requires” depends on the circumstances. Id. For example, justice
may require revision of a prior opinion and order when the Court
“has patently misunderstood a party,” has made a decision
outside the scope of the issues presented by the parties, “has
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made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension,” or where
there has been a significant or controlling change in the law or
facts since the issue was submitted to the Court. Id. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has broad
discretion in ruling on a Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration.
Id.As a preliminary matter, Dr. Jiva argues that Mr. Wall’s
Motion to Vacate is untimely. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 86 at 3, 5-
6. He contends that “[t]here is significant undue delay [in Mr.
Wall’s] request, as the matter has been pending for almost two
years and Defendant Jiva’s Motion for Judgment has been pending
for approximately four (4) months.” Id. at 5 (citing Smith v.
Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126, 1135 (4th Cir. 1997); Molovinsky v.
Monterey Co-Op, Inc., 689 A.2d 531, 534 (D.C. 1996)). He also
compares this motion to a motion for leave to amend a complaint
after summary judgment has been granted and points to the
caselaw denying such motions to amend where, as here, “the
[p]laintiff has waited many years before seeking amendments or
summary judgment has already been granted.” Id. (citing Gillard
v. Gruenberg, 302 F. Supp. 3d 257, 273 (D.D.C. 2018)).
The Court declines to find Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate to
be untimely. The Federal Rules do not establish a deadline for
filing a Rule 54(b) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Court
finds no occasion to impose a deadline here. Dr. Jiva’s
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citations are unpersuasive: Smith involves a federal habeas
petition, Smith, 111 F.3d at 1128, 1135; and Molovinsky involves
state court rules on amending a complaint, Molovinsky, 689 A.2d
at 533-34 (discussing D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 15). This
motion is also unlike a motion for leave to amend a complaint;
Mr. Wall is instead asking the Court to revise its prior
Memorandum Opinion and Order so that he may pursue claims he has
already attempted to add to his complaint. See Second Am.
Compl., ECF 32. The Court therefore will proceed to the merits
of the motion.
Mr. Wall contends that the Court must allow him to pursue
his negligence and bad faith claims because it “is not in the
interest of justice” for him to be left without a remedy against
Dr. Jiva. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1. As to the negligence
claim, he first argues that “the Court did not offer any
analysis of the claim specifically against Dr. Jiva” and instead
determined that ERISA preempted the negligence claim against
Reliance. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 2 (citing Wall, 2021 WL
2209405, at *9). He reasons that, like his medical malpractice
claim, his negligence claim against Dr. Jiva does not “relate
to” an ERISA plan. Id. at 5 (citing Padeh v. Zagoria, 900 F.
Supp. 442, 445, 447 (S.D. Fla. 1995)). Mr. Wall has misread the
Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion. There, the Court specifically
considered his negligence claims against Reliance, Dr. Brodner,
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and Dr. Jiva. Wall, 2021 WL 2209405, at *9. The Court determined
that none of these claims would survive a motion to dismiss
because the claims “ask the Court to review the manner in which
the termination decision was made” and thus seek to “supplement[
] . . . the ERISA civil enforcement remedy.” Id. (quoting Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004)). The Court
agrees with its previous reasoning that the negligence claim
against Dr. Jiva is preempted. Because a preempted claim would
not survive a motion to dismiss, the Court correctly denied Mr.
Wall’s motion for leave to amend his complaint to add this
claim. See James Madison Ltd. By Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085,
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Courts may deny a motion to amend a
complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not
survive a motion to dismiss.” (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178 (1962))).
Mr. Wall further argues that the Court failed to consider:
New York caselaw permitting negligence claims when plaintiffs
cannot pursue medical malpractice claims, the allegations he has
made against Dr. Jiva, and the elements of a negligence claim.
See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 2-6. The Court does not need to
consider any of these arguments. A plaintiff may not maintain a
state-law claim where, as here, it is preempted by ERISA. See
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. 312, 319-20 (2016).
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The Court therefore DENIES Mr. Wall’s motion as to his
negligence claim.
As to the bad faith claim, Mr. Wall accuses the Court of
dismissing the claim without citing any authority or explaining
its reasoning. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 6. He contends that
he “state[d] [his] case for bad faith” in the Second Amended
Complaint and that he incorporated his bad faith claim from his
New York State Department of Health complaint into the Second
Amended Complaint. Id. at 5-6 (citing Second Am. Compl., ECF No.
32 ¶¶ 119, 176, 177-83). He also argues that the Rule 15(a)(2)
standard requires that the Court allow him to maintain this
claim. Id. at 8 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)).
Again, Mr. Wall has misread the Court’s prior Memorandum
Opinion. There, the Court explained: “As to his claims for ‘bad
faith’ against . . . Dr. Jiva, Mr. Wall has presented no
authority supporting a common law cause of action for ‘bad
faith’ under District of Columbia law based on the allegations
in the Amended Complaint, and the Court is aware of none.” Wall,
2021 WL 2209405, at *6. Having reviewed the Second Amended
Complaint and incorporated materials again, the Court agrees
with its prior analysis. In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr.
Wall discusses bad faith claims—but only against insurance
companies. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 119-174. He does not
provide any legal authority for his claim against Dr. Jiva, see
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id. ¶¶ 176-77; and the papers he incorporates do not supply that
authority either, see Ex. 22, ECF No. 21-22 at 24-25. By failing
to cite any legal authority, Mr. Wall failed to provide a theory
of liability and therefore failed to state a claim to relief.
See Young v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. CV 17-02428 (JDB), 2018 WL
3941948, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2018) (dismissal was warranted
where complaint did not include the specific causes of action
under which the plaintiffs were suing). Accordingly, the Court
DENIES Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate as to his bad faith claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS
Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R., see ECF No. 83; GRANTS Dr.
Jiva’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, see ECF No. 73; and
DENIES Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1,
2021 Order, see ECF No. 85. An appropriate Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 27, 2023
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