United States v. Deft. 3 ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Case No. 01-cr-253-RCL-3
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Vv.
MICHAEL WELLS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Michael Wells is currently serving a 25-year sentence after a jury found him
guilty of drug trafficking and firearms offenses stemming from his participation in an illegal drug
operation in Washington, D.C. After serving more than 18 years in prison, Wells moved to reduce
his sentence to time served based on Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”),
Pub. L. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194. Section 404 allows courts to impose a reduced sentence
“as if? the reduced crack cocaine penalties established by Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010, Pub. L, 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, had been in effect “at the time of the commission of
the offense, not at the time of the original sentencing,” Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct.
2389, 2402 (2022). The government agrees with Wells that he is eligible for relief under the First
Step Act and does not object to the Court exercising its discretion to reduce his sentence.
After considering the parties’ briefing, the applicable law, and the record therein, the Court
will GRANT Wells’s motion. His sentence will be reduced from 25 years to the approximately
20 years of time already served.
1 BACKGROUND
When he was 15 years old, Wells began participating in a narcotics conspiracy dubbed the
“Marco Polo Crack Distribution Ring.”! Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), ECF No. 732-
1, {1 8, 9. This organization sold crack cocaine in and around northeast Washington, D.C. from
1992 until 2000. Id. 9. Wells and Reginald Baugham, Wells’s brother and co-defendant, were
the ring’s principal suppliers. United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 171-72, 180 (D.C. Cir.
2006). In 2001, a grand jury indicted Wells on four counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute 50 grams
or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)Giii), and 846
(“Count 1”); (2) unlawful distribution of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) (ii) (“Count 7”); (3) unlawful distribution of 50 grams or
more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)Gii) (“Count 23”);
and (4) possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) (“Count 24”). Indictment, ECF No. 1.
In 2003, a jury acquitted Wells on Count 7 but found him guilty on Counts 1, 23, and 24.
See PSR J 7. The verdict form did not ask the jury to find the specific amount of crack cocaine
that Wells trafficked. Rather, it only required the jury to find that Wells either conspired to or in
fact distributed 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. See Verdict Form, ECF No. 371, at 4.
The Probation Office prepared a PSR. Probation determined that Wells’s drug offenses
involved approximately 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. PSR 37. At the time, 1.5 kilograms of
crack cocaine triggered the highest base offense level under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) for drug distribution. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual
1 The ring was named after Marco Polo Honesty, Jr., one of Wells’s co-defendants and alleged co-conspirator, who
“spearheaded” the enterprise. Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) | 8, ECF No. 732-1, 9. At trial, Honesty
was acquitted of all charges. See id. n.2; United States v. Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
2
(“U.S.S.G.”) ch. 2, § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2002). This conduct gave Wells a base
offense level of 38. Jd. With a 4-point enhancement for serving as “an organizer or leader of a
criminal activity involving five or more participants,” see id. ch. 3, pt. B, § 3B1.1(a), Wells’s total
offense level was 42. PSR 4] 37—42. This total offense level rendered a Guidelines range of 360
months to life imprisonment for his drug offenses. U.S.S.G. ch. 5 pt. A.
In addition to the Guidelines calculation, the sentencing judge, Judge Henry H. Kennedy,
considered the then-applicable statutory penalties. At the time, Wells’s convictions on Counts 1
and 23—-conspiracy to distribute and unlawful distribution of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine—
resulted in a minimum statutory penalty of 120 months and a maximum of life imprisonment. See
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). That said, Wells’s minimum potential sentence for Counts 1 and 23
was 240 months due to a prior D.C. Code conviction for possession with intent to distribute
cocaine.? See Def.’s Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 726, at 4. Additionally, his conviction on Count 24—
firearm possession during a drug trafficking crime—carried a mandatory 60-month sentence. See
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
At sentencing, Judge Kennedy adopted the findings in Wells’s PSR and the accompanying
Guidelines calculations. See Minute Entry (12/18/2003). On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed
Wells’s convictions but vacated his original sentence in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005), which held that the Guidelines are only advisory. See Baugham, 449 F.3d at 182-84.
At resentencing, Judge Kennedy sentenced Wells to 300 months’ imprisonment—240 months for
the conspiracy and distribution counts, to run concurrently, and 60 months for the firearm count,
to run consecutively to the drug offenses. See Resent’g Tr. 10:9-19, ECF No. 693; Am. J., ECF
2 Wells’s sentence on that charge was suspended and the prior conviction did not affect his criminal history category
under the Guidelines because it was related to the conspiracy charge. See Def.’s Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 726, at 4;
PSR 47.
No. 605. Because Wells had the prior D.C. Code conviction for distributing cocaine, the 240-
month sentence represented the mandatory minimum for his drug offenses. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2006) (requiring a 10-year minimum sentence for a violator with a “prior
conviction for a serious drug felony”).
Wells previously moved to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. ECF No.
687 [hereinafter “Def.’s Mot.”]. The Court denied this motion after determining that Wells was
ineligible for relief due to actual quantity of drugs for which he was responsible. See Mem. Op.,
ECF No. 712, at 3-7. Wells timely appealed his conviction. Notice, ECF No. 713. While his
appeal was pending, the Circuit decided United States v. White, holding that (1) eligibility under
the First Step Act turned on the quantity listed in the defendant’s statute of conviction, not the
actual quantity, and (2) a district court must consider the sentencing factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
when adjudicating a First Step Act motion. 984 F.3d 76, 86, 90-93 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The Circuit
thus remanded Wells’s case for further proceedings in light of White. Mandate, ECF No. 721.
While his First Step Act motion was pending at the Circuit, Wells moved in this Court for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), ECF No. 718, a motion he later
supplemented, ECF No. 727. After the Circuit issued the mandate remanding Wells’s First Step
Act motion, he filed a supplement to that motion. See Def.’s Suppl. Mot. In response to Wells’s
filings, the government did not oppose Wells’s First Step Act motion, see ECF No. 730 [hereinafter
“Gov't Resp.”], but did oppose his.compassionate-release motion, see ECF No. 731. Wells then
replied in support of both of his pending motions. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 734.
In 2022, the Court denied Wells’s motion for compassionate release, but reserved ruling
on his First Step Act motion pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion.? See Mem.
1 Wells timely appealed this Court’s decision on his compassionate-release motion. Notice, ECF No. 741. Briefing
in that appeal is due in March 2023. See United States v. Wells, No. 22-3009 (D.C. Cir.).
4
Op., ECF No. 738. At the same time, the Court corrected a prior clerical error and clarified that
Wells’s sentence includes a supervised release term of 10 total years. Order, ECF No. 739.
Wells submitted supplemental briefing in the wake of Concepcion and the Chief Judge
Beryl A. Howell’s decision in United States v. White, No. 93-ct-097, 2022 WL 3646614, *1
(D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2022). ECF Nos. 744 & 745. The Court then ordered the government to provide
supplemental briefing addressing whether the Concepcion and White decisions changed the
government’s original position with respect to Wells’s motion. Order, ECF No. 746. The
government responded that the decisions did not, and that the government still did not oppose a
sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act. See ECF No. 749 [hereafter “Gov't Suppl.
Resp.”]. Wells replied. ECF No. 750.
Wells has served more than 20 years in prison.* He will be eligible for home detention
starting in December 2023 and has a projected release date of June 2024, See Ex. | to Gov't Suppl.
Resp., ECF No. 749-2, at 1.
IL. LEGAL STANDARD
“For nearly 25 years, federal criminal law punished offenses involving crack cocaine far
more harshly than offenses involving powder cocaine.” United States v. Lawrence, ] F.4th 40, 42
(D.C. Cir. 2021). In 2010, “[a]fter two decades of criticism, Congress reduced, but did not
eliminate, the crack-to-powder disparity in the Fair Sentencing Act,” by “reduc[ing] the disparity
between cocaine base and powder cocaine from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1,” id. (internal citations
omitted). Specifically, Section 2 of the Act increased the threshold drug amounts required to
trigger mandatory minimum sentences for crack offenses. 124 Stat. al 2372 § 2. Before the Act,
possessing 50 grams of crack cocaine triggered a 10-year mandatory minimum. Jd. The Act
4 As of November 9, 2022, Wells had served 19 years, 11 months, and 30 days in prison. See Ex. 1 to Gov't Suppl.
Resp. (Bureau of Prisons Records), ECF No. 749-2, at 3.
5
increased that threshold to 280 grams. Id. Likewise, the 5-gram threshold that previously triggered
a 5-year mandatory minimum was increased to 28 grams. Jd. Those revisions initially did not
apply to defendants sentenced before August 3, 2010, the date of the Fair Sentencing Act’s
enactment. See United States v. Swangin, 726 F.3d 205, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Eight years later,
Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018. 132 Stat. at 5194. Section 404 of the Act, which
made retroactive the Fair Sentencing Act’s modifications, “allows district courts to consider
intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to
the First Step Act,” so long as they “explain their decisions and demonstrate that they considered
the parties’ arguments.” Concepcion, 142 8. Ct. at 2404.
In considering Wells’s motion, the Court follows the Circuit’s instruction in United States
v. White, 984 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020). See United States v. Palmer, 35 F.4th 841, 850 (D.C. Cir.
2022) (“White provides our Circuit’s framework to evaluate First Step Act motions”). The two-
step process for ruling on a First Step Act motion is the following:
First, under section 404(a), the court must determine whether a defendant is eligible
for telief—that is, whether the movant committed a “covered offense,” defined as
“a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were
modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ..., that was
committed before August 3, 2010.” First Step Act § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222....
Second, under section 404(b), a “court that imposed a sentence for a covered
offense may ... impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act... were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.”
First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. Put simply, once a defendant is
considered eligible, the district court exercises its “broad discretion” to decide
“whether it should reduce the sentence.” White, 984 F.3d at 88 (quoting United
States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also First Step Act
§ 404(c) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce
any sentence pursuant to this section.”), 132 Stat. at 5222.
Id.
Il. DISCUSSION
A. Wells Is Eligible for Resentencing Under the First Step Act
The parties agree that, in light of White, Wells is eligible for resentencing under the First
Step Act. Wells was sentenced to 20 years in prison for his convictions on Count 1, corispiracy to
distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and 846, and Count 23, unlawful distribution of 50 grams or more of crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)Gii). Before 2010, violations of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) & 846 involving 50 grams or more of cocaine base carried a mandatory
minimum sentence of 10 years in prison and possibility of life. See Terry v. United States, 141 S.
Ct. 1858, 1862 (2021). Section 2(a) of the Fair Sentencing Act increased the threshold quantity in
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) necessary to trigger certain mandatory minimum penalties. See 124 Stat.
at 2372. With the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act through the First Step Act, 280
grams—rather than 50 grams—of cocaine base became the quantity necessary to trigger a
mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ incarceration and a maximum life sentence. See id.
Similarly, “a person charged with the original elements of [21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)] subparagraph
(A)-—knowing or intentional possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack [like
Wells]” “is now subject to the more lenient prison range for subparagraph (B): 5-to-40 years.”
Terry, 141 S. Ct. at 1863.
Because Wells’s statute of conviction was modified by the First Step Act, and his offense
occurred prior to August 3, 2010, he committed a covered offense and is thus eligible for relief
under Section 404. See White, 984 F.3d at 86.
B. This Court Will Exercise Its Discretion to Reduce Wells’s Sentence
A “district court may consider all relevant factors when determining whether an eligible
defendant merits relief under the First Step Act.” Palmer, 35 F.4th at 851 (quoting White, 984
7
F.3d at 90). Some important factors to consider are “new statutory minimum or maximum.
penalties; current Guidelines; post-sentencing conduct; and other relevant information about a
defendant’s history and conduct,” to ensure that a sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to fulfill the purposes of [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” Jd. (quoting White, 984 F.3d at 90);
see also Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2396 (affirming that courts “may consider other intervening
changes of law (such as changes to the Sentencing Guidelines) or changes of facts (such as
behavior in prison) in adjudicating a First Step Act motion” and are “obligated to consider
nonfrivolous arguments presented by the parties” but are “not compel[led] .. . to exercise their
discretion to reduce any sentence based on those arguments”).
Wells requests a sentence reduction to time served. Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 3. The
government does not object to Wells’s request. Gov’t Resp. at 1. The government further contends
that a sentence of time served, which falls within the updated Guidelines range, is an appropriate
reduction and is “consistent both with the combined remedial purpose of the Fair Sentencing Act
and the First Step Act to treat past and current cocaine offenders in a more uniform way and the
[18 U.S.C.] Section 3553(a) factors, which aim to avoid sentencing disparities among like
offenders.” Jd. at 12.
The Court agrees with both parties that a sentence of time served is fitting based on an
analysis of the new statutory minimum and maximum penalties, current Guidelines, and the
relevant sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
1. New Statutory Minimum or Maximum Penalties
Were Wells to be sentenced today, he would face lower minimum and maximum statutory
penalties. The Fair Sentencing Act raised the threshold quantity required to trigger the same
minimum (10 years’ incarceration) and maximum (life imprisonment) penalties for Wells’s statute
of conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). In Wells’s case, the jury made no findings on
quantity, but found him guilty of Count 1, conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine
base, and Count 23, possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base. If Wells
were convicted of the same drug charges involving that quantity today, he would face a minimum
of 5 years and a maximum of 40 years in prison.’ The decreased statutory penalties weigh in favor
of a sentence reduction.
2. Current Sentencing Guidelines Range
Similarly, if Wells were sentenced today, he would face a lower recommended sentence
under the Guidelines. Because the conspiracy involved 1.5 kilograms, as determined by the PSR,
Wells’s current base offense level would be 32. U.S.S.G., ch. 2, § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n
2021). With the 4-level enhancement for being a leader of a 5-member conspiracy, his total offense
level would be 36. See id. ch. 3, pt. B, § 3B1.1(a). Wells’s mandatory 5-year sentence for his
firearms conviction on Count 24 remains unchanged. Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 13. Thus, under the
current Guidelines, with a criminal history of I, Wells’s recommended Guidelines sentence would
be 248 to 295 months. See Def.’s Mot. at 9; U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. At the time of Wells’s
resentencing, the minimum Guidelines sentence he could have received—and did receive—was
300 months. That sentence exceeds even the high end of the Guidelines range today. Accounting
for good time credit, Wells has already served more than the bottom range of the updated
Guidelines sentence. See Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 15-16; Gov’t Resp. at 11. This factor militates
strongly in favor of a sentence reduction.
5 The parties debate about whether and to what extent the Court should consider Wells’s prior D.C. Code conviction,
resulting in the mandatory 10-year enhancement to his minimum sentence, in the First Step Act analysis. See Def."s
Suppl. Mot. at 13-15; Gov't Resp. at 12. The Court need not resolve this debate because “[t]he government notes,
and the defendant concedes, that subsequent changes to [the relevant statute governing the enhancement] are not
retroactive.” Gov't Resp. at 12 n.3.
3. Remaining 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors
The Court will next address the relevant Section 3553(a) factors, including the nature and
circumstances of the offense, Wells’s history and characteristics, Wells’s post-sentencing conduct,
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need for the sentence imposed. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2), (6). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, in conducting a Section
3553(a) analysis, “a district court is [not] required to articulate anything more than a brief statement
of reasons,” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404, and the First Step Act does not “require a district
court to make a point-by-point rebuttal of the parties’ arguments,” id. at 2405. See Palmer, 35
F.4th at 853 (“[T]here is no requirement that sentencing courts expressly list or discuss every
Section 3553(a) factor”) (citing United States v. Knight, 824 F.3d 1105, 1110 (D.C. Cir, 2016)).
a. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense
There is no doubt that Wells’s offense was serious. Evidence at trial, in the form of
multiple witnesses and recorded conversations, described Wells’s extensive involvement in the
Marco Polo Crack Distribution Ring.® PSR J 16, 21. Wells and Baugham sold and re-sold crack
cocaine in furtherance of the conspiracy multiple times per week over a nearly 10-year period. See
id. 10-11. Not only did Wells buy and sell crack cocaine himself, he managed other dealers. Id.
q 11. And Wells carried multiple firearms while engaging in his criminal activities. fd. & n.3.
Consistent with the Circuit’s instruction that this Court “may consider both judge-found
and jury-found drug quantities as part of its exercise of discretion” under the First Step Act, this
Court will consider the quantity involved in Wells’s offense. White, 984 F.3d at 88. As previously
discussed, the PSR determined, and the sentencing judge considered, that Wells was responsible
6 That said, the Circuit noted that the government’s proof that Wells conspired with 5 or more persons was
“exiguous at best.” Baugham, 449 F.3d at 174. Yet, the Circuit affirmed the conviction after harmless error
analysis. fd. at 171—74.
10
for approximately 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine.’ That quantity, combined with the leader
enhancement and consecutive firearms sentence, results in a minimum recommended sentence of
20 years’ incarceration under the current Guidelines—an amount that he has already served.
Despite the gravity of Wells’s conduct, which could lead to a sentence greater than 20
years, the Court is nevertheless convinced that a sentence closer to the minimum when calculated
under the current Guidelines, and therefore a reduction, is appropriate here. After the Circuit’s
Booker remand, Judge Kennedy, who presided over Wells’s trial, sentenced Wells in line with the
minimum of the then-applicable Guidelines. Thus, reducing Wells’s sentence to the minimum of
the current Guidelines would maintain consistency with Judge Kennedy’s sentence.
b. History and Characteristics of the Defendant
Wells argues that his young age at the time of the offense is a strong factor weighing in
favor of a sentence reduction. See Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 16-19. The government contends that
Wells’s managerial role in the conspiracy negates any argument that his youth at the time of the
offense is a mitigating factor. See Gov’t Resp. at 12. The Court previously determined Wells’s
age at the time of his involvement in the instant offense—15 years old at the conspiracy’s
beginning and 23 at its conclusion—id not entitle him to compassionate release. Mem. Op., ECF
No. 738, at 6-7. However, determining what is an extraordinary or compelling reason warranting
compassionate release and determining what is a suitable sentence under the Section 3553(a)
factors are entirely different inquiries. Sentencing judges routinely consider a host of
characteristics that are not at all extraordinary—including age—when imposing a sentence in the
first instance. See United States v. Hicks, Crim. No. 93-97-2 (BAH), 2021 WL 1634692, at *9
7 This figure appears to be based in part on testimony from (a) Earl Nelson, a fellow dealer and cooperating witness,
that Wells sold him “ounces” of crack cocaine 2 or 3 times a week for an approximately 9-year period, and {b) Perry
Nelson, another dealer and cooperator, who said that Wells once sold him 62 grams of crack cocaine. See i i. at 173;
PSR FJ 19-39.
11
(D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2021). There is no reason the same should not be true for purposes of a First
Step Act motion.
Though Wells was not a minor by the end of the conspiracy, the Court considers Wells’s
young age when he joined the conspiracy, and his personal growth since then, to be an important
factor weighing in favor of a sentence reduction. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s insistence that “youth matters in sentencing,” Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1314
(2021), and that district courts should consider the “hallmark features” of youth, including factors
such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences” as well as the
“possibility of rehabilitation.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-78 (2012). The Court does
not share the government’s view that Wells’s age and role in the conspiracy operate in a zero-sum
environment; both are relevant factors in determining the appropriateness of a sentence reduction.
Moreover, after careful consideration of his post-sentencing conduct, discussed infra Part 3(c), the
Court is confident that Wells is a different person today than he was when he committed his crimes.
Indeed, it seems that the first shock to Wells’s system came upon his arrest for this very
crime. After his arrest, Wells was released for placement in halfway house program. PSR 76.
With supervision and structured conditions, he complied with all of the program’s requirements
and was released to home confinement with electronic monitoring prior to trial. Jd. Wells was
only remanded to the Bureau of Prisons’ custody after the jury rendered a guilty verdict. Jd.
Wells’s successful completion of this pre-trial program indicates to the Court that Wells began
developing an appreciation for risks and consequences as well as a process of rehabilitation prior
to sentencing. That growth, combined with his conduct while incarcerated, is sufficient to afford
him a sentencing reduction.
12
c. Defendant's Post-Sentencing Conduct
As the Supreme Court has instructed, “in deciding whether to grant First Step Act motions
and in deciding how much to reduce sentences,” district courts may “look[ ] to postsentencing
evidence of violence or prison infractions as probative.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2403; see also
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 491 (2011) (“[E]vidence of postsentencing rehabilitation
may be highly relevant to several of the § 3553(a) factors that Congress has expressly instructed
district courts to consider at sentencing.”). Judges in this District have given post-sentencing
conduct “substantial weight.” See White, 2022 WL 3646614, at *22. In evaluating a defendant’s
post-sentencing conduct, the Court considers the defendant as he appears today, “not on the date
of his offense or the date of his conviction.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2396.
Like his behavior following his arrest, Wells has demonstrated substantial evidence of
rehabilitation through consistent work history and prison programming. Wells worked as a
maintenance mechanic and is currently employed in food service. See Def.’s Mot. at 12; Ex. 1 to
Def.’s Suppl. Mot. (Bureau of Prisons Records), ECF, No. 726-2. In addition to his work
responsibilities, he has engaged in “over 550 hours of classes and programs.” Def.’s Suppl. Mot.
at 20. Notably, Wells obtained his GED, prepared to obtain his commercial driver’s license, and
built skills in areas such as business management, customer service, and compu. See Ex. 1 to
Def.’s Suppl. Mot. Wells’s diligence in his studies has positioned him to secure employment post-
release. In fact, after closely following the news of the nationwide shortage of commercial truck
drivers, Wells plans to obtain his commercial driver’s license and secure a position in the trucking
industry.® See Def.’s 2d Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 737, at 1; Ex. 3 to Def’s 2d Suppl. Mot., ECF No.
8 In Wells’s first supplemental First Step Act briefing, he included a letter of intent from Akia Atkins, the owner of
National Communications Services, LLC, who represented that she “offered Mr. Michael Wells a full time position
with benefits to work for my company as a Data Technician upon his release.” See Ex. 2 to Def.’s Suppl. Mot.
13
737-1, at 2-19. Wells states that he is “ready and willing to work hard and help our great nation
by working in a sector that is in dire need.” Ex. 3 to Def.’s 2d Suppl. Mot. at 1. The Court would
sometimes consider such a statement skeptically, but given Wells’s aforementioned activities, this
appears to be a genuine commitment to working in a vital industry for this nation.
Wells expresses evidence of his rehabilitation in his own words. Ina letter to the Court,
he states that he is “remorseful for [his] actions of the past and ha[s] spen{t] this time incarcerated
preparing to be a role model to the people within [his] community.” Ex. 3 to Def.’s 2d Suppl. Mot.
at 1. He notes that “[t]hrough [his] experiences[,] [he] can reach out to others in similar situations
and lead them away from that [criminal] path and into a positive lifestyle.” Id. He believes that a
sentence reduction would “allow [him] the opportunity to step up and make up for [his] past
errors.” Jd. Finally, he insists that he is “not a danger to any person, or the community” and that
he “will obey all local, State, and Federal laws, as well as the supervised release conditions.” Jd.
The Court has also reviewed the thoughtful letters from Wells’s sister, aunt, three
children, and friend illustrating the Wells’s positive ties to his family and community. Wells’s
sister speaks of his remorse for his actions and his changed character. ECF No. 723. His aunt
describes how Wells’s incarceration meant that he was unable to be with his family to moum the
loss of his parents, who died just months apart in 2016. See Ex. 2 to Def.’s Suppl. Mot. (Letters
of Support), ECF No. 726-3, at 5. His children have lacked the opportunity to spend time with
him outside of prison, and they hope that a sentence reduction would enable him to build
relationships with grandchildren that he has never met. See id. at 2-4. And a proprietor in the
music and television business describes his close bond with Wells as a “sounding board, as an
adviser, and as a friend.” See id. at 6. These letters demonstrate the personal connections Wells
(Letters of Support), ECF No. 726-3, at 7. Based on his more recent supplemental filing, it appears that Wells
instead intends to pursue work in the commercial trucking industry.
14
fostered while incarcerated and the existence of a network to support him upon release. It is
noteworthy that he has worked to maintain these connections and the Court considers these sorts
of ties positively.
The only real point of disagreement between the parties regarding Wells’s post-
sentencing conduct is how to view a disciplinary incident from last year that resulted in charges
of possessing a cellphone and disruptive conduct. See Ex. 1 to Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 12-13; Ex.
3 to Gov’t Suppl. Resp., ECF No. 749-3. These charges fall within the category of the Bureau of
Prisons? most serious offenses. See Ex. 3 to Gov’t Suppl. Resp. The rest of Wells’s disciplinary
history includes the following charges, all of which were categorized by the Bureau of Prisons as
low or moderate severity: being in an unauthorized area (in 2016), refusing to obey an order (in
2016), possession of contraband (in 2006), and using another inmate’s identification number to
place a telephone call (in 2006).° See Ex. 1 to Gov’t Suppl. Resp., ECF No. 749-1.
Though the government concedes that the newest infractions do not change government’s
position that it does not oppose a sentence reduction for Wells, see Gov’t Suppl. Resp. at 1, the
government spills much ink describing how a cellphone poses a special danger in the prison
context as a “hazardous tool” to coordinate escapes, introduce contraband, assault other inmates,
obfuscate investigations, and other carry out nefarious purposes. See id. at 9-12.
It is troubling that Wells committed his most serious infractions while his First Step Act
motion was pending before this Court. And the Court is mindful of the particular perils that
inmate cellphone possession creates. However, the Court is confident that Wells’s largely clean
disciplinary record over more than 20 years is more demonstrative of his changed character than
9 A previous version of Wells’s disciplinary record included an additional infraction—using another inmate’s
identification number (in 2020)—but he successfully appealed the charge and it was later removed from his
disciplinary record. See Ex. 1 to Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 12-13; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 734, at 8.
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a single incident. The Court would perhaps feel otherwise if the Bureau of Prisons considered
Wells to be a particular danger. However, at this point, he is housed in a low eae facility
with a custody classification of “minimum.” See Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 21; Ex. 1 to Def.’s Suppl.
Mot. at 11. According to the Bureau of Prisons, “minimum” is the lowest security classification
in the system. See About Our Facilities, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/federal_prisons.jsp (last visited Jan. 31, 2023). The Bureau
describes “minimum security institutions” as having “a relatively low staff-to-inmate ratio” and
“limited or no perimeter fencing.” Jd. The Bureau of Prisons’ designation suggests that the
Court’s overall intuition about Wells’s conduct is accurate—that the past 20 years has led to
personal growth and made him a diminished danger to the community, which are some of the
primary purposes of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) inquiry.
The letters submitted to the Court by Wells, his family, and his friends demonstrate his
remorse for his actions, his desire to maintain meaningful relationships, and his goal to build
positive change in his community. Wells’s work and programming history while in prison
shows a strong work ethic, and Wells has positioned himself well to obtain employment upon
release. His largely unblemished disciplinary record over more than two decades in prison
illustrates his respect for rules. Thus, the Court finds that, on balance, Wells’s post-sentencing
conduct suggests that he would contribute constructively to his community if released. The
government’s overall view that Wells merits a sentence reduction helps to further convince this
Court that his character has changed over these last two decades.
d. Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentence Disparities
Reducing Wells’s sentence would maintain consistency with other defendants who
received sentence reductions pursuant to the First Step Act in this District. Antone White, Eric
Hicks, Kevin Williams-Davis, McKinley Board, and Gary Wyche were all originally sentenced to
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life imprisonment for participating in illegal drug distribution rings in Washington, D.C. See
White, 2022 WL 3646614, at *4-5; Mot. to Reduce Sentence, United States v. Williams-Davis,
No. 91-cr-559-1 (TFH), ECF No. 2365, at 13-14; Mot. to Reduce Sentence, United States v.
Board, No. 91-cr-559-11 (TFH), ECF No. 2331, at 8-9; United States v. Wyche, Case No. 89-cr-
36-RCL-S, 2023 WL 130825, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2023). Those operations trafficked tens or
hundreds of kilograms of illegal drugs. See White, 2022 WL 3646614, at *4—5; Sent’g Tr. 8:1-6
(Mar. 10, 1994), Board, ECF No. 1493; Wyche, 741 F.3d at 1288-89. Most engaged in violent
activity, including murder. See White, 2022 WL 3646614, at *13-14; Mot., Williams-Davis, at
13-14. Yet, consistent with the text and purpose of the First Step Act, as well as a consideration
of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the sentences of all four defendants were reduced.
Chief Judge Howell reduced White’s and Hicks’s original life sentences to 35 and 33 years,
respectively. See White, 2022 WL 3646614, at *12-14. Judge Thomas F. Hogan reduced
Williams-Davis’s and Board’s original life sentences to approximately 30 years and 28 years,
respectively. See Order, Williams-Davis, ECF No. 2376; Order, Board, ECF No. 2344. And the
undersigned reduced Wyche’s life sentence to 28 years. Wyche, 2023 WL 130825, at *1.
Wells’s case presents even more compelling factors weighing in favor of a sentence
reduction. Most importantly, Wells’s criminal history differs significantly from the
aforementioned defendants. Wells trafficked in far smaller quantities of illegal drugs than those
defendants. Though Wells used firearms to carry out his criminal activity, he was never implicated
in violent activities on the order of White, Hicks, Williams-Davis, or Board. Moreover, those
defendants—and White in particular—had troubling post-sentencing disciplinary histories. See
Gov’t Suppl. Resp. at 8. As discussed above, Wells was cited for a handful of infractions over the
course of more than 20 years, the majority of which were classified as low severity. White, on the
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other hand, engaged in 29 disciplinary infractions, nearly a third of which involved weapons,
violence, or threats to commit violence. See White, 2022 WL 3646614, at *19.
Based on these considerations, reducing Wells’s sentence to time served maintains
consistency with other similarly-situated defendants.
e. Need for the Sentence Imposed
The Supreme Court describes “the four identified purposes of sentencing” as “just
punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation.” Dean v. United States, 581
U.S. 62, 67 (2017) (internal citation omitted). This Court is satisfied that those purposes may still
be served with a reduced sentence. The more than two decades Wells has spent incarcerated and
separated from the outside world, including his children, grandchildren, family, and friends,
appears to be adequate punishment for Wells as well as deterrence both to him and others. The
Bureau of Prisons categorizes Wells as low risk, indicating that his release would present a minimal
danger to the community. Finally, Wells demonstrates substantial rehabilitation through his own
words and actions. Therefore, the Court concludes that a sentence of time served is “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary” to achieve the aims of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
kkk
“Nothing in the text and structure of the First Step Act expressly, or even implicitly,
overcomes the established tradition of district courts’ sentencing discretion.” Concepcion, 142 S.
Ct. at 2401. This Court, using its discretion, concludes that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing
factors demonstrate the appropriateness of a sentence reduction for Wells. The sentence reduction
requested by Wells is modest, and the various sentencing factors lead this Court to conclude that
he has made great strides in reforming himself into a productive and beneficial member of society.
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put on home detention at the end of the year and released shortly thereafter, is a proper and just
conclusion for his case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wells is eligible for a reduced sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act and this
Court will exercise its discretion to reduce Wells’s sentence. His motion is accordingly
GRANTED. A separate and corisistent Order shall issue this date.
SIGNED this “49 day of February, 2023.
“Kapa putes
Royce C. Lamberth
United States District Judge
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