Duran v. U.S. Congress ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                        FILED
    11/30/2020
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                         Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA                         Court for the District of Columbia
    DAVID DURAN,                                   )
    )
    Plaintiff,                      )
    )               Civil Action No. 20-2548 (UNA)
    )
    )
    U.S. CONGRESS et al.,                          )
    )
    Defendants.                    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter, brought pro se by a Texas state prisoner, is before the Court on initial
    review of plaintiff’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following
    reasons, the in forma pauperis motion will be granted and this case will be dismissed.
    A district court must immediately dismiss a prisoner’s complaint upon determining that
    it, among other enumerated grounds, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28
    U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff purports to sue the United States Congress and presumably the Texas
    Legislature under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging “that U.S. Congress acted under color of state law
    to deprive final convicted felons of right or privilege . . . to vote for a President of United States
    in November 2020.” Compl. at 4. He requests the right to vote in the 2020 presidential election
    “by proxy.”
    Id. Mootness aside, the
    U.S. Supreme Court has “held that a state has the power to
    disenfranchise persons convicted of a felony” without running afoul of the Fourteenth
    Amendment, Shepherd v. Trevino, 
    575 F.2d 1110
    , 1112 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing In Richardson v.
    Ramirez, 
    418 U.S. 24
    (1974)), and the “Texas Constitution disenfranchises all persons convicted
    1
    of a felony ‘subject to such exceptions as the Legislature may make,’ ”
    id. at 1111
    (quoting
    Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Const. art. VI, s 1). Specifically the “Texas system of disenfranchising and
    reenfranchising convicted felons gives the state courts the power to set aside [ ] convictions and
    to restore the civil rights of successful state probationers.”
    Id. at 1115;
    see Jones v. Governor of
    Fla., 
    950 F.3d 795
    , 823–24 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining that Texas law creates “a mechanism
    whereby persons convicted of a felony in Texas courts could, after the satisfactory fulfillment of
    and expiration of probation, return to the court of conviction and invoke the court’s discretionary
    authority to set aside the conviction and re-enfranchise the offender”). Because Plaintiff remains
    incarcerated, he cannot plausibly state a claim to relief. Consequently, this case will be
    dismissed with prejudice. See Firestone v. Firestone, 
    76 F.3d 1205
    , 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (A
    dismissal with prejudice is warranted upon determining “that ‘the allegation of other facts
    consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’”) (quoting
    Jarrell v. United States Postal Serv., 
    753 F.2d 1088
    , 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (other citation
    omitted)). A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    _________/s/_______________
    KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
    Date: November 30, 2020                         United States District Judge
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2020-2548

Judges: Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson

Filed Date: 11/30/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/30/2020