United States v. Puma ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Criminal No. 21-0454 (PLF)
ANTHONY PUMA,
Defendant.
)
OPINION
The Press Coalition filed an Application for Access to Video Exhibits (“App.”)
[Dkt. No. 57], seeking access to the videos provided by the government in advance of sentencing
in United States vy. Puma, Criminal No. 21-0454. See App.! The Court granted this motion on
March 19, 2023, and issues this opinion to explain the basis for its decision. See Order [Dkt.
No. 64]
; The Press Coalition is composed of the following media organizations: Cable
News Network, Inc., ABC News, The Associated Press, BuzzFeed News, CBS News, The Wall
Street Journal, The E.W. Scripps Company, Gannett Co., Inc., Gray Media Group, Inc., The Los
Angeles Times, National Public Radio, Inc., NBC News, The New York Times Company, Pro
Publica, Inc., Tegna, Inc., and The Washington Post. See App. at 1.
2 The Court has reviewed the following documents: Government’s Sentencing
Memorandum (“Gov’t Sent’g Mem.”) [Dkt. No. 55]; Government’s Notice of Filing of Exhibits
Pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 49 (“Notice”) [Dkt. No. 5 6]; Video Application for Access to
Video Exhibits (“App.”) [Dkt. No. 57]; Defense Opposition to Application for Access to Video
Exhibits (“Def. Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 59]; Reply Memorandum in Further Support of the Press
Coalition’s Application for Access to Video Exhibits (“Reply”) [Dkt. No. 60]; and Standing
Order 21-28, In re Media Access to Video Exhibits in Pretrial Hearings During the COVID-19
Pandemic (May 14, 2021) (“Standing Order 21-28”).
I. BACKGROUND
The charges against Mr. Puma relate to the events at the U.S. Capitol on
January 6, 2021, which are summarized in the Court’s opinion in United States v. Puma, 596 F.
Supp. 3d 90, 93-94 (D.D.C. 2022). This factual summary is “for background purposes only,”
and these facts “do not inform the Court’s analysis” of the Press Coalition’s application. See
United States v. Montgomery, 578 F. Supp. 3d 54, 59 n.1 (D.D.C. 2021).
On August 30, 2022, Mr. Puma entered a guilty plea to Count One of the
Indictment, Obstruction of an Official Proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). See
Plea Agreement [Dkt. No. 47]. In anticipation of sentencing, the government submitted several
video exhibits depicting Mr. Puma’s conduct on January 6, 2021. See Notice. The Court held a
sentencing hearing and sentenced Mr. Puma on March 21, 2023.
On February 9, 2023, the Press Coalition filed the present application requesting
access to these video exhibits. See App. The Press Coalition relies on the memorandum opinion
and standing order issued by then-Chief Judge Bery! Howell in In re: Press and Public Access to
Video Exhibits in the Capitol Riot Cases (“In re Public Access in Capitol Cases”), Misc. Action
No. 21-0046, 2021 WL 1946378 (D.D.C. May 14, 2021). Chief Judge Howell issued Standing
Order 21-46 after several media organizations sought implementation of “‘a uniform method of
prompt access to all judicial records,’ including video evidence, in cases arising from the violent
breach of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” Id. at *1. After soliciting briefing from
the United States Attorney and the Federal Public Defender, Chief Judge Howell declined to
institute a blanket policy allowing press unfettered access to video exhibits, instead opting for a
case-by-case analysis of press requests to be conducted by the presiding judge in each case. Id.
at *4-5, *7.
The Standing Order provides several methods by which members of the press can
access “pretrial proceedings in Capitol Cases, and video exhibits used therein that are not under
seal.” Standing Order 21-28 at 4. Members of the media can tune into proceedings via phone;
request access to live-stream video of certain proceedings; attend proceedings in-person; and
access video exhibits upon application to the court. Id. at 4-5. If a court orders that the press be
given access to certain video exhibits, the U.S. Attorney’s Office will make those videos
available through a digital drop box. Id. at 5. The Standing Order expressly provides that “[n]o
recording, copying, downloading, retransmitting or further broadcasting of video exhibits in a
particular case is permitted, unless such permission is granted by the presiding judge.” Id.
In this case, the Press Coalition requested that the government make available its
video exhibits via electronic drop box, consistent with the Standing Order. App. at 3. The Press
Coalition also requested that the Court grant its affiliate media organizations permission to
record, copy, download, retransmit, and otherwise publish the videos. Id. The United States has
indicated that “these exhibits should be promptly released to the public.” Notice at 2. Mr. Puma
opposed the Press Coalition’s request, arguing that disclosure of these videos would negatively
affect Mr. Puma’s “livelihood, and ability to be gainfully employed.” See Def. Opp. at 2.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts have routinely recognized “‘a general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents,” although this right is “not absolute.” Nixon v. Warner Comms..,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978). There is generally a presumption “in favor of public access to
judicial records.” Id. at 602; see United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(recognizing the “strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings”). This
presumption applies to “judicial records,” which are materials submitted “intended to influence
the court.” In re Matter of the Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Electronic
Surveillance Applications and Orders (“In re Leopold”), 964 F.3d 1121, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Although it is strong, the presumption of access to judicial records is not irrebuttable. See
United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 315-316. Competing public and private interests may
outweigh the presumption in favor of disclosure. See id.; MetLife v. Fin. Stability Oversight
Council, 865 F.3d 661, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The decision about whether and how to provide
third parties with access to judicial records is “best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a
discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.”
Nixon v. Warner Comms., Inc., 435 U.S. at 599; see United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d
at 316-17; see generally In re Public Access in Capitol Cases, 2021 WL 1946378.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hubbard guides the Court’s
assessment of whether to permit public access to judicial records. See MetLife v. Fin. Stability
Oversight Council, 865 F.3d at 666; In re Leopold, 964 F.3d at 1127; In re Public Access in
Capitol Cases, 2021 WL 1946378 at *4. After determining that a sought-after document is in
fact a judicial record, courts must assess the following factors:
(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue;
(2) the extent of previous public access to the documents;
(3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and the identity
of that person;
(4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted;
(5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and
(6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced during
the judicial proceedings.
See United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 317-22; Metlife v. Fin. Stability
Oversight Council, 865 F.3d at 665; In re Leopold, 964 F.3d at 1131; In re Public Access in
Capitol Cases, 2021 WL 1946378 at *4. Under Hubbard, as the D.C. Circuit has explained, “a
seal may be maintained only if the district court, after considering the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case, and after weighing the interests advanced by the parties in
light of the public interest and the duty of the courts, concludes that justice so requires.” In re
Leopold, 964 F.3d at 1131 (internal quotations omitted).
The Court’s inquiry into whether a document should be disclosed thus requires
examining: (1) whether a sought-after document is a “judicial record” intended to influence the
court’s decision, such that the presumption of public access applies; (2) whether common law
applies or whether Congress “has spoken directly to the issue at hand,” thus displacing common
law rules of public access; and (3) if the common law applies, whether the Hubbard factors
counsel in favor of disclosure. See In re Leopold, 964 F.3d at 1129; MetLife v. Fin. Stability
Oversight Council, 865 F.3d at 663.
III. DISCUSSION
The parties do not dispute whether the videos are “judicial records,” nor do they
contend that the common law has been displaced by an act of Congress in this case. See Def.
Opp. at 2-3; Reply at 1. The Court agrees that the video exhibits are judicial records and finds
that the common law applies. Accordingly, the only analysis required of the Court is an
assessment of the six Hubbard factors.
A. Factor (1): The Need for Public Access to the Documents at Issue
The Press Coalition argues that any and all videos from the January 6, 2021
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insurrection show ““th[e] effort to disrupt the democratic process in counting electoral votes,’
which remains ‘of deep national importance and public interest.” Reply at 2 (quoting United
States v. Jackson, Criminal No. 21-mj-0115, 2021 WL 1026127, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2021)).
Accordingly, the Press Coalition maintains, there is a “strong public interest in seeing real-time
images of what happened that day.” In re Application for Access to Certain Video Exhibits (“In
re Klein”), 546 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2021); Reply at 2; see United States y. Torrens, 560 F.
Supp. 3d 283, 293 (D.D.C. 2021) (“The public has an interest in understanding the conduct
underlying the charges in these cases, as well as the government’s prosecutorial decision-
making.”).
Mr. Puma does not dispute that the events of January 6 are a matter of national
importance. Rather, he argues that “there is nothing in particular about his case that is any
different than the average January 6 case that warrants a particular ‘need’ for these video
exhibits.” Def. Opp. at 4. As in Hubbard, the public already has access to many of the
documents relevant to his case — including docket entries, opinions by the Court, and sentencing
memoranda — which suggests that the public need for these specific videos is not particularly
strong. Id. at 5; see Hubbard v. United States, 650 F.2d at 318. In addition to the lack of any
particular public interest in his case, Mr. Puma also argues that the press has had “almost
unfettered access to all video exhibits filed in January 6 cases for almost two years now.” Def.
Opp. at 4. Courts have already disclosed a significant amount of January 6-related video to the
press, despite the Court’s ordinary practice of prohibiting members of the public from recording
judicial proceedings. Id.Despite Mr. Puma’s arguments, this first Hubbard factor weighs in favor of
disclosure — but only slightly. See United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 317-18 (the “purposes
of public access are only modestly served” where public had access to related proceedings). The
Press Coalition is correct that the events of January 6, 2021 remain matters of “deep national
importance,” see United States v. Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127, at *6, and thus there is a
“generalized” public interest in learning more about that day. United States v. Hubbard, 650
F.2d at 317. Aside from citing the general public interest in the January 6 insurrection, however,
the Press Coalition has not explained how disclosure of these specific materials would promote a
particular public purpose. App. at 2; Reply at 2. Still, although the Press Coalition cites only
this general interest in these videos — and the public has already been given access to a
substantial amount of January 6-related material — the Court nevertheless concludes that this
factor slightly weighs in favor of disclosure. In re Application for Access to Video Exhibits (“In
re Fitzsimons”), 575 F. Supp. 3d 101, 108 (D.D.C. 2021) (to be subject to disclosure, judicial
records need not depict events “more newsworthy” than records which are already publicly
accessible); see Nixon v. Warmer Comms. Inc., 435 U.S. at 602 (“On respondents’ side of the
scales is the incremental gain in public understanding of an immensely important historical
occurrence . . . not inconsequential despite the already widespread dissemination of printed
transcripts.”).
B. Factor (2): Extent of Previous Public Access to These Documents
The second Hubbard factor requires assessing whether the records at issue have
previously been made available to the public. “Previous access is a factor which may weigh in
favor of subsequent access.” United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 318. The video exhibits at
issue here include Mr. Puma’s GoPro footage, his selfie-style videos, and Capitol surveillance
footage. See Notice. The extent of prior public access to these videos varies, with some videos
having already been shared to social media and others having only been described or excerpted
as screenshots — still photos taken from live videos — in the parties’ sentencing memoranda. See
Reply at 2; Gov’t Sent’g Mem. at 4-11.
With regard to the selfie-style videos that Mr. Puma appeared to livestream on
Facebook, Mr. Puma argues that it is unclear whether the videos were actually livestreamed, and
the Court cannot ascertain how many people watched or had access to these videos. Def. Opp.
at 5-6. Nevertheless, the facts set forth in the government’s sentencing memorandum make clear
that these particular videos were in fact livestreamed. Gov’t Sent’g Mem. at 11-12. Because
these videos were, at some point and to some degree, “readily accessible on the internet,” this
factor weighs in favor of disclosure as to the selfie videos. United States v. Jackson, 2021
WL 1026127 at *6.
The other video exhibits — Mr. Puma’s GoPro footage and the Capitol
surveillance footage — were not streamed live on Facebook or previously made public. But the
Press Coalition argues that this Hubbard factor weighs in favor of disclosure as to these exhibits
as well, because the government’s sentencing memorandum contains screenshots derived from
the GoPro and surveillance footage. Reply at 2. The Press Coalition cites Judge Howell’s
opinion in United States v. Jackson in support. Id. In Jackson, a news organization requested
access to a video, screenshots of which had been featured in the publicly available criminal
complaint in a January 6 case. United States v. Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127 at *6. Because
screenshots “depict[ing] the defendant’s most egregious conduct” had already been made
publicly available, Judge Howell concluded that this Hubbard factor weighed in favor of
disclosure of the entire original video. Id.The Court does not believe this same conclusion can be fairly drawn in Mr.
Puma’s case. The exhibits at issue here — GoPro footage and Capitol surveillance footage — are
comprised of about an hour of video footage total, while the government’s sentencing
memorandum contains only about a dozen screenshots from these videos. See Gov’t Sent’g
Mem. at 4-11. Although the screenshots were derived from the videos, the videos themselves
contain a much fuller and more vivid representation of what Mr. Puma experienced that day — a
picture which cannot be conveyed in still images alone. See Def. Opp. at 6 (noting that the full-
length videos “provide the full context for the Court’). While there has been some degree of
public access to portions of these videos given the public disclosure of a few screenshots, it is not
accurate to say that there has been prior public access to these videos in their entirety. The
majority of these videos has not been disclosed. Compare In re Fitzsimons, 575 F, Supp. 3d at
110 (finding that prior public access weighed in favor of release where video footage itself was
“extensively discussed or publicly shown during the in person September pretrial hearing”);
United States v. Gieswein, Criminal No. 21-0024, Minute Order (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2021) (denying
disclosure of videos not submitted to the court even though the parties’ publicly available briefs
contained screenshots taken from these videos). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of
disclosure as to the videos that were previously posted to Facebook but against disclosure as far
as the GoPro and surveillance exhibits are concerned.
C. Factor (3): Objection to Disclosure and Identities of Objectors
Mr. Puma has objected to the disclosure of all of the videos requested in the Press
Coalition’s application, and the fact that he objects weighs against disclosure. See Def. Opp.
The Press Coalition argues that because Mr. Puma is the only person to object, this factor should
not weigh against disclosure. See Reply at 2-3. Some courts have concluded, particularly in the
context of the January 6 cases, that when a criminal defendant is the only party objecting, this
factor does not weigh strongly against disclosure. See In re Klein, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 7 (that “the
only objecting party here is Klein” is a fact that “favors disclosure”); United States v.
Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127 at *6 (that “[t]he only party to object here is the defendant, not any
third party, favors disclosure”). Courts that tend to discount a defendant’s objection reason that
“[t]his [Hubbard] factor focuses on the privacy interests of third parties.” In re Fitzsimons, 575
F, Supp. 3d at 110; see id. at 111 (where there are “no third-party property or privacy rights at
issue, there is no ‘broader protection’ from disclosure triggered under this factor”).
The Court in Hubbard, however, explicitly noted that “an obvious but important
consideration” is that “[s]trong objections were raised to the unsealing order both by the
individual defendants” and by a third party. United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 319.
Although the court in Hubbard expressed particular concern with third-party objections, its
holding was not limited to cases where only third-party interests are implicated. Id. Outside of
the January 6 context, courts have not universally discounted a defendant’s objections. See
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP v. Orian, 662 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Defendants
are the only parties who object to the unsealing . . . . [T]he fact that a party objects may be a
significant factor for the court to consider.”). Mr. Puma’s objection weighs against disclosure.
D. Factor (4): Strength of Property and Privacy Interests Asserted
“[D]isclosure is discouraged where there is a possibility of ‘public humiliation
and degradation’ that would ‘constitute an unconscionable invasion of privacy.’” United States
v. Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127 at *7 (quoting In re Nat’! Broad. Co., Inc., 653 F.2d 609, 620
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). Mr. Puma argues that the disputed videos contain his statements, “some of
which were made in private and in a private setting,” and which are not related to the charged
offenses. Def. Mem. at 6. He further argues that releasing these videos would potentially
subject him to scrutiny and humiliation. Id. at 7.
The public nature of the conduct depicted in these videos, however, outweighs
Mr. Puma’s objections. See United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 320 (noting a generalized
privacy interest where records were seized from a “non-public area”); Reply at 3. Multiple
courts have come to this conclusion in the context of the January 6 insurrection. See, e.g., In re
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Fitzsimons, 575 F. Supp. 3d at 111 (finding that this factor weighed in favor of disclosure
because videos depicted Mr. Fitzsimons’s public participation in the January 6 riot and
interviews he gave later on); In re Klein, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 7-8 (“Klein does not assert any
privacy interest in the videos, nor could he ‘since the images of [him] were captured while he
was participating very publicly’ in the January 6 events.”) (quoting United States v. Jackson,
2021 WL 1026127 at *7); United States v. Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127 at *6-7 (defendant could
not suggest he had a privacy interest in videos “since the images of defendant were captured
while he was participating very publicly with a mob assaulting the Capitol”); United States v.
Rukstales, Criminal No. 21-0041, Order (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 2021) [Dkt. No. 150] at 2 (granting
access to videos submitted for sentencing because Mr. Rukstales “does not have a property or
privacy interest in videos of his conduct inside the Capitol”).
E. Factor (5): Possibility of Prejudice
Mr. Puma explains that disclosure of these videos threatens to “[place] his
livelihood at risk and his ability to support his family at risk.” Def. Opp. at 6-7. Mr. Puma does
not argue that he will suffer legal prejudice — he had already pleaded guilty when he raised his
objection, and releasing these videos does not risk tainting the pool of potential jurors or
influencing any potential witnesses. Rather, he argues that he will be personally negatively
affected by the potential redistribution of these videos by national news organizations. Id.Mr. Puma’s primary concern is losing his job, as he reports that has already lost two jobs due to
media coverage of his charges. Def. Mem. at 6-7. Compare United States v. Torrens, 560 F.
Supp. 3d at 293 (concerns about releasing surveillance footage were “speculative and attenuated”
and “too general” to weigh against disclosure); In re Klein, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 8 (objecting party
did not specify the prejudice that disclosure would create). Mr. Puma frames this concern as a
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potential prejudice, though the Court notes that it is closely related to the property and privacy
interests considered above. See United States v. Torrens, 560 F. Supp. 3d at 293 (considering
the fourth and fifth Hubbard factors together); United States v. Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127 at *7
(same).
The Press Coalition argues, and some courts have agreed, that the personal
prejudice Mr. Puma describes is not the kind of prejudice contemplated by Hubbard. See United
States v. Rukstales, Criminal No. 21-0041 [Dkt. No. 150] at 2-3 (“While public dissemination of
the videos may cause Rukstales additional public embarrassment, that is not the legal prejudice
with which the Hubbard test is concerned.”); In re Fitzsimons, 575 F. Supp. 3d at 112-13
(primary concerns with disclosure relate to tainting a jury pool and precluding the possibility of a
fair trial); see, e.g., Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP v. Orian, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (“Although
the Defendants might be embarrassed by the public disclosure of formerly confidential
communications, they have not identified any legal prejudice they would suffer.””); United States
ex rel. Grover v. Related Cos., LP, 4 F. Supp. 3d 21, 26-27 (D.D.C. 2013) (concluding that
“{hjarm to reputation and career” is not a compelling reason for non-disclosure).
Although the Court in Hubbard certainly discussed “the danger of an unfair trial
by adverse publicity,” it did not purport to limit the kind of prejudice to be considered. United
States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 316; see id. at 324 (“The kinds of interests cited by the defendants
below do not, we think, exhaust the types of particularized privacy interests that might be
asserted.””). Moreover, in In re National Broadcasting Co., the D.C. Circuit expressed concern
with “public humiliation and degradation” that may result from the disclosure of judicial records,
and explained that a court may deny access where “justice so requires.” In re Nat’] Broad. Co.
Inc., 653 F.2d at 613, 620. Accordingly, the Court may consider the kind of non-legal potential
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prejudice that Mr. Puma describes. Def. Mem. at 6-8. This kind of practical and personal
prejudice, however, may not weigh as strongly against disclosure as the legal prejudice discussed
in Hubbard would.
Mr. Puma’s case is distinct from other January 6 media requests, as there was
minimal press coverage of Mr. Puma prior to his sentencing in March. See Def. Mem. at 4 n.3
(only two local papers had covered Mr. Puma). Other courts have authorized the release of
judicial records where criminal defendants were already subject to “high publicity [which]
diminishes the concern of additional prejudice.” In re Fitzsimons, 575 F. Supp. 3d at 113. See
In re Klein, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 8 (“Given the scope of prior public access, then, releasing the
hearing clips would not prejudice Klein.””); United States v. Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127 at *8
(“Further disclosures of his actual offense conduct” where two videos were already publicly
available “may focus more attention on that conduct and possibly exacerbate prejudice, but not
to an extent that overcomes the presumption of public access”). As discussed earlier, there has
been no previous public or media exposure to Mr. Puma’s GoPro videos and an indeterminate
amount of public access to his selfie videos. See supra Subsection III.A (discussing prior public
access, the first Hubbard factor). The lack of significant prior media exposure indicates that the
potential for prejudice here may be more substantial than in other cases.
Whether the fifth Hubbard factor weighs for or against disclosure is a close
question. The practical, non-legal prejudice asserted, coupled with the lack of prior media
exposure, might weigh strongly against publication of judicial records in some circumstances.
Here, however, Mr. Puma’s argument — that the media coverage potentially generated from
releasing these videos could “cause public and financial ruin” — loses force in light of the fact
that a sentence of incarceration has been imposed. Def. Opp. at 7. On March 21, 2023, the
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Court sentenced Mr. Puma to nine months of imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised
release. Mr. Puma’s employer will almost certainly learn of the details of this case when Mr.
Puma self-surrenders and is absent from work for a substantial period of time. The Court
understands Mr. Puma’s concerns, but given the circumstances of his sentence, this factor now
weighs only very slightly against disclosure, if at all.
F. Factor (6): Purpose of Introducing the Records in Judicial Proceedings
Mr. Puma argues that only small portions of the videos at issue depict his criminal
conduct, and thus the full-length GoPro videos are not “relevant to the overall allegations or the
Court’s consideration at sentencing.” Def. Opp. at 6. It is true that “the presumption of access to
documents that do not serve as the basis for a substantive determination . . . is appreciably
weaker.” United States v. Graham, 257 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2001). But these videos are
persuasive, as the government intended for them to be, on the facts relative to sentencing. The
videos depict Mr. Puma’s behavior, as well as the larger context of the Capitol insurrection, and
were considered by the Court in making its sentencing determination. The government showed
clips from several of these videos at the sentencing hearing, and the Court reviewed all of the
videos — the full length GoPro footage, as well as the Capitol surveillance video and selfie videos
~ prior to sentencing. This factor weighs in favor of disclosure. In re Fitzsimons, 575 F.
Supp. 3d at 114 (noting that “this factor weighs in favor of public release because the
Government introduced the exhibits to influence the Court’s decision to detain Defendant”);
United States v. Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127 at *8 (‘As the Video Exhibits were introduced for
the Court’s consideration on the matter of detaining defendant, the final factor weighs heavily in
favor of disclosure.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Press Coalition has demonstrated that the videos it requests depict matters of
“deep national importance and public interest both as to the offense conduct and individuals
involved,” United States v. Jackson, 2021 WL 1026127 at *6, and that there has been some
degree of previous public access to these records. Reply at 2. Each of the videos submitted was
supposed to be, and in fact was, relied on by the Court in making its sentencing determination.
After carefully weighing the competing interests, the Court finds that Mr. Puma’s showing of
prejudice is not sufficient to overcome the “strong presumption in favor of public access” to
these kinds of judicial records. United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 317. For the reasons
stated in this Opinion, the Press Coalition’s motion was granted by Order on March 19, 2023.
See Order [Dkt. No. 64].
SO ORDERED.
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge
DATE: 3\31 \ 3
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