Grant v. Csl Behring LLC ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JULIA GRANT,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02044 (CJN)
CSL BEHRING, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In March 2021, biopharmaceutical company CSL Behring, LLC terminated the
employment of Julia Grant, who then initiated this lawsuit for discrimination and retaliation under
the D.C. Human Rights Act. CSL has moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that
Grant’s termination was not motivated by unlawful discrimination or retaliation, but by a company
reorganization. Grant maintains that this stated reason is pretextual. For the reasons explained
below, the Court grants summary judgment to CSL on Grant’s retaliation claim, but denies
summary judgment on her age and sex discrimination claims.
I. Background
CSL is a biopharmaceutical company that “researches, develops, manufactures, and
markets plasma protein biotherapies . . . used to treat serious and rare medical conditions.”1 Def.’s
Statement of Facts (“Def.’s SOMF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 24. On May 1, 2017, CSL hired Grant as
Director of U.S. Healthcare Policy and Federal Affairs (or more simply, “Director of Federal
1
Unless otherwise noted, these facts are undisputed or established by uncontroverted evidence, at
least at the summary judgment stage.
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Government Affairs”). Id. ¶ 2. Grant remained in that position throughout the entirety of her
employment with the company. Id. ¶ 3. Her job duties included “forging relationships” in
Washington, D.C., “to help advance CSL’s position in policy” on matters that concerned the
company, like patient access or new biopharmaceutical products. Def.’s Ex. C (Wixted Corp. Tr.)
at 28; see Def.’s SOMF ¶ 18 (describing Grant’s role as “focusing on the legislative process and
driving advocacy initiatives within Congress”).
Grant’s direct supervisor during the entirety of her employment at CSL was Patrick Collins,
whose title was Senior Director of Global Healthcare Policy and External Affairs. Def.’s SOMF
¶ 6. Michael Ruggiero joined the company in June 2019 as the Senior Vice President of Global
Healthcare Policy and External Affairs; among other things, Ruggiero was Collins’s superior. Id.
¶ 7; Def.’s Ex. C (Wixted Corp. Tr.) at 23. Ruggiero was tasked with “review[ing] the organization
and prepar[ing] it for the future.” Def.’s Ex. F (Ruggiero Tr.) at 46–47. In other words, he assessed
the structure of the organization and considered how to improve it. See id. at 45. Although the
global government affairs function of CSL also had teams covering policy matters in other parts
of the world, the reorganization as relevant here concerned only the group focused on North
American affairs.
As it stood when Ruggiero joined, the North America government affairs group consisted
of six employees subordinate to him. Collins (again, Senior Director of Global Healthcare Policy
and External Affairs) reported to Ruggiero and supervised both Grant (again, Director of Federal
Government Affairs) and Karla White (Director of State Government Affairs). See Def.’s Ex. G
(Org. Charts) at 3361. White had three direct reports, and Grant had none. Pl.’s Statement of
Facts (“Pl.’s SOMF”) ¶¶ 59–60, ECF No. 25; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s SOMF (“Def.’s Resp.”)
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¶¶ 59–60, ECF No. 26-2. Grant’s office was located in Washington, D.C., while Collins was based
in Pennsylvania. Pl.’s SOMF ¶ 4.
A. Restructuring of the North America Government Affairs Group
The Parties dispute how best to characterize the effect of Ruggiero’s reorganization. What
is clear is that Ruggiero added an Executive Director-level position to lead the North America
group (called the “Head of North America Healthcare Policy & External Affairs”), who would
supervise a Senior Director of Federal Affairs and the existing Director of State Government
Affairs. Def.’s SOMF ¶ 13; see Def.’s Ex. G (Org. Charts) at 3366. The Senior Director of Federal
Affairs would have no direct reports, and the Director of State Government Affairs would have
three. See Def.’s Ex. G (Org. Charts) at 3366. And key to this lawsuit, there would no longer be
a Director of Federal Affairs—the position held by Grant. See id.; Def.’s SOMF ¶ 16.
According to CSL, pairing the new Executive Director with a Senior Director instead of a
Director focused on federal affairs within the North America group would involve “sacrific[ing]
the tactical execution of congressional strategy performed by a Director level role,” but the Senior
Director would have the benefit of “a deep understanding of CSL’s business” when developing
policy strategy. Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 15–18. Outside consultants could fill the gap left by the loss of
a Director-level role by executing the more “tactical elements” of advocacy work. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
After Ruggiero first proposed a restructuring in approximately April 2020, he went on to
produce multiple iterations of the reorganization plan over the course of the next several months.
Id. ¶ 22; Def.’s Ex. E (CSL Interrog. Resps.) ¶ 8; see Pl.’s Ex. 1 (Wixted Corp. Tr.) at 225–28.
One aspect of the initial plan, which lasted through many iterations, was to eliminate both Grant’s
Director role and Collins’s Senior Director role, but then fill the position of Senior Director of
Federal Affairs with a new hire. See Def.’s Ex. G (Org. Charts) at 3362, 3364; Pl.’s Ex. 1 (Wixted
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Corp. Tr.) at 148–49. Having experienced a successful virtual working environment during the
COVID-19 pandemic, however, CSL later decided that Collins could fill the Senior Director
position—which was supposed to be based in Washington, D.C.—from his location in
Pennsylvania. Def.’s SOMF ¶ 29. Ruggiero revised the plan to retain Collins in the Senior
Director role, but the plan still involved terminating Grant. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Ruggiero selected
Mary-Lacey Reuther to fill the Executive Director role. Id. ¶¶ 35–36.
The way Grant sees it, the reorganization did not involve the creation of any new roles, but
merely their renaming, as duties were shifted among members of the team. In Grant’s view,
Reuther was placed in Collins’s position; Collins was placed in Grant’s position; and Grant was
terminated. See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOMF (“Pl.’s Resp.”) ¶¶ 13, 33–35, ECF No. 25.
B. CSL Investigation
In early October 2020, Collins forwarded an email exchange to Grant and the Nickles
Group, a political consulting firm, regarding the possibility of having then-First Lady Melania
Trump donate convalescent plasma following her recovery from COVID-19 to publicly promote
plasma donation. Def.’s SOMF ¶¶ 38–39; Def.’s Ex. B (Grant Tr.) at 69, 106; see Pl.’s SOMF
¶ 18. Grant replied to Collins and Ruggiero asking why she was not included in the original
discussion about the idea. Def.’s SOMF ¶ 40. After receiving Grant’s reply, Collins called her
and advised her to recall the email, but Grant informed Collins that she did not know how to recall
emails and that she was “tired” of “being marginalized, cut out, [and] not included” by Collins and
Ruggiero. Def.’s Ex. B (Grant Tr.) at 110; Pl.’s Ex. 4 (Collins Tr.) at 93–97. Grant also told
Collins that she was “not afraid” of him and Ruggiero. Def.’s SOMF ¶ 41; Def.’s Ex. B (Grant
Tr.) at 110–11. Collins understood from the exchange that Grant was raising a concern about
CSL’s treatment of women. Def.’s SOMF ¶ 42.
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When Collins told Ruggiero about the comment and about his plans to contact Human
Resources, Ruggiero disagreed that CSL mistreated women but agreed that Collins should contact
HR. Pl.’s Ex. 4 (Collins Tr.) at 51; Pl.’s SOMF ¶ 38. On October 5, Collins called HR Director
Elizabeth Wixted, raising a concern about Grant’s complaint that she was “being treated differently
because she was a woman.” Pl.’s SOMF ¶ 19. On a call with Grant the next day, Wixted asked
her if she felt like she was not being included because she is female, and Grant responded that she
had “no recollection of that comment,” that “women are treated fine,” and that she had the “entirely
opposite experience” at CSL as she had at other companies. Def.’s Ex. I (Audio Tr.) at 3–4. But
Grant did confirm that she perceived “a repeated pattern of being excluded from decision making.”
Id. at 3. Wixted followed up with Collins and Ruggiero to ask them about their perspectives and
whether it was typical that Grant would be left out of decisions. Pl.’s SOMF ¶ 22.
C. Grant’s Termination
Over five months later, on March 15, 2021, Ruggiero and Wixted called Grant to inform
her that her position was being eliminated, and her employment terminated, effective immediately.
Id. ¶ 41. The Parties agree that the decision to terminate Grant was Ruggiero’s; that Grant is the
only employee that Ruggiero terminated at CSL; and that Grant’s termination was not performance
related. Id. ¶¶ 39, 42–43; Def.’s Resp. ¶¶ 39, 42–43. Grant claims that CSL gave her job to
Collins, “a less well qualified male who is ten years younger” than her. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 34. At the
time of her termination, Grant was 60 years old, and Collins was 50. See Def.’s SOMF ¶ 6; Pl.’s
SOMF ¶ 57.
D. Procedural History
Grant filed suit against CSL in D.C. Superior Court a few months after her termination,
and CSL removed the case to this Court, invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. Notice of
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Removal, ECF No. 1. Grant claims that CSL violated the DCHRA by terminating her on account
of her sex (Count I), her age (Count II), and her protected activities—responding to the HR inquiry
about CSL’s treatment of women (Count III). Compl. ¶¶ 30, 39, 48, 50, ECF No. 1-1. Following
discovery, CSL moved for summary judgment, arguing that Grant’s termination was due to the
company’s reorganization—not Grant’s age, sex, or protected conduct. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 24.
II. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Once the moving party demonstrates “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” the
nonmoving party must then identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986) (quotation omitted). A dispute is “genuine”
if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party”—“[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support” of the nonmoving party’s
position will not suffice. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986).
The Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (quotation omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000) (quotation omitted). In the context
of discrimination cases, courts exercise “caution” and apply “an added measure of rigor” when
ruling on motions for summary judgment, because “employers rarely maintain records directly
evidencing discrimination.” Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 526 (quotations omitted).
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III. Analysis
A. Discrimination Claims
In her first and second causes of action, Grant claims that CSL discriminated against her
by terminating her because of her sex and her age. As relevant here, the DCHRA makes it unlawful
for an employer to fire an employee “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason” based upon
the employee’s sex or age. D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1). Employment-discrimination claims
under the DCHRA are analyzed using “the same three-part, burden-shifting test articulated by the
Supreme Court for Title VII cases” in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973). McFarland v. George Wash. Univ., 935 A.2d 337, 346 (D.C. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Courts often construe the DCHRA with reference to cases interpreting and applying Title VII. See
Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 92 n.14 (D.C. 1998). But see Esteños v. PAHO/WHO Fed.
Credit Union, 952 A.2d 878, 886–87 (D.C. 2008) (explaining that the “differences between the
federal and D.C. laws . . . can be significant” and that the DCHRA is read liberally).
Under the burden-shifting framework, an aggrieved employee must first show a prima facie
case of discrimination. To do so here, “the employee must show that: (1) she belongs to a
protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job at which she suffered the prohibited action; (3)
the prohibited action occurred despite her employment qualifications; and (4) the prohibited action
was based on the protected characteristic.” Johnson v. D.C., 225 A.3d 1269, 1280 (D.C. 2020);
see Cain v. Reinoso, 43 A.3d 302, 306 (D.C. 2012). If she does, the burden then shifts to the
employer to “articulate[] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the employee’s termination.”
Johnson, 225 A.3d at 1280 (quotation omitted). If the employer can offer such an explanation,
“the burden of production shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the ostensibly legitimate
reason was pretextual.” Id. at 1281. That burden “merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion
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on the question of intentional discrimination,” so “the employee must show both that the reason
was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Id. (quotations omitted). The employee
may alternatively prevail under the DCHRA “by proving that the employer’s action was motivated
‘partially’ by a discriminatory reason, even if it also was motivated by permissible reasons,” so
long as she proves that the employer terminated her for a discriminatory reason “in whole or part.”
Furline v. Morrison, 953 A.2d 344, 353 (D.C. 2008).
CSL does not attempt to challenge (for purposes of its summary judgment motion) Grant’s
ability to prove a prima facie case of discrimination, but argues that a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason motivated the termination. The Court therefore “need not pause to analyze whether she
made out a prima facie case.” Id.; see Ukwuani v. D.C., 241 A.3d 529, 542 (D.C. 2020). And
Grant, for her part, does not dispute that CSL has met its burden of articulating a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. Pl.’s Opp’n at 27, ECF No. 25; see Hollins v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,
760 A.2d 563, 571 (D.C. 2000) (stating that an “employer can satisfy its burden by producing
admissible evidence from which the trier of fact can rationally conclude that the employment
action was not motivated by discriminatory animus” (quotation and brackets omitted)). In
particular, as CSL puts it, the company “creat[ed] a new organizational structure and conclud[ed]
that Plaintiff’s skill set did not align with the open positions in the restructured organization.”
Def.’s Mem. at 11, ECF No. 24. “[T]erminating an employee as part of the company’s larger
reorganization” is a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.” Brandli v. Micrus Endovascular
Corp., 209 F. Supp. 3d 356, 361 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 709 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quotation
and brackets omitted); see also Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (describing
“the elimination of the position altogether” as one of “the most common lawful reasons” behind
termination).
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The Court therefore proceeds “to answer the ultimate question”—whether Grant has
“presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find” that age or sex discrimination “actually motivated
the employer’s decision.” Furline, 953 A.2d at 353 (quotation omitted). The Court generally
focuses on whether a jury could infer discrimination from:
(1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case;
(2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered
explanation for its actions; and
(3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff
(such as independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the
part of the employer) or any contrary evidence that may be available to the
employer (such as evidence of a strong track record in equal opportunity
employment).
Id. at 353–54 (quotation omitted). As the Court of Appeals has stated, this “boils down to two
inquiries: could a reasonable jury infer that the employer’s given explanation was pretextual, and,
if so, could the jury infer that this pretext shielded discriminatory motives?” Murray v. Gilmore,
406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
The Court agrees with Grant that a reasonable jury could find CSL’s explanation
pretextual. In Murray v. Gilmore, the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion when
evaluating an employer’s explanation that a reduction in force resulted in elimination of the
plaintiff’s position. Id. at 713–14. The plaintiff there had “offer[ed] plentiful evidence from which
a jury could conclude that rather than functionally eliminating [her] position,” the employer
“simply gave the position a new title” and chose another individual to fill it. Id. at 714. For
instance, a representative of the employer testified at an administrative hearing that the plaintiff’s
former position and the new position were “functionally equivalent.” Id. (quotation omitted). The
Court of Appeals also noted the similarities between the two positions’ job descriptions and the
fact that the employer immediately changed another employee’s title after the plaintiff was
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terminated. Id. This “easily create[d] a material issue of fact as to whether [the employer’s]
justification was pretextual.” Id.Perhaps to a lesser extent than in Murray, some evidence supports Grant’s claim that her
position was not eliminated, but simply transferred to Collins. To start, Collins himself testified
that he was given Grant’s job. Pl.’s Ex. 4 (Collins Tr.) at 31; Pl.’s SOMF ¶ 57. Though CSL
strenuously objects to the relevance of Collins’s view, he not only performed the modified federal
affairs role but also supervised Grant when she occupied her previous position, and he would
therefore have personal knowledge of the functional similarities between his role and hers. Along
similar lines, White (who is also familiar with the workings of other roles within her group)
testified: “[W]hen you look at the job descriptions, the . . . federal job was not eliminated. There
was still a job focused on federal government affairs and specifically federal government affairs.
And that was going to be Patrick[ Collins]’s role moving forward.” Pl.’s Ex. 6 (White Tr.) at 122;
Pl.’s SOMF ¶ 46. Moreover, organization charts of the North America group preceding and
postdating the reorganization are strikingly similar in structure. See Def.’s Ex. G (Org. Charts) at
3361, 3366. There remains one head of the group who supervises two subordinates—the first
focused on federal government affairs (with no direct reports) and the second focused on state
government affairs (with three direct reports).2 See id. This evidence tending to show that Collins
was effectively given Grant’s job could lend to a jury finding that CSL’s explanation is pretextual
by supporting both Grant’s claim that CSL was “making up or lying about” the nature of the
2
In support of her position on the pretext question, Grant also cites her own testimony that CSL
“gave [her] job to a 50-year-old man” and various aspects of CSL’s testimony, which she argues
included “different and conflicting reasons” for her termination. Pl.’s SOMF ¶ 57; Pl.’s Ex. 2
(Grant Tr.) at 12; Pl.’s Opp’n at 28–36. Because the evidence described above is sufficient to
create a genuine issue for the jury, the Court does not address whether this additional evidence
makes any material contribution.
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reorganization and her claim that CSL gave more favorable treatment to a similarly situated
employee of a different age and sex. See Brady v. Off. of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 495
(D.C. Cir. 2008). A jury might discount White’s and Collins’s testimony and credit Ruggiero’s,
but the Court cannot conclude on the current record that it would be required to do so.
Although the record would permit a reasonable jury to find CSL’s explanation pretextual,
that does not automatically mean that a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination. See
Murray, 406 F.3d at 714; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148; Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1291
(DC. Cir. 1998) (en banc). But circumstances where the latter conclusion does not follow from
the former are relatively rare. There are two frequently cited examples: (1) “if the record
conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason,” and (2) “if the plaintiff created only
a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and
uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at
148; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291; see Johnson, 225 A.3d at 1283 n.15.
CSL appears to rely on the second option, arguing that no reasonable jury could conclude
that discriminatory reasons motivated Grant’s termination. Its “independent evidence that no
discrimination had occurred” is as follows: Ruggiero initially planned to eliminate Collins’s
position in addition to Grant’s, and that plan changed (such that Collins was not terminated) only
due to a “last minute” assessment that Collins could perform the Senior Director role out of
Pennsylvania instead of Washington, D.C. Def.’s Mem. at 12–13. To infer discrimination based
on these circumstances, CSL says, a factfinder would have to come to the incredible conclusion
that Ruggiero “harbored discriminatory motives against Plaintiff from the outset” and “first
proposed eliminating a younger male’s position” along with hers “in order to disguise those
discriminatory motives.” Id. at 13.
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But a reasonable jury need not make that leap to land on Grant’s side. Indeed, a similar
argument was made and rejected in Murray, where the employer “point[ed] out that he proposed
eliminating positions occupied by both men and women” and “argue[d] that a reasonable jury
could not infer sex discrimination”; there, the Court of Appeals “doubt[ed] that this could prevent
a jury from inferring sex discrimination” as to the plaintiff. 406 F.3d at 716. Adhering to Murray,
the Court declines to conclude that the proposed elimination of Collins absolutely bars any
inference of discrimination here. CSL points to nothing else in the record that would preclude a
reasonable jury from finding intentional discrimination. Even assuming that Grant made only a
weak showing of pretext, CSL has failed to identify “abundant and uncontroverted” evidence that
no discrimination occurred. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
B. Retaliation Claim
In her third cause of action, Grant claims that she engaged in protected activity “when she
responded to human resources’ inquiry into the work environment at CSL as it relates to women,”
and that CSL retaliated against her in violation of the DCHRA by terminating her on account of
that protected activity. Compl. ¶ 48; see D.C. Code § 2-1402.61(a). The same McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework applies here, requiring the plaintiff to first make out a prima
facie case. The plaintiff must show: “(1) that [s]he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2)
that [s]he suffered a materially adverse action by [her] employer; and (3) that a causal link connects
the two.” Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Just as
before, if the plaintiff makes out this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action. See id. Once that is done, the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered nonretaliatory reason is not true. Carpenter v.
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 174 F.3d 231, 235 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999). That burden “merges with the
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ultimate burden” of showing that “a reasonable jury could infer retaliation from all the evidence.”
Id. (quotation omitted); Gaujacq, 601 F.3d at 577 (quotation omitted).
This time, CSL argues that Grant has not established a prima facie case, homing in on the
third requirement that Grant show a causal connection between her response to the HR inquiry (the
protected activity) and her termination (the adverse action). Def.’s Mem. at 14–15. CSL contends
that because Ruggiero planned to eliminate Grant’s position as early as April 2020—months before
the HR inquiry in October 2020—her termination the following March could not possibly have
been motivated by retaliatory animus on his part. Agreeing that Ruggiero is fully responsible for
her termination, Grant responds that this timing inquiry should focus not on the time that Ruggiero
first planned to eliminate Grant’s position, but the time that he created the last version of the
reorganization plan (in December 2020)—or, alternatively, the time that “the decision to terminate
Grant on March 15, 2021, was made” (in February 2021). Pl.’s Opp’n at 40–41. In Grant’s view,
Ruggiero’s decision to terminate her was made either two or four months after her protected
activity, not months before. See Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 529 (explaining that “[t]emporal proximity
can indeed support an inference of causation, but only where the two events are ‘very close’ in
time” (citation and quotation omitted)).
The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, Grant has not offered sufficient evidentiary
support for her position that the last iteration of Ruggiero’s plan was made in December 2020 or
that Ruggiero decided to terminate Grant in February 2021 (and not earlier). Wixted’s testimony
about what occurred in December, on which Grant relies, reflects that “conversations with legal
began around what the potential restructure would look like” then, not that Ruggiero created the
last iteration of his plan then. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 28; Pl.’s Ex. 1 (Wixted Corp. Tr.) at 225–28; see Pl.’s
Opp’n at 41. As for February 2021, Grant relies on Ruggiero’s testimony regarding an email
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communication in that timeframe between Wixted and him that it “was contemplated at this point
that we would be moving forward and eliminating the director of federal government affairs role.”3
Pl.’s Ex. 3 (Ruggiero Tr.) at 194; see Pl.’s Opp’n at 41; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 26. Ruggiero explained that
Wixted was confused about whether the elimination “need[ed] to be addressed through the
exceptions process.” Pl.’s Ex. 3 (Ruggiero Tr.) at 194. Ruggiero clarified to Wixted that the
exceptions process did not come into play because this was a headcount-neutral change. Id. In
his deposition, Ruggiero denied that this conversation reflected an “opening to not eliminate Ms.
Grant’s role.” Id.Nor has Grant shown that these events in December or February—even if they did take
place—are material. She offers no reason to focus on the last version of the reorganization plan
rather than earlier versions that similarly involved the elimination of her position, and she makes
no contention that Ruggiero ever deviated from his initial decision to terminate her. Moreover,
she has not offered evidence that contradicts CSL’s well-supported assertion that Ruggiero decided
to eliminate her position in mid-2020, several months before the protected activity in October. See
Def.’s Mem. at 15; Def.’s Ex. B (Grant Tr.) at 30 (confirming that she does not have “any basis to
dispute that Mr. Ruggiero first put forth a plan back in April of 2020” to eliminate both her and
Collins’s positions); Def.’s Ex. C (Wixted Corp. Tr.) at 101–03, 124 (stating that CSL “made the
decision to eliminate [Grant’s] position in . . . June of 2020”); Def.’s Ex. G (Org. Charts).
Finally, Grant has abandoned any argument that the controlling point in time for the
causation analysis is March 15, 2021, when Grant was notified of her termination, and that a jury
3
Grant disputes CSL’s statement that “Ruggiero received approval to move forward with the
global restructuring of the GHPEA organization” around February 2021. Def.’s SOMF ¶ 26; Pl.’s
Resp. ¶ 26. She therefore does not appear to rely on that fact or argue that the date of ultimate
approval by CSL is what matters for the causal analysis.
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could find a causal connection based on that termination date. In response to CSL’s charge that
Grant has no evidence of a causal link beyond the “more than five month time gap” between her
October 2020 conversation and March 2021 termination, Grant argues only that she “was
terminated 2-4 months after the decision-maker in her termination became aware of [her]
complaint,” in either December 2020 or February 2021. Def.’s Mem. at 15; Pl.’s Opp’n at 42
(emphasis added). She does not contend that the relevant action occurred in March 2021 or that
additional facts could sufficiently support the finding of a causal connection here over a five-month
gap. Compare Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 69–70 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding
allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss where a “five-month time lag” existed), with
Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (concluding that an interval of two and a
half months, without more, did not support an inference of retaliatory motive). Because Grant
argues (without adequate record support) that Ruggiero decided to terminate her in December 2020
or February 2021, and fails to refute CSL’s argument that his decision actually occurred months
before her protected activity, she has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court grants CSL’s motion for summary judgment in part as to
Grant’s retaliation claim (Count III), and denies its motion as to her discrimination claims (Counts
I and II). An order will issue contemporaneously with this opinion.
DATE: March 31, 2023
CARL J. NICHOLS
United States District Judge
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