Briggs v. Midfirst ( 2023 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    )
    BRYAN BRIGGS, et al.,                     )
    )
    )
    Petitioner,                  )
    )
    v.                                  )      Miscellaneous Action 23-mc-0027 (TSC)
    )
    MIDFIRST, et al.,                         )
    )
    )
    Respondents.                 )
    )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Pro se Petitioner Brett Jones, also known as “Eeon,” filed this miscellaneous
    action purportedly on behalf of Bryan “Briggs, et al, and Eeon et al,” against two named
    Respondents and “Doe’s 1-20, et al.” See Pet. to Enforce at 3–4, ECF No. 1. For the
    reasons set forth below, the court will dismiss this action sua sponte without prejudice.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    The nature of Jones’s claims is unclear, and much of his filings are illegible. His
    Civil Cover Sheet names as Defendants “MIDFIRST, et al,” “Doe’s 1-20, et al,” and
    THE FEDERAL RESERVE, et al.” See ECF No. 1-1. His Petition to Enforce appears
    to assert that this action involves, among other things, a loan “agreement between the
    parties” and “the depositing of [a] ‘collateral security’ with the local Federal Reserve
    agent for the advancements of Federal Reserve notes to reimburse the Federal Reserve
    for the extension of bank credits.” Pet. to Enforce at 4–5. The relief Jones seeks
    includes court-ordered “compliance with the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act,” a
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    declaration of “the conversion of a promissory note to a negotiable instrument as valid
    and enforceable,” and “penalties on the Federal Reserve.” Id. at 18.
    Jones did not provide the court with an address for the Petitioners or
    Respondents, but contends that “[t]his Court holds jurisdiction over the matter due to
    the requirement for the Federal Reserve to operate under the Federal Reserve Act and
    the agreement between the parties being created within the jurisdiction of this court.”
    Id. at 17. Jones also asserts that because “the local Federal Reserve agent is a member
    bank registered as a State bank and operating under license with the Secretary of State”
    it has thus “waiv[ed] any rights respecting jurisdiction within the limits and and
    confines of the State.” Id.
    II.     ANALYSIS
    A district court “may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without notice
    where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not possibly prevail based on the facts alleged
    in the complaint.” Jafari v. United States, 
    83 F. Supp. 3d 277
    , 279 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 
    621 F. App'x 676
     (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 
    703 F.3d 122
    , 127 (D.C. Cir.
    2012)) (internal quotations and brackets removed). “The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant’s
    complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell
    v. Tisch, 
    656 F. Supp. 237
    , 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Redwood v. Council of the District of
    Columbia, 
    679 F.2d 931
    , 933 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520–21 (1972)).
    But this standard “does not constitute a license for a plaintiff filing pro se to ignore the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not
    want to assert.” Jarrell, 
    656 F. Supp. at 239
     (citations omitted).
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    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that complaints contain, among other
    things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other words, Rule 8(a) requires that the plaintiff “give the defendant fair
    notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555–56 (2007) (holding that the complaint must contain enough “factual matter” to
    suggest liability) (citation and alterations omitted). A plaintiff must assert enough facts to give
    the defendant “fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the [defendant] the
    opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the
    doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Brown v. Califano, 
    75 F.R.D. 497
    , 498 (D.D.C. 1977)
    (citation omitted).
    Jones’ petition does not meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. His factual allegations are
    unclear—as is the legal theory ostensibly providing the basis for the petition. Thus, he has not
    given the Respondents “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 555
    .
    Moreover, it appears that this case may have been improperly filed as a
    miscellaneous case. Miscellaneous cases include “(a) actions to perpetuate testimony as in
    Rule 27, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) actions to enforce administrative subpoenas and
    summonses; (c) proceedings ancillary to an action pending in another district; (d) supplementary
    proceedings brought in aid of execution; (e) motions for return of property in criminal
    proceedings; and (f) requests for judicial assistance.” Matter of Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec.
    Surveillance Applications & Ords., 
    300 F. Supp. 3d 61
    , 69, n.4 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Local Civil
    Rules (“LCvR”) 40.3(a)(1) n.1, 57.10(a)(1) n.3). Further, miscellaneous cases may “relate[] to a
    bankruptcy case or proceeding,” 
    id.
     (citing LCvR 403.3(c)(2)(iii)), may include a “motion or
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    application filed in connection with a grand jury subpoena or other matter occurring before a
    grand jury,” 
    id.
     (citing LCrR 6.1), and may include “[a]ny news organization or other interested
    person, other than a party or a subpoenaed witness, who seeks relief relating to any aspect of the
    proceedings in a criminal case.” 
    Id.
     (citing LCrR 57.6). Assuming that Jones intended to
    address a loan agreement or bank transaction, a miscellaneous action is not the proper judicial
    vehicle to resolve this dispute.
    Finally, while Jones may appear pro se, he is not authorized to seek relief on
    behalf of other litigants. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1654
     (“[P]arties may plead and conduct their own
    cases personally or by counsel.”); Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 
    729 F.2d 831
    , 834 (D.C. Cir.
    1984) (rejecting pro se party’s attempt to represent other parties).
    III.    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, this court will dismiss this action sua sponte
    without prejudice.
    Date: April 6, 2023
    Tanya S. Chutkan
    TANYA S. CHUTKAN
    United States District Judge
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