McKeown v. DOJ ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANASTASIA MCKEOWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00666 (UNA)
)
DOJ, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No.
1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The court will grant
the IFP application, dismiss the case for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The complaint is not a model of clarity. Plaintiff, a resident of Vienna, Virginia, sues the
Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the World Health Organization, Novant
Presbyterian Hospital, and Novant Health. Preliminarily, the Local Rules of this Court state that
“[t]hose filing pro se in forma pauperis must provide in the caption the name and full residence
address or official address of each defendant,” LCvR 5.1(c), which plaintiff has failed to do.
Plaintiff alleges that local North Carolina “police refused to investigate or even record
complaints that led to [plaintiff] be[ing] sexually assaulted & poisoned, & [her] cat injured and
killed.” She goes on to allege that, at various locations in North Carolina, unspecified wrongdoers
tampered with her real and personal property, placed toxic chemicals in her vehicle, stalked her,
harassed her, injured her, and hacked into her phone. She demands to be “reimbursed for all
expenses incurred from constant stalking,” and asks that his court enjoin the wrongdoers from
surveilling and retaliating against her. Even if plaintiff’s intended claims could be understood, she
fails to invoke any legal authority whatsoever, and also fails to explain how her claims are
connected to the named defendants, or what the named defendants or her intended claims have to
do with one another.
Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.
Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction
[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d
661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of
the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and
determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498
(D.D.C. 1977). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not
comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163,
169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The instant complaint falls
squarely within this category.
Furthermore, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is
set forth generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is
available only when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. “For jurisdiction to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may not be
a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007)
(citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978)). A party seeking
relief in the district court must at least plead facts that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff has failed to establish diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because she has
failed to specify the residence, let alone the citizenship, of some of the named defendants, and it
is a “well-established rule” that the diverse citizenship requirement be “assessed at the time the
suit is filed[,]” Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). Therefore,
“the citizenship of every party to the action must be distinctly alleged [in the complaint] and cannot
be established presumptively or by mere inference[.]” Meng v. Schwartz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55
(D.D.C. 2004). Similarly, plaintiff has not pled an amount in controversy, much less the threshold
amount, and the amount in controversy must also be determined at the time an action is
commenced. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Plaintiff has also failed entirely to state a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which
“must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly[,]” Johnson v. Robinson, 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir. 1990)). To the extent that she
challenges the alleged failure of some or all of the named defendants to initiate criminal
proceedings, plaintiff has no recourse in this court because it has no authority to compel the
government to prosecute a criminal case. See Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476,
1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Cox v. Sec'y of Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30
(D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases). The decision of whether or not to prosecute, and for what offense,
rests solely with the government. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
“[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973);
see also Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d
234, 234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988); Sibley v.
Obama, 866 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D.D.C. 2012). Nor may plaintiff compel a criminal investigation
by any law enforcement agency by filing a complaint with this court. See Otero v. U.S. Attorney
General, 832 F.2d 141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th
Cir. 1982). “[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). And notably, plaintiff takes issue with the actions of local enforcement–
–though fails to name them in this case––not any of the named federal law enforcement agencies.
For all of these reasons, plaintiff has failed to comply with Federal Rule 8(a) or to establish
subject matter jurisdiction. As a result, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order
accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Date: April 19, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge