Maloy v. Internal Revenue Service ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NATHANIEL MALOY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00535 (UNA)
v. )
)
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No.
1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The court will grant the in
forma pauperis application and dismiss the case without prejudice for the reasons stated herein.
Plaintiff, a resident of Pahrump, Nevada, sues the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), and
asserts federal question jurisdiction, however, his complaint is far from a model of clarity. He
cites to the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730, and alleges that the IRS is not “allowing
[him] to close the case even though [he] frauded the bank account . . . leaving [him] to deal with
this however they see fit.” He demands somewhere between $150,000 and $200,000, because “the
above mentioned . . . bank account associated with this case is fraudulent and [he has] closed it,”
but the IRS is allegedly “not allowing [him] to close [the] case”
First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v.
Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v.
CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive
fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate
defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D.
497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does
not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d
163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The instant complaint
falls into this category.
Second, plaintiff has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available when a “federal question” is
presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
“For jurisdiction to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, there must be complete diversity between the
parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”
Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978)). A party seeking relief in the district court must at least
plead facts that bring the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Plaintiff attempts to raise a federal question under the FCA, “an anti-fraud statute that
prohibits the knowing submission of false or fraudulent claims to the federal government.” United
States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003). The FCA
authorizes a private individual, as a relator, “to bring [a qui tam] action in the Government’s name,
and to recover a portion of the proceeds of the action, subject to the requirements of the statute.”
U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); 31
U.S.C. § 3730. In federal courts such as this one, a plaintiff “may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 1654, but when the United States is “the real party
in interest,” Cobb v. California, No. 15-cv-176, 2015 WL 512896, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2015), a
“pro se plaintiff may not file a qui tam action[,]” Jones v. Jindal, 409 Fed. App’x. 356, *1 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Gunn v. Credit Suisse Grp. AG, 610 Fed. App’x 155, 157 (3d
Cir. 2015) (noting that “every circuit that has [addressed the issue] is in agreement that a pro se
litigant may not pursue a qui tam action on behalf of the Government.”) (citing cases); U.S. ex rel.
Szymczak v. Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc., 207 Fed. App’x 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] qui
tam relator—even one with a personal bone to pick with the defendant—sues on behalf of the
government and not himself. He therefore must comply with the general rule prohibiting
nonlawyers from representing other litigants.”).
It is well established that “pro se parties may not pursue [qui tam] actions on behalf of the
United States.” Walker v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting
U.S. ex rel. Fisher v. Network Software Assocs., 377 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196–97 (D.D.C. 2005)); see
Canen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 118 F. Supp. 3d 164, 170 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that “courts in
this jurisdiction consistently have held that pro se plaintiffs . . . are not adequately able to represent
the interests of the United States”) (citing cases). Therefore, even if his claims could be
understood, plaintiff has neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to pursue them without
counsel.
Furthermore, plaintiff does not attempt to invoke diversity jurisdiction, but even if he did,
he would be unsuccessful. Assuming arguendo there was a cognizable claim against the IRS, its
presence in this District is irrelevant because federal agencies are not considered “citizens of a
state.” Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 999
F.2d 581, 584–85 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Finally, federal district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United
States Court of Federal Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner
wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws[.]
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). However, the Tucker and Little Tucker Acts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491,
1346(a)(2), set limits on the circumstances in which the United States may be sued for monetary
relief. The United States Court of Federal Claims generally has exclusive jurisdiction over claims,
such as here, “not sounding in tort” and brought “against the United States for ‘liquidated or
unliquidated damages’” exceeding $10,000. Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 189 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491); see Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army, Bd. for Correction of Military
Records, 56 F.3d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A] claim is subject to the Tucker Act and its
jurisdictional consequences if, in whole or in part, it explicitly or ‘in essence’ seeks more than
$10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government.”) (citations omitted). Here, plaintiff
demands more than $10,000, therefore, even he has stated a claim, the United States Court of
Federal Claims would have jurisdiction over it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).
For all of these reasons, the court grants plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, ECF No. 2, and dismisses the complaint without prejudice, ECF No. 1. An order
accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Date: April 14, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge