United States v. Taylor ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Criminal Action No. 18-198 (JEB)
JAMES THOMAS TAYLOR, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
While many people have had their plans and living situations upended by the COVID-19
pandemic, few have suffered as much as those jail inmates whose pretrial detention has extended
month after month. This case, unfortunately, provides a prime example. Although Defendants
James Taylor, Darin Moore, Gabriel Brown, and John Sweeney were originally scheduled to be
tried for first-degree murder and kidnapping on April 20, 2020, the pandemic forced this judicial
district to postpone all approaching jury trials. The Chief Judge repeatedly extended the
moratorium in the ensuing months, such that no trials have occurred since March 2020, and none
may commence until — barring further extension — January 2021. Protesting this delay, Taylor
moves to dismiss the indictment for violations of his rights under both the Speedy Trial Act and
the Sixth Amendment. While sympathetic to Defendant’s plight, the Court finds that neither
right has been infringed. It will, accordingly, deny the Motion.
I. Background
“The timeline for a criminal prosecution is controlled by both the strict tabulation of days
under the Speedy Trial Act and the broad, flexible standards under the Sixth Amendment Speedy
Trial Clause.” United States v. Homaune, 898 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (D.D.C. 2012). To place the
background of this case in context, a brief description of only the Speedy Trial Act framework is
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necessary. The Court then separately details this district’s response to the pandemic and the
procedural history of this case.
A. Legal Background
The Act provides that the trial of a defendant who enters a plea of not guilty shall
commence within 70 days of indictment or initial appearance, whichever occurs later, and
entitles the defendant to dismissal of the charges in the event such deadline is not met. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161(c)(1), 3162(a)(2). Certain periods of time, however, may be excluded from that
70-day clock. Id. § 3161(h). As relevant here, a court may exclude time under the Act if it finds
“that the ends of justice served by [a continuance] outweigh the best interest of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Those findings must be set forth “in the record
of the case, either orally or in writing.” Id. In determining whether to grant a continuance, the
court must consider a series of non-exclusive factors, including:
• “[w]hether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely
to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of
justice”;
• “[w]hether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the
nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial
itself within the time limits established by this section”; and
• “[w]hether the failure to grant such a continuance . . . would deny counsel for the
defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for
effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.”
Id. § 3161(h)(7)(B).
B. Pandemic Responses
On March 11, 2020, the District of Columbia declared a state of emergency in response
to the novel coronavirus, which causes the disease COVID-19. See Gov’t of the Dist. of
Columbia, Declaration of Public Emergency: Coronavirus (COVID-19) (Mar. 11, 2020),
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https://bit.ly/2Vz4gJT. President Trump followed suit two days later. See Proclamation No.
9994, Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020). The ensuing months saw the virus take its toll
on nearly all walks of life. To date, COVID-19 is reported to have killed over 290,000 people in
the United States and infected millions more. See Johns Hopkins Univ. & Med., Coronavirus
Resource Center, https://bit.ly/31Y81fB (last visited Dec. 10, 2020). To stem its spread, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has recommended that the public avoid large social
gatherings and indoor spaces to the extent possible, and practice physical distancing (at least six
feet apart) from other individuals. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Things to Know
about the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://bit.ly/37z0rdE (last updated Dec. 4, 2020) (CDC
Guidance).
The judicial system, unsurprisingly, has not escaped the pandemic’s reach. In this
district, Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell has issued a series of orders governing District Court
operations during the pandemic. The first such order came on March 16, 2020, and rested upon
the following factual findings:
(a) the state of emergency declared by the Mayor of the District of
Columbia on March 11, 2020 and the national emergency declared
by the President of the United States on March 13, 2020;
(b) confirmation, as of [March 16], that over 100 people in the
District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia have tested positive for
coronavirus; (b) [sic] guidance from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and other public health authorities that
limiting personal contacts and public gatherings are necessary to
reduce the possibility of exposure to the virus and to slow the
community spread of the disease; (c) guidance from the CDC that
large events and mass gatherings can contribute to the spread of
COVID-19 and that events and mass gatherings involving 50 or
more people should be postponed for at least eight weeks;
(d) guidance from the CDC that certain categories of persons are at
higher risk of becoming seriously ill from COVID-19, including
older adults and those with chronic medical conditions such as heart
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disease, diabetes and lung disease, and that such persons should stay
at home as much as possible; (e) the closing of all area school
districts for at least two weeks, which impinges on the availability
of courthouse staff, jurors and counsel; and (f) other restrictions
placed on public gatherings by the Mayor of the District of
Columbia and other local jurisdictions, reflecting the seriousness of
the need to combat the community spread of the virus[.]
Standing Order 20-9 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2020) at 1–2 (citations omitted). In light of those
circumstances, Chief Judge Howell ordered that all criminal and civil jury selections and trials
scheduled to commence before May 11, 2020, be postponed. Id. at 2. The Standing Order
further stated that the time period from March 17 through May 11, 2020, was excluded under the
Speedy Trial Act for all criminal trials because “the ends of justice served by these continuances
to protect public health and safety and the fair trial rights of the defendant outweigh the best
interests of the public and any defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” Id. at 2 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(7)(A)). It likewise noted that judges presiding over individual criminal cases “may
make additional findings and exclude additional time, as necessary and appropriate.” Id. at 2–3.
As the COVID-19 public-health crisis exploded in the ensuing months, Chief Judge
Howell — in consultation with her colleagues as well as with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the
D.C. Federal Public Defender, and other defense counsel — announced additional
postponements of jury trials and exclusions of time under the Speedy Trial Act. See Standing
Order 20-19 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2020) at 2–3 (postponing trials until June 11, 2020); Standing Order
20-29 (D.D.C. May 26, 2020) at 3–4 (postponing trials until August 1, 2020); Standing Order 20-
62 (D.D.C. July 9, 2020) at 2–3 (postponing trials until September 8, 2020); Standing Order 20-
68 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2020) at 2–3 (postponing trials until November 9, 2020); Standing Order
20-89 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2020) at 3–5 (postponing almost all trials until January 11, 2021). In so
doing, the Standing Orders both reaffirmed prior findings and referenced additional justifications
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for continuances, including rising regional rates of COVID-19 cases, stay-at-home orders,
limitations on gatherings of more than ten people, and concerns regarding in-court proceedings
communicated by the USAO-DC and FPD. See, e.g., Standing Order 20-19 at 1; Standing Order
20-29 at 2; Standing Order 20-89 at 2–3 & n.4.
Although the November 6 Standing Order allowed for the resumption of a “limited
number” of single-defendant trials of short duration with few and primarily local witnesses, see
Standing Order 20-89 at 4, Chief Judge Howell subsequently suspended that narrow exception
before any qualifying trials could begin in light of the most recent spike in local positive cases
and new citywide restrictions. See Standing Order 20-91 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 2020) at 1–2. At
present, therefore, all jury selections and trials are on hold until at least January 11, 2021. Id. at
2. The District Court has not been sitting on its hands in the interim; on the contrary, it has taken
“significant steps” since March in preparation for the return of jury trials, including by
reconfiguring courtrooms, installing plexiglass partitions, hiring experts, conducting airflow
studies, and consulting with other courts around the country about how to safely hold trials. See
Standing Order 20-89 at 3; see also U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, Continuity of
Operations Plan during the COVID-19 Pandemic (Nov. 17, 2020) at App. 8,
https://bit.ly/3oiHoLi (describing plan for resuming jury trials). There is no certainty, it is worth
noting, that the January 11 resumption date will stick; Chief Judge Howell may well extend that
once again given the virus’s continued spread in this area.
C. Procedural History
The Court now turns from general pandemic concerns to the specific facts of this case.
The Government alleges that on June 19–20, 2018, Defendants kidnapped Andre Carlos
Simmons, Jr., held him for ransom, and then killed him. See ECF No. 41 (Superseding
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Indictment) at 2–6. As relevant here, law enforcement arrested Taylor on August 20, 2018, at
which point he registered his initial appearance. See 8/20/18 Min. Entry. He eventually pled not
guilty to the Government’s superseding indictment on March 11, 2019, which charges him,
Moore, Brown, and Sweeney with First-Degree Murder While Armed, Kidnapping Resulting in
Death, and Conspiracy to Commit Kidnapping, among other crimes. See 3/11/19 Min. Entry;
Superseding Indictment at 1–6. Since his arrest, Taylor has been held without bond pending
trial. See ECF No. 24 (Taylor Detention Mem.); 8/20/18 Min. Entry.
On numerous occasions in the early stages of this litigation, the Court excluded specified
periods from Defendants’ speedy-trial clock in order to provide the parties sufficient time to
prepare for a particularly complex trial. See 9/6/18 Min. Order; 10/22/18 Min. Order; 11/13/18
Min. Entry; 1/24/19 Min. Entry; 2/25/19 Min. Entry; 3/11/19 Min. Entry; 4/23/19 Min. Entry;
7/24/19 Min. Entry. No small part of this delay concerned whether the Government would seek
the death penalty against any Defendant, which it ultimately declined to pursue. See ECF No.
58. The Court eventually set a trial date of April 20, 2020, see 7/24/19 Min. Order, and ruled on
a number of pretrial motions at a hearing on February 19, 2020. See 2/19/20 Min. Order. On
March 16, 2020, however, in light of the pandemic, the Court granted the parties’ joint request to
continue the trial and rescheduled it for September 21, 2020. See 3/16/20 Min. Entry. In so
doing, the Court excluded the period from March 16 through September 21 under the Speedy
Trial Act’s ends-of-justice provision. Id.; 3/16/20 Tr., 11:6–13 (recording findings); see also
7/20/20 Min. Entry (recording similar exclusion).
On August 17, 2020, the Court once again postponed the trial, this time to March 8, 2021.
See 8/17/20 Min. Entry. During a hearing, the Government explained that pandemic conditions
posed serious logistical challenges to an earlier trial date, given the complexity of the case, its
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expected length, and the large number of Defendants, lawyers, and out-of-state witnesses. See
ECF No. 169 (8/17/20 Tr.), 4:23–6:20. While Taylor stated his desire to preserve any argument
relating to speedy-trial violations that resulted from pandemic-related delays, he referred to
similar obstacles and acknowledged that there was no “realistic possibility of trying this case in
November.” Id., 7:23–8:11, 11:3–8, 11:24–12:2, 14:5–6. The Court then issued (admittedly less
than eloquent) findings under the Speedy Trial Act, excluding the period from August 17, 2020,
through March 8, 2021:
I do find that it is in the interest of justice to exclude time under the
Speedy Trial Act between today and March 8th, that the Chief
Judge’s Standing Order covers through November 9. It may be
extended. I also believe the logistics in this case, particularly in
addition to the Chief Judge’s Order, merit exclusion of time, and
have merited the exclusion of time from the original April date until
November, given the difficulties of trying such a case for all of the
reasons that the government and defense counsel have mentioned. I
find that it is in the interest of justice, it’s a very complex case, it’s
16 jurors, to select jurors, jurors who can serve who are not going to
be home with children who are not in school. I understand the
government’s witnesses are coming from out of the jurisdiction that
will impose a quarantine, that other difficulties, in meeting with
witnesses, preparing for trial. Again, logistics of being in court with
eight, six defense counsel, four defendants, being able communicate
at counsel table, in addition to making sure that we have jurors who
can serve and are spread out and don’t require a mistrial or long
delays because of contagion. I believe with all the reasons and those
stated by all counsel of record, that it is in the interest of justice to
exclude the time from today to March 8.
Id., 19:15–20:13; see also 8/17/20 Min. Entry.
Since that August 17, 2020, hearing, Defendants have filed a series of additional pretrial
motions, see ECF Nos. 148, 149, 158, including Taylor’s instant Motion to Dismiss on account
of asserted speedy-trial violations. See ECF No. 159-1 (Def. Mem.). The Government having
opposed, see ECF No. 162 (Gov’t Opp.), the Court is now ready to rule.
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II. Analysis
The Court will first address Taylor’s argument that the Government violated his rights
under the Speedy Trial Act and then move to his claim that the pretrial delay also runs afoul of
the Sixth Amendment.
A. Speedy Trial Act
As previously explained, although the Speedy Trial Act entitles a defendant to trial within
70 days of indictment or initial appearance, certain periods of time may be excluded from that
clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h). A defendant bears the burden of identifying the specific
time periods that he claims should not have been excluded. United States v. Rice, 746 F.3d
1074, 1077–78 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Here, Taylor challenges only the time that this Court excluded
on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Def. Mem. at 19–23 (confining discussion to
Standing Orders and Court’s exclusion of time “from March 2020 until March 8, 2021”); 8/17/20
Tr., 11:24–12:2 (Taylor’s counsel referencing “argument that the delays that had been attributed
to COVID were not properly excluded,” and noting, “That’s the only piece of the speedy trial
right that we’re trying to preserve here.”). The parties, however, never acknowledge that at least
some of the time after March 2020 may also be excludable on account of “delay resulting from
any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on [it].”
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). For instance, Defendant Moore filed a pair of pretrial motions on
September 21, 2020, and Taylor filed his own on October 30 — none of which the Court has yet
scheduled for hearing. See ECF Nos. 148, 149, 158.
At any rate, and the motions notwithstanding, the Government does not dispute that at
least 70 days have elapsed since March 2020, the only bases of exclusion for which are this
Court’s findings “that the ends of justice served by [a continuance] outweigh the best interest of
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the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In order to pass
muster under the Speedy Trial Act, those determinations “must indicate that [the court]
‘seriously weigh[ed] the benefits of granting the continuance against the strong public and
private interests served by speedy trials.’” Rice, 746 F.3d at 1078 (second alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). The findings that follow,
as supplemented by Chief Judge Howell’s Standing Orders and this Court’s prior
pronouncements, amply justify excluding the period between March 16, 2020, and March 8,
2021.
No jury trials have occurred in this judicial district since March 2020, nor will any
commence through at least early next year. This moratorium — as mandated by the Chief
Judge’s various Standing Orders — is motivated by a host of critical public-health
considerations. To name but a few: the District of Columbia remains in a state of emergency, as
has been the case since March. See Gov’t of the Dist. of Columbia, Extensions of Public
Emergency and Public Health Emergency and Additional Measures in Phase Two of
Washington, DC Reopening (Oct. 7, 2020), https://bit.ly/2JWPhHi. The CDC has consistently
recommended that people avoid public indoor spaces as much as possible and limit personal
contacts, see CDC Guidance, and the Mayor has restricted the allowable size of most indoor
gatherings to ten persons. See Gov’t of the Dist. of Columbia, Modified Requirements to
Combat Escalation of COVID-19 Pandemic During Phase Two (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3gkTNvg. As detailed in the Chief Judge’s most recent Standing Order, mid-
November witnessed an 89% increase in the seven-day average of new COVID-19 cases in the
District of Columbia. See Standing Order 20-91 at 1; see also Standing Order 20-9 at 1;
Standing Order 20-62 at 1; Standing Order 20-68 at 1 (similarly citing case increases). That
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average daily case rate has continued to climb in recent days, far surpassing the previous high-
water mark from early May. See Gov’t of the Dist. of Columbia, Reopening Metrics,
https://bit.ly/2VLBO7Y (last visited Dec. 10, 2020). As the region moves into the winter
months, all signs point to this figure — along with accompanying hospitalizations and deaths —
getting worse, not better.
Under such conditions, if the Court hypothetically held a criminal trial in violation of the
Chief Judge’s Standing Orders, such trial would jeopardize the health and safety of participants,
courthouse staff, and the surrounding community alike. While that risk, when mitigated by
safety precautions undertaken by the Court in conjunction with public-health experts, might
eventually be tolerable for certain trials of limited length and minimal complexity, the present
case does not fall into that category. On the contrary, this trial is precisely the type in which
delay is particularly warranted. It involves four co-defendants and six defense attorneys, and the
Government’s case-in-chief is expected to last roughly four to six weeks. See Gov’t Opp. at 13;
8/17/20 Tr., 20:6–8. The prosecution will feature an array of witnesses, including at least five
expected to travel to the District from out of state — specifically, from Arizona, California,
Ohio, Texas, and Puerto Rico. See Gov’t Opp. at 13; 8/17/20 Tr., 20:3–6. The Court also plans
to empanel at least sixteen jurors, given the possibility that some may need to withdraw over the
course of a lengthy trial for unforeseen personal circumstances, pandemic-related or otherwise.
In addition, with four Defendants, more Deputy United States Marshals will be needed; their
presence, along with other court staff, will ensure no shortage of bodies in the courtroom.
This confluence of circumstances — an unusually large number of trial participants
moving around in a confined indoor space, over an extended period of time, with numerous
witnesses arriving from across the country, as the pandemic shows little sign of abating, at least
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in the next few months — generates a heightened potential for exposure to and transmission of
the coronavirus. Cf. ECF No. 147-1 (Notice) at 2 (Brown’s counsel noting “concern” that trial
participants will contract virus). Failure to grant a continuance, accordingly, would likely render
completion of the trial “impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(i). That is so despite the numerous steps this judicial district has undertaken in
an effort to make trials possible in present conditions.
Courts across the country have reached the same conclusion, determining that the ends of
justice served by postponing trials outweigh the interest of the public and defendant in a speedy
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, No. 19-1991, 2020 WL 6707834, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov.
16, 2020); United States v. Aguerre, No. 19-75, 2020 WL 6487776, at *4 (D. Utah Nov. 4,
2020); United States v. Reese, No. 19-149, 2020 WL 5097041, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Aug. 28,
2020); United States v. Kane, No. 20-5054, 2020 WL 6434792, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. June 9,
2020); United States v. Smith, 460 F. Supp. 3d 981, 988 (E.D. Cal. 2020). There, as here,
continuances were not caused by “judicial backlog or neglect,” but rather were “necessitated by
the extraordinary circumstances caused by the pandemic” and the “need for [courts] to safely
plan the recommencement of criminal jury trials.” United States v. Foley, No. 18-333, 2020 WL
6198949, at *9 (D. Conn. Oct. 22, 2020).
Taylor mounts two primary arguments in response. First, he contends that the Chief
Judge’s Standing Orders are insufficient by themselves to toll his speedy-trial clock. But that
effort goes nowhere, for it misapprehends the relevance of the Standing Orders to the present
case. Even if those Orders did not themselves operate to exclude time, they clearly inform this
Court’s own ends-of-justice exclusions by offering critical underlying facts — namely, that
public-health conditions have necessitated the suspension of trials in this judicial district,
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notwithstanding every effort to hold them. See United States v. Santacruz-Cortes, No. 20-8566,
2020 WL 3884509, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2020) (determining that Chief Judge’s General Order
could not by itself exclude time, but noting it could inform individual district court’s exclusion);
Kane, 2020 WL 6434792, at *4–5 (similar). In other words, this Court’s own findings — as
expressed in the record of this case and the present Opinion, though necessarily informed by the
Chief Judge’s Standing Orders — support the pandemic-related continuances and exclusions it
ordered on March 16 and August 17, 2020, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
In addition, Defendant argues that this Court’s Orders excluding time are “ineffective”
because they do not “state[] the Court’s reasoning,” and because “there is no evidence that in
entering them, the Court ‘seriously weigh[ed]’ the benefits of the postponement against Mr.
Taylor’s strong interest in a speedy trial.” Def. Mem. at 23 (second alteration in original).
While the Court’s previously cited explanation in August 2020 may have been detailed, its prior
discussion in March was admittedly less so. It is well established, however, that the Court need
not “state[] [its] reasoning” at the time it grants a continuance, id., but may instead “put [its]
findings on record at the time [it] rule[s] on a [Speedy Trial Act] motion to dismiss.” Bryant,
523 F.3d at 361 (citing Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 507 (2006)); see also, e.g., United
States v. Richardson, 681 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Wasson, 679 F.3d 938,
946 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Ferguson, 565 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2008); United
States v. Reed, 253 F. Supp. 3d 52, 56 n.2 (D.D.C. 2017). The factual findings discussed herein
easily justify the continuances and exclusions the Court has granted since March.
The Court, moreover, has “seriously weighed” Taylor’s interests. Rice, 746 F.3d at 1079.
For instance, its continuances were spurred in part by Defendants’ repeated emphasis on the
challenges of preparing for trial — especially one of this length and complexity — in a
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pandemic. In addition to seeking delays to better prepare a defense and file pretrial motions, see
ECF Nos. 148, 149, 158, counsel have cited severe impediments to communicating with their
detained clients and conducting witness preparation during the pandemic. See 7/20/20 Tr., 20:1–
3 (Taylor’s counsel expressing concerns regarding witness preparation and stating, “[W]e can’t
even prep our own client, Mr. Taylor, with regard to testimony, should he end up deciding to
testify. I can’t meet with him and we certainly can’t do this over the phone.”); id., 7:22–8:4
(Moore’s counsel noting “serious concerns” regarding inability to meet with client and prepare
for trial); id., 11:15–19, 12:1–5 (similar for Brown’s counsel); Notice at 1 (Brown’s counsel
emphasizing pandemic-related impediments to client’s ability to “assist in his own defense” and
“counsel’s ability to provide an adequate defense”). Many of their concerns understandably
relate to problems at the D.C. Department of Corrections, which has had to drastically curtail
visits and inmate movement given the virus’s spread in its facilities. See Dist. of Columbia
Dep’t of Corrs., Coronavirus Prevention, https://bit.ly/36YJ3Qh (last visited Dec. 8, 2020);
Notice at 1.
Had trial proceeded as previously scheduled, therefore, it is likely that Taylor, even
exercising “due diligence,” would have been denied “reasonable time necessary for effective
preparation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Indeed, this is presumably one reason why defense
counsel agreed to a March 2021 trial date. The D.C. Circuit has emphasized similar defense
interests when affirming ends-of-justice exclusions under the Speedy Trial Act. See Rice, 746
F.3d at 1079 (upholding sufficiency of district court’s findings including that defense would not
“be in a position to adequately provide the quality of representation the defendants are entitled
to” absent delay); United States v. Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d 193, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(upholding district court’s order based on “complexity of the case, the nature of the prosecution,
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and that it would be unreasonable to expect adequate preparation . . . within the time limits
established under the Act”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In both cases, as
here, the court’s “conclusion that a continuance would give the defendant more time to . . .
prepare for trial demonstrated that [it] seriously weighed the defendant’s interest.” United States
v. Bikundi, 926 F.3d 761, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Moving forward now could similarly impair other defense rights. Defendants have
suggested, for instance, that any pandemic jury may not represent a fair cross-section of the
community, given the potential for diminished representation from various sub-groups, including
those vulnerable to or living with others vulnerable to severe complications from COVID-19, as
well as caregivers whose children are not in school. See Notice at 1; 7/20/20 Tr., 7:16–18. Both
this Court and defense counsel, moreover, have registered concerns surrounding potential
impediments to free and fluid communication between lawyers and their clients during trial
itself. See 8/17/20 Tr., 20:7–8; 7/20/20 Tr., 7:19–21. These critical defense interests further
weigh against rushing to trial in the midst of a global pandemic.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that Taylor has spent over two years in pretrial
detention and may well have preferred to go to trial many months ago. It likewise does not
discount the public interest in prompt assessment and resolution of criminal charges. In the end,
however, the realities of the present pandemic ensure that the ends of justice served by a
continuance decidedly outweigh the interests of Taylor and the public in a speedy trial. See 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The period between March 16, 2020, and March 8, 2021, is thus
properly excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.
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B. Sixth Amendment
“The absence of a Speedy Trial Act violation does not ipso facto defeat a Sixth
Amendment speedy trial claim.” Rice, 746 F.3d at 1081. Numerous courts, however, have
noted that “it will be an ‘unusual case’ in which the Act is followed but the Constitution
violated.” Id. (citations omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1497 (9th
Cir. 1995) (suggesting that because “the Speedy Trial Act affords greater protection to a
defendant’s right to a speedy trial than is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, . . . a trial which
complies with the Act raises a strong presumption of compliance with the Constitution”). It
should come as no surprise, then, that the pretrial delay in this case is fully consistent with the
Sixth Amendment.
The Speedy Trial Clause guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” This “amorphous, slippery, and necessarily relative”
constitutional right “is consistent with delays and dependent upon circumstances.” Vermont v.
Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89 (2009) (cleaned up) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522
(1972)). Instead of imposing a specific timeline governing all trials, the Supreme Court has
applied a balancing test that weighs four factors: 1) “[t]he length of the delay”; 2) “the reason for
the delay”; 3) “the defendant’s assertion of his right”; and 4) “prejudice to the defendant.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–32. None of these factors is “either a necessary or sufficient condition
to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Id. at 533. Rather, they “must be
considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant” as part of a “sensitive
balancing process.” Id.The first Barker factor — whether the “delay before trial was uncommonly long” — “is
actually a double enquiry.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). First, to trigger
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the speedy-trial analysis, a defendant must allege an abnormally long delay “since, by definition,
he cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact,
prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” Id. at 651–52. Courts call this trigger a
“presumptively prejudicial” delay and generally deem it satisfied if the delay exceeds one year.
See Bikundi, 926 F.3d at 779; Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d at 203; see also Betterman v.
Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016) (explaining that speedy-trial right attaches upon arrest or
indictment). The second half of the inquiry considers, “as one factor among several, the extent
to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of
the claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. How much delay is tolerable is “dependent upon the
peculiar circumstances of the case.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31.
Here, the delay is “presumptively prejudicial” because over two-and-a-half years will
have elapsed between Taylor’s arrest and the current anticipated trial date. While such delay
triggers the Barker analysis, however, it remains shorter than others the D.C. Circuit has upheld
against challenge. See United States v. Tchibassa, 452 F.3d 918, 924, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(delay of nearly eleven years); Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d at 202–03 (delay of three-and-a-
half years); see also United States v. Young, 657 F.3d 408, 414, 420 (6th Cir. 2011) (delay of
nearly eleven years). Especially given the complex nature of this four-defendant conspiracy
prosecution, the Court cannot say that the delay here is “uncommonly long.” Doggett, 505 U.S.
at 651; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (noting that “the delay that can be tolerated for an
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge”). The
Court, therefore, “proceeds with skepticism to the remaining Barker factors.” United States v.
Ford, 155 F. Supp. 3d 60, 69 (D.D.C. 2016).
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The second criterion, as discussed, looks to the reason for the delay. While a “deliberate
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the
government,” a “more neutral reason such as negligence . . . should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. A “valid reason,” on the other
hand, “should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Id. Taylor takes no issue with the period from
his arrest through March 2020, which the parties devoted to discovery and motions practice.
Instead, he argues — over 17 pages of briefing — that the pandemic-induced continuances
beginning that month are “entirely attributable to the United States, as a result of its gross
mishandling of the pandemic.” Def. Mem. at 2–19, 24–25. This position does not assail the
USAO or the prosecution, but more broadly targets the federal government as a whole,
particularly the current administration. According to Taylor, the Government “deliberately
abdicated its public health responsibilities” when confronted with the pandemic and “made
conscious decisions not to take the actions necessary to control” it. Id. at 10, 19. Those
“deliberate choices,” he maintains, amount to negligence on which the Government “may not
rely . . . to justify the delay in this case.” Id. at 25.
Though not lacking in creativity, this argument does not tip the second Barker factor in
Defendant’s favor, for the delay was ultimately “fully justified and cannot be blamed” on the
Government. Rice, 746 F.3d at 1082 (internal quotations omitted). Even assuming the
Government could have done more to curb the pandemic’s worst effects — especially in the first
half of 2020 — Taylor does not gainsay that it is an extraordinary phenomenon that has curbed
activities across the entire planet. The United States, unfortunately, is far from unique in being
compelled to forgo and postpone events both great and small to reduce risk of contagion. For all
his vehemence, Defendant never even attempts to establish that had the Government acted with
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his desired urgency, jury trials in this district would not have been suspended. Nor does he cite a
single case embracing his position or otherwise attributing pandemic-related delays to the
Government writ large. Indeed, at least one court has found precisely to the contrary. See
United States v. Briggs, No. 20-410, 2020 WL 3892979, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2020) (deeming
pandemic “a substantial and compelling reason” for delay and rejecting as “meritless” defense
argument that “the reason for the delay is the Government’s failure to adequately handle the
COVID-19 pandemic”). Because Taylor “fails to demonstrate that the [G]overnment was to
blame for the delay,” the second factor weighs against him. Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d at
203.
The third prong — which Defendant overlooks entirely — offers him minimal assistance.
Although he asserted his right to a speedy trial in the July 20 and August 17 hearings before this
Court, as well as in the present Motion, “[t]hese assertions . . . must be viewed in the light of
[his] other conduct.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986). Here, Taylor’s
invocation of his speedy-trial right carries less weight because he did not object to the Court’s
pandemic-related continuances. See United States v. King, 483 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 314). Specifically, his counsel consented to the March 2020
continuance, see 3/16/20 Min. Entry, and although he stood on his speedy-trial argument during
the August 17 hearing, he acknowledged that there was no “realistic possibility of trying this
case in November [2020]” and agreed to a later trial date without protest. See 8/17/20 Tr., 8:2,
14:5–6. Defendant has also filed a pretrial motion since that latter continuance, see ECF No.
158, even requesting an extension of the time period in which he could do so. See ECF No. 153.
Finally, while Taylor has no doubt suffered some degree of personal prejudice from his
pretrial detention, that harm does not push the fourth factor into his column. Barker enumerates
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three kinds of prejudice: 1) “oppressive pretrial incarceration”; 2) “anxiety and concern of the
accused”; and 3) “the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” 407 U.S. at 532. Although
Defendant focuses entirely on the first type, the Court will begin with the third, which carries the
most weight because “the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system.” Id. Taylor, critically, never suggests that the delay in this case has
impaired his defense in any manner whatsoever. As the Government points out, he offers no hint
of, for example, loss of records, death of witnesses, or other barriers to trial preparation. See
Gov’t Opp. at 19. That conspicuous absence is significant. See Bikundi, 926 F.3d at 780
(finding fourth factor favored government where defendant “offer[ed] no explanation of how the
delay impaired her defense”); United States v. Taplet, 776 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(rejecting speedy-trial claim where defendant “failed to offer a concrete explanation on how the
delays prejudiced his defense”); Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d at 203 (similar).
Arguing that the fourth Barker factor goes his way nonetheless, Defendant briefly reaches
back to the first factor, claiming that he need not affirmatively show prejudice because it is
“presumed.” Def. Mem. at 25. That tack, however, “confuses the ‘presumptive prejudice’
necessary to trigger the speedy-trial inquiry with the prejudice prong of the Barker test.”
Homaune, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 170. Indeed, the Supreme Court has warned against this very
mistake: “[A]s the term is used in this threshold context, ‘presumptive prejudice’ . . . simply
marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker
enquiry.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1. It is clear, moreover, that any such presumptive
prejudice “cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim.” Id. at 656. Because the other Barker
criteria do not work to Taylor’s advantage, and because he cannot demonstrate “specific
prejudice to his defense,” id., his fleeting invocation of “presumptive prejudice does not tip the
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scales in his favor.” Tchibassa, 452 F.3d at 927; see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 (explaining
that if government pursues defendant “with reasonable diligence,” speedy-trial claim will
generally fail “however great the delay, so long as [defendant] [can]not show specific prejudice
to his defense”).
With that avenue foreclosed, Taylor primarily relies on generalized prejudice arising
from the length of his pretrial incarceration, which has now spanned well over two years. See
Def. Mem. at 25. He references enhanced dangers stemming from detention during the COVID-
19 pandemic, and he cites the potential for additional delay if trial is ultimately postponed yet
again. Id. at 25–26. “[P]retrial delay,” however, “is often both inevitable and wholly
justifiable.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. Without more, Taylor’s confinement, while
understandably unpleasant, does not establish prejudice sufficient to support his Sixth
Amendment claim. See Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 761 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
pretrial detention, coupled with delay exceeding one year, does not “permit[] an automatic
inference of enough prejudice to balance [fourth] factor in a [defendant’s] favor without proof of
sub-standard conditions or other oppressive factors beyond those that necessarily attend
imprisonment”); Rice, 746 F.3d at 1082.
As it has on previous occasions, the Court fully acknowledges the hardship inflicted by
Defendant’s pretrial detention. It discounts neither the length of that incarceration nor Taylor’s
understandable desire for finality. No one whose innocence is presumed should be forced to
remain in jail any longer than absolutely necessary. The Court likewise remains committed, in
coordination with this judicial district, to ensuring he receives his day in court as soon as trial can
be held in a manner sufficient to ensure the health and safety of all participants. At the end of
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the day, however, it cannot find that the pretrial delay in this case violates the Speedy Trial
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: December 10, 2020
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