United States v. Cooper ( 2023 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    v.                                             Criminal Action No. 1:15-cr-00152 (CJN)
    ANTONIO COOPER,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before the Court is Antonio Cooper’s pro se motion challenging the federal detainer lodged
    against him as a result of his sentence in this case, which the Court construes as a petition for a
    writ of habeas corpus. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 353. For the reasons explained below, the Court
    denies that request.
    Background
    In 2016, Cooper pleaded guilty to three federal offenses: Conspiracy to Commit Theft of
    Government Funds and to Defraud the United States, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
     (Count 1);
    Theft of Public Money and Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to be Done, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 641
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (Count 4); and Aggravated Identity Theft and Aiding and
    Abetting and Causing an Act to be Done, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and (c)(1) and
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (Count 13). In 2018, Cooper was sentenced by Judge Collyer to 30 months’
    imprisonment on Count 1; 60 months’ imprisonment on Count 4; and 24 months’ imprisonment
    on Count 13. See Am. J. at 3, ECF No. 317. Cooper’s sentences on Counts 1 and 4 were imposed
    concurrently with each other and with sentences issued in two Maryland cases that totaled 15
    1
    years’ imprisonment.1 
    Id.
     But the 24-month imprisonment sentence on Count 13 was imposed
    consecutively to the sentences on the other federal counts and the state sentences. 
    Id.
     And a federal
    detainer was issued arising out of the sentences imposed by Judge Collyer.
    Cooper is currently incarcerated in a Maryland prison on those Maryland sentences. In his
    motion, styled as a “Motion to Uplift Detainer & Body Writ,” Cooper contends that he has
    completed his federal sentences and that he should therefore be released from the federal detainer.
    Def.’s Mot. at 1. The Government responds that Cooper is “still serving his Maryland sentences”
    and that, upon his completion of those sentences, the Bureau of Prisons “will retroactively credit
    [Cooper] for the 60-month federal sentence he served concurrently with his Maryland sentences.”
    Gov’t Opp’n at 3, ECF No. 354.
    Although Cooper refers only to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
     as statutory authority underlying his
    motion, that statute governs the initial imposition of a sentence and does not apply here. The Court
    instead construes Cooper’s motion as a petition for habeas relief under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    (notwithstanding his statement in his pro se reply that he is not “filing a habius [sic] Corpus”).
    Def.’s Reply at 3, ECF No. 355; see Dufur v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
    34 F.4th 1090
    , 1096 (D.C. Cir.
    2022) (describing “the longstanding practice of construing as a habeas petition a motion that a pro
    se federal prisoner has labeled differently” (quotations omitted)); United States v. Forrest, 
    316 F. Supp. 3d 111
    , 115 (D.D.C. 2018).
    1
    In case CT140292X, Cooper was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for firearm possession
    with a felony conviction, to run concurrently with his total 15-year sentence of imprisonment in
    case CT131759X for possession of cocaine and heroin. Cooper was arrested for these offenses in
    2013 and sentenced in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in 2015.
    2
    Legal Standards
    Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    , a prisoner “claiming to be ‘in custody in violation of the
    Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States’ may seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal
    district court.”   Day v. Trump, 
    860 F.3d 686
    , 689 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    (c)(3)).     District courts may grant writs of habeas corpus “within their respective
    jurisdictions.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    (a).
    In the habeas context, the Court may entertain a petition that challenges the prisoner’s
    “present physical confinement” if the respondent is the prisoner’s “immediate custodian,” that is,
    “the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 
    542 U.S. 426
    ,
    435 (2004); Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
    374 F.3d 1235
    , 1238–39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “[C]ore
    habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement” generally must also be filed in “the
    district of confinement,” because, “[b]y definition, the immediate custodian and the prisoner reside
    in the same district.” Padilla, 
    542 U.S. at
    443–47. These “habeas-specific procedural rules” do
    not concern the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and are therefore waivable. Dufur, 34 F.4th at
    1096–97 (noting that “a district court, sua sponte, may properly decline to enforce either
    requirement” if a habeas respondent fails to raise them).
    Moreover, if a prisoner challenges “something other than his present physical
    confinement,” these procedural rules do not apply. Padilla, 
    542 U.S. at
    437–38; see Day, 
    860 F.3d at
    690–91. The proper respondent in a dispute about the validity of a detainer lodged against a
    prisoner is “not the prisoner’s immediate physical custodian” but instead the “entity or person who
    exercises legal control” over that detainer. Padilla, 
    542 U.S. at 438
    . A court would have
    jurisdiction to grant habeas relief where that custodian resides or is located. See Stokes, 
    374 F.3d at 1239
    .
    3
    Analysis
    Whether Cooper is in fact disputing the validity of the federal detainer or the effect of the
    detainer on his current incarceration in Maryland need not be addressed here. Though those types
    of challenges would appear to warrant different treatment under the procedural rules described
    above, the Government has only objected to this Court’s jurisdiction to assess “the calculation of
    [Cooper’s] Maryland sentence” and has forfeited any broader defense under those rules. Gov’t
    Opp’n at 3; see Dufur, 34 F.4th at 1096–97; see also Forrest, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 117–18
    (distinguishing between a prisoner’s challenge to “the effect of the . . . detainer on [the prisoner’s]
    current detention” and an attack on “the validity of the detainer”). In any event, it is apparent that
    Cooper challenges the validity of the federal detainer at least in part.
    However, Cooper’s claim about the invalidity of the federal detainer fails on the merits.
    Cooper is incorrect that his federal sentence has ended. Because he is still serving the 15-year
    term of imprisonment for his Maryland convictions, Cooper has not yet started the 24-month term
    of imprisonment imposed consecutively on Count 13 in this case, which is one reason the federal
    detainer was issued. Cooper has identified no valid basis to justify the removal of his federal
    detainer.
    To be sure, Cooper has identified certain ways in which that detainer affects his ability to
    participate in programs while in Maryland custody, apparently because of Maryland rules
    regarding eligibility for those programs. See Def.’s Reply at 2. The Court cannot decide whether
    those rules are being correctly applied to Cooper, but he can certainly represent that the Court has
    no objection to his participation in those programs notwithstanding the federal detainer.
    4
    Conclusion
    For these reasons, Cooper’s petition is denied. An order will issue contemporaneously
    with this opinion.
    DATE: April 21, 2023
    CARL J. NICHOLS
    United States District Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Criminal No. 2015-0152

Judges: Judge Carl J. Nichols

Filed Date: 4/21/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/21/2023